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Abstract 
International trade connects environmental problems in a given location to consumption patterns 
elsewhere. Relatively few of these connections, however, have prompted 'downstream' actors -
located at the consumption end of supply chains - to respond to the upstream environmental 
problems in which they are implicated. Contemporary tropical deforestation, a problem 
substantially driven by production of beef palm oil, timber and soya, provides a prominent 
exception. In the last two decades, downstream actors - primarily Western companies and 
governments, often in conjunction with NGOs - have enacted an array of policy, regulatory and 
institutional responses that target international supply chains for these four commodities Yet 
significant uncertainty lingers over the contribution these responses can make to slowing tropical 
deforestation. 
Drawing on intensive analysis of current responses and more than twenty interviews and 
correspondences with practitioners and experts, this study gathers together this array of supply 
chain responses to interrogate their potential contribution to slowing deforestation. It asks what 
limitations exist on this contribution, both conceptually [deriving from responses' nature) and 
empirically (deriving from responses' behaviour) and finds that current responses face significant 
limitations in both categories. Some of these limitations are inescapable, given the structural 
features of the underlying problem, but interestingly, others emerge instead from the parameters 
for responding set by downstream actors. In effect, some limitations are chosen by actors through 
their framing of the problem of deforestation in such a way that protects, inter alia, consumption 
patterns and continuing globalisation. Additional limitations derive from the behaviour of actors, 
whether through counter-productive competition within the dynamics of private sector and civil 
society or deference to some of the sensitivities confronting governments 
In the course of its broad analysis of this newly coherent field, this study also recognises the 
importance of balancing these limitations with an exploration of the pathways and theories of 
change through which current responses might be able to overcome them. Multiple of these 
pathways and theories of change offer promise, though they are nonetheless subject to limitations 
of their own. Responses may yet be capable of spear-heading deforestation's slowing, even if by 
themselves their direct effects prove minimal. In short, there is no silver bullet, but greater traction 
on deforestation is possible by recognising the implications of alternative, deeper framings of that 
problem, as well as cultivating both an awareness of and willingness to act in ways that go beyond 
actors' rational interests as narrowly-defined. 
X I P a g e 
Against a backdrop of continuing globalisation, this study clarifies the limitations of downstream 
actors' current responses to a major environmental problem, /li international trade acts 
increasingly to connect these actors to upstream problems, an understanding of these limitations is 
a platform on which future policy, regulatory and institutional responses can draw. 
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Introduction 
Some environmental problems, such as habitat fragmentation and nutrient pollution, can be 
clearly confined within jurisdictional boundaries, while others, such as climate change, have an 
equally clear disregard for such human divisions. There is, however, a murky and contested 
middle ground between these two poles. Occupying this niche is a set of environmental 
problems that, even when incurred in specific locations, are nonetheless connected to actors in 
distant jurisdictions. International trade is one mechanism connecting actors with such 
problems, and the one to which this study pertains. 
International trade's capacity to connect consumption in one location to environmental 
problems in another has long been qualitatively recognised. In recent years, advances in 
comput ing power and the availability of fine-grained trade data have enabled a new body of 
research to emerge, which with great precision has begun to quantitatively connect individual 
supply chains to specific environmental problems. Actors' connections to these 'middle ground' 
environmental problems are therefore being actively delineated. Yet such knowledge has 
elicited responses from downstream actors to only comparatively few of these problems. 
Tropical deforestation 
Contemporary deforestation, which occurs overwhelmingly in the tropics, has been both 
qualitatively and quantitatively linked to internationally-traded commodities. Specifically, the 
harvesting and production of palm oil, beef, soya and t imber are major drivers of tropical 
deforestation, and these relationships are at their clearest in the locations - within Indonesia 
and Brazil, specifically - where deforestation continues to be most rapid. In stark contrast to 
other environmental problems, however, downstream actors have been both active and 
innovative in seeking to address their connection to contemporary deforestation. As a result, 
current responses to deforestation - which include, for example, sustainability schemes and 
illegal logging laws - provide a compell ing case study for exploring both how downstream 
actors have approached their connection to an upstream environmental problem, and the 
consequences of this approach. This study focuses exclusively on responses that operate on 
international supply chains through which the four commodit ies of palm oil, beef, soya and 
t imber travel. 
The innovation of downstream companies, governments and NGOs has made the last two 
decades an 'age of experimentation' in responding to tropical deforestation. However, while the 
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term 'experimentation' captures both the extent of activity and innovation, it also connotes a 
significant uncertainty over the potential contribution that these responses can make to slowing 
deforestation. 
Regrettably, the 'ultimate' question to be asked of these supply-chain responses - 'Do they 
work?' - presently defies answer. This stems from multiple constraints, including the novelty of 
many responses - both their new forms and their recentness - and difficulties in attributing any 
changes observed within forests to any particular response. (There are also observation 
difficulties that can make changes to forest cover slow to detect, which technologies such as 
satellites and drones have partly begun to remedy.) But while only the passage of time might 
allow for more familiarity with responses and the changes occurring in forests, the attribution 
challenge is compounded by our currently lagging understanding of even how responses might 
work, both individually and collectively. Thus the scope of the unknown remains significant, 
with a number of puzzle pieces still to be put in place before the ultimate question about 
responses can be directly approached. 
This study's guiding questions 
This study cannot directly approach the question of whether responses work, although it 
nonetheless intends to yield insights that are constructive towards that end. Instead, given the 
difficulties in determining the contribution that responses can make to slowing deforestation, 
this study asks the reverse: 
'What might limit - or otherwise determine - the contribution that the current set of 
responses from downstream actors can make to slowing tropical deforestation?'. 
Rather than focusing on responses' potential to contribute, then, this study is aimed first and 
foremost at the limitations on that contribution. Of course, responses' potential and limitations 
are intimately linked, yet in avoiding attribution and other challenges the latter provides a more 
robust platform for scrutiny. In addition, the delineation of these limitations may serve as a 
tonic for the often-lofty aspirations and rhetoric that have come to surround responses, where 
the absence of an answer to 'whether they work' can lead to outsized claims of what they are 
hoped to achieve. Illuminating the bounds on these claims will nonetheless serve a constructive 
purpose, since in circumscribing what responses cannot do, actors - and whole societies - can 
better understand what they could or would need to do to fulfil these responses' objective of 
slowing deforestation, which at the time of writing continues apace. 
This study separates the primary research question above into two sub-questions, focused 
respectively on what, firstly, the conceptual nature of responses (ie. their design), and secondly, 
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their empir ica l behaviour , can i l luminate about the l imi tat ions and determinants of their 
aggregate contr ibut ion . These sub-questions create two fruitful channels of enqu i ry towards 
answer ing the study's p r imary research quest ion. In br ing ing to l ight different aspects of 
responses' l imitat ions, they are intended as componen t parts that can sum towards the whole. 
As the fo l lowing d iagram makes clear, however , the final chapter of this study ties the 
contr ibut ions of preceding chapters together, weaves in both conceptual and empir ical 
l imi ta t ions as well as d r aw ing out the fmal e lement ("or otherwise determine") of the pr imary 
research quest ion . 
Figure 1.1 Chapter-by-chapter contributions to the study's research questions 
Research questions 
& Methodology introduced 
Sub-quest ion 1-a 
(conceptual) 
Sub-quest ion 1-b 
(empiric^al) 
Both sub-questions 
( S equal to primary question) 
'Chapters shown in diagram: 1. Introduces tropical deforestation and presents responses; 2. Introduces 
research justification, questions and methodology; 3. Synthesises relevant literatures; 4. Explores 
conceptual limitations of responses (Sub-question 1-a]; 5. and 6. Explore empirical limitations (Sub-
question 1-b); 7. Ties together conceptual and empirical limitations and explores pathways to circumvent 
them (Primary research question). Nb. Introduction and Conclusion not shown. 
In answer ing these questions, this study f inds that current responses face signif icant l imi tat ions 
in the potent ia l contr ibut ion they can directly make to s lowing tropical deforestation. In 
accordance wi th the two channels of enquiry, these l imi tat ions are both conceptual (der iv ing 
f rom responses' nature) and empir ica l (der iv ing from responses' behaviour) . Some of these 
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l imitations are inescapable, given the extra-jurisdictional nature of the underlying problem, for 
example. Other limitations emerge instead from the parameters for responding set by 
downstream actors, which generally preclude challenging future increases in consumption or 
the continued expansion of international trade. However, the study also identifies a number of 
pathways through which current responses might indirectly achieve greater traction on this 
problem than the aforementioned limitations would suggest. Responses may yet be capable of 
spear-heading deforestation's slowing, even if by themselves their direct effects prove minimal . 
Approaching the study's questions 
To address its guiding question, this study first gathers together a relevant set of responses 
from downstream actors which meet two key characteristics: a shared objective of slowing 
tropical deforestation and the shared mechanism of, and focus on, the international supply 
chains that facilitate trade and consumption of the handful of commodit ies most strongly 
implicated. The second of these characteristics is particularly important in excluding some 
notable though dramatically different downstream response forms, including financial-based 
instruments such as aid programs and the institution-forming efforts of the Reduction in 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation program (REDD+). Although these efforts 
also intend to positively affect deforestation they nonetheless seek to achieve it through 
conceptually and practically distinct mechanisms. This second characteristic also allows 
downstream supply-chain responses to be isolated from domestic efforts within tropical 
forested countries, which have the ability to approach deforestation as a jurisdictionally-
bounded, domestic problem. Domestic environmental problems and their remedies already 
benefit from a comparatively greater understanding and more extensive literatures. However, 
the subject matter of this study - downstream responses to an upstream problem - does not 
have the luxury of approaching deforestation within such familiar parameters; indeed, many of 
them owe their creation to a deep dissatisfaction with the willingness and ability of tropical 
forest countries to tackle deforestation through domestic means. 
The study forges an intellectual space for conceptualising and analysing these responses to 
deforestation. It does this by weaving a synthesis of academic literatures, from which emerges 
the metaphor of a 'governance gap' for the environmental impacts precipitated by international 
trade. Responses are construed as trying to bridge this gap and effectively govern the capacity 
of trade to precipitate environmental impacts. The synthesis realises the crucial importance of 
inter-jurisdictional distance in influencing, if not determining, the parameters of actor 
behaviour in relation to this environmental problem. It also notes a crucial disagreement on 
what responses' subject of governance should be, a feature that several literatures - as well as 
later empirical chapters - reveal to be consequential. 
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Recall that this study's guiding concern is to identify l imitations that diminish the potential 
contr ibut ion of current responses. Broadly speaking there are two approaches that inform this 
quest: a conceptual examination of the nature of responses (what they are designed to achieve, 
and what l imitations exist), and an empirical exploration of their behaviour (whether, in all 
their variety, responses are complementary or mutual ly inhibitive). This study does both, 
sequentially. 
Its conceptual examination (Chapter 4) builds on the synthesis of literatures to show that 
responses are designed according to one particular framing, among many possible others, of the 
problem of tropical deforestation. Clearly, to the extent that this framing does not map 
accurately or completely onto the underlying problem, a limitation emerges on the traction 
responses can hold on deforestation. Another inescapable limitation derives from the fact that, 
among the downstream actors that have implemented responses, none has sufficient 'coverage' 
to directly effect changes to the total production of any of the deforestation commodities. 
Indeed, even all 'active' actors taken together comprise only fractions - sometimes meagre - of 
total demand for these commodities. 
One of the advantages of this study, having gathered responses together into a distinct set, is its 
ability to scrutinise them collectively. Unlike most existing literature, then, this study can go 
beyond analysing individual responses, or individual response-types, to explore how responses 
operate in concert to pursue their shared objective. Phrased as a dichotomy, two broad 
possibilities are apparent: either responses complement each other, or they undermine each 
other. From a conceptual perspective this study finds that determining whether or not 
responses complement or undermine each other depends in turn on the effect of diversity 
across responses. This diversity could strengthen their potential as a set, or conversely it could 
confuse and deflate that potential. In other words, the mere existence of other responses -
including those with differing attributions of responsibility, different reference points in legality 
or sustainability, and additional objectives - has a conceptually indeterminate effect on 
responses' potential as a collective. Some of these questions are revisited and furnished with 
participants' perspectives in the empirical chapters that follow this conceptual examination. 
Empirical material 
Given both the novelty of these responses and the politicised contexts in which they are 
deployed, any understanding of responses' potential contribution also needs to explore and 
account for their behaviour. The final three chapters of this study (Chapters 5, 6 and 7} are 
devoted to that task, and also mark the introduction of the study's empirical material. This 
material consists most prominent ly of intensive analysis of the perspectives of practitioners 
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engaged with, and experts on, the responses canvassed by this study. These perspectives were 
aired in more than twenty interviews and correspondences that took place over an eighteen-
month period between November 2012 and March 2014. These perspectives are supported by 
further material from two events that 1 attended: the Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil annual 
meeting in Singapore in October/November 2012, as well as a meeting of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation working group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade, held in Medan in 
|une, 2013. Given the nature of the subject matter, a considerable and often-illuminating grey 
literature is also drawn upon. 
The empirical chapters that make use of this material begin with one each for responses from 
the private [business and civil society] and public (government] sector actors. This distinction is 
made in recognition of the different parameters that structure the behaviour and responses of 
these two downstream actor groups. Companies have an obvious focus in their own supply 
chains but face a range of choices in how they relate to existing schemes. They are also advised 
and heavily scrutinised by NGOs. The consequences of company responses, for responses and 
the behaviour of other actors, becomes a primary theme of Chapter 5. Governments, in 
comparison, have a broader range of potential responses they can enact, including their unique 
capacity to regulate other domestic actors. Yet downstream government responses [and non-
responses] reveal a web of perceived constraints and sensitivities shaping public sector 
positions and actions, which form the primary theme of Chapter 6. 
While these two chapters each have a distinct - and almost mutually exclusive - focus, they both 
introduce empirical material that further develops themes raised by the study's conceptual 
examination. These chapters demonstrate, for example, that all actors have tended to explicitly 
frame tropical deforestation as a responsibility primarily of the private sector, with government 
casting itself in a supporting role. These chapters also bear out both sides of the dichotomy on 
interactions between responses, showcasing instances where Interactions are complementary 
and mutually supportive and others where they are competitive and mutually inhibitive. 
A final empirical chapter returns to the conceptually 'hard' limitation of fractional coverage, 
applying an empirical lens - through participants' perspectives - to identify pathways for 
overcoming this limit. Actors place substantial hope that these pathways not only exist but 
might prove decisive. This final chapter - Chapter 7 - allows a distinction to emerge between 
the direct effects of responses, which are inescapably constrained by coverage, and their 
indirect effects, which are not. The indirect influence of responses is worthy of this examination 
precisely because it has the potential to balance out many of the other limitations identified by 
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this study. Understanding the potential of this influence is therefore critical for making any final 
determinat ion on responses' l imitations in contributing to a slowing of tropical deforestation. 
This study's subject matter - downstream policy, regulatory and institutional responses to 
tropical deforestation - has a broader relevance than just that one environmental problem. 
Continuing processes of globalisation are forging further, deeper and more invisible 
connections between consumption and notionally-distant environmental problems, raising 
questions of what responsibility downstream actors have, how they can best respond, as well as 
what might be expected of those responses. Tropical deforestation, a major environmental 
problem that has generated unrivalled attention and activity from downstream actors, offers a 
un ique case study to interrogate the limitations of a relatively 'mature' set of responses. 
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Chapter 1 Tropical deforestation and responses from beyond the tropics 
This opening chapter introduces the phenomenon of tropical deforestation, detailing its 
magnitude, pace and regional variation, as well as multiple reasons why its continuation might be 
considered problematic. The chapter then presents two building blocks that define both the 
direction and the scope of the ensuing study. The first building block is the understanding that has 
recently emerged that commercial agriculture is a major, if not primary, driver of contemporary 
tropical deforestation. Because a portion of this agricultural production is subsequently traded 
internationally, 'downstream' actors in consumer countries are connected to deforestation 
through their trade and consumption of relevant agricultural commodities. The second building 
block is a distinct set of policy, regulatory and institutional responses that have emerged from 
these downstream actors based on their connection to deforestation. These responses - their 
form, intent and prospects, and what they reveal - provide the subject matter of this study. While 
the present chapter merely introduces them, the following chapter will locate them as one 
especially prominent case of the environmental impacts of trade. 
Tropical deforestation as a plienomenon 
The term 'tropical deforestation' conjures up images of chainsaws felling giant trees and 
bulldozers tearing through pristine rainforest, leaving exotic animals such as orang-utans clinging 
to isolated trees. Yet how stylised is this depiction? What is actually happening in tropical forests, 
and how comprehensive is the science behind it? The following sections detail the current state of 
knowledge on the phenomenon of tropical deforestation, seeking to clarify - respectively - what, 
where and how fast it is happening, why it is considered important, and what is causing it. 
1. What, where and how fast is deforestation happening? 
Michael Williams is a historian of humanity's long and global experience of forest clearing. In an 
article updating his landmark book. Deforesting the Earth, written at the turn of this century, 
Williams writes that land clearing 'is not a modern phenomenon, as is commonly supposed, but is 
as old as human occupation of the earth' (2008:346). Contemporary deforestation, then, is 'merely 
the latest manifestation (albeit at an accelerating rate) of an ever upward rising curve that began 
with the emergence of humans on Earth' (ibid.). 
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In showing deforestation as a constant of human history, Wil l iams is not arguing that it does not 
matter, nor that it is undeserving of the attention it currently receives. Indeed, in addit ion to the 
'accelerating rate' that Wil l iams notes, there are at least two other notable differences between 
historic and contemporary deforestation that have only drawn further attention to the process. 
The first is the geographical concentration of a vast majority of contemporary deforestation 
with in the planet's tropical zones. The second, which is accorded a later section in this chapter, is 
the historically-novel constellation of factors causing, or driving, contemporary processes of 
deforestation. 
Before delving into the data on the geographical concentration of deforestation, a cautionary note 
is warranted. It seems self-evident that a process as prominent in the minds of global 
policymakers, members of the private and civil sectors, and indeed much of the public, should be 
relatively well understood. To the deep chagrin of many, however, the state of regional and global 
evidence bases on the process is both limited and flawed. For the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, for example, only two data sets existed: the Global Forest Resources Assessments (FRAs) 
conducted every five years by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the global 
assessment of a single expert, Norman Myers, in 1980 (Williams, 2008). Thankfully, the 2000s 
saw the implementat ion of satellite-based monitor ing systems of the world's forests. Some data 
sets were also able to be compiled retrospectively from satellite images, generating data 
beginning in the 1980s to complement the efforts of the FRAs and Myers' expert assessment. And 
some forests, such as certain parts of the Brazilian Amazon, are now subject to continuous, 
real-time data collection, aiding not just monitor ing but also law enforcement to the extent that 
three fifths of Brazil's reduction in deforestation has been attributed to this monitor ing (Assunfao 
et al., 2014). Even with these new sources, however, many data sets for the world's tropical 
forests remain inconsistent, confusing and patchy. 
As the longest-standing and most comprehensive data set on global forests, the FRA could be 
expected to be a valuable guide to deforestation's trends and patterns. Several limitations of that 
data set, however, undermine its utility (Hansen et al., 2010). These flaws include: 
• the data's self-reported nature (at country level), 
• the national-level scope (often obscuring different rates within countries that cross multiple 
climatic zones), 
• the fact that countries' definitions have changed through time, undermin ing the robustness of 
any t ime series data, and 
• the fact that 'forest' is weakly-defined (as anything over 10 percent forest cover, inclusive of 
plantations) (Hansen etal., 2010; DeFries et al., 2002; Grainger, 2008; Will iams, 2008). 
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Modern satellite technology, turned to the monitoring of forests, has enabled an enhanced -
though by no means flawless (Asner et al., 2 0 0 9 } - means of corroborating other data sources. 
These advances have shed light on the changes occurring within not just humid tropical forests 
(the rainforests of most of our imaginations], but also dry tropical forests such as the cerrado in 
Brazil and Argentina, the extensive boreal forests circling the entire northern hemisphere through 
the United States, Canada and Russia, and the temperate forests found in the mid-latitudes of both 
hemispheres. This global picture of forests helps to situate tropical forests, and tropical 
deforestation, within a broader context. 
At the time of writing, the most comprehensive satellite-based study on global forests showed that 
between the years 2 0 0 0 and 2005 , 3.1 percent of forests were cleared worldwide (Hansen et al., 
2010) . Of the four biomes, boreal forests experienced the highest clearing rates in both absolute 
area cleared ( 3 5 1 0 0 0 sq km) and percentage of the biome cleared (4.0 percent}(ibid.}. Humid 
tropical forests had the second highest area cleared (272 0 0 0 sq km) but a lower than average 
percentage of total biome area cleared (2.4 percent), primarily due to the significant expanses of 
tropical forest still remaining. Tropical forests are the largest of all biomes, with 11 5 6 4 0 0 0 sq km 
remaining in the year 2 0 0 0 (ibid.). 
These data show that deforestation is not confined to the tropics. So why then does tropical 
deforestation 'trigger such a reaction of concern' (Williams, 2 0 0 8 : 3 5 8 ) ? The authors of the 
aforementioned global forest loss study (Hansen et al., 2 0 1 0 ) give some preliminary indications: 
humid tropical forests are the most significant forest biome for carbon and biodiversity, firstly, 
and tropical deforestation (across humid, but also dry forests) is also being driven by different, 
more obviously human, causes than deforestation in other biomes. For example, sixty percent of 
the boreal deforestation referred to above was caused by wildfire, with much of the remainder 
caused by beetle-infestation and disease (Hansen et al., 2010 ) . The following two sections will 
elaborate on each of these differences between tropical and other deforestation. But first, it is 
imperative to provide some further understanding of the magnitude, pace and location of tropical 
deforestation. 
Consistent with the study by Hansen et al. (2010) , an earlier study by Asner et al. ( 2 0 0 9 ) of the 
same time period 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 5 had concluded that a roughly similar amount of tropical forests 
(275 0 0 0 sq km) had been cleared. These authors began with a different total area for tropical 
forests, which is reflected in their conclusion that only 1.4 percent of the biome was deforested 
(against Hansen et al.'s 2.4 percent). These different baselines (estimates of total tropical forest 
area) underscore both the limitations of current data on deforestation and the importance of 
forest definitions. The consistency found between the two estimates of area cleared, however, is 
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highly encouraging from a data perspective. Overall these two studies suggest that, on average, 
55 000 sq km of humid tropical forests were cleared each year between 2000 and 2005. However, 
these data cannot be safely extrapolated out beyond this time period, as they relate to a period 
when deforestation in Brazil alone reached its staggering peak of 27 772 sq km in 2004 (INPE, 
2014). 
For previous decades, only relatively patchy data are available, and results are not necessarily 
directly comparable to those from the early 2000s (nor able to be aggregated by region). But it is 
still worth emphasising that, for the 1980s and 1990s, for example, different data sources tell 
remarkably different stories. 
DeFries et al. (2002) combined mult iple remote-sensing (i.e. satellite) data sources to find that 
tropical deforestation rates in the 1990s had increased by 10.3 percent over those in the 1980s. 
This conclusion jarred with the self-reported country data compiled in the FAO's data set, which 
had reported a 10.9 percent decrease in the latter decade (ibid.). The primary reason such 
differing results were found, according to DeFries et al., is that countries reported inflated 
deforestation rates in the 1980s, which served to mask continued (indeed, accelerating) rates for 
the following decade (ibid.). 
This pattern repeated itself the following decade, where the FAO (2010) followed up its own prior 
analysis based on self-reported country data, this time including some data derived from satellite 
monitoring, to find that its 2005 FRA had over-estimated the forest area cleared in the 1990s, 
masking an increase in the rate in 2000-2005 (FAO, 2011a). Each of these corrections lends 
weight to the need to recognise shortcomings in tropical forests data, for which a helpful 
touchstone is Grainger's analysis, published under the title 'Difficulties in tracking the long-term 
global trend in tropical forest area' (2008). 
Whi le acknowledging the existence of these difficulties, the al ignment between Asner et al. (2009) 
and Hansen et al. (2010) provides a sound starting-point for depicting the magnitude of 
contemporary deforestation. These two papers estimate the total area of tropical forest cleared 
between 2000 and 2005 at 275 000 sq km, which if represented as a rectangle would measure 
550km X 500km. With reference to mult iple Western countries, this area equates to: 
• the size of Colorado, or two-thirds the size of California, 
• the area of the UK (double the size of England alone), 
• four times the size of the Australian state of Tasmania, more than the size of Victoria, or 
• almost precisely the size of New Zealand. 
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These compar i sons reveal the sizable tracts o f fo res ted land c leared in the historical eye-b l ink of a 
single 5 y ea r per iod. If these rates w e r e to cont inue fo r f i f teen, o r twenty - f i ve , or f i f ty years, the 
accumulated area of c leared forest starts to b e come even m o r e tangible to the imaginat ion. W i th in 
at least t w o tropical locations, long-range data are avai lable to reveal the cumulat ive e f f ec t o f 
annual fores t clearing. The wor ld ' s third largest island, Borneo, is shared by Indonesia ( the 
prov inces of Kal imantan) , Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah) and Brunei. In a recent study, Gaveau et 
al. ( 2 0 1 4 ] calculate that 30.2 percent of the island's forests (168 000 sq k m ] was c leared f r om 
1973 to 2010, w i th only a comparab le area of forest ( 210 000 sq k m ] es t imated to remain intact. 
In a remarkab ly s imi lar result, the Greater Mekong Subregion, which includes Cambodia , Thai land, 
Laos, V ie tnam and Myanmar, as we l l as t w o Chinese provinces, w a s recent ly es t imated to have 
lost just under a third of its forested area f r om 1973 to 2009 ( W W F , 2013a ] . W h i l e these total 
areas are di f f icult enough to envisage, forest c lear ing does not occur in neat rectangles, w i th the 
important consequence that c lear ing also leads to the f ragmentat ion of remain ing fores t areas, 
w i th concomitant adverse e f fects for their abil ity to se rve as w i ld l i f e habitat ( ibid. ] . 
T o c lar i fy the rapidi ty wi th which de forestat ion is current ly occurring, it can be helpful to g i v e a 
t empora l f lavour to the global est imate agreed by Hansen et al. ( 2 0 1 0 ] and Asner et al. ( 2009 ] . 
This f igure - 275 000 sq km of c leared tropical forest o v e r a 5 y ea r per iod - equates to an ave rage 
of around 150 square k i lometres (15 000 hectares ] of c leared forests per day, 6.25 square 
k i lometres (625 hectares ] per hour, or 0.1 square k i lometres (100 hectares ] per minute. These 
are astonishing f igures, suggest ive of the stagger ing and sustained human e f f o r t put t owards 
clearing tropical forests. 
These f igures are intended to p rov ide a depict ion of the global magni tude o f tropical de fores ta t ion 
as a broad trend. But any understanding of this process also needs to account fo r s igni f icant 
regional distinctions found across the three land masses of Latin Amer ica , Afr ica and Asia, which 
toge ther compr ise the tropical cl imatic zone. 
Tropica l forest are not spread even ly across the three land masses. Using data f r om 1989, Myers 
( 1 9 9 4 ] est imated tropical forest area as they then stood. Of the three regions, Latin Amer ica had 
by far the greatest forest area (4 155 500 sq km] , a lmost double that of second- largest Asia 
(2 106 000 sq k m ] and b igger than both Asia and Afr ica (wh ich has 1 522 000 sq k m ] combined . 
T o emphas ise these d i f ferences, the single country of Brazil a lone contained m o r e tropical forests 
(2 200 000 sq k m ] than the second- largest land mass of Asia. The forest areas of the largest 
tropical forest country in each reg ion (Brazi l , Indonesia and the Democrat ic Republ ic of Congo, 
r espec t i ve l y ] combine to hold m o r e than half of the near-8 mil l ion sq. km of total tropical fo res t 
c ove r found in 1989 ( ibid.] . 
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just as tropical forests are not spread even l y across these three regions, nor is de forestat ion 
occurr ing e ven l y throughout tropical forests. Instead, Hansen et al. ( 2 0 0 8 ) found that 
de fo res ta t i on was highly concentrated, w i th ' f i f ty - f ive percent of total [tropical forest ] b i ome 
c lear ing occurr ing within only 6 percent of the b i ome area ' ( p9440 ] . The authors concluded that 
this demonst ra ted 'the presence of forest c lear ing hotspots ' ( ibid.] , or what o the rw ise might be 
t e rmed ' frontiers ' . (Theoret ica l ly , at least, this concentrat ion could make both regulat ion by 
tropical country gove rnments and the responses of downs t r eam actors easier to tailor, although 
as Chapter 6 shows, international trade law can act to constrain this possibil ity for downs t r eam 
gove rnments . ] 
At a country scale, tropical fo res t clearing during the per iod ( 2000 -2005 ] occurred largely in 
Brazil (47.8 percent of the total ] , which as prev ious ly noted was engaged in a contemporary peak 
of de fo res t ing activity. A t that t ime, Indonesia was a distant second with 12.8 percent of the global 
total Hansen et al. ( 2008 ] . It is a mark of just h o w much tropical forest lies within Brazil 's terr i tory 
that its extens ive c lear ing wi th in the 2000-2005 per iod accounted for only 3.6 percent of the 
year -2000 forest area, wh i l e the comparab le percentage for Indonesia was similar (around 
3.4 percent; ibid.]. These t w o countries - Brazil and Indonesia - have come to be the most 
s igni f icant de fo res te rs since the 1980s, as the FAO's FRAs bear out. Drawing on mult iple of these 
FRAs, Rudel et al. ( 2009 :1400 ] repor t that, 'Brazil and Indonesia accounted for 20.3 percent of the 
global tropical fo res t loss dur ing the 1980s, 25.7 percent of the loss during the 1990s, and 
40.7 percent of the loss b e tween 2000 and 2005' . These f igures are perhaps compl icated by the 
inclusion of mult ip le tropical forest types ( including dry forests ] , ye t in terms of the humid 
tropical forests a lone the results are even more stark. Citing Hansen et al. (2008 ] , Rudel et al. 
( 2 0 0 9 ] note that Brazil and Indonesia 'accounted fo r 60.6 percent of the w o r l d w i d e losses of 
humid tropical fo res t b e tween 2000 and 2005 ' ( p l 4 4 0 ] . 
Since this per iod, at least one ma j o r change has occurred. Brazil 's space agency, INPE, has 
d e v e l oped a comprehens i v e satel l i te-based forest moni tor ing system to moni tor that country 's 
forests cont inuously and in real-t ime. At the t ime of wr i t ing, INPE had recorded a pro longed and 
steady decl ine in the annual de forestat ion rate wi thin the legal A m a z o n Basin f r om its most recent 
peak of 27 772 sq km ( in 2 0 0 4 ] to 4 571 sq km (in 2012 ] . In 2013, this f igure c l imbed again for the 
f irst t ime in a decade, to 5 843 sq km, be f o r e fall ing again to an est imated 4 848 sq km in 2014 
( INPE, 2014 ] . T h e remarkab le decl ine in Brazil 's de forestat ion rate underscores the extent of the 
c lear ing that was occurr ing in and around 2004. 
Outside o f Brazil, a d i f f e rent s tory is apparent . Wi th in the o ther Latin Amer ican countr ies that 
share the Amazon , de forestat ion has 'sharply increased' , wi th Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and 
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Venezuela together clearing 20 000 sq km from 2004-12 (Butler, 2013a, presenting data from 
Terra-i and 0-Eco). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, deforestation has climbed consistently over the same 
period, with the area cleared in 2012 (8 400 sq km) almost double that of the same year in Brazil 
(4 600 sq km; Margano etal, 2014). Overall, more recent estimates (eg. data from Hansen et al., 
2013-14, presented by Mongabay, 2014a) of global deforestation rates reveal an increasing trend 
line - despite Brazil's reductions - which has led over the last decade to an annual area of 
80 000 sq km cleared in 2013. The dynamics of deforestation, then, have clearly continued to 
evolve, with Indonesia now the most active clearer of its forests by area and with the cleared area 
globally increasing through the last decade. 
What can be summarised from this brief survey of tropical deforestation? Firstly, to borrow 
Williams' words, it needs to be acknowledged that given the state of the data on tropical 
deforestation, 'we are left with the knowledge that the exact magnitude, pace, and nature of one of 
the most important processes of the environmental change over large portions of Earth is largely 
unknown' (2008:356). Here it is worth emphasising Grainger's assertion that 'better techniques 
will not be enough', and hence his call for the design of 'an appropriate set of institutions... to 
sustain regular monitoring of forests or other phenomena' (2008:822). In a prelude to a theme 
that will emerge in Chapter 3 of this study, an imbalance or 'governance gap' exists between a 
given process (in this case, deforestation) and the institutions (accurate and timely forest 
monitoring) needed to adequately understand - let alone respond to - that process. Thankfully, 
more comprehensive, consistent, precise and up-to-date data sets are being developed to bolster 
humanity's knowledge of the fate of the world's tropical forests. The ability to collect and 
corroborate data by satellite has afforded greater accuracy to estimates of deforestation, 
especially in its concentrated hotspots. 
Secondly, irrespective of shortcomings in data, enough is known to identify - with only isolated 
exceptions - highly unfavourable trends for the world's tropical forests. As Asner et al. (2009) 
conclude, 'never has the impact of human enterprise in tropical forests been as profound as it is 
today' (pl387). A later section in this chapter will expand upon the further point that the drivers 
of much of this 'impact' are of an entirely different character than previous periods of 
deforestation, within and beyond the tropics. 
Thirdly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, it is important to recognise that - as Hansen et al. 
(2010) affirm - 'large regions of forest absent of large-scale forest disturbance still exist in the 
humid tropics', with 'the Amazon interior being the largest remaining intact forest landscape, 
primarily due to its inaccessibility', and 'the interior Congo Basin also lacking significant forest 
loss' (p8651). Thus there are still large swathes of tropical forest remaining, especially in Brazil, 
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although the continuation of current trends of logging and deforestation are rendering these 
forests ever more diminished, fragmented and threatened. As Asner et ai. (2009) conclude, 
wri t ing on the vast areas of tropical forest that have been logged (even if not, or not yet, cleared), 
'today most tropical forests are within human reach' (p l387) . 
2. Why are tropical forests important? 
It may seem self-evident why the clearing of tropical forests is cause for concern. Yet as this study 
will show in Chapter 4, downstream actors actually espouse multiple and varied reasons for their 
concern over forest clearing, which have in turn motivated their responses. Following a broad 
sweep of these reasons, this section will detail the science behind some of the more prominent 
ones and show that ultimately, tropical forests are significant for the confluence of values they 
embody. 
Tropical forests contain vast volumes of stored carbon, within both the trees that comprise those 
forests as well as the peatlands on which some of them are sited. The previously-cited study of the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (WWF, 2013a), for example, cites research showing total carbon 
storage of 320 mill ion tonnes of carbon within the region's landscapes. Forests also house many of 
the terrestrial world's most remarkable creatures, sometimes as the only preserve of habitat 
where these creatures can dwell. Tropical forests serve vital ecosystem functions in local, regional 
and global hydrological and atmospheric systems. They also consist of economically valuable 
t imber and yield other valuable non-timber forest products for local populations, and so on. As the 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), a donor-funded organisation dedicated to 
research on tropical forests and based in Bogor, Indonesia, concludes: 'it is almost impossible to 
exaggerate the importance of forests' (2008:3). 
Studies of tropical deforestation often bring a particular value of tropical forests to the fore. For 
instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change included the following in its most recent 
assessment, stating that '[forestry and other land use change] has accounted for about a third of 
anthropogenic C02 emissions from 1750 to 2011 and 12 percent of emissions in 2000 to 2009' 
(IPCC, 2013:18). Houghton (2012) explains that this decline in the contribution of forestry and 
land use change - from one third of all greenhouse gases to just 12 percent, or one eighth, since 
2000 - reflects a steady rise in emissions from fossil fuel use rather than a decline in deforestation. 
(As already noted, deforestation has been on an upward trajectory over the last decade.) Even 
with deforestation at record levels since the turn of this century, however, forests remain a 'net 
sink' for carbon, absorbing more through growth than is emitted through their clearance (IPCC, 
2013; FAO, 2010; Houghton, 2012). 
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CIFOR draws on multiple studies on forests to confirm their significance for global carbon 
balances: 
'Forests represent the world's most significant terrestrial carbon store, containing an 
estimated 77 percent of all carbon stored in vegetation and 39 percent of all carbon stored 
in soils; twice as much carbon as is present in the atmosphere' (CIFOR, 2012a]. 
Crucially, however, not all forests are equally valuable for carbon storage. Of all the forest biomes, 
rainforests provide the most carbon dense storage (FAO, 2011b], with the consequence that this 
type of tropical deforestation results in the release of more carbon than the clearing of other 
forests Hansen et al. (2008]. Yet even within the world's rainforests, differences exist, most 
notably with the very dense stores of carbon found in peatlands (or peat swamps], found 
primarily in Indonesia. Although peatland forests only cover about 3 percent of the Earth's land 
area, they store as much as one-third of all soil carbon (CIFOR, 2012a]. For example, on the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra, the draining of peatland was responsible for 70-77 percent of the 
palm oil industry's gross carbon emissions between 2000 and 2010, despite the fact that a 
significantly greater forest area was cleared than peatland drained (Lee et al., 2014]. 
Holding all else equal, the disproportional amount of carbon stored in peatland means that a given 
area of tropical forest cleared from atop a peat swamp in Indonesia generates much larger carbon 
emissions than the same area of tropical forest cleared anywhere else on the planet. This is the 
first intimation of a discrepancy across the world's tropical forests, which will be shown to also 
apply for other values of tropical forests. The unequal distribution of carbon within the world's 
tropical forests, in conjunction with 'hot spots' of concentrated forest clearing, lead the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, an advocacy organisation of scientists, to conclude that, 'only a dozen or so 
countries [including Brazil and Indonesia] are responsible for over 90 percent of the global 
warming pollution due to deforestation' (Boucher et al., 2011:7]. 
An often-repeated 'fact' is that deforestation generates more carbon emissions than 'the entire 
global transportation sector' (eg. UN-REDD, 2009]. Given Boucher et al.'s (2011] point that the 
vast majority of deforestation originates in only a dozen or so countries, the challenge of reducing 
global emissions has led many actors, including the UN and many of the downstream governments 
and companies included in this study, to view deforestation as a prime target for achieving those 
emissions reductions. As Chapter 6 will argue, however, there is a further convenience for 
downstream actors to the concentration of deforestation: it necessitates that changes in 
behaviour occur within other countries. And as Chapter 3 will show, current responses by 
downstream actors to deforestation ensure that 'the problem' they are responding to is isolated to 
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the direct connection between certain commodi ty and deforestation, and not the 'global 
transportat ion sector' that ferries those commodit ies to countries beyond the tropics. 
The world's tropical forests are also a tremendous store of the planet's biodiversity, harbouring 
the most species diversity of any terrestrial biome (and eclipsed only by coral reefs; NOAA, 2011). 
One possible explanation for these levels of biodiversity is that tropical rainforests 'are thought to 
be the oldest [terrestrial] b iome on earth' (RCF, 2015], Removing this habitat by clearing 
rainforests 'results in a concomitant loss in biodiversity richness' (Hansen et al., 2008:9439). 
Deforestation has consequently been identified as 'one of the most important drivers of mount ing 
species extinction rates' (Bennett and Balvanera, 2007:191]. Many of the species found in 
rainforests are familiar even to the non-specialist: southeast Asia's multiple species of orang-utan, 
as well as gibbons and proboscis monkeys, the Sumatran rhino and Sumatran tiger, forest 
elephants, tree kangaroos and birds of paradise; central Africa's forest elephants, gorillas and 
chimpanzees; the Amazon's jaguars, pumas, tapirs, capuchin monkeys, hornbills, and so on. Recent 
research suggests that some of the most 'bio-diverse' patches of rainforest on earth may be in 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru in the western Amazon; indeed, there can be more tree species (655) 
within a single hectare of this rainforest than in the continental US and Canada combined (Bass et 
al., 2010; Hance, 2012a; Le Saout et al., 2013]. 
Although each of the three rainforest regions contains a bewildering array of species, the species 
themselves vary across (and within) each region. The clearance of a given area of rainforest in one 
location therefore produces different consequences for biodiversity than clearing the same area in 
another, by virtue of the species it threatens. These differences have often been reflected in NGO 
campaigns (eg. Greenpeace, 2010] and policymakers' speeches (Siewert, 2011), which highlight 
threats to 'iconic' or 'charismatic megafauna' species, such as the orang-utan populations of 
northern Sumatra and Borneo, both in Indonesia. As such, while the overall magnitude of 
biodiversity within tropical forests are significant in their own right, responses by downstream 
actors to deforestation have been just as clearly motivated by threats to individual, identifiable 
species. 
Across regions and locations, rainforests vary in the carbon and biodiversity values they embody. 
The point of emphasising their differential nature is not to argue that only some areas of 
rainforests are important, but rather that some areas may be more important than others to 
protect against clearing. Of course, the consequences of this approach hinge to a great extent on 
the values accorded greatest priority. Already researchers are seeking this 'damage limitation' 
approach to future deforestation, with Boucher etal. (2011) arguing (on the basis of Lambin and 
Meyfroidt's (2011) research on displacement] that if 'there is no way to prevent [displacement] 
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from happening entirely, the point is to minimise it, restrict it, and guide it to places where it does 
the least environmental and social damage' (p98). In 'guiding it to other places', these authors 
could mean protecting tropical forests while 'displacing' land use change to other biomes. Yet 
given their varying significance as carbon and biodiversity stores, perhaps land use change could 
also be guided within tropical forests. In this case, attention solely to forest area is likely to be an 
insufficient guide, as it sacrifices the nuance of forests' varying carbon or biodiversity stores. Yet 
similarly, organising concern around carbon values, as at least one prominent innovation -
REDD+, or Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation - does, neglects forests' 
varying biodiversity value. Accounting for and clarifying which of tropical forests' values is of 
interest therefore becomes crucial. 
Rainforests also have an abundance of other values that are no less important for both ecosystems 
and humans livelihoods. Forests provide soil stabilisation, a steady supply of clean water and 
flood control, they act as rainmakers on a regional basis, provide homes for the insects and birds 
that in turn pollinate agricultural crops, and provide supplementary food and nutrition for many 
of the world's poorest billion people (CIFOR, 2012b; Boucher et al., 2011]. They also provide vital 
fuel sources in the form of fuel wood and charcoal for much of Africa, and to a lesser extent, 
elsewhere. 
Clearly then, there are many reasons to avoid and limit deforestation in tropical forests; human 
societies have many direct interests in doing so. But the values of rainforests delineated above are 
what might be called the 'rational, scientific' reasons for protecting forests. As Williams (2008) 
suggests, perhaps underlying these reasons is 'a deeper sentiment or feeling of which most of us 
are only dimly aware - that trees and forests have cultural meanings' (p359), and that the strong 
reactions to deforestation are based just as much on the perception of the 'loss of a repository of 
myth and memory' (p356]. While these less tangible values are rarely noted within downstream 
actors' motivations for responding, perhaps they play a subliminal role nonetheless. 
Certainly, the conclusion to be drawn about tropical forests here is not that any one value they 
represent is more important than another. Rather it is that tropical forests embody a confluence of 
values, unmatched by any other biome on the planet. Yet equally clearly, as the previous section 
showed, tropical forests' confluence of values have not prevented their dramatic clearance. The 
following section explores the contemporary causes of this phenomenon's continuation. 
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3. The drivers of tropical deforestation 
Tropical forests continue to be destroyed even though the confluence of values they embody, both 
scientific and cultural, would seem to provide ample reason for human societies to protect them. 
This section explores the factors that cause contemporary tropical deforestation. What are the 
causes, or drivers, of deforestation, and how have they changed through time? 
Throughout most of human history, forests have been cleared for one relatively straightforward 
reason. As Rolett and Diamond note, 'although the forest [itself was] a source of many kinds of 
foods and useful products, fundamental ly the forest and agriculture were in conflict' (2004, cited 
in Boucher etal., 2011:5). Farmers and shifting cultivators (who grow crops on one patch of land 
until the soil is exhausted, then move on and clear another] have long 'been seen as the chief 
agents of deforestation in the tropics' (Boucher et al., 2011:90]. When aggregated, the actions of 
these agents continually expanded the agricultural frontier into areas of forests (Butler and 
Laurance, 2008), with the food they produced being directed primarily towards either domestic 
markets or their own self-sufficiency. Governments have often been actively supportive of 
expansion into forests, framing it positively as a 'colonisation' activity (DeFries et al., 2010) and 
building roads and otherwise assisting the development of land and waterways (Richards et al., 
2012; Rudel et al., 2009). Thus in most places, including the tropics, deforestation has been 
explicitly aided and abetted by governments encouraging farmers to pursue one or a combination 
of agricultural production, economic development and national security. This process occurred 
almost universally, including in the countries within the West that may no longer be actively 
deforesting. This historical behaviour is frequently dragged into the light to accuse Western 
countries of hypocrisy in seeking to prevent contemporary tropical deforestation, as Chapter 6 
will show. 
Continuing through the 1970s and most of the 1980s (the first years for which satellite 
moni tor ing of forests existed], the actions of small farmers and shifting cultivators still provided 
an accurate explanation for the clearance of forests, which by now were primarily being cleared in 
the tropics. But within the 1980s a broad shift in the drivers of forest clearing emerged, and by the 
year 1990 at the latest, the potency of the 'smallholder farmers' explanation had reached an 
inflexion point. Another agent of deforestation had became apparent: the large-scale 'industrial' 
agricultural production of a handful of crops, produced in part for export rather than solely for 
domestic markets or self-sufficiency. As Rudel et al. (2009) explain: 
'From the 1960s to the 1980s, small-scale farmers with state assistance deforested large 
areas of tropical forest in Southeast Asia and Latin America. As globalisation and 
urbanisation increased during the 1980s, the agents of deforestation changed in two 
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important parts of the tropical biome, the lowland rainforests in Brazil and Indonesia. 
Well-capitalised ranchers, farmers, and loggers producing for consumers in distant 
markets became more prominent in these places and this globalisation weakened the 
historically strong relationship between local population growth and forest cover' 
[pl396}. 
Recent satellite data support these claims. DeFries et al. (2010) analyse data for the decades from 
1990-2010 and conclude that 'forest loss is positively correlated with urban populat ion growth 
and exports of agricultural products for this time period' (p l78]. Further, these authors find that 
'rural population growth is not associated with forest loss' (ibid.). Other authors support these 
findings, with Butler and Laurance [2008) contending that 'rather than being dominated by rural 
farmers, tropical deforestation now is substantially driven by major industries and economic 
globalisation' (p469). The understanding of contemporary deforestation that emerges from these 
(and other authors') findings were consolidated and writ large in a report (Kissinger et al., 2012) 
prepared for the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in 2012. This report is 
worth quoting at length: 
'Proximate or direct drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are human activities 
and actions that directly impact forest cover and result in loss of carbon stocks. 
Agriculture is estimated to be the proximate driver for around 80% of deforestation 
worldwide. Commercial agriculture is the most important driver of deforestation in Latin 
America (around 2/3 of total deforested area). In Africa and (sub)tropical Asia it accounts 
for around 1/3 of deforestation and is of similar importance to subsistence agriculture. 
Mining, infrastructure and urban expansion are important but less prominent ' (emphasis 
added; Kissinger et al., 2012:5). 
Kissinger et al.'s (2012) statement attributing 80 percent of contemporary tropical deforestation 
to agriculture has become a common reference point in the deforestation literature. As a result, in 
recent years - and unequivocally since the publication of their report - an understanding has 
become embedded that agricultural production, at a commercial scale and often with a fraction of 
production traded internationally, is the primary driver of tropical deforestation. From this 
understanding comes the term 'traded deforestation', which will be used often by this study. The 
simplicity of the understanding that agricultural production drives deforestation is only advanced 
by the mere handful of commodities that are implicated. 
This section will turn to those commodit ies shortly. Beforehand, however, it is essential to 
recognise that significant regional differences remain within commercial agriculture's role as the 
primary driver of deforestation. These differences are acknowledged by Kissinger et al. (2012), 
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including in the above quote, but it is worth reiterating, specifically that: agricultural production is 
a particularly strong driver in the Amazon Basin (responsible for two-thirds of tropical 
deforestation), and a lesser, though still strong, driver in southeast Asia (one-third of 
deforestation; Kissinger et al., 2012). As noted earlier, Brazil's Amazon Basin and southeast Asia 
(especially Indonesia) are also the two regions where deforestation rates are currendy highest. 
This strengthens the hand of the commercial agriculture explanation, since it holds most true for 
precisely those locations where deforestation is currently most rapid. In contrast, in the Congo 
Basin of Africa, the third tropical forest region, Fisher (2010) explains that 'the old patterns of 
forest loss' (p375) remain paramount , adding: 
'Here, the slow expansion of subsistence or smallholder agriculture, and the extraction of 
pr imary products such as wood fuel, t imber and charcoal for domestic use, are the 
dominant drivers of deforestation' (p375). 
In more than one way, the fact that rural farmers are the main drivers of African deforestation is 
unfortunate: it pits the environmental objectives of addressing deforestation directly against the 
interests, livelihoods and security of some of the planet's poorest people. Boucher (2010) 
expresses relief that deforestation in the Amazon and southeast Asia avoids this contention, when 
he writes, 
'But at least we now understand that we are not choosing between protecting forests and 
feeding poor farmers. Deforestation is largely a business proposition, driven by the 
demands of far-off consumers' (p2). 
Several claims within this quote will be questioned by this study. Firstly, Chapter 4 will 
demonstrate that the exported fractions of relevant commodit ies to 'far-off consumers' are 
sometimes min imal and with only one exception - soya - comprise less than a quarter of the total 
product ion of any given commodity. Domestic demand is therefore at least as important as the 
demands of'far-off consumers'. Secondly, Chapter 2 will query whether it is actually demand from 
consumers that drive this production in the first place, noting instead that for some commodities, 
such as palm oil, production is substantially driven by supply-side support, such as subsidies and 
government-provided infrastructure. And finally, although palm oil production in southeast Asia 
is certainly a commercial proposition, smallholders still manage just under half of total planted 
area (World Bank, 2010). As Chapter 6 will show, the palm oil-producing countries of Indonesia 
and Malaysia are emphat ic about the employment and economic benefits that accrue to 
smallholder farmers from production of that crop, as if to provide a counter-narrative to the one 
cemented by Kissinger et al. (2012) and others. 
21 I P a g e 
Nevertheless, Boucher's (2010} succinct quote neatly reflects the understanding of traded 
deforestation that has been enshrined in the advocacy, activism and responses of downstream 
actors concerned about forest loss. Yet the implication of 'commercial agriculture' in deforestation 
lacks specificity; research has therefore sought to identify the port/cu/or commodities that are 
most implicated. Admittedly, these commodities have not been unduly difficult to discern. 
A research report by the European Commission - the 'Impacts of Consumption' report (EC, 2013a) 
- identified the commodities with the highest potential connection to deforestation imported by 
the EU. The report's top ten list, which was further delineated by country, included soya, beef, 
cacao, palm oil and nuts from Brazil. A similar report by the International Institute for the 
Environment and Development (IIED) in turn identified five 'forest risk commodities', closely 
matching those on the EU's list; namely palm oil, soybean, cacao, beef/leather and biofuels 
(Walker et al., 2013). In the same year. Climate Advisers, an US-based environmental advocacy 
group, stated that 'the production of just four commodities (soy, palm oil, beef and pulp/paper) 
accounts for the majority of global deforestation' (Purvis et al., 2013:i). A Chatham House report 
produced a somewhat longer list when it claimed that, 'Globally the crops most heavily associated 
with deforestation are soy, maize, oil palm, rice and sugar cane, while more than half the total is 
associated with pasture and feed for cattle' (Brack and Bailey, 2013:vii). While some discrepancies 
do exist, these reports from a government, two institutes and an advocacy group were in 
concurrence on the importance of soya, palm oil, beef and pulp/paper. 
Within the private sector, major multinational companies such as Nestle and Unilever have also 
sought to identify the commodities for which they could be pursuing more sustainable sourcing. 
Each of these retailers listed commodities of concern as follows. Nestle, as set out within its 
Responsible Sourcing Guidelines (RSGs; 2013), lists (in order) palm oil, paper/board, sugar, soya, 
cacao, coffee, dairy, fish and seafood, meat, poultry and eggs, and vanilla, hazelnuts and shea 
(emphasis added). Unilever, on the Sustainable Sourcing section of its website, lists the following 
(in order): palm oil, paper/board, soy and oils, tea, fruit and vegetables, cacao and sugar, and eggs 
and dairy [emphasis added: 2014). These two lists introduce several additional commodities to the 
short lists detailed above, many of which - eg. eggs, seafood - are clearly separate to these 
retailers' expressed concern with tropical deforestation. For present purposes, there is 
nonetheless a prominence given by these retailers to four commodities - soya, beef, palm oil and 
paper/board - that are now familiar from each of the lists above. The agreement between 
downstream actors, from the public sector, private sector and civil society, has enabled these four 
commodities to become known collectively as 'forest risk commodities' (Rautner et al,, 2013:14; 
Walker et al., 2013:5) or 'deforestation-related commodities' (Brack and Bailey, 2013:1), but this 
study will often refer to them simply as the 'deforestation commodities'. 
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So then, what is the evidence impugning these deforestation commodities? For Latin America, two 
of these commodities - beef and soya - are especially pertinent. Recall that Kissinger et al.'s 
report for DECC ( 2 0 1 2 ) claims, 'commercial agriculture is the most important driver [of 
deforestation] in Latin America' (p5], a statement that Barona et al. ( 2 0 1 0 ] echo, noting that 
'agricultural land-use changes have been the major driving force behind land-cover 
transformation in Latin America' [p i ] . These broad claims are furnished with evidence by Gibbs et 
al. ( 2 0 1 0 ] , who find that over the period 1 9 8 0 to 2000 , half of the expansion of pasture land 
(which increased by - 3 5 0 0 0 0 sq km] and croplands ( - 7 0 0 0 0 sq km] in Latin America came at 
the expense of forests, with nearly a quarter more from disturbed forests. 
Other authors (eg. Walker et al., 2 0 1 3 ] have found an even greater imbalance in the attribution of 
deforestation to pasture, contending that fully three-quarters of deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon occurred at the hands of expanding cattle ranches. At least one study, however, has 
sought to challenge (or at least nuance] this apparent consensus on the primary culpability of 
cattle pasture Brazilian deforestation. Barona eta l . ( 2 0 1 0 ] found that that the expansion of 
soybean production may actually be displacing pasture further into the forest frontier, which 
makes soya 'one of the major underlying causes' of deforestation in the Amazon (p8]. This finding 
further reinforces the authors' claim that, like elsewhere within the tropics, the 'dynamics of land 
use change' in the Brazilian Amazon are 'complex' (ibid.). What is clear, however, is the 
entanglement of commercial-scale beef and soya production in contemporary Amazonian 
deforestation. 
In southeast Asia, the other region where widespread clearing of tropical forests is occurring, 
another of the deforestation commodities - palm oil - is fingered as the primary culprit. Again 
according to Gibbs et al. ( 2 0 1 0 ) , although in the 1980s expansion in tree plantations came from 'a 
range of plantation crops' ( p l 6 7 3 4 ] , by the 1990s more than 80 percent of the expansion of 
agricultural land was due solely to oil palm (ibid.]. The expansion of agricultural land does not 
necessarily have to come at the expense of forests, of course, although these authors find that 
across southeast Asia, it generally did. Gibbs et al. ( 2 0 1 0 ] find that nearly 60 percent of the 
expansion of agricultural land in southeast Asia between 1 9 8 0 and 2 0 0 0 came at the expense of 
intact forests, with more than 30 percent coming additionally from disturbed forests. For some 
locations within this region, these figures are even more dramatic, further supporting the notion 
of the deforestation 'hotspots' that Hansen et al. ( 2 0 0 8 ] identified. On the island of Sumatra in 
Indonesia, for example, almost all agricultural expansion occurred at either the expense of intact 
forest (itself more than 75 percent) or disturbed forest during the same period (Gibbs etal. , 2010 ) . 
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More recent data reveals the consequences for forests of the expansion of oil palm in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, which together account for around 90 percent of total global production (USDA, 2015). 
Using data from 1990 to 2005, Koh and Wilcove (2008a) found that 55-59 per cent of oil palm 
expansion in Malaysia (8 340 - 11 090 sq km of a total of 18 740 sq km), and over 56 per cent of 
expansion in Indonesia (13 130 -17 070 sq km of a total of 30 170 sq km) occurred at the expense 
of natural forest cover. For the longer period between 1990 and 2010, another group of authors 
reporting for the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil's Greenhouse Gases Work ing Group, 
produce the following synopsis: 
'Forest conversion to establish oil palm, including both undisturbed and disturbed forest 
in both upland and swamp forest habitats summed [between 1990 and 2010] was 
proportionally greatest in Papua (61%: 33,600 ha), Sabah (62%: 714,000 ha) and Papua 
New Guinea (54%: 41,700 ha), followed by Kalimantan (44%: 1.23 M ha), Sarawak (48%: 
471,000 ha), Sumatra (25%: 883,000 ha) and Peninsular Malaysia (28%: 318,000 ha)' 
(Gunarsoetal . , 2013:29). 
Summing these figures for each country respectively, these authors fmd that 15 030 sq km of 
forest in Malaysia and 21 466 sq km of forest in Indonesia was cleared between 1990 and 2010 in 
order to plant palm oil (with 417 sq km cleared in neighbouring Papua New Guinea). These 
figures suggest the gigantic magnitude of forest clearing that has taken place in southeast Asia to 
enable palm oil planting. With respect to the impact on biodiversity that could result from this 
clearing, Koh and Wilcove conclude that 'oil palm may well be the single most immediate threat to 
the greatest number of species' (2008b:68). With respect to that forest's carbon values, the 
planting of palm oil on peatlands is particularly problematic; Agus et al. (2013) find that 18 
percent (24 000 sq km) of palm oil's total spatial footprint in Indonesia and Malaysia provided 
'the source of approximately 64 percent (118 million metric tonnes) of total carbon dioxide 
emissions from industrial scale oil palm plantations' (p65). 
The remaining 'deforestation commodity' is the timber-derived pulp, paper and board. These 
commodities are produced from agro-forestry plantations - often of acacia, eucalyptus or other 
fast-growing species - rather than forests themselves. In this sense, these commodit ies bear much 
the same relationship to deforestation as the commodities of soya, beef and palm oil; forest is 
cleared to create land for plantations. 
There is also another relevant yet more complex relationship between t imber and deforestation, 
which relates specifically to the selective-logging of t imber from forests iv/t/iout clearing them. 
Does the fact that forests are not simultaneously cleared mean that t imber harvesting is not 
implicated In deforestation? Whi le Kissinger et al. (2012) implicate logging in tropical 
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deforestation, its role is as an indirect driver, reflecting that while timber harvesting does not 
itself drive deforestation, it frequently precerfes the clearing of land for agriculture (Williams, 
2008; Gunarso et al., 2013). But selective logging can also lead to deforestation, since it changes 
the forest from a primary into a secondary, altered or fragmented state, making land claims for 
agricultural and mining purposes more likely to be allocated to those areas. Even in the absence of 
causality betw^een the two, however, the frequent sequence of'logging-before-clearing' casts new 
importance on Asner et al.'s (2009) finding that although 275 000 sq km of tropical forests were 
cleared between 2000 and 2005, there was evidence of selective logging across an area 15 times 
this size (almost 4 million sq km). These figures suggest the likelihood that enormous tracts of 
forests, already logged, are at high risk of being cleared for agriculture. Furthermore, although the 
Congo Basin is the tropical forest region least disturbed by contemporary clearing - and least 
affected by large-scale commercial agriculture - there is an upward trend in selective logging 
(Laporte et al., 2007, in Rudel et al., 2009) which in turn suggests a climbing risk level of 
deforestation for Africa's rainforests. 
Taken in aggregate, this research confirms the signal importance of the four 'deforestation 
commodities ' as major drivers of contemporary deforestation. These commodities are also most 
important in the locations where contemporary deforestation is most rapid (beef and soya in the 
Brazilian Amazon; oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia); in other words, the commercial 
agriculture explanation of deforestation is best supported in the forests suffering from the most 
extensive clearing. And while it is important to differentiate between timber's two distinct 
relationships to deforestation, as selectively-logged timber and as the pulp, paper and board from 
agro-forestry plantations, each of these relationships nonetheless connects timber to 
deforestation. 
Responses by downstream actors to deforestation have undoubtedly been both prompted and 
enabled by the potency of the 'deforestation commodities ' explanation. Despite its clarity and 
significance, however, this understanding of deforestation is only partial. Before the second half of 
this chapter turns to introducing this study's responses, then, a brief overview of the other drivers 
of contemporary deforestation is warranted. The utility of a richer understanding of deforestation 
underpins Chapter 4 's finding that one limitation acting on current responses by downstream 
actors is their implicit framing of deforestation as a process driven solely by the aforementioned 
commodities. 
In a wide-ranging study of deforestation, Geist and Lambin (2002) divide its causes into the two 
categories of 'proximate ' and 'underlying ' (an approach that Kissinger et al., 2012, emulate) to 
signify that deforestation is a symptom of both shallow (direct) and deep (indirect) causes. In the 
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'proximate' category, which is roughly analogous to 'direct' causes, the authors list infrastructure 
extension, agricultural expansion and wood extraction; in the 'underlying' category, roughly 
analogous to 'indirect' causes, are demographic factors, economic factors, technological factors, 
policy and institutional factors, and cultural factors (Geistand Lambin, 2002:143]. The authors 
conclude that 'the causes of deforestation are multiple and complex and vary from country to 
country', but tropical forest cover losses are 'best explained' by synergies between proximate and 
underlying causes (emphasis added; p l46) . 
More recently, DeFries etal . (2010] single out two variables as highly correlated to contemporary 
deforestation: urban growth and agricultural exports. Making a distinction between correlation 
and causation, Cardille and Bennett (2010] note the absence within this research of a mechanistic 
understanding of why these relationships should be so significant. Given Geist and Lambin's 
(2002] emphasis of its multiple and complex causes, however, perhaps the absence of known 
mechanisms is unsurprising. Ultimately, DeFries etal . (2010] echo Geistand Lambin (2002] in 
concluding that 'the pressures from these direct and indirect forces probably vary among 
countries and require country-specific analysis to develop effective approaches to reduce 
deforestation' (p l80] . 
The complexity emphasised by multiple of these authors can be borne out even in the multiple 
ways that forests are affected by a single proximate, or direct, cause of deforestation, such as the 
expansion of oil palm plantations. Firstly, it is clear that the effects on forests can extend beyond 
the area on which palm oil is later produced, as evidenced by the fact that the forest areas cleared 
ostensibly for oil palm plantations are often greater than the area subsequently planted (Shell et 
al., 2009]. Secondly, other impacts on forests come from 'the increases in access, population and 
proximity to forest edges' (Sheil et al., 2009:33], which might be termed 'underlying' causes of 
further deforestation. 
Indeed, roads are themselves a significant driver of forest disturbance, making the proposed 
expansion of roads through, for example, the Brazilian Amazon (Ahmed et al., 2013] and the 
largest remaining tract of forest in central Thailand (also a UNESCO World Heritage Site; 
Erickson-Davis, 2014] a source of concern. Indeed, Barber et al. (2014] find that ' ~95 percent of 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon occurs on land less than 5 kilometres from a road or 
navigable river' (p203]. These concerns led Laurence et al. (2014] to publish a 'Global strategy for 
road building' to - in the spirit of Boucher et al. (2011] - guide land use change to places where it 
does the least damage. Yet even before these findings and road-building strategy, the European 
Parliament had already recognised the role of roads as an indirect cause of deforestation, backing 
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an initiative from one of its Greek members to prevent roads being built specifically through intact 
tropical forests (Roadfree, 2013). 
Whi le roads accompany nearly all development within tropical forests, some locations are 
experiencing deforestation from more direct, or proximate, causes, such as mining. A study of the 
Madre de Dios region in Peru, for example, found that 'deforestation for gold min ing now exceeds 
all other forms of forest loss combined, including ranching, agriculture and logging' (Asner et al., 
2013:18456). In Indonesia's Kal imantan provinces, coal mining permits cover nearly a quarter of 
the total land area; for the province of East Kalimantan, the figure is nearly one half (Fogarty, 
2014a). Indeed, a single coal mine - 75 percent is owned by the Australian mining behemoth, BHP 
Billiton - with in East Kalimantan currently has concessions covering an area of 3 500 sq km, or 
five times the size of Singapore (Fogarty, 2014b). Clearly, min ing developments threaten large 
areas of tropical forests across mult iple tropical regions. 
Beyond the deforestation hotspots, then, where commercial agriculture can be identified as the 
pr imary (proximate, or direct) driver, the only consensus within current science is that 
deforestation has multiple, complex and interacting causes that differ both regionally and by 
location. Some authors, such as Houghton (2012), contend that shifting cultivation remains the 
foremost driver of deforestation (when measured in carbon emissions), while other authors note 
that in some locations, such as Papua New Guinea, subsistence agriculture (some of which may be 
shifting cultivation) causes a much higher proportion of deforestation (47 percent) than in most 
others (Boucher etal., 2011). 
Concluding with a more philosophical perspective, at least one historian identifies an overarching 
context that might be responsible for generating both proximate and underlying causes of tropical 
deforestation. In Wil l iams' (2008) comprehensive article, he writes (quoting Eckholm): 
'uncontrolled clearing "is a symptom of society's inability to get a grip on other 
fundamental development issues" [so that]... almost everywhere destroying rainforest is a 
means of avoiding tackling real problems by pursuing chimeras: a "license to print money" 
that yields quick cash at the cost of ult imate catastrophe' (in Will iams, 2008:347). 
Whether or not Eckholm's logic here appeals, there is no doubt that human societies continue to 
destroy tropical forests despite myriad reasons for conserving and protecting them. International 
trade in the deforestation commodit ies implicates downstream societies in that destruction, with 
the implication that the problem of deforestation cannot be confined to the jurisdictions where 
tropical forests reside. In recognising this, actors within downstream societies have enacted a 
distinct set of responses, which this chapter now turns to introducing. 
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Downstream responses to tropical deforestation 
The first half of this chapter detailed the accelerating magnitude of contemporary deforestation. It 
also presented this study's first building block: the coalescence of an understanding that just a 
handful of commodities - palm oil, beef, soya and timber - have become the primary driver of 
deforestation, especially within the hotspots where it has recently been concentrated. 
1. This half of the chapter now turns to this study's second building block: a distinct set of 
responses to tropical deforestation that have emerged from downstream actors beyond 
the tropics. To qualify within the framework of this study, responses satisfy two 
characteristics: Responses share an objective to slow tropical deforestation, and 
2. Responses function through a shared mechanism in seeking to affect trade in, and 
consumption of, internationally-traded fractions of the deforestation commodities. 
This study's responses are therefore united by, firstly, an understanding of the role of the four 
major deforestation commodities, and secondly, by an acceptance that international trade in these 
commodities connects downstream societies, and specific actors, to that deforestation. Thus the 
emergence of these responses implicitly - and sometimes explicltiy - validates the premise that 
tropical deforestation is an internationalised or transnational environmental problem that extends 
beyond the tropics. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that responses to tropical deforestation provide 
an unparalleled case study for exploring how downstream actors perceive and respond to a 
connection to a major, yet distant, environmental problem. Chapter 3 will then further clarify the 
nature of these responses by locating them within relevant environmental governance literatures. 
The term 'responses' has been carefully chosen to emphasise the centrality of the 'deforestation-
for-commodities' understanding as the basis for each of their design and implementation. The 
term is also general enough to encompass the full range of instruments and interventions 
explored by this thesis, despite the many and often clear differences between them otherwise, for 
example between the US Lacey Act Amendments (a piece of illegal logging legislation] and the 
Forest Stewardship Council (an NGO-industry Roundtable). Without eliding these differences, this 
thesis takes as its platform for analysis the two shared characteristics specified above. These two 
commonalities are primary and demarcate the boundaries of this study, whereas other differences, 
while still substantial and relevant, are secondary and play out within those boundaries. 
Many responses that this study will examine, including the Lacey Act Amendments and FSC, may 
already be familiar to readers. Indeed, many have already been subjected to some examination, in 
isolation, for their potential as responses. Yet this study differs from previous contributions to 
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forestry governance literatures chiefly in its breadth. This broader scope enables an analysis that 
goes beyond any single response, and also beyond any single response-^pe, to identify patterns 
and themes emerging across the range of these responses. In light of these key patterns and 
themes, future research will have big picture insights and a readymade backdrop against w^hich to 
apply scrutiny to a narrower range of responses. 
This study 's primary research question emerges directly from this broader scope. Gathering 
responses together on the basis of their shared characteristics enables direct interrogation of 
their limitations as a set in attempting to impact favourably on the problem of tropical 
deforestation. The study 's two sub-questions then distinguish between two broad sources of 
limitations on responses, namely those that emerge from their design and those that emerge from 
their (and actors') behaviour. These sub-questions are component parts of the primary research 
question, and in that sense provide discrete, partitionable approaches that are then assembled, in 
Chapter 7 and the Conclusion, to provide a comprehensive answer to that primary question. 
The remainder of this chapter presents responses, in chronological order, beginning with the 
emergence of the Forest Stewardship Council in the early 1990s. Although some of these 
responses have been examined at the level of individual responses (eg. Auld et al., 2008), and 
others even at the level of responses-types (eg. Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; Steering Committee, 
2012), the findings from these literatures will not be surveyed comprehensively here. The 
intention behind the remainder of this chapter is merely to present sufficient information on each 
response to establish a platform for further analysis in the conceptual and empirical chapters to 
come. Responses are characterised as either 'policy', 'regulatory' or 'institutional', where 'policy' 
indicates an internal or unilateral decision made by an actor and affecting that actor's own supply 
chains, 'regulatory' indicates a decision made by government that has implications for other 
actors and is grounded in law, and 'institutional' indicates the creation or formation of a new 
entity or actor. Collaborative responses are noted in Table 1.1 where relevant. 
Following the first of each response-type (eg. the FSC is a sustainability scheme), other responses 
within that response-type are then introduced. A timeline for the emergence of responses over the 
last two decades can be found in Figure 1.1 below. This chronological account allows for the 
identification of two, roughly decade-long phases of (mainly) Western responses to tropical 
deforestation. The first of these phases begins with the formation of the Forest Stewardship 
Council in the early 1990s and the related announcements of company sourcing policies for 
timber. The second phase dates roughly from 2004, and is characterised by new response-types 
(such as illegal logging laws and biofuels frameworks), the emergence of responses for the 
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Table 1.1 Key characteristics of responses included in this study. 
Response Actor(s) Example (individual 
response) 
Policy, regulatory or 
institutional? 
Company sourcing Companies, industry Policy 
policies associations 
Public procurement Governments 8 national timber Policy 
policies policies, UK palm oil 
procurement policy 
Illegal logging Governments Lacey Act, EU TR, Regulatory 
legislation (national/inter-j) Australian Prohibition 
Biofuels framework Governments 
(national/inter-j] 
EU Renewable Energy 
Directive, US Fuels 
Standard 2 
Regulatory 
Forest governance Governments (inter- FLEGT Regulatory (but FLEGT 
program jurisdictional) licences are institutional) 
Inter-governmental Governments CITES Regulatory 
agreements (national/inter-j) (collaborative) 
Sustainability Companies all along FSC, PEFC, RSPO, RTRS Institutional 
schemes (incl. supply chains. etc. 




CGF,TFA Policy (collaborative) 
non-timber deforestation commodities of palm oil, beef and soya (such as the RSPO), and 
increasing levels of collaboration both within actor groups and between them. It is these 
characteristics that signal an intensification over the last decade in the 'age of experimentation' 
with supply chain-focused responses to tropical deforestation. 
Excluded from this study's remit are several further initiatives that are characterised by their 
focus on financing the production of the deforestation commodities, rather than supply chains 
for those commodities. Specifically, these initiatives include aid programs that facilitate more 
sustainable production of crops such as palm oil, including where aid is directed towards 
achieving certification (a topic that itself raises interesting questions). Voluntary financing 
guidelines developed for banks for lending to (eg.) palm oil production are similarly excluded, 
though they may nonetheless comprise an important part of overall efforts to respond to 
tropical deforestation (as do domestic policies and programs within tropical forested countries). 
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Excluding these init iat ives a l l ows for g rea te r conceptual purity, by enabl ing supply chain 
responses to be scrutinised in l ight of their a f o r emen t i oned dist inct ive features. 
Sustainabil i ty schemes 
Forest Stewardship Council 
As concern mounted o v e r acce lerat ing tropical de fores ta t ion throughout the 1980s and ear ly 
1990s, p roposed in te r -governmenta l responses f r om both the International Tropica l T i m b e r 
Organisat ion ( I T T O ] and the United Nat ions ( U N ) w e r e thwar ted by t imber-produc ing countr ies 
(Auld et al., 2008 ] , This s ta lemate at the gove rnmenta l level p rov ided the impetus for what 
Cashore et al. ( 2 0 0 4 ) ident i fy as 'non-state, market dr i ven ' initiatives, and which have o the rw ise 
been r e f e r r ed to as a core feature of the 'pr ivate governance ' landscape (Clapp, 1998) , but which 
to many are probab ly m o r e fami l iar as cert i f icat ion. The pr ior ex istence of the FairTrade 
cert i f icat ion scheme for select agricultural commod i t i e s p rov ided a blueprint for the Rainforest 
Al l iance 's ' Smar twood ' scheme for t imber , which was operat ional ised in 1990. This was f o l l owed 
- and soon ecl ipsed in scale - by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1993 (Synnott, 2005) . 
The FSC was or ig inal ly an all iance b e t w e e n the W o r l d w i d e Fund for Nature ( W W F , f o rmer l y the 
W o r l d Wi ld l i f e Fund) and env i ronmenta l , indigenous and business interests that toge ther f o r esaw 
'the need for a sys tem that could cred ib ly ident i fy we l l -managed forests as sources for 
respons ib ly -produced fores t products ' (FSC, 2014a ) . A large part of the mot ivat ion behind the 
FSC's f o rmat ion w a s to p rov ide an a l ternat ive to p roposed bans and boycotts of tropical t imber, 
which the fa i lure of in te r -governmenta l responses had made attract ive to s ome actors. Crucially, 
h o w e v e r , the FSC did not l imit its mandate to tropical t imber but expanded it to focus on 
sustainable fores t managemen t g lobal ly ( ibid. ) . As current ly stated, the FSC's mission is to ensure 
and encourage fores t m a n a g e m e n t that is ' env i ronmenta l l y appropr iate , social ly benef ic ial and 
economica l l y viable ' , three ob jec t i ves that are re f l ec ted in its three-chambered governance system 
(FSC, 2014b ) . 
The g r o w t h in FSC-cert i f ied area has been strong since the organisat ion 's format ion, wi th o v e r 
184 mi l l ion hectares of fo res t (1 .8m sq km ) w o r l d w i d e FSC-certi f ied in December 2014 (FSC, 
2014c ) . The impor tance of the FSC opt ing for a global mandate is revea led by the fact that the vast 
ma jo r i t y of FSC-cert i f ied forests are situated outs ide the tropics. In fact, on ly just o ve r 10 percent 
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of FSC-certified area (representing 189 000 sq km) is classified as tropical/subtropical, with the 
majority instead situated in Europe (44 percent] and North America (38 percent] (ibid.]. The FSC 
has also evolved since its formation to begin certifying supply chains ('Chain-of-Custody'] and 
timber plantations in addition to its original focus on forest areas ( 'Forest Management Units; 
FMUs] and managed 'natural' forests, respectively. The FSC has also launched a 'Mixed Sources' 
standard where a minimum of 70 percent of timber supplies must be certified to its standard, 
with the remainder coming from 'controlled sources' but not needing to be certified. Each of these 
decisions - to certify plantations, and to develop Chain-of-Custody and Mixed Sources certification 
- has been controversial, and following these decisions the FSC lost support from some 
environmental groups, such as the Rainforest Foundation UK and the European forest group. 
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FERN (Mongabay, 2013a). In 2013, the major environmental NGO, Greenpeace, launched a series 
of case studies on the FSC, some of which critiqued the organisation for certifying companies that 
fell short of the FSC standard (ibid.). (Participants in this study, some of whom are from the FSC, 
provide their own critiques in later empirical chapters.) Nonetheless, Greenpeace and several 
other NGOs, including the WWF, contend that forest certification is both beneficial and 
worthwhi le , and that 'the FSC represents the best option among several competing standards' 
(ibid.). 
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes (PEFC) is also a forestry 
certification organisation, and widely considered to be a rival of the FSC. (The dynamics of this 
rivalry, and its consequences for actor behaviour, are explored in empirical Chapter 5.) The 
PEFC's origins were largely reactive: the formation of the FSC sparked the development of 
alternative standards from national forestry industries in North America, Europe and some 
tropical countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Gabon etc. (Auld et al., 2008). Whi le each of 
these countries established its own national forestry scheme (or standard), from the late 1990s 
these schemes began coalescing into an umbrella scheme - the PEFC - which took its current 
name in 2003. 
The PEFC prides itself on emerging from national forestry industries, rather than being driven by 
'urban NGOs', a difference that it claims makes it more amenable to national interpretations of 
sustainability within the countries where it operates (Price, 2011). Indeed, this is a key functional 
difference between the FSC and PEFC, where the latter endorses nationally-developed forest 
management standards, whi le the former predominantly certifies FMUs. (The PEFC now also 
certifies chains of custody.) In December 2014, the PEFC had a certified forest area of 2.6 million 
sq km, greater than the 1.8 mill ion sq km of the FSC, yet similarly concentrated in North America 
and Europe. Of the 35 national standards it has now endorsed, the PEFC has been extending its 
coverage of tropical forests, with recent endorsement of the national systems of Indonesia and 
China (both in 2014) following prior endorsement of Malaysia and Gabon (both 2009) and Brazil 
(2005)(PEFC, 2014). 
Other Roundtables 
Following its experience with the FSC, the WWF, together with other NGO and corporate actors, 
pushed to establish sustainability schemes of a similar type - Roundtables - for several other 
commodit ies relevant to this study. The WWF's role in driving the formation of these institutions 
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efforts is inspired by its 'Market Transformation Initiative', a comprehensive strategy focused on 
the '15 commodities that have the greatest impacts on biodiversity, water and climate' (WWF, 
2012:2). These commodities explicitly include the deforestation commodities, or 'five largest 
drivers of deforestation': timber, pulp and paper, palm oil, soy and beef (ibid.). While timber, pulp 
and paper all fall within the ambit of the FSC, the latter three - palm oil, soy and beef - each have a 
dedicated Roundtable of their own, which this section will now briefly detail. 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was established in 2004 with a vision to make 
'sustainable palm oil the norm' (RSPO, 2014a). The organisation has members from the entire 
length of the palm oil supply chain, including (inter alia) producers, traders and retailers, social, 
environmental and indigenous NGOs, and financiers of palm oil projects. The RSPO seeks to 
'develop, implement, verify, assure and periodically review credible global standards for the 
entire supply chain of sustainable palm oil' (ibid.). In practice, this means emulating the FSC in 
formulating a set of principles and criteria ('P&C, or 'standard') that all members (though 
especially producers) must adhere to. The first RSPO standard was adopted in 2007, with a first 
systematic review completed in 2013 (RSPO, 2014b). 
The RSPO has rapidly gained traction in global palm oil markets: by 2012, the organisation had 
over 1000 members and had certified over 14 percent of global production (RSPO, 2012). Yet 
given the strong implication of palm oil in southeast Asian deforestation, the organisation has 
faced criticism for the weakness - and sometimes absence - of relevant environmental criteria; 
even following the first strategic review of its standard in 2013, the Rainforest Action Network 
(RAN), an NGO, alleged that the RSPO does not 'have a credible standard include mechanisms 'to 
protect against conversion of carbon-dense rainforests and peatlands for oil palm plantations' (in 
Mongabay, 2013b). 
In 2013, following the completed review of the RSPO's P&C, a new entity - the Palm Oil Innovation 
Group (POIG) - was formed. At its launch, the POIG was explained as 'a group of progressive palm 
oil companies [that], together with environmental and social NGOs, [intends] to push the 
boundaries of current requirements of the RSPO' (POIG, 2013:1). The announcement continued, 
saying that 'the POIG will demonstrate that by setting and implementing ambitious standards that 
stretch the RSPO standard, we can break the link between deforestation and social conflict and 
palm oil' (ibid.). Given the rivalry that emerged between the FSC and PEFC, it is important that the 
POIG explicidy avers its intention not to become a rival to the RSPO. To this end, the POIG has not 
developed an alternative sustainability scheme (although it is designing a Charter by updating 
several RSPO P&C). Rather, the POIG 'seeks to have [its] innovations rolled out across the palm oil 
industry and reflected in the RSPO standard' (POIG, 2013:2). 
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In 2006 , the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) was established by an alliance of industry 
participants along the soy supply chain, together with NGO partners. The RTRS developed its P&C 
in 2010 , certifying the first soybeans under the scheme in 2011, and in 2012 certified almost 
1 million tonnes of soy (WWF, 2013b] . In contrast to the RSPO, the RTRS standard 'ensures that... 
clearance of native forests and high conservation areas' is avoided (ibid.). This has not satisfied all 
of the RTRS' critics, however, since the most polarising issue for the RTRS standard is instead 
whether genetically-modified soy should be permitted to become certified (which under the 
current standard is permitted; GM Freeze, 2010] . 
The production context for soybean has been markedly different to other deforestation 
commodities, by virtue of an Amazon-wide moratorium on deforestation for soybean production. 
This 'soy moratorium' was implemented in 2 0 0 6 by an alliance of domestic industry participants, 
multinational companies, NGOs and - critically - the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment, which 
uses INPE's satellite monitoring to support the program (Walker et al., 2013] . The RTRS therefore 
operates in a governance context that is supportive of its mission, a situation that paradoxically 
may undermine the grounds for its existence as a safeguard. The RSPO, for example, operates 
against an entirely different backdrop, where the governments and industrial actors of the two 
main palm oil producers - Indonesia and Malaysia - have instead sought to develop national 
standards as alternatives to the RSPO (Djama etal., forthcoming]. 
For the last of the deforestation commodities - beef - a Roundtable has also been devised. The 
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef(GRSB) is a global, multi-stakeholder initiative developed 
'to advance continuous improvement in sustainability of the global beef value chain through 
leadership, science and multi-stakeholder engagement and collaboration' (GRSBa, 2014] . Yet 
crucially, the GRSB 'does not intend to develop standards or create a certification system' (GRSB, 
2014b:2] , marking a different approach from that taken within the Roundtables for timber, palm 
oil and soya. In late 2014 , the GRSB approved its first set of P&C, which includes one criterion that 
'native forests are protected from deforestation' (GRSB, 2014a] . Like soybean, the governance 
context for the GRSB in the Amazon (the primary region of tropical production] is largely 
supportive of greater transparency, legality and sustainability. In 2009, following the success of 
the soy moratorium, Greenpeace also signed an agreement with Brazil's four largest meatpackers 
to purge deforestation from their supply chains (the 'G4 Agreement': Walker et al., 2013] . 
Beyond these Roundtables are a number of more boutique, or niche, sustainability schemes for 
commodities including timber and palm oil. Increasingly too, new schemes have emerged based 
on legality, which verify compliance with laws, rather than sustainability (see Cashore and Stone, 
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2012], The impetus for this new baseline undoubtedly stems from the requirements of due 
diligence enacted under several jurisdictions' illegal logging laws (see further below). 
Sourcing policies 
Corporate sourcing policies 
For major companies, based or headquartered in downstream jurisdictions for any of the 
deforestation commodities, becoming a member of a Roundtable usually requires a commitment 
to source only certified versions of that commodity (often by a given date). These commitments, 
or sourcing policies, are the primary means available to companies to respond to their 
entanglement with the deforestation commodities. Sourcing policies do not necessarily need to 
rely explicitly on existing sustainability schemes (the interesting permutations of these 
relationships are explored fully in Chapter 5); yet they often do, and for sustainability schemes 
these policies are also the primary means through which they induce producers to undergo 
certification. 
Not coincidentally, the first corporate sourcing policies for timber emerged simultaneously with 
the FSC in the early-mid 1990s, as the formation of that institution created a tool that became the 
common reference point for both designing and assessing these policies. The first major sourcing 
policies announced for palm oil, in contrast, were those of Unilever and Nestle, two major retailers 
headquartered in the UK and Switzerland respectively. The format of these policies was typical for 
the time (and commodity): a commitment to source only RSPO-certified palm oil supplies by 2015 
(although interestingly, both companies have now adopted palm oil standards that go beyond the 
RSPO's). 
Company sourcing policies do not emerge from a vacuum. Since the formation of Roundtables for 
each deforestation commodity, NGOs have been pivotal in pressuring companies to devise policies 
that commit them to the purchase only certified versions. Sometimes NGOs have employed 
combative methods to achieve this end; for instance, in a now-famous mock advertisement from 
2009, Greenpeace showed a block of Kit Kat, Nestle flagship chocolate, containing an orang-utan 
finger, to signify the company's use of palm oil from threatened forests. These campaigns are often 
successful in prompting companies to respond, as showed by Nestle's subsequent engagement of 
a supply chain consultancy. The Forest Trust (TFT), to help design its Responsible Sourcing 
Guidelines (Nestle, 2013) 
Not all types of companies have responded equally to their connection to deforestation, however, 
nor have NGO campaigns equally targeted these different types. In both cases, the companies that 
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have tended to develop and publicly announce sourcing policies for the deforestation 
commodities are concentrated in the retail sector, vviith supermarkets and - to a much lesser 
extent - manufacturers and traders sometimes following suit. (The announcement of sourcing 
policies from major palm oil, soya and beef traders during 2014 has partly remedied this 
imbalance, though retailers remain the most prominent adopters.] The bias towards major 
retailers is not coincidental: these companies are generally well-known brands that are subject to 
both NGO campaigns and consumer boycotts, making sourcing policies attractive - if for no other 
reason - as a defensive measure. 
Public procurement policies 
Downstream governments have implemented a range of responses to deforestation, mostly 
focusing on timber at the expense of other relevant commodities. For this study's purposes, the 
first responses deployed by governments were procurement policies for their purchases of timber 
and wood products, such as office paper. Just like a company's sourcing policy, these procurement 
policies establish product standards that must be met by suppliers to, and contractors operating 
on behalf of, national governments. 
Since the formation of the FSC in the 1990s, the first of these responses to emerge was the UK 
Government's timber procurement policy, which was enacted in 2003, while other governments -
especially within the EU - quickly followed suit. To date, 26 national government procurement 
policies exist for timber, five of which (the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Luxembourg] 
require timber to be sustainable, while the remainder require it merely to be legal (Brack, 2014]. 
(These legality-based policies have helped to spur the emergence of the legality-based timber 
verification schemes referred to above.] Furthermore, some of these policies are mandatory, 
while others are voluntary (Brack and Saunders, 2004]. Norway's timber procurement policy is an 
exception, consisting of a complete ban on tropical timber for publicly-funded projects and office 
supplies. Finally, there is only one policy so far announced for any other deforestation commodity 
beyond timber: the UK Government's policy on palm oil, which was announced in 2012 (DEFRA, 
2012a]. 
Illegal logging legislation 
In the latter half of the 2000s, around the time that the first major corporate sourcing policies for 
palm oil were announced, multiple Western governments turned their attention back to 
international trade in timber. In contrast to the inter-governmental responses they had sought to 
negotiate in the late 1980s, some twenty years earlier, this more recent attention yielded 
unilateral regulatory responses and focused on illegal, rather than unsustainable, logging. 
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us Lacey Act Amendments 
In 2008, the United States (US) became the first downstream jurisdiction to enact a law making 
the import and subsequent trading of illegal timber a prosecutable offence. This was achieved by 
amending an already long-lived piece of legislation, the Lacey Act, to include timber products 
within its scope. Prior to the Lacey Act Amendments of 2008, there was no legal basis to prosecute 
US actors that imported and traded illegal timber, even if that illegality was known. The Lacey Act 
Amendments were widely supported, in what the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) 
called 'a precedent-setting coalition of environmental, industry, and labour groups' [EIA, 2008:2). 
Support from the latter two groups was premised mainly on the fact that imports of illegal timber 
were undercutting the domestic forestry industry within the US. (Some consequences of this 
support are explored in chapters 4 and 6.) 
The amended Lacey Act contains two main operative provisions. Firstly, importers and traders 
must provide a declaration of their shipments including the scientific name (genus and species) of 
the timber, its volume and value, and its country of origin (APHIS, 2014). These declarations are 
designed to 'increase the transparency of the timber and plant trade and enable the US Govt to 
better enforce the law' (EIA, 2008:2). Secondly, the Lacey Act requires importers and subsequent 
traders in timber to exercise 'due care', which according to the EIA is defined as 'that degree of 
care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances' 
(Senate Report 97-123, in EIA, 2008:4). However, Cooney et al. (2012) offer the caution that due 
care is not defined in the Act itself and therefore 'judicial interpretation will be crucial' (p5). An 
important aspect of the US Lacey Act is its extension to all persons or companies that 'import, 
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase' illegally-sourced timber (EIA, 2008:1). The 
Act provides, however, for the differential application of the requirement of due care to 'different 
categories of persons with varying degrees of knowledge and responsibility' (Senate Report 97-
123, in EIA, 2008:4). 
The EU approach: FLEGT and the EU Timber Regulation 
In 2003, the EU announced its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action 
Plan, which now encompasses two responses relevant to the present study (EC, 2003). The central 
component of FLEGT was the EU's intention to create 'Voluntary Partnership Agreements' (VPAs) 
between itself and individual timber-producing countries in the tropics. The idea behind the EU's 
VPAs is to ensure 'that timber and timber products exported to the EU come from legal sources. 
The agreements also help timber-exporting countries stop illegal logging by improving regulation 
and governance of the forest sector' (EFl, 2014a). At the time of writing, in early 2015, the EU had 
signed VPAs with six timber-producing countries - Ghana, Indonesia, Cameroon, Central African 
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Republic, Liberia and the Republic of the Congo - but none of these countries had yet completed 
the necessary requirements (EFI, 2014b). The most significant of these requirements is the 
development of a 't imber legality assurance system', which once endorsed by the EU allows 
timber-exporting countries to award 'FLEGT licences' - essentially a stamp of legality approval -
to verified consignments intended for export to the EU (EFI, 2014c]. Although countries enter into 
a VPA voluntarily, once the agreement 'enters into force' it becomes 'a legally binding agreement 
on both sides', meaning that 'the timber-producing country develops systems to verify that its 
t imber exports are legal, and the EU agrees to accept only licensed imports from that country' [EFI, 
2014c). 
From its inception in 2003, the FLEGT Action Plan included the option for the European 
Commission to 'review options for... further measures, including, in the absence of multilateral 
progress, the feasibility of legislation to control the import of illegal produced t imber into the EU' 
(EC, 2003). There were at least two good reasons for the EU to revisit this option in the late 2000s: 
firstly, the lengthy delays getting VPAs to the point of being operational (at the beginning of 2015, 
none yet are), and secondly, the emerging evidence that illegal t imber increasingly originated 
outside of the forest concessions (FMUs) that VPAs are focused on (FERN, 2013). More specifically, 
illegal t imber was increasingly derived from agricultural concessions, in line with the accepted 
understanding of contemporary deforestation expounded earlier in this chapter. 
In December 2010, the European Parliament approved its own legislation akin to the US' Lacey 
Act Amendments , called the EU Timber Regulation (EU TR). The EU TR became operational in 
March 2013. Like the Lacey Act, the EU TR requires importers to set up due diligence systems to 
min imise the risk of illegal products entering the EU, with the 30 month w indow between 
approval and implementat ion intended to give importers t ime to establish these systems (Brack 
and Buckrell, 2011). Because the EU functions as an amalgamation of countries, however, each 
member country of the EU is required to enact support ing national legislation for the EU TR which 
lays out 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties to ensure compliance' (EC, 2013b). Each 
member country is also required to nominate a 'competent authority' that is charged with 
carrying out checks on t imber importers and otherwise coordinating the application of the 
regulation (ibid.). This diffusion of authority, which sets the EU TR apart from the 
federally-instigated Lacey Amendments and the Australian Prohibition (see below), has the 
potential to lead to discrepancies in the application of the EU TR (Saunders, 2013; FERN, 2013). 
The prosecutable offence under the EU TR is placing an illegal product on the internal (EU) 
market, which confines responsibility to importers of t imber products, although subsequent 
traders are also required to keep records for five years of their trades in foreign timbers (both 
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upstream and downstream] to encourage greater traceability (Brack and Buckrell, 2011). When 
the EU Parliament initially proposed this legislation, it sought to apply a broader definition of 
responsibility that would include (as the Lacey Act does) not just importers but also subsequent 
traders of illegal timber products (FERN, 2010). That initial proposal was rejected, amidst 
concerns - which others saw as unjustified - over the administrative burden this would place on 
'smaller forest owners and timber traders' (ibid.). 
So as not to undermine maturing VPA arrangements, both FLEGT licences (which remain 
theoretical) and CITES licences (see below) are deemed to automatically fulfil the EU TR's due 
diligence of legality requirements (EC, 2013c). However, neither sustainability schemes, such as 
the FSC and PEFC, nor other legality verification schemes fulfil these requirements automatically, 
though they can nonetheless be used to demonstrate risk mitigation (ibid.). 
Australian Prohibition on Illegal Logging 
Australia is the third jurisdiction to have implemented legislation targeting imports of illegally-
logged timber. In the lead-up to the 2007 federal election, the Australian Labour Party (the 
government-to-be) announced a policy proposal to prohibit the import of illegal timber; yet it was 
not until March 2011 when the first exposure draft was introduced to the Australian Parliament 
(Brack et al., 2012). Three public enquiries then occurred before the Australian Illegal Logging 
Prohibition Bill was passed by both houses of Parliament in the second half of 2012. The new laws 
became operational on 30 November 2014, and an independent review of the impact of those 
laws on small business was subsequently announced on 1 December 2014 (DAFF, 2014a). 
The Australian illegal logging laws emulate both the US and EU in requiring importers to develop 
due diligence systems. The Australian Prohibition laws echo the EU TR, and diverges from the 
Lacey Amendments, in focusing on 'importers and processors' of illegally-sourced timber, with 
culpability not passed on through subsequent trades (DAFF, 2014b). In contrast to both the US 
and EU laws, the Australian laws explicitly accept that certification by the FSC or PEFC, as well as 
FLEGT licences, comprise sufficient due diligence (ComLaw, 2013). 
Biofuels frameworks 
While governments' regulatory responses - illegal logging laws - have been exclusively concerned 
with timber, two governments have begun to account for some other deforestation commodities 
through their biofuels policy frameworks. 'Biofuels' are plant-derived oil blends that can 
supplement conventional petrol and diesel (bioethanol and biodiesel, respectively). Both the EU 
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and the US have major biofuels pohcy frameworks, which are intended to reduce reliance on 
imported fossil fuels and to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions associated with burning them. 
The EU's biofuels framework is set out in the Renewable Energy Directive [RED], which was 
updated in 2 0 0 9 to include a mandatory target for all member states of 10 percent renewable 
energy in the transport sector by the year 2020 [Johnson et al., 2012] , Importantly for the present 
study, the 2 0 0 9 version of the RED also introduced a number of sustainability criteria that 
biofuels must meet in order to count towards the mandatory target. These criteria addressed two 
sustainability issues - biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions - and were applied to all 
biofuels intended to count towards the RED target, including imported palm oil (a biodiesel] and 
soybean [a bioethanol; Pena et al., 2010) . In 2013 , the EU Parliament faced pressure to amend the 
RED framework to recognise that the indirect land use change from some biofuels could make 
their emissions higher than those of conventional fossil fuels (van Noorden, 2013) . In mid-2014, 
EU Energy ministers voted to resolve this issue by limiting the proportion of the biofuels target 
that can be met through fuels derived from food crops, otherwise known as 'first generation' 
biofuels, to 7 of the 10 percent (ICTSD, 2014a) , which the European Parliament's environmental 
committee more recently tightened to 6 percent (Lewis, 2015) . A final decision by the European 
Parliament remains outstanding. 
The EU is the world's primary importer of biofuels and as a result its approach to governing the 
sustainability of imported biofuels has 'transformed the biofuels market' not just in the EU but 
globally' (Johnson et al., 2012) . This has not exempted the US (and, even from within the EU, the 
UK) from grappling separately with how to ensure the sustainability of imported biofuels. The 
latest US biofuels policy framework - the Renewable Fuels Standard 2 (RFS2) - released in 2 0 1 4 
states that the US Environmental Protection Agency is 'actively continuing its evaluation of 
biodiesel produced from palm oil' with an expected completion date originally set for later in 
2 0 1 4 (EPA, 2013a) , but now clearly pushed to 2015. For the original RFS, the EPA released a 
preliminary determination finding that 'biodiesel and renewable diesel produced from palm oil do 
not meet the minimum 20 percent lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions reduction threshold 
necessary to qualify as a renewable fuel' (EPA, 2011) . 
Labelling reforms 
In each of 2009 , 2010 and 2011, an Australian coalition between the then-leader of the Australian 
Greens Party, Senator Bob Brown, and the independent Senator Nick Xenophon (as well as the 
National (rural) Party Senator Barnaby Joyce for the 2 0 0 9 Bill) introduced a draft piece of 
legislation into the Australian Parliament. The Bill was called the 'Food Standards Amendment 
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(Truth in Labelling - Palm Oil) Bill', and in each case it sought to achieve something very simple; 
to force manufacturers using palm oil to label it as such, rather than as the generic 'vegetable oil', 
on product packaging. The Bill was referred to mult iple committees for further review and 
ultimately not passed by the Parliament. 
An Explanatory Memorandum (EM) was circulated for the 2009 Bill outl ining the reason for the 
focus specifically on palm oil, which was due to the commodity's association with tropical 
deforestation. The EM stated that 'the current production of palm oil, which predominant ly occurs 
in Malaysia and Indonesia, results in extensive deforestation and, as a consequence, the removal 
of wildlife habitat, namely affecting the endangered orang-utan' (Xenophon et al, 2009). The 
purpose of the Bill, reiterated in 2011, was 'to provide consumers with accurate labelling 
information about palm oil to enable them to make an informed choice' (ibid.). 
Whi le the objectives of these bills might at first appear cosmetic and relatively straightforward, 
product labelling at the time was an active policy area in Australia. This fact complicated these 
palm oil-specific proposals, as the House of Representatives Economics Committee noted in 2011, 
after reviewing the latter version of the bill. The flaws noted by the Committee included: 
• that a systemic review into Australia's labelling laws (the Blewett Review) had already been 
undertaken (iv), 
the Committee's view that - because of various legal complications in Australian labelling 
laws - 'the Bill will not bring about the desired result' but would instead 'have a range of 
unintended consequences' (iii), 
the Committee's view that by 'singling out palm oil', the Bill is 'more discriminatory than 
necessary to fulfil a health or environmental objective', meaning that 'Australia would then 
be at risk of a trade dispute under WTO rules', especially given that 
• 'Malaysia and Indonesia have already indicated that they are prepared to take this step' 
(Economics Committee, 2011:iv). 
Some of these arguments will be visited in later chapters, including Chapter 6, which explores the 
need for downstream governments to justify to foreign audiences - and specifically producer 
countries - their responses to tropical deforestation. Incidentally, when the Labelling Review was 
released in 2011 (prior to the Economics Committee's report, above), it included a 
recommendat ion that sugars, fats and vegetable oils should be specifically named (Blewett et al., 
2011). Interestingly, this recommendat ion was made to address health concerns about the 
inclusion of unspecified ingredients; in contrast, environmental concerns were categorised as a 
'consumer value issue' which - the Review argued - 'is best left as a market response mechanism 
regulated by consumer protection laws' (ibid.:97). 
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Australia is not the only jurisdiction engaged in product labelling reform that affects the 
deforestation commodit ies. In 2011, the EU Parl iament agreed to comprehensively update its 
labell ing laws, with the new rules applying since late 2014 (EC, 2013d). Whi le these reforms are 
driven by nutrit ional concerns and are systematic rather than focused on particular ingredients, 
commodit ies such as palm oil and soybean oil will be caught in the net and will therefore need to 
be specified as ingredients from 2014 onwards (EC, 2013e]. (In Chapter 7, a participant in this 
study from a major retailer will remark that these reforms have been a motivation for companies 
to address the use of palm oil in their supply chains.) 
CITES 
Governments, uniquely amongst the actors canvassed in this thesis, can collaborate to create 
legally-binding international treaties, conventions and agreements. In 1975, concern over 
international trafficking (trade) in endangered species ultimately led to the establishment of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wi ld Fauna and Flora (CITES). Yet 
whi le it has existed for almost four decades, CITES' relevance for this study was greatly enhanced 
dur ing the last few years with a trend towards 'uplisting' (registering) hundreds of commercially 
valuable t imber species - many of them tropical species - to the CITES Appendices, providing the 
organisation with a mandate over their trade. Ahead of the 2013 annual meeting of the 
organisation, john Scanlon, the Secretary-General of CITES, affirmed the significance of this trend: 
T think one of the most significant [agenda items] is the number of proposals that are 
coming from range states [countries of origin] to list high value t imber species. A number 
of years ago, there was some resistance to incorporating a commercially valuable t imber 
species under CITES. We've seen a significant transition there, where we now see range 
states seeing the benefit of CITES... We've gone from 10-20 t imber species under the 
convention, to 350 now. 
'So I think here we've seen the international communi ty turn to CITES as a reliable and 
useful instrument in regulating international trade in commercially valuable timber... I 
found that significant' (Scanlon, in Neme, 2013). 
The aim of CITES is 'to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants 
does not threaten their survival', a task that 'requires international cooperation' (CITES, undated). 
Yet CITES has suffered - and in many cases, continues to suffer - from a persistent lack of the 
political will necessary to both conduct baseline research to inform listings, and then enforce 
those listings (Cooney et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2010). Recent government commitments (eg. 
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Obama, 2014] to tackle illegal wildlife trafficking suggest that governments - including major 
'destination' (consumer) countries, such as the US - are committed to rejuvenating CITES and also 
to enact other complementary responses. 
Collaborations 
This study's set of downstream responses to tropical deforestation is characterised by significant 
levels of experimentation [an argument made in full in Chapter 2). One telling aspect of this 
experimentation is the number of collaborative responses that have emerged across companies, 
and between companies and governments. An example is the Consumer Goods Forum [CGF], 'a 
global, parity-based industry network' consisting of over 400 retailers, manufacturers, service 
providers and other stakeholders with combined sales of €2.5 trillion and nearly 10 million 
employees (CGF, 2014a]. Sustainability is one of the CGF's five 'strategic priorities', and in 2010 
the CGF Board agreed to 'mobilise resources to achieve net zero deforestation by 2020' (CGF, 
2014b]. The CGF Board noted the sources of its motivation: 'the attribution of 20 percent of all 
greenhouse gas emissions to deforestation', and the fact that the cultivation of palm oil and soya, 
logging for paper and board and the rearing of cattle are 'generally acknowledged as the greatest 
drivers of this phenomenon' (CGF, 2014b]. As should by now be clear, these motivations closely 
align with the understanding of the causes of contemporary tropical deforestation presented in 
the first half of this chapter, and drawn on - implicitly and explicitly - by many actors enacting 
responses. 
In 2012 at the 'Rio+20' inter-governmental sustainability conference in Rio de Janiero, the 
US Government announced a 'joint initiative with the Consumer Goods Forum' (CGF, 2012]. 
Although details were initially scant, the two entities would 'forge a private-public partnership to 
support a concerted international effort to reduce deforestation by promoting sustainable supply 
chains' (p i ) . This initiative later became known as the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA], with its 
mission statement noting its intention to 'tackle the drivers of tropical deforestation using a range 
of market, policy and communications approaches' (TFA, 2012:1], Since its formation, several 
other governments have joined the TFA, including the UK, Norway, Netherlands, as well as Liberia 
and Indonesia (TFA, 2014]. More recently, many NGOs and research institutions (and even the 
FSC] have joined the TFA, signifying its evolution into a broad multi-actor collaboration that can 
'serve as a marketplace of ideas and initiatives to tackle tropical deforestation' (ibid.]. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the phenomenon of tropical deforestation, noting its magnitude, pace 
and regional variation. It has also explored reasons why continued deforestation - and indeed, its 
gentle acceleration - might be considered problematic. The chapter then canvassed this study's 
first building block; an understanding accepted by downstream actors that contemporary 
deforestation is primarily driven by commercial production of the four 'deforestation 
commodities'. The fraction of each of these commodities that is exported connects deforestation 
to the often distant consumption patterns of downstream actors. The implication of these four 
commodities in deforestation is well-evidenced, and they are especially prominent in the locations 
where recent deforestation has been most acute. Nevertheless, the role of these commodities in 
contemporary deforestation is only partial. 
This study's second building block is a distinct set of responses from downstream actors to their 
connection to tropical deforestation. A chronological account of these responses emphasised two, 
roughly decade-long phases of downstream actors responses, with the first decade consisting 
primarily of the formation of the FSC and associated corporate sourcing policies for timber. A 
second phase began around 2004, where new responses-types emerged, attention expanded from 
timber to other relevant commodities, and collaborations became more common. These phases 
suggest that within the 'age of experimentation' that comprises the last two decades (noting that 
the FSC was a novel response at the time of its formation), there has been an intensification in 
experimentation over the most recent decade. 
These responses - to the author's knowledge - have not previously been gathered together for 
collective examination. Yet in exploring the limitations on their potential contribution to slowing 
tropical deforestation, such a collective approach is necessary. The following chapters will 
proceed as follows. Chapter 2 will explain why, in light of other internationalised environmental 
problems, responses to tropical deforestation offer an unparalleled opportunity to interrogate 
how downstream actors approach the environmental problems of international trade. On the 
basis of this foundation. Chapter 2 will also present this study's research questions and 
methodology. Chapter 3 will synthesise relevant ideas from existing literatures to locate - and 
provide a basis for interrogating - these downstream responses. 
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Chapter 2 Research justification, questions and metliods 
Tropical deforestation is not the only environmental problem entangled with international 
trade, nor is it the only one that has elicited supply chain responses. This chapter will 
commence by canvassing the state knowledge as pertains to the environmental impacts of trade, 
placing tropical deforestation and its responses within their broader context. The chapter will 
then assert that tropical deforestation is a special case, and that its responses have unique 
characteristics that justify this study's scrutiny. This chapter will emphasise the bounded nature 
of deforestation's underlying environmental processes, the perception of its non-inevitability, 
and its confinement to trade in a limited number of commodities. The chapter then builds the 
argument that the range and number of responses for traded deforestation, as well as the 
genuine intent and momentum behind efforts to resolve the problem, offer an unparalleled case 
study for how contemporary environmental problems connected to international trade are 
being conceptualised and addressed. 
After this argument has been advanced, this chapter develops the research questions that guide 
the remainder of this study. To recall from the Introduction, the primary research question is 
divided into two sub-questions - one conceptual and one empirical - to further refine the 
contributions made by the following chapters. These two sub-questions then provide the 
structure for the remainder of the study, as each is sequentially addressed. Following the 
introduction of these research questions, the chapter outlines the methods undertaken to 
answer them, before discussing several key terms that reappear throughout the text. 
Tlie environmental impacts of trade 
Recent advances in computing capabilities, together with fine-grained trade data at the level of 
industries, commodities and even individual supply chains, have enabled quantification of 
international trade's significance for many contemporary environmental problems. The role of 
international trade in these problems is generally as a linking mechanism between the location 
of production or harvesting, which is where impacts are overwhelmingly incurred, and the 
locations where the resulting commodities are consumed. 
As a prime example of these new research possibilities, Lenzen et al. (2012] directed a 
mammoth computing task covering more than 5 billion supply chains to detect links between 
trade in given commodities and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature's (lUCN) 
'Red List of Threatened Species', which determines at-risk species and also canvasses the 
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par t i cu lar t h r e a t s t h e y face ( s e e lUCN, 2 0 1 4 ) . T h u s both d i rec t threats , such as s p e c i e s 
harves t ing , and indirect threats , such as habi ta t loss and e c o s y s t e m pollution, a r e included 
within the s tudy's remit . Lenzen et al. ( 2 0 1 2 ] ul t imately conc lude that ' 3 0 per c e n t of global 
s p e c i e s t h r e a t s a r e due to in ternat ional t rade ' ( p l 0 9 } . T h e s e authors also produce a finding that 
is e c h o e d in m a n y o f the o t h e r s tudies this sec t ion will present , with r e s p e c t to a range of 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s ; specifically, that 'in m a n y developed countr ies , the c o n s u m p t i o n of 
impor ted . . . i t ems c a u s e s a b iodivers i ty footpr int that is larger a b r o a d than it is at h o m e ' ( p l 0 9 ) . 
Th is f inding suggests the potent ia l for internat ional t rade to act as a ' t rans locat ion ' m e c h a n i s m 
for e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s deriving from consumpt ion . 
G r e e n h o u s e gas e m i s s i o n s a r e a n o t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m in which internat ional t rade 
plays a s ignif icant role. Pe ters et al. ( 2 0 1 1 ] found that o v e r the t ime period 1 9 9 0 to 2 0 0 8 
' e m i s s i o n s f rom the product ion of [ internat ional ly- ] t raded goods and serv ices have increased 
from 4 .3 to 7 .8 g iga tonnes of c a r b o n dioxide' ( p 8 9 0 3 ] . F u r t h e r m o r e , whi le in 1 9 9 0 this figure 
r e p r e s e n t e d 2 0 p e r c e n t of global emiss ions , in 2 0 0 8 - against much larger total e m i s s i o n s - this 
p e r c e n t a g e had increased to 2 6 p e r c e n t of global emiss ions (ibid.]. T h e s e figures d e m o n s t r a t e 
that in ternat iona l ly - t raded goods n o w a c c o u n t for m o r e than a q u a r t e r of global g r e e n h o u s e gas 
e m i s s i o n s and that this p e r c e n t a g e has b e e n increas ing (ibid.]. T h e s e authors also note that 
' m o s t developed c o u n t r i e s have increased their c o n s u m p t i o n - b a s e d e m i s s i o n s fas ter than their 
terr i tor ia l e m i s s i o n s ' ( p 8 9 0 3 ] , which provides ev idence for the a r g u m e n t that internat ional 
t rade may be driving or e x a c e r b a t i n g g r e e n h o u s e gas emiss ions , ra ther than s imply being 
' c o n n e c t e d to' them. 
T h e s u b j e c t o f P e t e r s et al.'s ( 2 0 1 1 ] s tudy w a s the embodied emiss ions of in ternat ional ly- t raded 
goods and serv ices ( m e a n i n g the e m i s s i o n s incurred in o r d e r to produce them] . Another study 
identi f ied a crucial miss ing c o m p o n e n t of t rade-re la ted emiss ions : namely, the emiss ions 
r e q u i r e d to actual ly t r a n s p o r t goods from o n e country to another . In this study, Cristea e t al., 
( 2 0 1 3 ] find that ' internat ional t r a n s p o r t is respons ib le for 3 3 percent of wor ldwide t rade-
re la ted e m i s s i o n s ' ( p l 5 3 ] , m e a n i n g that a n o t h e r half of the emiss ions involved in producing 
g o o d s for in ternat iona l t rade is again required to transport them. In de termin ing 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ' s ' surpris ingly high s h a r e ' of t rade- re la ted emiss ions ( p l 7 0 ] , the study not only 
af f i rms the i r s igni f icance but a lso identif ies a n o t h e r p a t h w a y through which internat ional t rade 
is impl icated in e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s . In its amplif icat ion of the ' t ranspor t of invasive 
spec ies ' , B e n n e t t and Ba lvanera ( 2 0 0 7 ] note a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of an e n v i r o n m e n t a l 'external i ty ' 
e n a b l e d by in ternat iona l t rade ' s intensif ied global connec t ions . 
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International trade, generally of agricultural commodities, is also responsible for the transfer of 
large volumes of embodied water, which can theoretically create or exacerbate water scarcity in 
certain locations. Conceivably too, trade could ameliorate water scarcity in some locations, 
remedying global inequalities in water availability by enabling water-intensive commodities to 
be imported rather than domestically produced. In investigating this possibility quantitatively, 
Suweis et al. (2011, in Seekell et al., 2011:5) find that '4 percent of international trade 
connections account of 80 percent of virtual water transfers'. However, Seekell et al. (2011) find 
that the volumes of water embodied in international trade are both too small and not travelling 
in the right direction to accomplish this redistribution. Subsequently, Lenzen et al. (2013) find 
both that 'the volume of [embodied] water trade [has] more than doubled over the past two 
decades' (p78) and that '32 percent of global scarce water consumption' is linked to 
international trade (p81). These authors conclude that 'developed countries increasingly import 
water embodied in goods from the rest of the world to alleviate pressure on domestic water 
resources' (p78). In effect, these authors show that developed countries use international trade 
to enable increased consumption of water-intensive products by exacerbating the scarcity of 
water elsewhere. 
Another study, by Wiedmann et al. (2013), uses the metric of a national 'material footprint' as a 
determinant of a country's impacts. This footprint is a measure of the total volumes of materials 
needed for a country's consumption and - crucially - also includes the embodied materials 
required to produce and transport goods but which are not consumed themselves. These 
authors find that international trade is heavily involved in facilitating the translocation of 
countries' material needs, with 'the real dependence on non-domestic resources far exceed[ing] 
the actual physical quantity of traded goods' (p2). They continue, stating that 'two-fifths of all 
global raw materials is extracted and used just to enable exports of goods and services to other 
countries. This is [about three times] more than the 10 Gt of direct physical trade of materials 
and products' (p2). These authors conclude that 'countries depend increasingly on international 
trade for acquiring their natural resource base' (p2). 
Land is another metric used to measure the pressures that countries place beyond their borders, 
with international trade enabling such transfers. Yu et al. (2013) seek to determine the amount 
of land that countries require in order to underpin the magnitude and composition of their 
consumption. These authors find that 'the US, EU and ]apan have the largest share of foreign 
land in their total land use' (pl lBO), with the US 'displacing' abroad 33 percent, the EU 
countries more than 50 percent and japan 92 percent of the land use requirements of their 
consumption. With specific regard to forested land, Yu et al. (2013) find that '27-67 percent of 
forestland in South-East Asia, China, Russia, Africa and Brazil is displaced for consumption in 
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rich countr ies, in part icu lar tine US and EU... a l though s imi lar pressures are exerted from fast 
g r ow i ng emerg ing economies ' ( p i 185). China, for example, displaces 5 mi l l ion hectares (50 000 
sq km] of crop land in Brazil, ma in ly for its impor ts of soybean (ibid.). Finally, and still using land 
use as a metr ic (l ike Yu etal . ; 2013) , Weinzet te l et al. (2013) explore the extent to wh ich 
aff luence is signif icant in de te rm in ing whe ther countr ies displace env i ronmenta l impacts. These 
au thors conclude that, 'in 2004, high-income countr ies required more biologically product ive 
land per capita than low-income countries, bu t this connect ion could only be identif ied when 
land used to produce internat ional ly traded products was taken into account, because 
higher-income countr ies tend to displace a larger fraction of land use' (p433) . 
T a b l e 2 .1 Headl ine conclusions of research quant i fy ing the in ternat iona l trade's connect ions to 
resource use and env i ronmenta l problems. 
Authors Metr i c /Prob lem Headl ine conclusion 
Lenzen et al. Endangered species '30 percent of global species threats are due to international trade' 
(2012) (p l09) 
Peters et al. GHGs (embodied) In 2008, 26 percent of global emissions derived from the production 
(2011) of internationally-traded goods and services (p8903) 
Christea etal. GHGs (transport) 'International transport [of traded goods] is responsible for 
(2013) 33 percent of worldwide trade-related emissions' (p l53) 
Suweis et al. Water '4 percent of international trade connections account for 80 percent 
(2011) of virtual [embodied] water transfers' (in Seekell etal., 2013) 
Lenzen etal. Scarce water '32 percent of global scarce water consumption' is embodied within 
(2013) internationally-traded goods (p81) 
Wiedmann et Material footprint 'two-fifths of all global raw materials is extracted and used just to 
al. (2013) enable exports of goods and services to other countries' (p2) 
Yu etal. Land 'the US (33pc), EU (>50pc) and [apan (92pc) have the largest share 
(2013) of foreign land in their total land use' ( p l l SO) 
'27-67 percent of forestland in South-East Asia, China, Russia, Africa 
and Brazil is displaced for consumption in rich countries, in 
particular the US and EU... although similar pressures are exerted 
from fast growing emerging economies' ( p l l 8 4 ) 
Weinzettel et Land 'higher income countries tend to displace a larger fraction of land 
al. (2013) use' (p433) 
Table 2.1 conta ins the headl ine f indings of these studies, wh ich form an emerg ing body of 
quant i ta t ive l i terature. Collectively, these studies demonst ra te robust ly that in ternat iona l trade 
connects countr ies to env i ronmenta l prob lems beyond their borders, and further, that the 
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magnitude of these connections are significant. For two of these cases - the emissions from 
transportation, and conduction of invasive species - trade can be unequivocally identified as a 
cause of problems. Additionally, for Lenzen et al.'s (2013) study of scarce water, trade is found 
to be responsible for 32 percent of global scarce water consumption; in other words, by 
enabling the transfer of embodied water out of situations of water scarcity, trade exacerbates 
that problem. 
For the remainder of these studies, it becomes necessary to find appropriate counter-factual to 
the present scenario, since it remains theoretically possible that trade could actually be 
ameliorating these environmental problems vis-a-vis a no-trade scenario. This exercise occurs 
within a loaded political dynamic. As Chapter 6 will elaborate upon, support for the further 
liberalisation and promotion of international trade is an article of faith among governments 
globally. These objectives are also institutionalised by the World Trade Organisation at the 
international level and by trade agencies and representatives at a national one. 
Several studies, including one from those presented above, have sought to better understand 
the likely consequences of a more liberalised trading system for environmental problems. For 
example, Cristea et al., (2013) find that in 2004, 31 percent of international trade by value 
resulted in a net reduction of emissions, while the remaining 69 percent does not. Using a 
general equilibrium model, these authors also find that under a trade liberalisation scenario, the 
tariff regimes that currently 'favour proximate and land-adjacent partners, who use rail and 
road transport to move goods short distances' would instead shift trade 'toward distant 
partners, [resulting in] a more intensive use of air cargo and transport emissions growth that is 
more rapid than trade growth' (pl70). This evidence provides direct refutation of the hope that 
trade might ameliorate greenhouse gas emissions. 
An additional study by Schmitz et al. (2012] cites research that shows 'trade liberalisation leads 
only to small land-use shifts in Europe but dramatic shifts in developing regions' (pl90}. As for 
their own study, which explores the effects of trading more food across international distances, 
Schmitz et al. (2012) conclude that, 'bringing environmental and economic aspects together, our 
result is that economic benefits [of trade liberalisation] are generated at the costs of the 
environment' (pl99). Finally, Richards et al. (2012) conduct a study with specific relevance to 
tropical deforestation, highlighting the inter-dependent relationships between the production of 
soybean in the Amazon and macro-economic variables such as exchange rates. These authors 
show that vast additional areas of soybean production - comprising 29 percent of the total 
harvest area, or 63 000 sq km, in 2009 - were stimulated by the devaluing of the Brazilian 
currency, the real, against the US dollar. These authors note that 'as trade barriers and 
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transportation costs decline... the impact of exchange rates on the location and distribution of 
[agricultural] production will only increase' (p461}. 
Drawing on an emerging body of literature, this synopsis has conclusively demonstrated that 
international trade plays a significant role in multiple major environmental problems. While 
several of these problems - biodiversity loss and land requirements, for example - are directly 
relevant to tropical deforestation. Chapter 1 has already shown that deforestation is itself one 
such problem, with international trade linking the production and distant consumption of the 
four deforestation commodities. Two questions remain, the first of which is whether trade 
exacerbates or ameliorates environmental problems. Answers to this question could potentially 
differ for each problem. One study that specifically sought an answer to this question was 
conducted by Christea et al. (2013], who used a general equilibrium model to conclude that only 
31 percent of trade in 2004 resulted in a net reduction of emissions, meaning that over 
two-thirds of trade did not. Other studies answer this question implicitly; for example, Yu et al.'s 
(2013) finding that )apan displaces more land for its consumption that it possesses; and Lenzen 
et al.'s (2013) finding that 32 percent of scarce water is extracted in order to be traded, 
exacerbating that problem. Yet regardless of whether counter-factuals have been examined, one 
clear pattern emerges from these studies: namely that countries are not just implicated in 
environmental problems beyond their borders, but they also depend on those 'translocated 
environmental pressures' to underwrite the current magnitude and composition of their 
material consumption, land and resource use. Further, as a number of these studies note, it is 
the affluent, developed countries that are disproportionately implicated. 
This leads to the second question, which is whether the causation or exacerbation of these 
problems by international trade is nevertheless justified by the benefits - economic, employment 
etc. - that it enables. Given the rarity with which the environmental 'trade-offs' of the trade 
liberalisation agenda - or even of current levels of trade - are acknowledged, that agenda has so 
far avoided such an honest appraisal of its merits. A measure of the success of the above studies, 
then, as well as the openness of debate around international trade and its proposed 
liberalisation, therefore lies in the extent to which this question is acknowledged and answered 
by trade's proponents. 
For the environmental problem this study is concerned with - tropical deforestation - the 
emergence of a set of responses from downstream actors provides a strong indication that trade 
in the deforestation commodities cannot be justified at the continuing expense of tropical 
forests. This argument, which will be made explicit in Chapter 4's discussion of actors' 
motivations for responses, therefore precipitates a further question: 'What can be done when 
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international trade's connections become problematic?'. The set of responses introduced in 
Chapter 1 are, in essence, attempted answers to this question, since they reflect an acceptance 
both that international trade connects downstream actors to tropical deforestation, and also 
that actors have judged this particular environmental trade-off to be unwarranted, or 
unjustifiable. As such, these responses provide a prominent case - or as the following section 
will argue, the prominent case - for examining how actors address problematic connections 
forged through international trade to distant environmental problems. The following section 
locates this quest for responses to international trade's deforestation connections within the 
environmental governance literature. 
W h y t raded deforestat ion, and responses for it? 
In Chapter 1, the connection between tropical deforestation and international trade was given 
the explicit name of 'traded deforestation'. The previous section positioned traded deforestation 
as just one of many environmental problems that are entangled with international trade (where 
'trade' can refer either to a component of overall economic activity or to specific sets of supply 
chains}. In singling out traded deforestation as especially worthy of further examination, then, 
this study will now build an argument for why this problem - and responses that have emerged 
to it - warrants this attention more so than any other possible candidates. 
These other candidates provide a useful starting point. As the above section canvassed, 
quantitative research has connected international trade to multiple environmental problems, 
including greenhouse gas emissions, scarce water use, land use, threats to endangered species 
and material footprints. Tellingly, few of these problems - with one major exception in CITES, 
for threats to endangered species - have elicited policy, regulatory or institutional governance 
responses focused on supply chains, although 'precursor' tools based on measurement and 
information - such as footprinting, for example - are becoming more prevalent [O'Rourke, 
2014]. There are multiple reasons for the absence of supply-chain responses to other problems, 
beginning with the difficulty of adequately defining boundaries for these problems. What, for 
example, is an acceptable level of greenhouse emissions, water use, land use or material 
footprint for a given level of traded production? In comparison, tropical deforestation has the 
distinct advantage of being a conceptually bounded problem conducive to an unambiguous 
position. Companies and governments in the West know precisely how much tropical 
deforestation they wish to be associated with or implicated in: none. The gravitation of actors 
towards this position is evidenced by the current debate over the parameters of 'no net 
deforestation' (Brown and Zarin, 2013; The Forests Dialogue, 2014). In contrast, some net 
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positive quantity of water and area of land is required to grow any agricultural commodity, just 
as t ransport ing those commodities internationally necessarily incurs some volume of 
greenhouse gas emissions. There are no equivalently unambiguous positions that actors can 
seek for these problems, since all agriculture requires these inputs and all transportation 
necessitates this output. 
Unlike these other environmental problems, then, tropical deforestation cannot be cast as 
'inevitable' for ongoing agricultural production and subsequent trade, even for those 
commodities currently implicated in driving that deforestation. In my view, this perception of 
contingency has been an absolutely critical factor behind the public and genuine acceptance of 
the connection of international trade in certain commodities to deforestation. No doubt this 
acceptance is aided by the small number of commodities directly implicated, which provides a 
tractable focus on certain supply chains. So then, these three features of traded deforestation -
the perception that it is (a] a bounded problem conducive to an unambiguous position, (b] 
connected to a limited number of commodities, and (c) is not regarded as inevitable - have 
provided fertile soil for the subsequent emergence of responses to traded deforestation. These 
characteristics define the uniqueness of traded deforestation as a problem, and in turn provide 
a basis for understanding the emergence of responses of a range and number that are not 
matched by those for other, comparable international environmental problems. 
However, because the subject matter of this study is not the problem of traded deforestation but 
instead the array of policy, regulatory and institutional responses to that problem, further 
analysis is also warranted to ascertain the uniqueness of these responses. For although the 
above examples of environmental problems (greenhouse gas emissions, land use, material 
footprint, etc.) have not yet generated any strong examples of governance responses, there are 
other problems that have generated such responses. And similarly to those for traded 
deforestation, many of these responses have also focused on international supply chains. For 
instance, CITES is a clear and longstanding supply chain-based response to the problem of 
international trade in endangered flora and fauna, while the Basel Convention provides another 
example where many governments have agreed on a collective response for ' t ransboundary 
movements ' (international trade) in hazardous wastes. 
Temporarily casting a gaze beyond predominantly 'environmental ' problems, other examples of 
supply chain-based responses to problematic trades also swim into focus. Multiple responses 
have recently sought to address perceived problems with trade in minerals and metals, the 
so-called 'hard' commodities. These commodities attracted negative attention in the early 2000s 
as concern emerged over the role of conflict diamonds in perpetuating and exacerbating 
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Liberia's civil war. At that time, the UN Security Council banned the purchase of diamonds 
exported from that country (UNSC, 2001). The Security Council later banned purchases of 
Liberian timber exports after it emerged that revenues from those exports had been 
compensating for the loss of revenues from diamond exports (UNSC, 2003). In the Security 
Council's latter decision, it also encouraged the Liberian Government to join the Kimberley 
Process, the only functioning example of an international government-sponsored certification 
scheme, which was endorsed by both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council 
prior to its launch in 2003 (Global Witness, 2011a). 
More recently still, 'conflict minerals' also entered the lexicon, referring to the mining of tin, 
tungsten, tantalum and gold (and occasionally other metals) in the eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo. These metals are required in small amounts for all electronic devices, including 
computers and mobile phones. Both the US and EU have recently initiated responses to 
international trade in conflict minerals: the US setting out due diligence requirements for 
importers in the Dodd-Frank Act (USSEC, 2010), while - at the time of writing - the EU has 
proposed a voluntary 'self-certification' approach to due diligence (EC, 2014a). The voluntary 
nature of the EU's position jars with both its and the US' mandatory, regulatory-based response 
to illegal logging, which form a part of this study. (Chapter 4 will suggest a confluence between 
hard commodities and deforestation in light of an apparent shift in the drivers of deforestation 
towards mining, including for coal, gold and other minerals and metals. Consequently, US and 
EU regulatory responses to traded deforestation may soon need to elevate the importance of 
these and other 'hard commodities' for already-agreed policy objectives on deforestation.) 
These examples demonstrate that, both in concert and individually, governments have 
responded - and are currently responding - to problems associated with international trade of 
commodities beyond traded deforestation. In this sense, government responses to traded 
deforestation (scrutinised more fully in Chapter 6) may be better conceived as part of a piqued 
interest - and crucially, renewed willingness - to experiment with responses to this type of 
policy problem. As Chapter 6 will also bear out, however, significant barriers remain on both the 
scope and nature of actions that governments are currently willing to countenance. 
The private sector has also responded to perceived problems within international supply chains. 
The major clothing and footwear multinationals, a category that includes Nike, Reebok, Adidas, 
Puma and many other well-known brands, have launched initiatives to address both alleged and 
proven cases of social harm perpetrated through the contracts they outsource for the 
manufacture of their products. For the private sector too, then, responding to traded 
deforestation is less a 'new thing under the sun' and more an extension of an extant approach 
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(even if many individual companies may be responding to their supply chains for the first time]. 
The role of NGOs in exposing the connection betw^een individual companies and unfavourable 
outcomes is a further similarity betw^een corporate sourcing policies for clothing and footwear, 
on the one hand, and to traded deforestation commodities on the other. 
Given that responses have clearly emerged for other problems, then, what makes responses to 
traded deforestation especially worthy of further attention? The short answer is as follows: the 
set of responses to traded deforestation exhibit vastly greater range, number, novelty and - at 
the time of writing - momentum than any other environmental or social problem currently 
connected to international trade. In Cashore and Stone's [2012] words, these responses 'present 
students of public policy, regulations, international relations, and corporate social responsibility 
with one of the most innovative "policy baskets" available to practitioners of resource and 
environmental management' (p21]. As a consequence, they provide an unparalleled case study 
in understanding the potential and limitations of current attempts to govern these problems. 
Each of these characteristics will now be expanded upon. 
The range of responses was made apparent in Table 1.1, which listed eight different 
response-^pe5, encompassing actors from across downstream societies. Beginning with the 
private sector and civil society, it is almost impossible not to concede that NGO advocacy and 
activism efforts - mostly targeted at individual companies - have been tremendously successful 
in stimulating corporate responses to traded deforestation. Companies have also united within 
major peer-group organisations such as the Consumer Goods Forum, which in 2010 elected 
traded deforestation as one of two environmental priority areas, and the CGF has in turn 
partnered with consumer country governments to form the Tropical Forest Alliance. Also within 
the private sector, trade and industry associations such as the Dutch and Belgian palm oil 
industries have forged policies for the palm oil that they import. NGOs with environmental and 
social foci have also devoted considerable attention to the problem of traded deforestation. 
While Chapter 1 noted that governments have been slower than companies to deploy responses 
to traded deforestation, they have still responded across their multiple roles to that problem. 
The earliest and by far most widespread response has been to design public procurement 
policies for timber. A handful of governments (the US, EU and Australia) have also designed 
regulatory responses to traded deforestation, focused on illegal timber. Some governments have 
also begun, perhaps tentatively, to design responses for other commodities relevant to traded 
deforestation, beginning with palm oil, which the EU's amended biofuels framework (from 2009) 
covers, and for which a UK procurement policy emerged in 2012. Taken together with corporate 
(policy) and civil society (generally institutional) responses, these public, regulatory responses 
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reveal the extent to which actors have engaged with the particular problem of traded 
deforestation, generating an unparalleled range of responses in the process. 
Coupled with their range, the number of responses to traded deforestation comfortably eclipses 
in number those that map onto any other single trade-related environmental problem. Indeed, 
even considering sustainability schemes for one of the deforestation commodities - timber -
alone, their proliferation has begun to cause confusion and - as Chapter 5 will detail - some 
deleterious outcomes from competition. The plethora of company sourcing policies that have 
emerged for commodities such as palm oil (see Climate and Land Use Alliance, 2014] and public 
procurement policies for timber (see Brack, 2014) further bolster the overall number of 
responses. 
Taken together, then, the number and range of these responses suggest a prominence for the 
problem of traded deforestation that supersedes that of any other international environmental 
problem over the last decade (noting that concern over climate change has frequently been 
channelled into tropical deforestation). Another characteristic worthy of mention is the novelty 
of many response-types, which in many cases (Roundtables, Tropical Forest Alliance, FLEGT, 
public procurement) have been innovated specifically for the deforestation commodities and in 
others (CITES, illegal logging, biofuels frameworks) have been significantly extended to enable 
their application to those commodities. Recall that this innovation, by all actors, in response to 
the problem of traded deforestation is one half of the explanation for this study's claim that the 
last two decades have been an 'age of experimentation'. The other half of that explanation, as 
noted, is the uncertainty that lingers over what these responses can and cannot be expected to 
contribute to their objective of slowing tropical deforestation. 
There is one final characteristic - momentum - that is necessary to adequately summarise 
(especially) the last decade of responses to traded deforestation. At the time of writing, the UN 
Climate Summit, held in New York in September 2014, has only recently produced the 'New 
York Declaration on Forests' which reports that 'for the first time, world leaders endorse a 
global timeline to cut loss of natural forest in half by 2020, and strive to end it by 2030' (New 
York Climate Summit, 2014). The document notes that 'the Declaration comes at a critical time 
for forests - in the midst of a radical transformation of commodity sectors' (ibid.), a clear 
reference to the expected effects of the focus of this study's responses on the deforestation 
commodities. Multiple other major conferences, whether targeting private or public sector 
actors, show how pertinent are concerns over traded deforestation (eg. Innovation Forum, 2015; 
Forests Asia Summit, 2014; The Forests Dialogue, 2014). 
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A contributing factor to this momentum, 1 would suggest, is the authenticity - or genuineness -
of actors' ambitions to in some way address their connection to tropical deforestation. While 
multiple motivations support many of this study's responses to traded deforestation, I believe 
that intrinsic to all responses is an intention to honestly address some form of the underlying 
problem. (Chapters 3 and 4 will further explore the way that traded deforestation is 
conceptualised within the forms taken by responses.) This perception of genuineness does not 
preclude a basis for scepticism about some actors' motivations for addressing traded 
deforestation, including for example that some consumer countries are attracted to argue for 
the further protection of tropical forests to distract from the need to tackle significant domestic 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions and associated industries (eg. Lang, 2014; Amazon Watch 
et al., 2013]. And as Chapter 4 will detail, the motivations for other responses, such as the US 
and EU's illegal logging legislation, go well beyond an abiding interest in the world's tropical 
forests. Similarly, there is no denying that some companies are motivated to respond primarily 
by the threat of NGO campaigns against them. Yet as Chapter 4 also discusses, responses' 
political attractiveness and the perceived susceptibility of actors to NGO campaigns can bolster 
the support that responses receive. 
Yet even in acknowledging that not all actors are acting from the lofty motive of wanting an end 
to tropical deforestation, what cannot be denied is that the emergence of most responses are 
premised on a recognition that traded deforestation is a real problem requiring redress. How 
else could the sentiments of Gavin Neath, the Senior Vice President of Sustainability at Unilever, 
be explained, given his view that "Greenpeace was right to attack us" (in Mongabay, 2013d)? 
Similarly, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, downstream governments have been required to 
navigate occasionally fierce protestation by actors - including governments - within producer 
countries, in order to enact response-types such as illegal logging legislation and biofuels 
frameworks. That these responses should have been enacted despite this protestation, which 
sometimes crosses over the border into outright threats, suggests a firm resolve to respond to 
the underlying problem. 
To conclude, then, traded deforestation has generated a greater number and range of responses 
- including many novel ones - than any other comparable problem. It is also underpinned by an 
(at times) surging momentum and a genuine intention on the part of many actors to resolve it. 
These features render the set of responses to traded deforestation an unparalleled opportunity 
to examine and better understand the nature and behaviour of supply chain-focused attempts to 
resolve environmental problems, potentially holding broader lessons for responses to other 
problems associated with international trade. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that the 'current-ness' of responses to traded deforestation has posed 
some challenges during the research period, as relevant announcements and strategies have 
required either rapid incorporation into existing themes or in some cases reorientation of those 
themes to accommodate the latest evidence. Yet this same current-ness has also provided 
considerable inspiration throughout that same research period, with the hope that this study's 
findings might contribute to an active area of both study and practice, illuminating the 
conceptual nature and empirical behaviour of responses to traded deforestation, and in doing so 
satisfy a palpable deficit in our collective understanding of what these responses might, and 
conversely might not, be capable of achieving. 
I n t roduc ing this study's research ques t ions 
The preceding section identified the characteristics of responses to traded deforestation that 
make them a peerless case study for examining how downstream actors have sought to address 
the environmental impacts of international trade. It is important to recognise how this 
statement quickly leads to perhaps 'the ultimate' question that can and should be asked of these 
responses: simply, 'do they work?'. The discussion below will explain what attempts have been 
made within the literature to answer this question, as well as why this current study does not 
itself pursue that question directly. 
Each of the many types of response that have emerged for traded deforestation has attracted 
research and policy attention individually. Some responses, such as the FSC, have inspired a 
deluge of research, at least in part due to its novelty as an instrument or mechanism. It took 
more than a decade from the FSC's inception, however, before comprehensive conclusions on 
that response's 'effectiveness' began to be reached and the question of whether it 'works' was 
approached (Cashore et al., 2004; Auld et al., 2008; Moog et al., 2012). Once the turn towards 
'macro-effectiveness' began, both individual responses (Auld et al., 2008; see Gulbrandsen, 2009, 
for a related take on the MSG) and response-types, such as sustainability schemes, have been 
scrutinised (Steering Committee, 2012; Dauvergne and Lister, 2012; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010). 
The innovative form of the NGO-industry Roundtables - of which FSC was developed first, 
followed by the RSPO, RTRS and the RSB - has meant they have attracted the most attention 
from researchers, with bodies of research exploring their 'emergence and proliferation', 
'legitimacy and accountability', and 'effectiveness and broader consequences', among other 
aspects (Newell et al., 2012:374). Yet even within the sustainability scheme 'response-type', 
examples are usually analysed individually (see Shouten et al., 2012, and McCarthy, 2012, for 
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exceptions). Other research has organised itself according to whether responses are 
market-based or information-based (eg. Biermann and Pattberg, 2008] . 
Revealingly, a recent wide-ranging assessment of sustainability schemes (Steering Committee, 
2 0 1 2 ) also contained some exploratory analysis on the pathways through which sustainability 
schemes influence the underlying processes of production. In other words, this assessment 
identified that in order to answer the question of whether schemes 'work' it is also (if not first) 
necessary to understand how they might work in generating their effects. This task of mapping 
out influence pathways for schemes has also been approached by Cashore and Stone (2012) , 
with respect to interactions between legality and sustainability-based schemes, and in a broader 
sense (i.e. beyond schemes) by Bernstein and Cashore (2012) , who develop a framework to 
'facilitate the shift from [a study of responses'] 'effectiveness' to 'influence" (p587]. The very 
need for this shift to occur confirms the point here that our understanding of how schemes work 
remains too incomplete to be able to fully address the overarching question of whether they can 
be said to work. Further, what applies to sustainability schemes, which are by far the most 
scrutinised response-type within this study's remit, applies equally - if not more so - to the 
other response-types. 
Almost all of this research has tended to group responses on the basis of their form (with 
voluntary, multi-actor responses such as Roundtables predominating), rather than according to 
their objective. Given that multiple actors have identified traded deforestation as an 
environmental problem warranting a series of responses, however, it makes intuitive sense for 
research to align itself with the collective ambitions of these responses. Such an alignment 
merely applies one of the tenets of governance theory - aligning institutions to the problems 
they address - to the research that examines those problems. It may also contribute to 
Biermann et al.'s (2010) call for 'innovative research... to analyse political options to govern 
sustainable development' (p203], namely by examining a set of extant options with shared 
characteristics. The alignment between problem and research scope that this study attempts 
has an added benefit in allowing the question of 'how responses work' to be extended to include 
the question of how they might work together. This remains another potentially crucial 
shortcoming in current understandings of responses, as Bernstein and Cashore (2012) note: 
'...simple comparisons of governance mechanisms are of limited value. Rather, it is often 
the interaction of mechanisms and processes, sometimes along multiple pathways, that 
create collective influence' (p603]. 
This study acknowledges, then, that despite the desirability of answering the overarching 
question - 'do they work?' - for responses to traded deforestation, this question is unable to be 
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approached directly. Other authors emphatically concur with this point, concluding that 'it is too 
early to critically assess whether these [responses] are better equipped to tackle the problems 
of the twenty-first century, despite much emerging scholarship on this issue' (Newell et al., 
2012:369); that 'the evidence base for assessing the impacts of these interventions... in tropical 
forest landscapes remains limited' (Newton et al., 2013:1762]; and that 'given the paucity of 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of single instruments and their partial effect within 
policy mixes, it is premature to propose optimal combinations of instruments' (Lambin et al., 
2014:137). 
Clearly, then, better understandings of how responses work - their mechanisms or pathways of 
influence - are needed before their potential contribution to slowing deforestation can be 
delineated. Through its exploration this study is able to contribute to several important aspects 
of this question, including the aforementioned deficit of understanding in how this set of 
responses might work together. Further support for this collective approach can be found from 
Newton et al. (2013), who conclude that: 
'Studying the collective experience of multiple interventions across commodities and 
spatial contexts is necessary to generate more systematic understandings of the impacts 
of commodity supply chain interventions in forest-agriculture landscapes... and also of 
the conditions under which different interventions lead to trade-offs and synergies 
between goals' (pl768). 
Newton et al.'s noting of the possibility of trade-offs between responses will prove particularly 
salient in the empirical chapters of this study. Bernstein and Cashore (2012) also refer to this 
possibility in noting that responses' 'multiple channels of influence may be synergistic, or they 
may overlap, perhaps with contradictory authorities and mandates' (p589). 
Summarising, then, there is strong and recent recognition and support within environmental 
governance literatures for this study's approach, on three counts: that responses should be 
examined collectively, that the focus of that examination should shift away from responses' 
'effectiveness' and towards their 'influence', and that for reasons including a 'limited evidence 
base' it is too soon to conclusively determine whether responses work. 
Before turning to this study's research questions, it is worth briefly delineating several further 
reasons why efforts to directly answer the overarching question of whether responses work are 
likely to be misguided. Firstly, there are problems of delayed and incomplete observation, 
where outcomes for either tropical forests or the processes of deforestation are difficult to 
detect. Secondly, even when changes are detected, there are considerable problems attributing 
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those changes to any particular source, whether singular or multiple. This is because the 
decisions made by governments, companies and individuals with the ability to directiy affect 
processes of deforestation can be inscrutable, and it is difficult to determine the veracity and 
completeness of any explanations that may be offered. Thirdly, even in rare cases where a given 
response appears to have generated an intended effect, uncertainty remains over what 
unintended effects might also have been generated. As the following chapter's discussion of 
displacement will bear out, the global interconnectedness of diverse pockets of economic 
activity makes it extremely difficult to understand the full consequences of any single policy or 
action, let alone multiple that might be at work on the same subject simultaneously. 
Further, there is also a temporal source of ignorance, stemming from the (in some cases, very) 
novel nature of many of these responses. Many responses were developed only in the late 2000s 
or early 2010s; for instance, the EU illegal logging legislation was implemented in early 2013. 
This recentness makes it difficult even to detect the changes that might be occurring in tropical 
forests over such a short time period, a problem then compounded by the aforementioned 
difficulties of attribution, and so on. And finally, there is the absence of a counter-factual. It 
might be tempting for some to conclude that these responses have been wholly ineffective, since 
the rate of aggregate tropical deforestation has been slowly climbing over the two decades in 
which they have existed. Yet how this trend would have differed in the absence of these 
responses - the appropriate counter-factual - is not just unknown, but unknowable. 
All in all, then, it is both too early and too empirically-fraught to directly approach the question 
of whether this set of responses works. This study's approach aims to keep this ultimate 
question in mind, however, rather than channelling itself off in pursuit of more manageable 
targets. It achieves this mainly by focusing not on responses' potential to contribute, but on the 
limitations of that contribution. Of course, responses' potential and limitations are intimately 
linked, yet in avoiding attribution and other difficulties the latter provides a more robust target 
for scrutiny. As referred to above, this study also adheres to - and seeks to advance - the recent 
conclusions within governance literatures that responses can valuably be examined both 
collectively and - especially relevant for Chapter 7 - in pursuit of their capacity to 'influence', 
rather than their as-yet undetermined 'effectiveness'. 
Bearing these foundations in mind, this study's primary research question can therefore be 
presented as follows: 
Primary research question: What will limit - or otherwise determine - the contribution 
of the current set of responses from downstream actors to slowing tropical deforestation? 
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The importance of this question - and its relevance to researchers, practitioners and 
policymakers alike - remains effectively unchanged since the formation of the FSC in the early 
1990s, despite an increasingly populated governance landscape, and continuing tropical [and 
traded) deforestation. In order to delineate approaches to the primary research question above, 
the question can be broken down into two dimensions (one conceptual and one empirical). 
Taken respectively, this yields the following two sub-questions: 
Sub-question la: What does the conceptual nature of responses (ie. their design) suggest 
about any limitations on their potential contribution? 
and. 
Sub-question lb: What does the empirical behaviour of responses suggest about any 
limitations on their potential contribution? 
These two sub-questions home in on two broadly-distinguished sources of limitations that 
might determine the contribution that responses can make to slowing deforestation. They also 
provide the structure for the remainder of the study, as shown in Table 2.1, which details both 
the chapters that address each question as well as the prevailing themes of those questions. 
Table 2.2 Chapters contributing to research sub-questions, including major themes. 
Research sub-question Contributing chapters Themes 
1-a. Conceptual (3,) 4, 7 Framing (3,4), coverage (4), influence 
limitations beyond coverage (7), interactions (4) 
1-b. Empirical 5, 6,7 Consequences of competition (5), 
limitations perceived constraints (6), influence 
beyond coverage (7) 
This study's answers to these questions will address several deficits that have already been 
referred to explicitly, but will be collated here. The primary importance of answering these 
questions is to continue building towards a deeper, more sophisticated understanding of what 
current supply-chain focused responses from downstream actors are capable of achieving with 
respect to slowing tropical deforestation. Through its exploration of the nature and behaviour of 
'one of the most innovative "policy baskets" available' [Cashore and Stone, 2012:21), the study 
will provide contributions to Newell et al.'s (2012) question of whether and how 'equipped' 
these responses are 'to tackle the problems of the twenty-first century' (p369). Crucially, the 
study's collective approach to responses will enable it to contribution in a broad sense to the 
need Newton etal. (2013) identify 'to generate more systematic understandings of the impacts 
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of commodity supply chain interventions in forest-agriculture landscapes' (1768). This 
contribution is also called for by Bernstein and Cashore (2012), who note that further research 
'could help reveal... the contradictions and synergies of complex institutional arrangements 
through which policy change occurs' (p603], and Challies et al. (2014), who identify a 'need for 
detailed empirical analyses of specific governance arrangements under contemporary 
globalisation' (p33). 
Of course, responses to deforestation form (and symbolise) part of a much larger project, which 
has been alluded to as 'the grand challenge...[of] governance for sustainability' (Challies et al., 
2014:32). In its examination of these responses, this study therefore forms part of the trend 
noted by Bulkeley and )ordan (2012) towards 'an active reengagement with the transnational as 
a distinct and researchable sphere of politics' (p556), as well as contributing to Biermann et al.'s 
(2010) call for research to 'analyse political options to govern sustainable development' (p203). 
Together with climate change, with which it has nonetheless been robustly connected, traded 
deforestation has elicited the most prominent and advanced response from Western societies to 
Challies et al.'s 'grand challenge' as arguably any other contemporary, transnational 
environmental problem. 
Methods 
Chapters 3-7, which follow the current chapter, sequentially approach the research 
sub-questions introduced above. Chapter 3 synthesises relevant literatures, enabling Chapter 4 
to first explore the conceptual sub-question, examining how aspects of responses' nature, such 
as their coverage, limit their potential contribution to slowing tropical deforestation. 
Capitalising on the fact that responses are gathered together. Chapter 4 also scrutinises them 
collectively. This examination consists of two parts: firstly, comparing and contrasting notable 
features of responses within the set, and secondly, exploring the nature of formal, on-paper 
interactions between responses. 
The empirical material of the present study - applied to the empirical research sub-question 
above - emerges fully across Chapter 5, 6 and 7. These chapters draw on interviews and other 
material collected explicitly for this study, the process of which is outlined in some detail below. 
These chapters also pick up and elaborate on the theme, discovered in Chapter 4, of the 
importance of interactions between responses. 
Chapter Survev 
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Chapter 5 examines the sourcing pohcies that have emerged from within the private sector for 
the deforestation commodities. The chapter begins by conducting an indicative sample of the 
variety of different relationships that sourcing policies establish with sustainability schemes. To 
my knowledge, these relationships - what Chapter 5 calls 'recognition strategies' - have never 
before provided a discrete subject of academic focus. Five recognition strategies are identified 
in total from a survey of grey literature [media releases, public statements by company 
representatives and official company policy documents]. The survey is indicative; it aims to 
delineate and identify the variety of strategies currently in use by companies. These strategies 
are then formalised in a typology. The survey is not comprehensive across any given sector or 
commodity, and no quantitative results (such as 'most common strategy') are presented. The 
second half of Chapter 5 is derived from discussions with participants which took the variety 
and consequences of these strategies as their starting point. 
There is a bias in the type of companies that were captured in this survey, as the need for 
relevant information to be publicly-available skews the survey towards major, branded 
companies that are eager to communicate with their customers and other stakeholders 
(including critical NGOs). This bias is not deemed problematic, on the basis that it mirrors the 
underlying bias in the type of companies (major, branded multinationals) that have both been 
disproportionately targeted by NGOs and have enacted such sourcing policies in the first place. 
Interviews 
For the second half of Chapter 5, as well as Chapters 6 and 7 in their entirety, the material 
presented is based on careful analysis of original, qualitative data collected for this study. The 
majority of this data is derived from interviews, with what are referred to in the remainder of 
the text as 'participants' (effectively, interviewees). The interview material that will begin to 
appear from the second half of Chapter 5 is identifiable by the use of double quotation marks, 
italics and a signifying number unique to each participant. An example follows shortly. There 
are a number of grammatical techniques used to present quoted material in a form conducive to 
the now of argument and discussion, all of which are intended to be intuitive. For example, in 
cases where a quote refers implicitly to an essential concept or term not overtly stated, square 
brackets are used to specify this information. A series of full stops are used to indicate that a 
part of a discussion has been excised to capture a specific idea or train of thought more clearly. 
The following (fabricated) quote illustrates these techniques and the quotation format: 
"The real tragedy is that what [sustainability schemes] do in order to maximise their 
success in competition with others... might undermine the overall potential of certification 
as a tool" [4], 
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There are three aspects of the interview process that warrant elaboration: the intention behind 
this empirical work, the process of identifying participants to be interviewed, and the process of 
collecting and managing the material. 
Firstly, the intention behind this empirical work was to identify key concepts of relevance to 
each of Chapter 5, 6 and 7's remit. Recall that the empirical sub-question invites an exploration 
of how responses behave or perform in reality, and what this might suggest about their 
potential and limitations. Given the different possibilities or 'solution sets' for responding to 
traded deforestation available to private sector actors and the public sector, respectively, a 
decision was made a priori to devote one chapter to the themes most relevant to each. This 
decision carved out Chapter 5 for the private sector (and civil society] and Chapter 6 for the 
public sector. A second conceptual limitation (coverage] that was identified in Chapter 4 is then 
re-approached empirically in Chapter 7, which explores the possibility that responses may 
achieve influence beyond their immediate coverage. This effort to identify pathways is of 
paramount importance to any conception of the overall potential of responses, hence the study's 
return to this particular limitation. 
For each of the three empirical chapters, a theoretically-grounded concept mapping exercise 
was undertaken, which was then extended, calibrated and - without fail - greatly enhanced by 
discussions with participants. Relevant themes emerged from each chapter. For Chapter 5's 
examination of the dynamics of private sector and civil society responses, this theme is the 
conflicting motivations and behaviours of relevant actors; for Chapter 6, the theme is the web of 
constraints perceived by policymakers to limit, or at the very least shape, their possible 
responses to this policy problem. Finally, Chapter 7 identifies numerous pathways through 
which responses might achieve (or extend] their influence beyond their (necessarily limited] 
coverage, while also carefully considering and interrogating three 'theories of change' that were 
discerned as underlying the perspectives with participants. 
Secondly, embarking on a concept mapping exercise necessitated interviewing a number of 'key 
persons', namely practitioners and experts in one or more of the relevant responses for this 
policy problem (as defined in Chapter 1]. Specifically, 'practitioner' refers to a person either 
employed by, or actively involved as a member or adviser in, one of the responses. The label 
'experts' refers to supply chain consultants, policy advisers and advocates (including NGOs] 
with intimate knowledge of one or more specific responses. These categories are accorded to 
participants on the basis of their positions at the time of interview. Nevertheless, it was both 
apparent - sometimes explicitly so - as well as desirable that participants drew too on their 
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previous professional experiences across these roles and categories. A breakdown of the 
professional roles of participants is provided in Figure 2.1. 
Overall, 22 participants comprise the source for the empirical material collected. Of these, 17 
were interviewed exclusively for this study, while another 4 provided written material (email 
correspondence] exclusively for this study. (The remaining participant was interviewed for a 
related study with which 1 was involved, as explained in further detail below.] Wi th one 
exception, all participants were interviewed only once; one participant [[5]) provided a second 
interview to expand upon the themes identified in the first. Interviews lasted an average of 50 
minutes, with a modal length of 60 minutes. Interviews were conducted over an eighteen-month 
period between November 2012 and March 2014. 
The participants targeted for this study were those with a compell ing understanding, and often 
intimate perspectives, on responses to tropical deforestation. Inevitably, the fact that some of 
these participants worked for or on a given response might call into question their neutrality. 
There was little that could be done to guard against this, other than seek alternative opinions 
and pose difficult questions, but I am convinced that the interview format allowed honest 
appraisals of the subject matter. To my mind, clues to this effect could be found in participants' 
eagerness to talk anonymously, their willingness to refer me on to others with whom they 
vehemently - and publicly - disagree, as well as their proclivity to acknowledge the drawbacks, 
dangers and risks of their and likeminded organisations' undertakings. At no point did 1 sense 
that I was receiving 'the company line', and I remained extremely alert to the prospect. As a final 
point on this matter, there is simply no way other than through interviews with such 
participants that I could delve into and discern the motivations - many of them hidden from 
public view - of the actors behind certain responses. 
Further explanation and justification can also be provided on the choice to use semi-structured 
interviews, with these participants, to form the body of empirical work that follows later in this 
thesis. This is particularly so in light of several alternatives, including surveying and focus 
groups, as well as more rigidly structured interviews. The justification is relatively 
straightforward for choosing to use semi-structured interviews. Given the novelty of this 
research effort, attempting to weave together a high-level synthesis about broad patterns and 
key themes, the method chosen had to allow for the emergence of those patterns and themes 
from participants while providing - through the questions - a framework for the ideas. 
In comparison, to an almost unavoidable extent, surveys require a pre-supposition of the range 
of relevant themes, and given the professional constraints faced by many of this study's 
participants, do not allow adequate time or space for follow-up questioning and exploration. 
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R ig i d l y s t ruc tu r ed i n t e r v i e w s , w h e r e b y 1 cou ld h a v e r e e l e d o f f a p r e d e t e r m i n e d list o f ques t i ons , 
a r e v u l n e r a b l e to the s a m e d r a w b a c k s . W h i l e these a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s m a y h a v e a l l o w e d f o r 
easy c o m p a r i s o n o f a n s w e r s ac ross par t i c ipants , as w e l l as s o m e quant i f i ca t i on o f the 
i m p o r t a n c e w i t h w h i c h cer ta in t h e m e s w e r e p e r c e i v e d , these me r i t s a re less c o n d u c i v e to the 
t y p e o f n o v e l and b r o a d ana lys is that f o r m s the c o r e m o t i v a t i n g p u r p o s e o f this thesis. Semi -
s t ruc tured i n t e r v i e w s o f f e r the bes t o f bo th w o r l d s : f l ex ib i l i t y in the c oncep t s d iscussed, 
inc lud ing space f o r par t i c ipants to s t e e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s t o w a r d s w h a t they j udge to be m o s t 
cr i t ical , w h i l e n o n e t h e l e s s a l l o w i n g m e to po s e d i r e c t ques t i ons on par t i cu lar top ics that had 
a l r e a d y e m e r g e d ( o r w h i c h I suspec t ed w o u l d e m e r g e ) as r e l e van t f o r the analysis. 
T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f this cho i c e o f m e t h o d a r e w o r t h no t ing expl ic i t ly . Due to the r e qu i r ed 
i n v e s t m e n t o f t i m e and e f f o r t , as w e l l as vu lne rab i l i t y to any d i f f i cu l t ques t i ons 1 m igh t 
u n e x p e c t e d l y pose , it is l ike ly that f e w e r p e o p l e b e c a m e par t i c ipants in this s tudy than m igh t 
h a v e b e e n the case had I s i m p l y c i r cu la ted a s u r v e y o r s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d list o f ques t ions . As a 
result , the f inal count o f par t i c ipants - 22 - m a y s e e m min ima l , a l though of c ourse it is w o r t h 
b e a r i n g in m i n d the w i d e r ange o f t op i cs that can be c o v e r e d in this m a n y hours o f i n t e r v i e w . 
None the l e s s , this is o n e l im i ta t i on o f the s tudy and - c o n s e q u e n t l y - the abi l i ty to g ene ra l i s e its 
conc lus ions , but it is an u n a v o i d a b l e one . A l s o c o u n t e r i n g the l o w e r n u m b e r o f par t i c ipants than 
w o u l d h a v e b e e n ava i l ab l e us ing o t h e r t e chn iques w a s the g e n e r o s i t y - in t ime, thought and 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n - o f the par t i c ipants w h o d id pa r t ake in the study. 
F i g u r e 2.1 P r o f e s s i ona l r o l e s o f par t i c ipants in this s tudy 
NGO reps, 1 
Pol icymakers,-/ 
3 
iSust scheme reps 
I Company reps 
I Policymakers 
I Supply chain experts 
I NGO reps 
T h e p r o c e s s o f i d e n t i f y i n g par t i c ipan ts to take par t in this s tudy p r o c e e d e d a l ong mu l t i p l e 
t racks. T h e f i rs t p e r s o n to e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e a par t i c ipant w a s v i s i t ing the r e sea rch inst i tut ion 
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at which I was based (the Center for International Forestry Research, CIFOR) soon after I had 
arrived there myself; the meeting was pure chance. Just as coincidental was my encounter with 
another eventual participant on a street corner in Singapore, while I was visiting that city for the 
annual meeting of the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil in 2012. 
Usually, however, further participants were identified by more intentional means. For example, 
all participants were asked at the conclusion of their interviews for referrals (and often, 
introductions] to any others who might have been informed about the themes and questions 
that I was pursuing in this study. This strategy was very successful and many participants were 
'recruited' in this way. Critically, 1 was also able to attend two events - the aforementioned 
RSPO annual meeting in 2012, as well as an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Experts' 
Group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade workshop held in Medan in )une, 2013 - which 
enabled me to introduce myself and my research to speakers and fellow attendees, thereby 
eliciting some level of interest and a willingness to further discuss in interview format. Finally, 1 
took the direct approach of emailing a number of prospective participants, some of whom 
responded by granting interviews and others of which provided written correspondence that 
was incorporated into the study's empirical material. There were also multiple non-responses, 
as is to be expected given the profile and schedules of the people whom I had approached. 
My attendance at the two events mentioned in the previous paragraph generated not only a 
handful of participants but also rich material garnered during presentations and comments 
made at the proceedings of these events. For the RSPO event, comments made on stage in 
presentations, discussions and Q&As were taken as 'public', enabling quotes to be attributed to 
individuals by name and organisation. For the APEC event, to which 1 was invited by the 
Australian delegation (an invitation not contested by any attending delegations], follow-up 
approval was sought from and granted by private sector presenters, while comments by 
country delegations were again taken as 'on-record'. Audio recordings and personal notes exist 
to ensure the fidelity of the comments presented in this study. 
Clearly then, there are multiple sources of empirical data used in this study. Summarised 
explicitly, these sources comprise: 
• interviews and written correspondences gathered exclusively for this study, 
• presentations and comments made on-stage in discussion and Q&A sessions at the two 
aforementioned events, and 
• one additional interview, conducted as part of a conceptually-aligned research project of 
which I was a part (see further below]. 
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All of this material was assessed equally; i.e. was a priori accorded equal veracity and reliability. 
The intention behind interviews and written correspondences was to allow space for deeper 
understandings and perspectives to emerge, including those that individuals or organisations 
may not wish to have attributed to them publicly. It is for this reason that anonymity is granted 
as a default for interviews and written correspondences, although some participants were 
keener than others to ensure - as best as possible - this condition. The entirety of this research 
was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee, 
and the Protocol for this research is 2012/059. 
Consistent with its equal assessment, material was also handled consistently. For all interviews, 
as well as presentations, discussions and Q&As and the two events, material was recorded using 
a dictaphone, before being transcribed and ultimately coded with what I judged at the time 
were its emerging themes. Coding was done manually rather than with the use of software, with 
material for each theme collated into a 'super-structure document' for ease of referral during 
the writing of chapters. Written material - namely, email correspondences - was similarly 
coded and collated. Material was often revisited and re-coded during the writing of empirical 
chapters and as the addition of further material clarified the direction and themes of each 
chapter. For each chapter, there came a certain point within the tic-tac of writing and 
interviewing where it was apparent that I was in possession of sufficient insights and 
perspectives to identify and develop each of the most important themes. At these points, the 
quest for further participants was generally halted, and my attention turned to finalising the 
exploration of existing material and the writing of chapters. 
Finally, this methods section has twice referred to a research project, of which I was a part, as a 
supplementary source for material. Specifically, two quotes are used from one participant in 
that research, which was conducted with several colleagues of mine from CIFOR during 2013-14. 
Thus, there is one additional participant [[22]), from whom approval has been sought, and 
granted, to include these specific quotes. The paper produced by this project (Djama et al., 
forthcoming] concerns an emerging trend whereby producer governments of exported 
commodities such as palm oil initiate domestic legality or sustainability 'schemes' as a reflexive 
response to dissatisfaction with existing international schemes. This point is mentioned and 
explored briefly in Chapter 6. My involvement in this project was straightforward: I attended 
one interview personally but played a more involved role in collating and analysing interview 
data (there were 14 interviews in total) and identifying themes. It was during these activities 
that I realised the pertinence of the two quotes that have been drawn on for this study. 
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Key terms 
Throughout this study, several terms appear regularly. Some of these terms, such as 'traded 
deforestation', have been elaborated on in the previous chapter. This section of the chapter 
briefly acknowfledges the importance of four more of these semantic markers, and while 
recognising that none of them is perfect, argues their selection over the alternatives considered. 
The umbrella term 'responses' was first introduced in Chapter 1, yet warrants further 
explanation here on the basis of its centrality to this study. Collecting together the policy, 
regulatory and institutional responses relevant to traded deforestation, which marks one of this 
study's pioneering contributions, requires combining markedly different types of responses 
operating through international supply chains for the deforestation commodities. A single term 
is needed to semantically unify - and thereby demonstrate the similar objectives of - these 
responses. Multiple other labels, including 'interventions', 'initiatives' and 'instruments' would 
have sufficed in this task. In addition, however, the term 'responses' is felt to better match 
Chapter I's characterisation of these entities in relation to the general recognition of the 
problem of traded deforestation. The evolution of these 'policy, regulatory and institutional' 
responses, as introduced in Chapter 1 (and their imminent labelling in Chapter 3 as 'governance' 
responses), reflects the development in that chapter of the argument that what these responses 
attempt to achieve is to remedy a governance gap for international supply chains. 
Implicit within the word 'response', is the seed of a further question that can be usefully 
elaborated on; namely, what are responses responding to? Immediate candidates for answers 
include 'tropical deforestation' and 'traded deforestation', of course, yet both seem too broad. 
Tropical deforestation has generated a host of responses, some of which are domestic within 
tropical countries, and others of which are international but focused on financing for palm oil 
plantations, for example. Traded deforestation is much more specific and close to the mark, 
implying a focus on international supply chains. Yet because only a subsection of actors in a 
handful of jurisdictions have generated all of the responses relevant to this study, these actors 
cannot be said to be responding to traded deforestation as a problem in its entirety. Rather, it 
seems more precise to state that what actors are responding to is their connection to that 
deforestation, whether through a company's own supply chains, or for governments, through 
either procurement or the broader responsibility it has for governing the economic activity of a 
given jurisdiction. 
Without stealing Chapter 4's thunder, a telling and consistent discrepancy is evident between 
what these responses are designed to respond to (a specific connection to deforestation] and the 
rhetoric that accompanies their announcement and implementation, which usually refers 
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instead to the broad problem of tropical deforestation. The phrasing of this study's primary 
research question, which asks what limitations there are on responses' contribution to slowing 
tropical deforestation, is a imed squarely at this disjunct between responses' stated objectives 
and rhetoric, versus their design. Chapter 4's discussions of framing and limits to coverage will 
extrapolate on this discrepancy. 
There is another set of relationships that can now be bedded down more explicitly than 
previous discussions have allowed. The first clarification is narrow: the terms used to 
characterise both the relationship between tropical deforestation, on the one hand, and either (a) 
the commodit ies of timber, palm oil, soya, beef and leather, or (b] relevant downstream actors, 
on the other. This study uses the terms 'associated with', 'connected to' and 'implicated in' 
interchangeably to refer to the link that lies at the heart of traded deforestation, while 
recognising their nuanced strength. The use of multiple terms is intended merely to avoid 
monotony or overuse of any single one. 
The same terms are used to define a much broader relationship that exists between, on the one 
hand, international trade, and 'middle ground' environmental problems (i.e. neither wholly 
domestic nor wholly international) on the other. That is, this study refers to international trade 
that is 'associated with', 'connected to' and 'implicated in' certain environmental problems. (At 
times, this relationship is simplified to the possessive term, 'the environmental problems of 
international trade'.) Yet the use of these terms to connect international trade itself to 
deforestation is likely to be more contentious than in connecting certain commodities to 
deforestation, due to a long-standing debate over the nature of the relationship between 
international trade and environmental problems. 
This debate, which is highly relevant to traded deforestation, is worth briefly canvassing here in 
terms of the semantic decisions that this study has made. An entry-point can be found in the two 
following questions: What impact does international trade have on environmental problems? 
Wou ld a given environmental problem (such as tropical deforestation] be improved or 
worsened in the absence of international trade, or even with reduced levels of trade? The 
impacts of international trade are likely to differ across given environmental problems, a point 
that culminates in a spectrum of plausible answers to the questions above. This spectrum is 
captured in Figure 2.2, below. There are some problems that international trade is not just 
'associated with ' or 'connected to', but is more specifically a causal driver of, with the 
consequence that restricting relevant trades would ameliorate the problem and stopping those 
trades would ult imately 'stop' the problem. One salient example at the time of writ ing is the 
decimation of wildlife populations in Africa (namely, elephants and rhinos) and southeast Asia 
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(pangolins and reef fish, for example] almost exclusively in order to supply international 
markets - often in China and Hong Kong - for these animals (and their body parts](Akella and 
Allan, 2012). While international trade is only ever a conduit between demand and supply, in 
this case it is in fact essential for these environmental problems (usually also crimes] to occur. 
Preventing this trade, as CITES attempts to do, would preclude that environmental problem. 
Figure 2.2 Spectrum showing the range of relationships between international trade and a 
given environmental problem. 




Nb. The terms 'associated with', 'connected to' and 'implicated in' could refer to the whole spectrum of 
possible impacts, although as used in this study they often connote negative (causing or exacerbating] 
relationship. 
Conceivably, for other environmental problems international trade may instead exert a positive 
impact, ameliorating or even avoiding a given problem. This possibility is often proposed by 
proponents of international trade as the default nature of the relationship, with or without 
empirical support, creating a carte fo/anc/7e justification for the political and policy priority 
accorded to the trade liberalisation agenda vw-d-Ws environmental (and other] problems. The 
position draws heavily on the (theoretical] premise that economic activity will occur in 
locations where comparative advantages exist, a premise that at its extreme led former World 
Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers to agree that the relocation of polluting industries 
from industrialised (developed] to industrialising (developing] countries made sense because 
the economic costs of pollution, measured in sick days and lost earnings, were less in countries 
where people were poorer (Wikipedia, 2013]. While most non-economists, as well as many 
economists, would find this argument challenging, the statement nonetheless provides an 
accurate representation of the 'impeccable...economic logic' (ibid.] contained with neoclassical 
economic thought. 
This brief blast of economic theory aside, let me state that this study does not deny the 
conceptual possibility that international trade may ameliorate some environmental problems. 
When countries are able to source the ingredients for their economies abroad, they may be able 
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to leave domestic reserves untapped, which in the case of an unchangeable (inelastic) demand 
for a given resource or commodity, may in turn reduce or avoid certain environmental problems. 
From this admittedly limited environmental perspective, it may therefore make sense for both 
the US and Ecuador to source as much of their petroleum oil from Saudi Arabia for as long as 
possible, leaving domestic reserves under the Arctic and Amazon, respectively, untouched. Such 
problems occupy the opposite extreme on the spectrum in Figure 2.2, where the impact of 
international trade on a given environmental problem is favourable and positive. 
Between these two extremes of 'causing' and 'avoiding' problems, it seems apparent that 
international trade might also either 'exacerbate' or 'ameliorate' environmental problems. 
These points are also shown on the spectrum in Figure 2.2. Through modell ing the appropriate 
counter-factuals, for example, Christea et al. (2013) can conclude that international trade 
worsens the greenhouse gas emissions associated with production in 66 percent of traded 
commodities. Other studies introduced in the opening section of this chapter implicitly answer 
along the same lines - sans modell ing - with for example Wiedmann et al. (2013) finding that 
some countries have been able to use international trade to make use of greater areas of land 
than exist within their own jurisdiction. Given that these areas of land have often been 
converted from some of the highest conservation-value ecosystems on earth (the Brazilian 
Amazon and Argentinean cerrado, for example), it follows that trade has necessarily had an 
exacerbating impact on environmental problems such as land and forest clearing, as well as 
threats to biodiversity. 
Even if international trade is recognised as exacerbating or causing certain environmental 
problems, however, all of the above reasoning does not prejudge the deep-rooted question of 
whether it might still be 'worth it'. A situation where countries are completely self-reliant - a 
state of autarky - need not necessarily be an improvement over a situation where trade exists. 
However, Chapter 3 will assert the existence of a governance gap for the causal relationship 
between international trade and environmental problems. As such, it seems essential to better 
articulate the nature of these relationships in order to assess the questions o f ' i f and 'how much' 
trade is truly desirable. Filling out some of the details of these relationships has been the 
outstanding contribution of the body of empirical research canvassed in the opening to this 
chapter. 
Lying in the middle of Figure 2.2.'s spectrum is a gap, where the effect of international trade on 
environmental problems becomes 'irrelevant' or 'neutral'. This position, which in no way 
assumes 'no trade', may be more fully characterised as 'no causal relationship'. It is at least 
possible that this may best characterise the relationship between trade and one of the 
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deforestation commodities: palm oil. An argument along these lines might run as follows. While 
international demand for palm oil exists, and is supplied, the former does not necessarily 
precipitate the latter. Rather, the production of palm oil is spurred largely by a host of targets, 
subsidy payments and other incentives enacted by the Government of Indonesia to promote the 
palm oil industry (for economic as well as social reasons; Obidzinski et al., 2012). Much of 
Indonesia's palm oil is also consumed domestically. In this scenario, then, reduced international 
demand for palm oil [or even for palm oil implicated in deforestation) might instead induce new 
domestic uses for the crop, for example as a fuel for the national airline, Garuda Indonesia 
(Mongabay, 2014d). The expanding production of palm oil, with its concomitant effects for 
Indonesia's humid forests, is being driven more by factors at work on the side of supply, rather 
than demand. When demand is a factor, domestic demand may be sufficient to continue the 
expansion of production. 
These dynamics are not limited to the deforestation commodities, nor to Indonesia; to my 
knowledge, they have been best examined in relation to the US production of corn. In the book 
Omnivore's Dilemma, Michael Pollan documents how supply-side stimulation determines the 
levels of production for the crop, with corn derivates proliferating within products sold in US 
supermarkets on the basis of that cheap supply (Pollan, 2006). (Demonstrating an example of a 
problem enabled by international trade, some of that corn - roughly 5-10 percent - is also 
exported to Mexico, which while lowering the price of a staple food cheaply, also undermines 
the livelihoods of Mexican corn producers; National Geographic, 2014.) For palm oil, the 
increasing use of the oil and its derivates within thousands of manufactured food, cosmetic and 
cleaning products might stem from its abundant (and therefore cheap) supply, rather than 
demand specifically for it. I will leave to the philosophers the question of whether it is possible 
to benefit from an environmental problem without begin complicit in its incurrence. 
So then, is international trade causing or exacerbating deforestation? I would argue that in 
broad terms there is a causal relationship between the two, and further that trade's impact is 
highly likely to 'exacerbate' or at least 'facilitate' deforestation. In some cases, such as 
deforestation to enable the production of Brazilian soya, the high percentage of production that 
is exported suggests a strong causal role for trade. For other cases, even for Brazilian beef, the 
high percentage of domestic consumption suggests a smaller, though still causal, role. To resolve 
the question of semantics that launched the above discussion, then, I will make use of the terms 
'associated with' and 'connected to' to demonstrate an unspecified relationship between 
international trade and environmental problems (which may nonetheless be a causal one). For 
international trade and deforestation, specifically, as well as any other evidenced problems, I 
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will use 'implicated in'. At times when it is not necessary to specify the underlying nature of the 
relationship, 1 will use the 'environmental problems of international trade' as shorthand. 
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Chapter 3 A synthesis of relevant literatures 
The opening chapter canvassed a set of pohcy, regulatory and institutional responses to tropica! 
deforestation that has been enacted by actors beyond the tropics. Underlying these responses is 
an acceptance of the idea that international trade can connect environmental problems in one 
location to the distant consumption of implicated commodities. This idea has long been 
qualitatively recognised as a possibility, yet only recently has an emerging body of quantitative 
research allowed its relevance to be affirmed for many contemporary environmental problems. 
Chapter 2 surveyed this emerging literature and explained the importance of tropical 
deforestation as a case study with a relatively advanced set of responses. 
Against that backdrop, this chapter will introduce several ideas from the environmental 
governance literature, including the concepts of a 'governance gap', 'teleconnections' and 
'distance', to conceptualise this study's downstream responses to deforestation. A crucial part of 
this task is to identify precisely what downstream actors construe as problematic through these 
responses. This 'subject of governance' is then subjected to scrutiny with reference to some 
alternatives emphasised by other environmental literatures on consumption and globalisation. 
Introducing governance 
In general terms, governance has been described as 'a concept that... reflect[s] the notion that 
the public sector is not the only controlling actor when it comes to... collective-action problems' 
(Vermeulen and Kok, 2012:184). Thus a distinction can be drawn between governance and 
government, the primary difference being that the latter is enacted by a single actor - the state -
while the former is enacted by multiple actors, sometimes including the state but more often 
consisting of actors from the private sector and civil society. Indeed, the transboundary nature 
of the problems presented in the previous section tends to 'lower the effectiveness of 
government', meaning that 'governance starts to appear attractive to other actors', even if 'their 
own effectiveness [and legitimacy] is crucially dependent on the presence of the state' (Borzel, 
2010, in Bulkeley and Jordan, 2012:564). In turn, one definition of 'environmental governance' 
is as 'the means by which society determines and acts on goals and priorities related to the 
management of the environment' (Vermeulen and Kok, 2012: 184). Again, for transboundary 
problems this definition can be expanded to recognise the potential for actors from multiple 
societies to become active within Its governance. 
76 I P a g e 
The previous chapter surveyed a range of environmental problems whose nature is 
transboundary by virtue of international trade. Importantly, such problems do not conform to 
what Biermann et al. (2010) call 'traditional notions of environmental policy' (p203). As these 
authors explain, 
'traditional notions of environmental policy, pollution control and nature conservation 
do not capture current global developments that transform the bio-geophysical cycles 
and processes of our planet' (p203). 
A similar realisation was communicated almost a decade earlier by Lambin et al. (2001), who 
wrote that 'global forces increasingly replace or rearrange the local factors determining land 
uses [including deforestation], bui lding new, global cause-connection patterns in their place' 
(p266). Tropical deforestation, especially as understood by downstream actors, clearly fits into 
this category, and it is these 'global cause-connection patterns' that this chapter will soon 
characterise. 
The quantitative research that the previous chapter presented affirms the transboundary 
nature of specific environmental problems, as - for example - Lenzen et al. (2012) conclude: 
'our results emphasise the importance of examining biodiversity loss as a global systemic 
phenomenon, instead of looking at the degrading or polluting producers in isolation' (p l09 ) . 
Fittingly, some authors observe 'an active reengagement with the transnational as a distinct and 
researchable sphere of polities', including among environmental governance researchers 
(Bulkeley and Jordan, 2012:556). Quoting these authors in full, 
'A critical facet of this growing interest in global environmental governance (and 
governance more generally) has thus been an active reengagement with the 
transnational as a distinct and researchable sphere of politics. ... In brief, scholars 
concerned with the transnational arena seek to understand the ways in which 
institutions, forms of cooperation, and new political spaces are emerging which cut 
across traditional jurisdictional boundaries set by national borders' (ibid.). 
The study of governance itself, then, is moving to align itself with the 'global forces' identified by 
Lambin et al. (2001) and the nature of transboundary problems. In part, this realignment of 
governance research has been consciously sought. Perhaps the best example of this approach 
can be found in the Earth System Governance Project (ESGP), which was formed in 2008 to 
bring together scientists working on governance issues at a global scale. The ESGP stated its 
premise as follows: 
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'New perspectives and research are needed to understand the complex relation between 
global transformations of social and natural systems, including accelerating economic 
integration, globalisation in all its forms, internationalisation of policy processes, and 
multi-scale consequences of ecological transformation. Innovative research is needed 
also to analyse political options to govern sustainable development' (emphasis added; 
Biermann et al., 2010:203). 
Environmental governance is uniquely suited to the challenge of analysing these 'political 
options'. Its scope and flexibility renders it uniquely able to grapple with the conundrum that 
'most problems of earth system transformation are unprecedented' and 'adequate policies, 
polities and, especially, modes of allocation are uncertain, initially always contested, and need to 
be developed and agreed upon by societies over time' (Biermann, 2007:330). And because 
governance can encompass the ideas of environmental economics, for example, it can also go 
beyond the territory that other disciplines comfortably inhabit, allowing - in this case - non-
economic factors to be discerned and included. This is for the best, as Schandl et al. (2011) 
elaborate in an outlook for resource efficiency in Asia and the Pacific, 
'Prices alone do not provide appropriate signals for enabling resource efficiency and 
systems innovation because global resource markets are characterised by complex 
producer-consumer networks and complicated institutional and power relationships. It 
will require new forms of governance together with market incentives to improve 
current resource efficiency trends, alter consumption behaviours and trigger systems 
innovation' (2011:1). 
Similarly, in their wide-ranging examination of the relationships between agriculture, 
biodiversity and markets, Lockie and Carpenter (2010) ultimately concur, noting that: 'There is 
a danger that... every social and environmental issue will come to be conceptualised First and 
foremost as an example of market failure, blinkering us to alternative ways of understanding 
and addressing those issues' (p312). These authors' caution applies equally to tropical 
deforestation, a danger that this study defuses by drawing on the broader disciplinary scope of 
environmental governance to examine responses to traded deforestation. 
A governance gap 
The evidence presented in the previous chapter, as well as Chapter I's survey of deforestation 
science, implicates international trade in multiple major environmental problems. Yet for a 
deceptively simple reason, many of the authors of that evidence are not surprised by the 
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growing significance of trade in these problems: namely, because these problems are relatively 
inconsequential to the decision-making processes, or governance, of trade. For instance, as Yu et 
al. (2013) note in their study of land use, although 'in principle, trade can spatially distribute 
environmental burden among the least sensitive natural systems land resources... this would be 
by coincidence rather than design' given that such decisions are 'mainly built on [factors other] 
than environmental considerations' [emphasis added; p l l 8 4 ] . Similarly, for virtual (or 
embodied) water trade, Seekell et al. (2011) conclude that, 'the concept of virtual water has not 
been actively employed as a policy tool to avoid conflict because water is not generally the 
dominant factor in making trade decisions' (emphasis added; p i ) . Also for virtual water, Hoff 
(2009) calls for this invisibility to be remedied, stating that 'international trade and foreign 
investments need to take into account their effects on water resources across regions' (p l45 ) . 
Finally, in relation to greenhouse gas emissions, Cristea et al. (2013) agree that 'the emissions 
associated with international transportation are largely overlooked, [including] in the text of 
existing agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol regulations' (p l53 ) . Peters et al. (2011) agree 
that the 'likely cause of the large emission transfers we report here [for internationally-traded 
products] are pre-existing policies and socioeconomic factors that are unrelated to climate 
policy itself (p8907). 
These examples are indicative of the presence of a 'governance gap', in line with a broad 
definition provided by Dauvergne and Lister (2012) who argue that 'global environmental 
problems persist as economic growth continues to outpace the institutional response to promote 
sustainability' (emphasis added; p42). Whi le this study focuses in on one particular aspect of 
economic growth - international trade - these authors nonetheless capture the importance of 
the relationship between, on the one hand, the drivers of a given problem, and on the other, its 
institutional remedies. The idea of the governance gap is echoed in strikingly similar terms by 
other environmental governance research. Ruggie, for instance, writes that 'One [governance 
gap] consists of the gaps between the scope and complexity of the challenges we face, including 
environmental threats, and the institutional means through which we strive to deal with them' 
(2002). Further, one of the founders of the environmental governance field, the late Elinor 
Ostrom, echoed this thought with her co-authors when they wrote that: 
'Ideal conditions for [environmental] governance are increasingly rare. Critical 
problems, such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforestation and climate change, 
are at larger scales and involve non-local influences... Devising effective governance 
arrangements is akin to a co-evolutionaiy race' [emphasis added; Dietz et al., 2003:1907). 
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T h e s e quotes f rom the e n v i r o n m e n t a l g o v e r n a n c e l i terature s h a r e the idea that a gap o r 
i m b a l a n c e has e m e r g e d b e t w e e n , on the o n e hand, the p r o c e s s e s driving e n v i r o n m e n t a l impacts , 
and on the other , the ' inst i tut ional response ' , ' inst i tut ional m e a n s ' or ' g o v e r n a n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s ' 
that a r e needed to mit igate against t h o s e impacts . T h u s e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s a r e be ing dr iven 
by inst i tut ions des igned to fur ther o t h e r ends, n a m e l y i n c r e a s e s in in ternat iona l t rade . As Dietz 
e t al. ( 2 0 0 3 ] note, echoing the point m a d e in much of t h e empir ica l r e s e a r c h above , 
' C o m m e r c e has b e c o m e regional , national , and global, and inst i tut ions at all o f t h e s e 
levels have b e e n c r e a t e d to e n a b l e and regulate trade.. . T h e s e inst i tut ions s h a p e 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact , even if they a r e not des igned with tha t intent ' ( p l 9 0 8 ) . 
Others s e e a m o r e insidious re la t ionship b e t w e e n the two par t ic ipants in g o v e r n a n c e ' s 
' co-evolut ionary race' , with g o v e r n a n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s ef fect ively handicapped by 'a growing 
imbalance in global ru lemaking ' (Ruggie, 2 0 0 2 : 2 9 8 ] , He cont inues , 
' T h o s e rules that favour global m a r k e t expans ion have b e c o m e m o r e r o b u s t and 
e n f o r c e a b l e in the last decade or two - intel lectual p r o p e r t y r ights be ing a p r i m e 
example . But rules intended to p r o m o t e equal ly valid social ob jec t ives , be they pover ty 
reduct ion, labour s tandards , h u m a n rights o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l quality, lag behind and in 
s o m e instances have actual ly b e e n w e a k e n e d ' (ibid.]. 
In o t h e r words , the failure of effect ive g o v e r n a n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s to e m e r g e for the 
env i ronmenta l impacts of t rade is not acc idental , but r a t h e r a ref lect ion of the differing 
priori t ies given to these two object ives , which the a b o v e empir ica l l i terature has d e m o n s t r a t e d 
to be - to s o m e degree - contrary , if not incompat ib le . (Chapter 6 of this s tudy will identify a 
two-fold ef fect of the inst i tut ions designed to p r o m o t e internat ional t rade, especia l ly the WTO, 
s ince they not only ' shape e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact ' but they a lso affect the nature o f g o v e r n a n c e 
r e s p o n s e s avai lable to d o w n s t r e a m a c t o r s to mit igate t h o s e impacts . T h u s r e s p o n s e s to t raded 
defores ta t ion occur within a broader , p r o - t r a d e context , suppor t ing Ruggie's claim of an 
' imbalance in global rulemaking' . ] 
Despite the broad c o n c u r r e n c e across these quotes from Dietz e t al. ( 2 0 0 3 ] , Ruggie ( 2 0 0 2 ] , and 
Dauvergne and Lister ( 2 0 1 2 ] on the idea of a g o v e r n a n c e gap, they a r e n o n e t h e l e s s misal igned 
in o n e crucial way: these authors diverge in where they locate the g o v e r n a n c e gap. Whi le Dietz 
et al. ( 2 0 0 3 ] focus on a gap for part icular e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s such as t r a n s b o u n d a r y 
pollution, tropical defores ta t ion and c l imate change, for example , Ruggie ( 2 0 0 2 ] is ins tead 
c o n c e r n e d with a gap for internat ional trade, and Dauvergne and Lister ( 2 0 1 2 ] r e f e r to a gap for 
the b r o a d e r re la t ionship b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c growth and e n v i r o n m e n t a l impacts . This 
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discrepancy is significant, since it reflects (implicit) disagreement within environmental 
governance research over the appropriate subject of governance. Helpfully, this study's 
responses to tropical deforestation can inform this discussion, since they offer an answer to the 
critical question of exactly what needs to be governed. 
Current responses to tropical deforestation can now be seen clearly for what they are, and 
conversely what they are not. They are not responses to Ruggie's (2002) gap for international 
trade per se, in that they do not seek to place limits on the magnitude or directions of that trade, 
even if some responses aspire to prevent illegal trade of timber. Nor do they align with Dietz et 
al.'s (2003) gap for whole environmental problems, in this case tropical deforestation, which 
suggest an overarching governance structure (Chapter 4 emphasises the uncoordinated nature 
of the current response set). Far less are they responses to Dauvergne and Lister's (2012) gap 
for economic growth. Instead, responses take a more circumscribed subject for governance: 
international supply chains for the deforestation commodities, with particular attention to 
illegal or unsustainable versions of these commodities. This is not just a characteristic used to 
determine inclusion within this study's ambit; with the prominent exception of REDD+, the 
focus on supply chains is a defining feature of downstream actors' responses to deforestation. 
Yet what the authors above implicitly show through their advocacy of alternative subjects of 
governance is that supply chains are only one of many possible alternatives. Indeed, they lie at 
more circumscribed end of a spectrum of these alternatives. More encompassing alternatives on 
this spectrum could include international trade, globalisation, consumption, economic growth, 
and perhaps ultimately, capitalism. 
Tellingly, as Newell et al. (2012) note, 'There is a politics to making claims about where 
governance deficits lie and why and who gets to frame discussions about which alternatives are 
appropriate, desirable, and viable' (p367). The literature on alternative subjects of governance 
has much to offer - by way of constructive critique - for current responses to the deforestation 
commodities, and a later part of this chapter will draw on consumption, globalisation and 
capitalism literatures to further scrutinise responses' choice of subject of governance. 
Beforehand, however, a more robust theoretical backing is need to better explain the nature of 
responses, including by fitting them into the aforementioned framework of a governance gap, a 
task to which this chapter now turns with the aid of theory on supply chains, 'teleconnections' 
and 'distance'. 
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Literatures on the nature of responses 
The inadequacy of supply ciiains governance literatures 
All of the responses introduced in Chapter 1 select supply chains for the deforestation 
commodit ies as their subject of governance. This is a useful juncture at which to introduce in 
greater detail the theoretical construct of the 'supply chain', which is closely related to a 
'product chain', 'global commodity chain' or 'global value chain', according to the interwoven 
literatures on these topics. The differences between these literatures are not whol ly pertinent 
here, as further and more suited theoretical constructs will soon be introduced (however, see 
Bair, 2005, for an excellent overview). Yet the importance of these literatures here is in the 
support they lend for the use of international supply chains as an appropriate subject of 
governance. 
According to Gibbon and Ponte (2008], then, global value chain theory 'postulates that the 
global economy can be usefully understood as a combination of discrete, product-specific 'value 
chains' rather than of liberalised markets' (p366]. As Bair explains, 
'Tracing the path of a commodity.. . provides a grounded way to study and operationalise 
the global-local nexus. The[se] method[s] permit one to analyse globalisation in situ, 
directing our attention to the specific locations where particular production processes 
occur, while simultaneously i l luminating how these discrete locations and activities are 
connected to each other as constituent links that collectively comprise the commodity 
chain' (2005:158). 
Boons and Wagner (2009, in Boons et al., 2012} concur, noting that 'the product chain is one 
possible unit of analysis that can be adopted by practitioners and researchers to assess the 
interplay between economic and ecological dynamics' ( p l34 ) . Similarly, Bair (2005) writes that 
'commodity chains are tools that enable one to study the operation of global capitalism beyond 
the territorial confines of the national economy' ( p l56 ) . Some of the research presented in the 
previous chapter indeed relied on a chain-by-chain analysis of international trade, and as such, 
authors were able to identify which chains were most implicated in a given environmental 
problem. For example, Lenzen et al.'s (2012) study of 'over 5 billion supply chains' ( p l09} 
identified those stemming from the forestry industry in Papua New Guinea, fisheries throughout 
much of the Pacific islands, and manufacturing industries in China, Canada and Indonesia as 
especially implicated in threats to at-risk species. Using this same 'unit of analysis' for tropical 
deforestation, then. Chapter 1 clearly showed that current science supports the connection of 
supply chains for palm oil in southeast Asia, beef and soya in the Amazon, and t imber from all 
three tropical regions to deforestation. The European Commission's Impact of Consumption 
82 I P a g e 
report (EC, 2013) confirmed that supply chains for soybean, palm oil and cacao comprised the 
bulk of the EU's imported deforestation during the period 1990-2008. Finally, the UK 
Government 's palm oil mapping study (Bottriell etal., 2011) achieved even more fine-grained 
understanding of that commodity 's routes along various supply chains w^ithin the UK. These 
studies confirm Boons and Wagner ' s (2009) claim about the utility of the supply chain as a 'unit 
of analysis ' (in Boons et al., 2012:134). 
This study 's subject matter - downstream responses to traded deforestation - draws on supply 
chains not just for analysis, however, but also as the mechanism through which downstream 
actors have responded to the underlying problem. (The inclusion of two partial exceptions, 
labelling initiatives and FLEGT, are explained in detail in Chapter 4.) Many authors approve of 
responses ' subject of governance as an appropriate, and potentially potent, one from the 
available alternatives. Vermeulen and Kok (2012), for instance, write that, 'sustainable supply 
chain governance systems are successful in integrating the complex wide spectrum of 
sustainability issues into one 'all inclusive' instrument' (p l90). Similarly, Dauvergne and Lister 
(2012) contend that 'the supply chains of the world 's largest brand companies... offer vital 
leverage points to produce the range, response, and coordination necessary for more systemic 
global market changes' (p42). Bair (2005) concludes that, 
'One significant thrust of [global commodity chain research] has been to create 
accountability in global industries by demanding that lead firms take responsibility for 
what happens in the factories of their suppliers and subcontractors around the world... 
Such 'real world ' applications of the commodity chain concept are among the most 
fruitful implications of [this concept] to date' (p l61). 
Yet as the debate within the governance gap literature shows, supply chains are only one of 
many possible alternative subjects of governance. (This chapter will later return to the question 
to examining these alternatives in order to illuminate the consequences of using supply chains. 
Then Chapter 3 will elucidate why responses to tropical deforestation therefore offer an 
exceptional case study to scrutinise the use of supply chains as a mechanism to respond to a 
contemporary yet distant environmental problem.) In the meantime, it remains to be seen 
whether the supply chain literatures provide a suitable framework for understanding the nature 
of current response. 
Already there are perspectives challenging whether the idea of the 'chain' captures the 
relationships most relevant to tropical deforestation. Indeed, Dauvergne and Lister (2011) 
argue that international trade could be better conceptualised as occurring not 'along chains', 
which imply stability and linearity, but ' through networks ' (p5), suggesting a non-linearity in 
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both space and time. (Later in this chapter this non-linearity is shown to be one of the primary 
features of globalisation, and Chapter 7 will ultimately question whether attending to, and 
partly reversing, this feature might be necessary for responses to avoid simply displacing 
problematic commodities.] For present purposes, however, the importance of the non-linearity 
of supply 'networks' is the greater complexity that can therefore be expected in both analysing 
and responding to the upstream problems of international trade. 
More significant still is the limited sense in which the concept of 'governance' has been applied 
by some of the existing literatures on chains. As Bair (2005) explains, the commodity and value 
chain literatures have taken 'governance' to mean, 
'the question of which firms in the chain are most able to control various aspects of the 
production process and how they appropriate and/or distribute the value that is created. 
Thus, to describe a chain's governance structure is to illuminate the nature of power 
relations that exist along a chain' (pl59]. 
These power relations are undoubtedly relevant to how current responses to deforestation 
operate (as Chapter 5 and 7 touch on]. But this interpretation of governance, focused on the 
arrangement of actors within the chain in order to explain distributions of economic value, fails 
to recognise - or shed light on remedies for - the governance gap that has spurred responses to 
tropical deforestation. This shortcoming is two-fold: these literatures take chains as a given 
focus, therefore providing insufficient scope for examining this as one among many possible 
alternatives; and in their concern with the distribution of economic value within chains, they 
provide no traction on the problems beyond chains that empirical research has increasingly 
connected to those chains. In other words, the governance 'dimension' within chain literatures 
is incapable of providing a platform for examining current responses' attempts to fill a 
perceived governance gap for tropical deforestation. Fortunately, there are two other 
theoretical contributions that, especially when combined and extended, can create the 
necessary platform. 
'Teleconnections' 
The essence of the problem of tropical deforestation as responded to by downstream actors is 
the idea of'spatial interdependencies' between activities in one place (the consumption of 
certain traded commodities) and consequences in another (deforestation). Other disciplines 
have also grappled with this idea of spatial interdependencies, one of which - climate science -
has coined the term 'teleconnections'. Writing about the global hydrological system, Alcamo et 
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al. ( 2 0 0 8 ] a p p r o p r i a t e d this t e r m and def ined it as 'a cause-and-e f fec t chain tha t o p e r a t e s 
t h r o u g h severa l i n t e r m e d i a t e s t eps and leads to unexpec ted l inkages ' (p2) . Fur ther , these 
a u t h o r s sugges t the p r e s e n c e of t h r e e different forms of t e leconnec t ions (with Hoff 's (2009) 
example s in b racke t s ) : 
• b iophysical ( fo res t loss in o n e location leading to reduced rainfall in ano ther ) , 
• soc io-economic ( in te rna t iona l d e m a n d for soybean propel l ing Amazonian 
de fo re s t a t ion ) , and 
• ins t i tu t ional (a f fores ta t ion policies leading to r educed r iver r u n - o f f ) ( p l 4 2 - 3 ) . 
Hoff 's (2009) o w n examples d e m o n s t r a t e an immed ia t e re levance to the p rob lem of t ropical 
de fo res t a t ion , a l though its biophysical t e leconnec t ions a r e largely beyond the r emi t of this s tudy. 
The la t te r t w o fo rms of te leconnect ions , on the o the r hand, a re highly pe r t inen t to the ques t ions 
of g o v e r n a n c e cons ide red by this chapter . The l inkages tha t in terna t ional t r a d e forges b e t w e e n 
d i s t an t c o n s u m e r s and tropical de fores ta t ion , as identif ied in Chapter 1, can be charac te r i sed as 
socio-economic t e leconnect ions . This s tudy ' s se t of r e s p o n s e s to these socio-economic 
t e l econnec t ions a r e in tu rn institutional t e leconnect ions . With the benef i t of these 
charac te r i sa t ions , the gove rnance gap tha t cu r r en t r e sponses aim to close can be precisely 
a r t icu la ted : the capaci ty of in te rna t iona l t r a d e in a handfu l of commodi t i e s to connec t 
d o w n s t r e a m ac tors to de fo res ta t ion (socio-economic te leconnect ions) has eclipsed the capaci ty 
of ac to r s to govern those connec t ions ( inst i tut ional te leconnect ions) . 
How significant, then, does this governance gap remain? An a n s w e r to this r equ i re s precisely 
w h a t this s tudy seeks to cont r ibu te : an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the l imitat ions on c u r r e n t r e sponses . 
The r ecen t h is tory of this gap is m o r e s t r a igh t fo rward ; until the fo rmat ion of the FSC in 1993, no 
g o v e r n a n c e r e s p o n s e s had e m e r g e d to r e spond to the connect ion of d o w n s t r e a m ac tors to 
t ropical de fo res t a t ion th rough in te rna t iona l t r a d e in a handfu l of specified commodi t ies . Partly, 
as Chapte r 1 noted, the d r ivers of de fo res ta t ion w e r e still undergo ing a t rans i t ion dur ing the 
1980s , even if the t r e n d s had by then b e c o m e at the very least detectable . And fu r ther , as tha t 
c h a p t e r also noted , i n t e r -gove rnmen ta l a t t e m p t s to forge a col laborat ive, governmenta l 
r e s p o n s e for p rob l ema t i c t imbe r t r a d e con t inued in e a r n e s t until the ear ly 1990s. The collapse 
of t he se nego t ia t ions m a y have been a necessa ry p re requ i s i t e to ushe r in the s u b s e q u e n t 'age of 
expe r imen ta t ion ' . In any case, until the ear ly 1990s, the gove rnance gap for d o w n s t r e a m actors ' 
connec t ion to de fo res t a t ion w a s n e a r complete . 
Yet whi le c u r r e n t g o v e r n a n c e r e s p o n s e s - ins t i tut ional t e leconnec t ions - to de fo res t a t ion car ry 
cons ide rab l e p romise , the resu l t s of Dietz et al.'s (2003) ' co-evolu t ionary race ' r ema in as yet 
u n k n o w n . Indeed, p e r h a p s tha t race is still be ing run, wi th the exper iences of d o w n s t r e a m 
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actors amidst continuing deforestat ion bearing out Hoff's reminder that 'functional (and natural 
and social) spatial interdependencies pose difficult challenges for global governance' 
(2009:142). 
Teleconnections have usefully characterised the governance gap that current responses to 
deforestation a t tempt to close, and this chapter will now show how a fur ther useful concept -
distance - expands on, and provides new insight into, the nature of deforestat ion 's 
teleconnections. 
'Distance' 
Distance is a defining feature of the problems of international trade. An analysis of distance as a 
concept is provided by Princen (2002), who identifies multiple dimensions of distance, which 
increase 'the separation between primary resource extraction decisions and ultimate 
consumption decisions' ( p l l 6 ) . Princen's dimensions of 'distance' , then, can be applied to 
Alcamo et al.'s (2008) 'cause-and-effect chains', Hoffs (2009) 'spatial interdependencies ' , or the 
more general term employed by both: ' teleconnections'. As the following arguments 
demonstrate, the application of these dimensions of distance can usefully expand upon the 
concept of teleconnections. 
Princen (2002) delineates four dimensions of 'distance': 'geography', 'culture', 'bargaining 
power ' and 'agency' ( p i 16). The effect of each of these dimensions is to 'block feedback effects 
by inhibiting knowledge, information and contextual unders tanding of the production process 
feeding one's consumption decisions' (Conca, 2002:144). In other words, as these dimensions of 
distance increase, they undermine the flow of feedbacks from one end of a teleconnection to the 
other. Where teleconnections are socio-economic, or problem precipitating, increases in these 
dimensions of distance create a more difficult governance gap for institutional, or remedial, 
teleconnections to bridge. Exploring the operation of these particular dimensions of distance 
sheds fur ther insight into the nature of the governance gap that has emerged for international 
t rade in the deforestation commodities. 
Inter-jurisdictional distance 
For this study's responses to tropical deforestation, the most pert inent of Princen's (2002) 
dimensions of distance is 'geography'. In its most s t raightforward sense, geographical distance 
could refer to a purely physical measure of the separat ion of, for example, the consumption of a 
palm oil-based product from the tract of forest cleared at that palm oil's expense. As this 
measure of separation increases, then, the connection between that product and its 
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consequences is likely to be further obscured. Yet the geographical dimension of distance 
contains the seed of a greater insight, with particular relevance to the environmental problems 
of international trade. Princen (2002) alludes to this insight when he uses the term 
'jurisdictional discontinuity' ( p l05 ) , which he notes can lead 'policymakers and business people 
to try to construct [frontier economies]' ( p l 04 ) . 
Princen's attention to the crossing of jurisdictional borders is apt. His conclusion is that crossing 
international borders can actually facilitate the adverse impacts of international trade by 
extending it into jurisdictions where these impacts are less scrutinised, regulated or prevented 
by governments. In his words, 'from the firm's perspective, the more its transactions cross 
jurisdictional boundaries [especially international ones], the more it is operating, de facto and 
de jure, in a frontier economy' (2002:105). The term 'frontier economy' is not fully explained by 
Princen, but nonetheless his point is clear: paraphrased, socio-economic teleconnections, such 
as those created by international trade in the deforestation commodities, can conceivably be 
established in order to create (geographical) distance between consumption and its 
consequences. 
Whi le this is an important point, even more pertinent is the distinction Princen (2002) creates 
between ' international' economic transactions, such as the teleconnections described directly 
above, and 'local' economic transactions. Local economic transactions are described as 
'embedded in a mosaic of institutional arrangements, some governmental and legally 
enforceable, some cultural and enforced by societal norms' (p l06 ) . This distinction is echoed in 
general terms by Boyle and Simms (2009), who note that 'markets are a part of life, but they are 
not the same everywhere', continuing, 
'They can be vibrant and bustling at street level in towns and villages, binding 
communit ies together. And, on a larger scale, they can be faceless, bland and destructive, 
the economic equivalent of aerial bombing, in which the pilot never gets to see the 
damage they cause on the ground' ( p l2 ) . 
For responses to deforestation, this distinction raises two questions. The first, and more 
significant, question is whether responses are either attempting to, or capable of, 'localising' 
international trade, thereby mitigating its capacity to create teleconnections to deforestation. It 
could conceivably be argued that the emphasis on transparency and control that imbue this 
study's responses to deforestation are attempts to strengthen feedbacks across geographical 
distance. A more conclusive answer to this question is suggested - in the negative - later in this 
chapter, with reference to globalisation as an alternative 'subject of governance' that responses 
have consciously not pursued, whi le Chapter 7 partially reverses this conclusion by noting 
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instances where companies have in fact needed to reconfigure the nature of their international 
transactions to ensure greater sustainability. 
A second question raised by the distinction is more immediately relevant to this discussion of 
distance: namely, what are the consequences of teleconnections' geographical distance? This 
question enables the real consequences of the 'geography' dimension of distance to be identified, 
resting not in the physical separation between two ends of a teleconnection but instead in the 
crossing of jurisdictional borders. 
Trade in the deforestation commodities has forged teleconnections stretching across 
jurisdictions, linking downstream actors to an upstream problem. As a result, the challenge for 
downstream actors - governments, companies, NGOs - is to devise and implement responses 
that affect the behaviour of actors - suppliers, producers, etc. - located in other jurisdictions. 
For one major actor, downstream governments, inter-jurisdictional distance constrains the 
range of its possible responses, since it cannot directly legislate for the behaviour of these 
upstream actors as it could have if they had been confined to the same jurisdiction. Downstream, 
or consuming, governments are therefore left with two broad possible roles, both of which are 
indirect: it can regulate the behaviour of domestic actors that participate in these 
teleconnections by importing relevant commodities; and it can engage, negotiate with or 
otherwise seek to influence the upstream governments that are its peers. Chapter 6 
demonstrates perceived constraints on each of these roles, which derive from the need for 
foreign and domestic support, as well as the constraints contained within international trade 
law and governed by the WTO. 
The inter-jurisdictional distance of teleconnections constrain the regulatory capacity of 
downstream governments. Simultaneously, however, other actors such as major corporations 
and NGOs have stepped in to fill this vacuum (Conca, 2002; Walker et al., 2013). The 
prominence of these actors with respect to tropical deforestation and other environmental 
problems is desirable, according to some (eg. WWF, 2012; Dauvergne and Lister, 2012], as 
major companies occupy 'nodes' within relevant supply chains that enable them leverage over 
the circumstances of upstream production. Yet there are also burdens placed on NGOs as a 
result of these governance dynamics, which Chapter 5 details. In a speech to the lUCN World 
Conservation Congress in 2004, Marcus Colchester offered a cynical conclusion on these 
dynamics, which could pertain to many responses for the deforestation teleconnections: 
"almost without realising it, conservationists have replaced the organs of democracy: we 
now have consumers instead of enfranchised citizens; we have NGOs in watchdog roles 
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to replace the executive; we only have recourse to the media as a court of appeal..." (in 
Moog etal., 2012:18). 
Simply stated, then, when teleconnections cross of international borders there are 
consequences for the governance responses of downstream actors. Downstream governments 
have significantly reduced regulatory options, and what options remain are still constrained. 
Companies, especially major multinationals occupying nodes in relevant supply chains, are 
relatively empowered, though the exercise of their responses face other limitations not yet 
canvassed by this study [and dealt with in chapters 4 and 5). NGOs are also burdened with 
additional responsibilities within these dynamics. As a result, international teleconnections that 
require responses from downstream actors, of which trade in the deforestation commodities is 
a singular example, are a problems of a different nature than what Biermann et al. (2010) have 
called 'traditional', single-jurisdiction problems. And it is the inter-jurisdictionality of 
socio-economic teleconnections, such as trade in the deforestation commodities, that comprises 
the most crucial dimension of distance, since it shapes and circumscribes the range of 
institutional teleconnections that can emerge in response to such problems. 
For deforestation, and perhaps even more so for other comparable problems, the pace-setter in 
the 'co-evolutionary race' has been the socio-economic teleconnections connecting downstream 
actors to upstream problems, vis-d-vis their institutional responses. It has been relatively easier 
to establish trades in soya or tropical timber, for example, and for palm oil consumption to be 
fragmented across thousands of supermarket products, than it has been for responses to ensure 
- and verify - the disconnection of these commodities from deforestation. Part - but only part -
of the reason why downstream actors' responses have lagged has been the often-unprecedented 
need for these responses to operate over inter-jurisdictional distance. 
Transformative distance 
There are another two dimensions of distance, not canvassed by Princen, which are nonetheless 
pivotal for understanding tropical deforestation's teleconnections. The first is the extent to 
which a commodity is transformed along its supply chains; the second is the complexity of the 
impacts that comprise the actual environmental problem. Each of these dimensions holds a 
positive relationship to the 'distance' inherent within these teleconnections, and will here be 
explored in turn. 
Transformative distance emerges from the extent to which a commodity is transformed along 
its supply chains [or networks), between the form in which it is harvested and the form in which 
it is ultimately used or consumed. The clarity of the relationship between a set of garden 
furniture and the timber it comprises is more straightforward than the relationship, to the same 
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original resource, of a package of paper or a set of cardboard boxes. The difference within these 
relationships is the degree to which the resource has been transformed to produce differing 
commodities. In fact, one of the remarkable things about t imber is the sheer variety of the 
products that can be derived from it. As one measure of this variety, the Australian illegal 
logging regulation lists 4 'chapters' or categories of products to which it applies, ranging from 
newsprint to cigarette papers to seats to sawn wood (DAFF, 2 0 1 4 c ) . The transformative 
distance separating the great majority of these products from the original resource obscure 
their relationship to that resource, which, to use Princen's language, serves to 'block ecological 
feedback by inhibiting information flow from extraction to consumption decisions' ( 2 0 0 2 : 1 1 9 ) . 
Two of the other deforestation commodities - palm oil and soya - can be even more challenging 
to identify at the point of consumption. 
For palm oil, as Boyle and Simms ( 2 0 0 9 ) note, there is 'a thread [connecting] chocolate to [oil] 
palm trees to shrinking rainforests in Southeast Asia, but it is not easy to see' ( p i 12). Palm oil is 
used for a variety of purposes yet it rarely comprises more than a tiny fraction of any final 
product. There is also a distinct lack of basic data on which products actually contain palm oil (a 
gap that the EU's labelling reforms closed for that jurisdiction in late 2 0 1 4 ) . In Australia, where 
a more targeted labelling proposal for palm oil failed to gain the Parliament's acceptance, the 
information on which products contain palm oil is instead emerging from small investigative 
organisations, such as Palm Oil Investigations (POl, 2 0 1 4 ) . But palm oil's invisibility in these 
products nonetheless increases its transformative distance further. 
Soybean is subject to even greater transformative distance, in an even more literal sense. The 
vast majority of exported soy is used as feed for cattle, pigs, chickens and farmed fish (some oil 
palm derivates have also been used for this purpose, for example as cattle feed in New Zealand 
during drought years). Almost half of the soybean produced in the tropics is exported to China, 
where it is used as feed for pigs; a significant share of the remainder is exported to the EU 
member states, such as Denmark, for the same use. Whether these pigs are slaughtered and 
consumed either in these countries, or once again exported, identifying the connections to 
deforestation from the point of consumption requires not just data, but also some work of the 
imagination. 
Hertwich ( 2 0 1 2 ) emphasises the overriding importance of transformative distance when he 
writes, 
'If you buy a set of chess figures carved from ivory, you can suspect that you have 
contributed to killing an elephant. But if you buy a sausage, you cannot know whether 
the pig that was turned into the sausage was fed soy meal sourced from a farm that had 
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just expanded into elephant habitat. The effects on species diversity, however, are 
similar' (p36). 
Put to one side the fact that elephant habitat is probably not the most compelling impact worth 
considering, given the overwhelming production of tropical soybean in Latin America, rather 
than Africa or southeast Asia. What remains clear, however, is that identifying teleconnections 
means not just 'having to visualise long and complex supply chains... [which] are growing in size, 
number and complexity as the world becomes ever more interdependent' (Boyle and Simms, 
2009:112], but also having to understand the substantial transformative distance that products 
travel along these chains. 
Transformative distance merits inclusion as a crucial dimension of distance for understanding 
the nature of teleconnections. While no metric is proposed here to measure 'the degree of 
transformative distance', the following working definition will suffice: 'the extent to which a 
product is unrecognisable or has been transformed, or transfigured, from its original 
resaurce(s)'. As a rule of thumb, the greater this degree of transformation - i.e. the greater the 
distance - then the more difficult it will be to identify problematic teleconnections from the 
points of consumption. Finally, this concept of 'distance through transformation' might also help 
to explain why environmental problems with some similar features to tropical deforestation, 
such as mangrove clearance for shrimp farming in southeast Asia, have not generated 
comparable governance response. The 'complexity as distance' argument that follows further 
reinforces the strength of this explanation. 
Complexity as distance 
The complexity of an environmental problem is also a component of the distance characterising 
a given teleconnection. Complexity can be found in the lack of immediacy, or lack of visibility, 
with which environmental impacts are incurred. Tropical deforestation actually allows for a 
relatively straightforward identification of its impacts; a forest cleared for palm oil production 
can now be observed from satellites in space. Other subsequent impacts that flow from 
deforestation, however, such as the biophysical teleconnections of changes to hydrological and 
climate systems, take much longer to emerge and are usually more difficult both to discern and 
to attribute. 
The socio-economic teleconnections of deforestation, then, sit at the more obvious end of the 
spectrum (notwithstanding Chapter I's note on the continued shortcomings of contemporary 
data). Other environmental problems can be invisible, cumulative and with slow-moving effects, 
and are therefore typically even more difficult to identify. Examples might include the 
accumulation of chemical pollutants in waterways, especially those emitted from non-point 
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sources (as run-off from agricultural fields, for example), or the depletion of invisible resources, 
such as groundwater, or mobile resources, such as wild capture fisheries. Understanding how 
complexity acts as a dimension of distance also suggests why responses comparable to those for 
deforestation have not yet emerged for many of the environmental problems connected to 
international trade, as well as the mangrove clearance for shrimp farming referred to above. 
The perpetuation of complexity as a dimension of distance also emphasises the significance of 
recent efforts to empirically discern, quantify and thereby understand the nature of such 
problems. 
Both the transformative and complexity dimensions of distance make it more difficult to 
identify relevant socio-economic teleconnections from the point of consumption. The 
transformative distance of three of the deforestation commodities - timber, palm oil and soya -
helps to explain why a governance gap emerged for these teleconnections, which current 
responses are attempting to bridge. In order to close this gap, this chapter has developed the 
argument that responses need to locate an appropriate subject of governance. These 
dimensions of distance are pertinent to assessing that subject. It is telling to note, for example, 
that responses overwhelmingly do not attempt to reduce these distances, by simplifying the 
paths - both geographical and transformative - that commodities travel. Instead, these 
dimensions are taken as given by most downstream actors. 
Current responses therefore seek to respond to deforestation's teleconnections by simply 
'excising' or 'purging' the problematic upstream impact of deforestation, leaving the underlying 
magnitude, direction and structures of relevant trades unaltered. This chapter will now draw on 
literatures proposing consumption, globalisation - and briefly - capitalism as alternative 
subjects of governance, which critique current responses, including for their blindness to these 
dimensions of distance. 
Insights f rom other l i teratures 
As earlier noted, Newell et al. (2012] conclude that, 'there is a politics to making claims about 
where governance deficits lie and why and who gets to frame discussions about which 
alternatives are appropriate, desirable, and viable' (p367). Given current responses' focus, 
among multiple alternatives, on international supply chains for the deforestation commodities, 
Newell et al.'s point is that this focus - indeed, any focus - has consequences, both in what is 
(and is not) problematised by responses and in the form that responses subsequently take. The 
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remainder of this chapter is dedicated to exploring the insights that literatures proposing 
alternative subjects of governance can provide on current responses to deforestation. 
Governing consumption 
'Consumption' is one prominent, alternative subject of governance that responses to 
deforestation could have considered. A definition of consumption is provided by Rees and 
Westra (2003], who state that 'in physical terms, consumption involves the irreversible 
transformation of available energy and material partly into useful products, but mainly into 
waste, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics' (p i 10]. In turn, Mutersbaugh and 
Klooster (2010] contend that, 'addressing the environmental consequences of consumption is 
arguably the single most pressing global environmental concern' (pl68]. Rees and Westra, 
continuing on from the above, concur that 'material consumption, particularly by the 
economically privileged, is the "forcing mechanism" for global ecological change' (p i 1]. 
Given the strength of these statements, it seems surprising that Dauvergne would be in the 
position of needing to note that, 
'across the social sciences, relatively little research has probed the full complexity and 
difficulty of 'governing consumption globally', compared with, say, the extensive 
research on global environmental governance and trade agreements [inter alia]' 
(2010:2]. 
This expression of frustration reflects a two-fold blindness in the ways that consumption has 
(failed to] been perceived: firstly, in downplaying or ignoring consumption as a driver of 
environmental impacts, and secondly, in neglecting it as a driver that actors could or should 
respond to directly. It is thus worth questioning whether current responses to deforestation fix 
their attention on either of these shortcomings. 
At first blush, it might seem an easy conceptual step from current responses' subject of 
governance - supply chains of the deforestation commodities - to the consumption o/those 
same commodities. Yet within this seemingly small discrepancy, consumption literatures carve 
out a space for substantial insight. The essential difference between these two subjects of 
governance is found in what they do and do not problematise, which is in turn reflected in the 
different ends of supply chains that they focus on. Specifically, current responses problematise 
the deforestation that, through international supply chains, is teleconnected to downstream 
actors. Responses therefore leave the consumption of these commodities ultimately 
unproblematised. Putting these two strands together, it becomes clear that current responses 
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are designed - and rely - on the premise that it is possible to purge supply chains of their 
connections to deforestation without attending to the consumption of these commodities. 
Whether or not this might be possible is a topic of a schism within consumption literatures, for 
which responses to tropical deforestation offer a valuable case study. 
Numerous authors have wondered whether addressing the /mpact5 of consumption is possible 
without altering consumption itself Among those, Hertwich perhaps phrases it best, when he 
introduces Lenzen et al.'s (2012) study with the following: 
'The fundamental question that remains is whether the current (and increasing] scale of 
consumption will inevitably cause these threats [to biodiversity], or whether ways could 
be found to satisfy this consumption but allow affluent consumers to reduce their 
impact' (Hertwich, 2012:37]. 
On one side of this schism is a 'camp' that tends to view unwanted impacts - whether 
environmental or social - merely as 'by-products' or 'externalities' involved in the production of 
soybean, palm oil, timber and so on. The United Nations Environmental Program, for example, 
adheres to this characterisation when it states that, 'environmental impacts are the unwanted 
by-products of economic activities...' (UNEP, 2010:3]. Mutersbaugh and Klooster (in Lockie and 
Carpenter, 2010} contend likewise, identifying one particular type of governance response -
certification - as an ally, 
'Whether we speak of a healthy food system, forest conservation, global warming or 
mass species extinction, certified production linked to acts of consumption provides one 
such means to address these global ecological crises' (pl68]. 
This characterisation of the consumption governance problem perhaps finds its zenith in the 
ideas of 'green growth' and 'the green economy'. These ideas found full favour in the early to 
mid 2000s, when countries began using the highly conscious language of 'decoupling' economic 
growth from greenhouse gas emissions (eg. UNEP, 2011]. The governance responses to the 
environmental problem at hand, tropical deforestation, also fit neatly within this camp. As time 
has passed, however, it appears that efforts to decouple economic growth from emissions have 
largely gone unrealised. The other 'camp' in this rift is ready to offer some reasons why; reasons 
that apply squarely to current responses to deforestation. 
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Three insights 
A. Magnitude matters 
Consumption as a subject of governance suggests a perspective in which magnitude matters. 
Simple as this premise seems, it is has often been neglected by other literatures; or where it is 
acknowledged, it is assumed to be unchangeable (forecast increases in demand are taken as 
given]. Whether alternative subjects of governance either rule out a concern for the magnitude 
of consumption, or simply dismiss an ability to affect it, they abandon directly targeting, and 
changing, underlying levels of demand as a possible approach to remedying environmental 
problems. 
To illustrate this point, consider the statement from Bennett and Balvanera (2007) that, 'in the 
coming decades, how we meet increased demand for provisioning ecosystem services will 
determine the conditions of the future' (pl92, citing Sarukhan, 2006). In order to interpret this 
claim, however, a preliminary question need first be answered: namely, is 'increased demand' 
inevitable, or could 'reducing demand' be targeted as a policy objective? This preliminary 
question is, in fact, the main point for one 'camp' on consumption. For amid forecast increases in 
demand for fossil fuel energy, food production, biofuels, as well as the deforestation 
commodities, an essential starting point seems to be an exploration of whether current and 
future levels of demand could be reduced, and if so, how. 
Indeed, some authors with precisely this point in mind have found fault with current responses 
to tropical deforestation, noting that the magnitude of demand for commodities is generally left 
unaddressed, and accordingly, unproblematised. For instance, writing on the FSC, Moog et al. 
(2012) pose the following dilemma: 
'Forest movement activists hoping to decrease global consumption of timber and wood 
products, and to significantly slow rates of deforestation in the tropics, have had to ask 
themselves whether the gains made by somewhat improving forestry standards, 
especially in Northern forests, are ultimately worth the costs of legitimating, through 
their participation in market-based schemes like the FSC,... ideas of protection through 
consumption, rather than protection through clear, measurable decreases in hectares 
lost...' (emphasis added; p22). 
The sensitivity of such an attention to the magnitude of consumption, which to some introduces 
the spectre of limits, should not be underestimated. For example, in their examination of the 
RTRS and RSPO, Schouten et al. (2012) identified tensions between warring ideological 
viewpoints, leading these authors to conclude that, 
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'...in essence we see the same pattern occurring [in the RSPO] as in the RTRS; discourses 
that are included in the RSPO have essentially a reformist view on sustainable 
development, and more radical views, that suggest changes at system level and a 
fundamentally different relationship between economy and ecology, are excluded...' 
(p48). 
Specifically in relation to the decision to include or exclude magnitude as a specific concern, 
Shouten et al. (2012] note that, 
'...the participants of the [RTRS'] Principles and Criteria and Development Group were 
able to reach consensus on every aspect of the document, except the expansion of soy 
cultivation' (emphasis added; p47). 
In a similar vein, this trait has been noted in other responses beyond NGO-industry Roundtables. 
For example, it is the exclusion of any magnitude-based concerns from corporate sourcing 
policies (and other corporate initiatives] that led Dauvergne and Lister (2012] to the following, 
parallel, conclusion: 'Fundamentally, big brand sustainability governance on its own will not -
indeed, it cannot - achieve global sustainability. Put simply, the planet cannot sustain the 
impacts of the big brand business model' (p43]. These authors continue, 
'[Companies'] aim is to leverage sustainability for business growth while focusing on 
reducing the intensity of environmental impacts. Consequently, the on-the-ground 
results of big brand efforts have not been able to reverse - or even measurably slow -
the net environmental consequences of rising global consumption on ecosystems such 
as the global climate, tropical forests, or oceans...' (ibid.]. 
The nuance of a concern for magnitude can be demonstrated as follows. At the time of writing, 
multiple producer countries have explicitly stated targets to increase their production of the 
deforestation commodities, with Indonesia intending to export 40 million tonnes of palm oil by 
2020 (Hadinaryanto, 2014]. Unrealistic as this target might be (it takes 3-4 years before newly-
planted trees begin producing fruit], the Indonesian Government's target creates a quandary 
given the impacts on forests that previous expansions have incurred (ibid.]. Broadly speaking, 
there are two approaches to resolving that quandary, but it depends on the nuance of the 
question that is asked. The following 'model' permutations of such a question reveal the 
different priorities that emerge in either the absence, or presence, of a concern over magnitude. 
Question 1. How can increased demand for palm oil production be met while 
minimising the impact on southeast Asia's tropical forests? 
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Versus, 
Question 2. By how much can production of palm oil increase without incurring 
further impacts on southeast Asia's tropical forests? 
The first of these questions takes it for granted that increased production of palm oil must occur, 
with concern over 'minimising the impact' on forests emerging as a secondary priority. In 
contrast, the second question prioritises preventing further impacts on southeast Asia's forests 
by instead orienting towards the extent to which increased palm oil production is possible 
within compromis ing that priority. With in a global paradigm that lauds, unquestioningly, 
increases in economic growth, international trade and the production of nationally-valuable 
commodities, the first of these two 'model' questions is the one that policymakers and other 
actors most commonly choose to answer. Indeed, Indonesia itself provides evidence of that 
outcome, by announcing its intention to clear an additional 14 mill ion hectares (140 000 sq km] 
of forest by 2020, in large part to allow the expansion of palm oil plantations (Butler, 2014b}. 
This study's responses to deforestation are also aligned with the first of these two questions, 
mak ing them 'magnitude-blind'. In fact, some responses such as the RSPO even hold the 
objective of ' increasing consumpt ion of palm oil', albeit of a sustainable type (RSPO, 2014a]. As 
jacquet et al. (2010) note in a comparable case, however, 'simply creating demand for an 
eco-certified product is not enough unless there is a concurrent decrease in demand for other 
[versions of that product]' (plO]. Even if the RSPO could realise its objective to increase 
sustainable consumpt ion of palm oil, that commodity's role in driving deforestation could 
remain unmitigated, or even worsened. In the absence of an attention to magnitude, the two are 
not mutual ly exclusive. 
The magni tude of consumpt ion is important, and may be crucial, for attempts to ameliorate 
environmental problems such as deforestation. This discovery leads to a simple approach to 
deforestation: develop policy responses to consume less of the commodit ies that have been 
implicated in tropical deforestation. The spirit of such an approach would find support from the 
conclusions of a rigorous study of resource efficiency in Asia and the Pacific. In that study, 
Schandl et al. (2011) write that 'in the light of already very high resource use globally, 
dematerial isation - that is, an absolute reduction in resource use - needs to be achieved' (p2]. 
Similarly, some of the empirical research presented in the previous chapter echoes this 
sentiment, as W iedmann et al. (2013], for example, conclude: 
'Rather than a mere decline in intensities of use and impact, true dematerialisation has 
to mean an absolute decoupling of impacts if a growing world populat ion is to make 
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ends meet on a finite planet. The [material footprint] indicates that this goal might be 
harder to achieve than previously thought as global affluence grows' [p5). 
The connection that Wiedmann et al. ( 2013) find between global affluence and material 
footprints further underlines the significance of the total magnitude of consumption, rather than 
just the relative intensity of that consumption. While reducing total consumption seems to be a 
logical endpoint for this discussion, however, one further possibility would be to attend to the 
magnitude of consumption - or production, for that matter - by reducing it in the interim, until 
such time as it can increase without exacerbating environmental problems. 
Pointedly, then, none of the current responses to tropical deforestation explicitiy propose or are 
designed to achieve a reduction in the consumption of the deforestation commodities, either 
temporarily or permanently. (Although it is at least possible that some might have this effect, as 
this chapter later notes with reference to the globalisation literature.) As such, current 
responses are magnitude-blind, a choice which foregoes one clear option - reduced 
consumption, or equally, production - to avert the impacts that the deforestation commodities 
will have on tropical forests. Forgoing this option is particularly risky, or optimistic, both in the 
context of planned expansions of production of these commodities, and in conjunction with the 
possibility of displacement and rebound effects, to which this critique now turns. 
B. The displacement effect 
A second insight from consumption literature is the concept of 'displacement', through which 
attempts to resolve a given problem merely transpose that problem onto other places, other 
resources, or push it forward into the future. Thus although a problem can appear to be 
resolved, this is more appearance than reality. As Princen states, 'displacement results in the 
appearance of solutions when, in fact, the problem is only shifted to other media, other 
ecosystems, or other, usually unrepresented, peoples' (2002 :129) . 
This chapter has already noted one example of displacement, through Yu et al.'s (2013) findings 
on the areas of foreign cropland used by the 'rich countries' of the EU, US and japan, as well as 
the 'fast growing emerging economies' of China, South Korea and others ( p l l 8 5 ) . In Yu et al.'s 
own words, 
'This pattern reflects that rich countries displace land from other countries to meet their 
own consumption while the emerging economies such as the Russian Federation and 
Brazil absorb their demands on land... Our results show that 4 7 % of Brazilian cropland 
and 8 8 % of Argentinean cropland are used for consumption in other countries, mainly 
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in the EU and China. Our results also show that China displaced 5 million hectares of 
cropland in Brazil, mainly for soybeans...' (emphasis added; p l l84-5) . 
As Yu et al. (2013) demonstrate, then, displacement can occur geographically, and indeed, 
geographical displacement can also occur at mult iple scales. Within the tropics itself, it is 
already clear that soybean production has been displaced from the humid tropical forests of the 
Amazon to the dry tropical forests of the cerrado in northern Argentina and southern Brazil, 
even though pastureland provides a viable alternative (Macedo and Davidson, 2014; WWF, 
2014). It can be argued, of course, that the environmental consequences of clearing cerrado are 
preferable to clearing further areas within the Amazon, and indeed that this displacement might 
be an example of Boucher et al.'s (2011) 'guiding' of deforestation to 'places where it does the 
least damage' (p98). Without disputing this point, however, the concept of displacement 
provides a lens to confirm that the root problem in this case (the impacts of clearing land to 
increase soybean production) has not been resolved, merely displaced. 
Geographical displacement can also be understood at the scale of an individual land 'concession', 
or forestry management unit (FMU). This is the scale at which sustainability schemes certify 
production of forestry and agricultural commodities. Recent evidence from Peru (Finer et al., 
2014) suggests that high-value t imber is being illegally extracted from beyond t imber 
concessions, while in many cases the same timber species are left unharvested within those 
concessions. This may allow for the later harvesting of these legal species, amplifying the 
impacts of selective logging. Auld etal. (2008) have suggested that, even in the absence of illegal 
practices, sustainability schemes could generate a similar dynamic, with producers parcelling 
up their land to adhere to the requirements for certification within given concessions while 
displacing problematic practices to adjacent forests. With reference to the FSC, these authors 
write: 
'Moreover, there is a perceived trade-off between the conservation gains occurring on 
FSC-certified lands and the landscape-level patterns of protection. Without a 
commensurate reduction in demand for forest products, too much protection on an 
individually certified tract, which leads to reduced outputs, can mean higher pressure 
for extraction on non-certified lands. This logic has led to arguments that reduced 
standards for certified plantations may help conservation rather than hinder it' (Auld et 
al., 2008:199). 
Wi th a landscape parcelled up to facilitate the certification of at least some concessions, then, 
geographical displacement can mean that overall levels of impacts remain unmitigated. 
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Non-geographical forms of displacement also exist, such as the substitution of one commodity 
for another. Following the restrictions on expanding soybean production within the Amazon, for 
instance, another commodity might come to be substituted to fill soybean's end-markets, 
especially if the expansion of soybean into the cerrado was similarly constrained. Given that the 
predominant use of Brazilian soya is as animal feed within China and the EU, one alternative 
commodity being touted for this purpose is wild-caught fish. If livestock producers in those two 
jurisdictions instead began to substitute fishmeal as feed for their animals (themselves 
becoming more numerous as demand for meat escalates], then the environmental burdens 
previously experienced by tropical forests could be displaced onto wild-capture fisheries 
(Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011). Crucially in this example, such a development is likely to go 
unnoticed, or at least unproblematised, by those actors who are currently prioritising tropical 
forests. 
Further, displacement can occur through indirect mechanisms, making the transposition of 
impacts especially difficult to detect. Such mechanisms include multiple economic parameters, 
including exchange rates (Richards et al., 2012), appreciation in land prices (Richards et al., 
2014], as well as commodity prices. To provide an example of the complexities involved, 
consider the consequences of a (hypothetical] contraction in logging activity, which - at least 
ostensibly - could result from the illegal logging laws now implemented by the US, EU and 
Australia. Reduced supply of timber could conceivably result in increased timber prices, which 
in turn could provoke the substitution of other products for timber for use as building materials, 
for example. Multiple possibilities then emerge. While the effect of price increases is likely to be 
a reduction in timber consumption (satisfying a concern with the magnitude of production], the 
environmental consequences of this shift may still be either positive or negative, depending on 
both the product that is substituted (Auld et al., 2008; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011], for 
example steel, plastic or bamboo (Dauvergne and Lister, 2011], as well as any consequent 
behaviour change (if packaging material becomes so expensive that more is recycled and reused, 
rather than discarded]. Alternatively, or even concurrently, one possibility is that increased 
timber prices simply induce supply from other sources, encouraging procurement from 
locations with weak controls on timber extraction. 
As these examples demonstrate, the displacement effect is highly relevant to current responses 
to tropical deforestation. From within their focus on humid tropical forests and a handful of 
commodities, these responses are incapable of preventing all possible displacements of the 
impacts currently borne by tropical forests. In the globalised context of economic activity that 
they operate within, expecting more from responses is probably unrealistic; as Boucher et al. 
(2011] conclude, 'there is no way to prevent it from happening entirely' (p98]. 
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What then is the antidote to these possibilities of displacement? A later section in this chapter 
will explore how the context of globalisation is left unquestioned, and therefore 
unproblematised, by responses and suggest the need for further attention to that topic. Yet 
more immediately, some authors have emphasised the importance of a 'holistic perspective' 
(Boons et al., 2 0 1 2 ] in order to 'safeguard against inter- and intra-industry spill-overs, 
displacement, and segregation of markets' ( p l 3 4 ) . A starting point for a more holistic 
perspective is surely, as this study attempts to do for responses to deforestation, to build a 
broader lens, or field of view, for a given topic, allowing as many relevant elements as possible 
to be simultaneously scrutinised. Indeed, this study's empirical chapters will go on to reach 
conclusions that are only possible through such a lens (after Chapter 2 first establishes that 
lens]. It is a further step from a holistic analysis of a given topic, which can recognise 
displacement, to a holistic governance of that topic, but this section's contributions on the 
importance of both the magnitude of consumption and the possibility of displacement apply 
equally to that more challenging task (which will be explored in chapters 4 and 5, especially]. A 
final contribution from consumption literature is the rebound effect, which is now introduced. 
C. The rebound effect 
Consumption literature's third insight for this study is the concept of a 'rebound' effect. A 
rebound effect occurs when production of a given product or commodity becomes more 
efficient, leading in turn to higher overall production and associated impacts. This outcome 
usually occurs through the lower prices created by efficiency, which in turn can create further 
potential uses for it. A classic example of the rebound effect (also known as the 'Jevons paradox'; 
Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2 0 1 1 : 3 4 6 8 ] is the dramatic increases in fuel efficiencies of vehicles 
throughout the 20"' century, which stimulated both greater production of vehicles and 
encouraged each to travel further distances, which together meant that the total volume of fuel 
used by all vehicles dramatically increased, despite the fact that fuel use by a given vehicle over 
a given distance had declined. 
Rebound effects are relevant for tropical forests too. Agricultural intensification, which entails 
improvements in the efficiencies, or intensities, with which production occurs, can result in 
increased profitability, leading to increased aggregate production, land use and therefore 
impacts on forests from that production. As Lambin and Meyfroidt (2011] note, for cases 
'involving cash crops for rapidly expanding global markets', which characterises all of the 
tropical deforestation commodities, 'agricultural intensification [has] encouraged more 
cropland expansion, as observed for soybean in Brazil and oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia' 
(p3468] . 
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Finally, there is a second way in which a rebound effect can work that is highly relevant for 
Amazonian soy production. This effect does not stem from the crop's production efficiencies, 
though, but rather from perceptions about its implication in deforestation. As Barona et al. 
(2010) write, 'the soy industry is expanding rapidly in Brazil, supported by the notion that they 
are not causing new deforestation; the blame continues to be placed on cattle ranching' (p8]. 
Under an assumption of false innocence, then, soy production has been stimulated, leading to a 
situation where soy production 'may have displaced [cattle] pastures further north into the 
forested areas' (p8). Greater soy production has also led to the displacement of soy into the 
cerrado, as recently noted, as well as causing an appreciation in land values within the Amazon 
that in turn drives further deforestation (Richards etal., 2014]. Clearly, the dynamics of 
Amazonian deforestation are complex, and an over-simplified understanding of these dynamics 
has so far allowed production of soya to expand significandy, leading to continued pressure on 
the region's forests. 
For this study's subject matter, what are the implications of these three contributions from the 
consumption literature? The neglect by current responses to deforestation of the magnitude of 
timber, palm oil, beef and soya consumption is premised on the possibility of purging that 
consumption of its problematic connection to deforestation independent of the quantities 
demanded. This means that even if the impacts of a less than total fraction of consumption - say, 
the fraction that occurs in 'eco-sensitive markets' - are effectively purged of this connection, this 
does not necessarily translate into a reduction in the overall connection between these 
commodities and deforestation. With no reduction in the total magnitude of consumption, 
production of these commodities can continue to expand, driving impacts on forests, even if a 
fraction of consumption can be absolved from direct implication. In other words, neglect of the 
magnitude of consumption of the deforestation commodities means that, even if responses are 
successful in verifiably decoupling some consumption from deforestation, they may not yield 
commensurate respite for tropical forests. 
Displacement muddies this picture, and darkens the worst-case scenario, even further. Even if 
consumption in some jurisdictions is decoupled from direct implication in deforestation, the 
impacts on tropical forests may simply be displaced, through shifting those impacts to other 
locations (within or beyond the tropics, outside of certified areas), onto other resources 
(wild-caught fish for soya, or concrete for timber), or somewhere and onto something else 
entirely. Further, any rebound effects that lead to greater demand for the deforestation 
commodities - by virtue of their 'proven' innocence in tropical deforestation, for example -
could in turn create an amplification of these displacement effects. The term 'the shadows of 
consumption' (from Dauvergne, 2008) is an attempt to capture the 'many indirect and hidden 
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spi l l -overs of supplying and replac ing c o n s u m e r products ' (Dauvergne, 2 0 1 0 : 3 ) . As this c h a p t e r 
has s h o w n , in a c o n t e x t w h e r e magni tude is a s s u m e d not to mat ter , d i sp lacement and rebound 
ef fects undoubtedly cont r ibute to these ' shadows' . 
One c lear l imitat ion o f c u r r e n t responses , explored at length in Chapter 4 and re turned to 
empir ica l ly in Chapter 7, is their only partial coverage of internat ional ly- t raded deforestat ion 
c o m m o d i t i e s . Indeed, with the except ion of soy, a ma jor i ty of each of these c o m m o d i t i e s is 
ul t imately c o n s u m e d within the country of product ion, leaving c u r r e n t responses - focused on 
internat ional t rade - with an even m o r e partial coverage of total production. One possibil i ty for 
d i s p l a c e m e n t t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e s obvious: prob lemat i c vers ions of commodi t i es purged from 
supply chains leading to cer ta in jur isdic t ions could be displaced towards undiscerning end 
m a r k e t s , w h e t h e r within the country of production or to o t h e r import ing jurisdict ions. Indeed, 
empir ica l ev idence s h o w s that segregat ion of ' sustainable ' from 'unsusta inable ' is a lready 
occurr ing with r e s p e c t to t rade in t i m b e r (ITTO, 2 0 1 0 ; Cashore and Stone, 2 0 1 2 ] and palm oil 
(Sus ta inable Palm Oil, 2 0 1 3 ] , for example , while China - the world 's largest i m p o r t e r and 
c o n s u m e r of s o y b e a n - has not enacted any c o m p a r a b l e r e s p o n s e s to those in this study. This 
evidence , backed by the three contr ibut ions from consumpt ion l i terature, supports Dauvergne's 
content ion that 'unsusta inable product ion. . . is increasingly masking itself as susta inable 
c o n s u m p t i o n ' ( 2 0 1 0 : 2 ) . However, such t rends a r e only discernible from a holistic perspect ive of 
the type e s p o u s e d by the c o n s u m p t i o n l i teratures , and aspired to by this study. 
T w o fur ther points w a r r a n t ment ioning here . Firstly, even the proven p r e s e n c e of d isplacement 
ef fects would not imply that c u r r e n t r e s p o n s e s to deforestat ion a r e incapable of alleviating some 
m e a s u r e o f the p r o b l e m s caused in tropical forests by c o m m o d i t y production. Indeed, as 
B o u c h e r et al. ( 2 0 1 1 ) concede , ' there is no way to prevent [displacement] from happening 
ent irely ; the point is to minimise it, res tr ic t it, and guide it to places w h e r e it does the least 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l and social damage ' ( p 9 8 ) . For the reasons outlined in Chapter 1, the priori ty of 
protec t ing humid tropical forests from further c lear ing is sound. However, d o w n s t r e a m ac tors 
should not fool t h e m s e l v e s by the illusion that this e x o n e r a t e s their consumpt ion of the 
d e f o r e s t a t i o n commodi t ies , even at present - and let a lone increased - levels. An inability to 
contro l the d i s p l a c e m e n t of envi ronmenta l burdens m e a n s one of three things: firstly, accept ing 
B o u c h e r e t al.'s ( 2 0 1 1 ) chal lenge and seeking to 'guide' d i sp lacement to less valuable places, as 
to s o m e e x t e n t is current ly occurring; secondly, acknowledging the i m p o r t a n c e of the 
magni tude of c o n s u m p t i o n and a t t e m p t i n g to reduce environmenta l burdens in totality, 
t h e r e f o r e obviat ing displacement ; o r thirdly, a t tending to the s t ruc tures of internat ional t rade 
tha t enable the d i s p l a c e m e n t of these b u r d e n s in the first place. This lat ter meaning is 
e l a b o r a t e d on below, with r e f e r e n c e to global isat ion l i terature. 
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Given these options, it becomes clear that current responses are unMkely to be perfect remedies 
capable of avoiding perverse outcomes. Instead, downstream actors' responses may need to be 
conceptualised more as part of a patchwork set of solutions, a topic that Chapter 4 examines in 
detail by introducing the question of whether responses are mutually supportive or inhibitive. 
A second point to make here is that consumption literature itself offers less than comprehensive 
guidance in seeking to resolve tropical deforestation. Indeed, consumption's strength is also its 
weakness and Achilles heel, since in identifying the critical importance of magnitude it 
inevitably sacrifices some potential to propose practicable governance responses at scales 
smaller than the whole. The way in which this puzzle has been resolved within that literature, as 
outlined briefly below, actually lends support to the narrow delineation of a handful of 
commodities that characterise current responses to deforestation. If environmental impacts 
ultimately cannot be disconnected from total magnitudes of consumption, the task of governing 
consumption becomes less tractable as it inflates to encompass - at its extreme - the 'full global 
balance of natural resources' (Auld et al., 2008:204], And if this is consumption's diagnosis, then 
there can be only one justifiable guideline in responding: namely, whatever the problem, 
'consume less'. Authors accept the need for more useful solutions than this, a challenge that 
[Kastner, Kastner, et al., 2011] capture succinctly when they write of needing to link 
'production-related environmental pressures... to consumption patterns in a relevant way' 
(pl032]. 
Through their targeting of a narrow set of teleconnections, current responses to deforestation 
cogently make this link; doing so much more rapidly and effectively than did decades of 
inter-governmental negotiations, in comparison. Breaking down the all-encompassing category 
of 'consumption' into some of its constituent parts provides a pathway to actually enact 
responses. Spaargaren (2011] encourages such a targeted approach when he urges, 
'researchers and policy makers to focus on clusters or sets of consumption practices that 
are situated within a limited number of'domains' spanning everyday life' (p815]. 
For 'domains', Spaargaren lists consumption categories such as 'food, clothing, mobility, leisure, 
housing and personal care'. Other categories enable stronger application to the concerns 
introduced over the last two chapters, however, such as 'the consumption of 
internationally-traded commodities', or more specifically, 'consumption of the deforestation 
commodities'. 
Current governance responses, then, have successfully identified a set of teleconnections 
warranting remedial attention. At the same time, as this section has elucidated, the challenge for 
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current responses is not to suffer from their chosen neglect of the magnitude of consumption, 
which could potentially be compounded by rebound effects, and the partial neglect - but also 
partial inevitability - of displacement. In addition, globalisation and capitalism literatures both 
emphasise further subjects of governance that are being neglected by current responses, which 
again may generate consequences. 
Governing globalisation and capitalism 
Current responses take international supply chains in the deforestation commodities as their 
subject of governance. As Newell et al. (2012] noted, 'there is a politics' to this decision (p367). 
Additionally, there are also consequences that flow from the neglect of alternative subjects of 
governance, such as consumption, for example. 
Globalisation provides a further alternative subject of governance. That is, rather than targeting 
international supply chains for specific commodities, downstream actors could have responded 
to their connection to deforestation through attention to the processes of globalisation that 
enabled those connections to emerge. This section explores what globalisation offers as a 
subject of governance and illuminates the dangers to current responses from ignoring it. 
It is first important to understand what the processes of globalisation entail. According to Conca, 
'In contrast to the more popular (but ultimately incomplete] view of globalisation as 
more frequent cross-border transactions, I stress changes in the underlying organisation 
and logic of production in the world economy. Two particularly important changes... 
[are] the proliferation and lengthening of genuinely global commodity chains and the 
continuing shift towards so-called post-Fordist modes of production...' (2002:136]. 
Whi le 'more frequent international transactions' might provide an 'incomplete' comprehension 
of globalisation, however, this section nonetheless includes it as an important aspect of the 
complete picture. Thus there are three aspects of globalisation which warrant attention here, 
characterised as: 1. The greater frequency of international trades, 2. the increasing geographical 
distances that supply chains travel, and 3. the continuing shift towards 'post-Fordist' modes of 
production. The concept of'distance' developed earlier in this chapter enables Conca's 
'proliferation and lengthening' ( p l 36] of supply chains to be understood as geographical 
distance; and as that earlier section noted, other distances - such as transformative distance -
often increase in tandem with geographical distance, although they can also increase 
independently. Each of these three aspects are important for comprehending the insights that 
globalisation can offer as an alternative subject of governance. 
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Another interpretation of the empirical research that opened the previous chapter could be 
build around the implication in environmental problems not just of specific supply chains, but 
rather of international trade in general. As Weinzettel et al. (2013] write, 'the translocation of 
environmental pressures through international trade (e.g., via land use displacement) has only 
recently received attention' (p437). What has recently been documented confirms not only 
Bennett and Balvanera (2007) statement that 'globalisation... allow[s] access to new products 
and new locations in which to produce them' (p l94], but also Lambin et al.'s claim that 'rapid 
land-use changes often coincide with the incorporation of a region into an expanding world 
economy' (2001). The final piece of this narrative is Wiedmann et al.'s conclusion that 'the 
current level of national material consumption has only been made possible through a record 
increase in international trade' (2013:5). 
Thus greater international trade has tended not to be benign; it not only allows access to new 
opportunities but incurs significant impacts, such as tropical deforestation, in claiming them. 
Yet it is only by claiming these opportunities that societies (primarily in the wealthy world, but 
also in emerging economies) have enabled current levels of prosperity. These revealing 
statement about international trade have led the founder of the Tropical Forests Trust, a forest 
consultancy that has worked with some of the world's largest companies, to conclude that, 
'Globalisation is the [lowest common denominator], the principal driver of deforestation, not soy 
or rice farmers, cattle ranchers, palm oil plantation or forest managers' (Poynton, 2013; 
emphasis added). In more general terms, Sachs's (1999) comment holds true: 'the globalisation 
of goodies is accompanied by the globalisation of nasties' (p75). What these perspectives 
propose - implicitly and sometimes explicitly - is that responses to a problem such as tropical 
deforestation should take globalisation, or international trade in shorthand, as a subject that 
itself warrants governance. 
For many of the actors this study refers to, both downstream and upstream of deforestation 
supply chains, the idea of governing international trade is highly challenging, especially if it 
could entail the imposition of constraints on international transactions. This idea, of restricting 
trade, is directly contrary to the objective of further promoting and liberalising international 
trade institutionalised by actors from the WTO and the International Monetary Fund, to trade 
agencies, departments and representatives at the national level, and within large companies and 
even many NGOs. In short, most actors are united in their wholehearted support for the further 
expansion of international trade, a central aspect of globalisation. 
Yet within the context of this general support for international trade, however, some current 
responses for deforestation do l imit trade in versions of specified commodities. For example, 
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illegal logging laws and public procurement policies are designed to l imit trade in illegal t imber 
products, while company sourcing policies limit trade in unsustainable versions of the 
deforestation commodities. Perhaps it is these precedents that embolden Lenzen et al. (2012) to 
suggest 'suppressing trade in at-risk commodit ies [found to be impacting on biodiversity]' 
( p i l l ) . But the smallness of this logic step, from limiting trade in problematic versions of 
commodit ies to l imiting trade in certain commodities, full-stop, belies the tenuous acceptance 
that even the former of these objectives holds (as Chapter 6 explores at length). 
Other authors propose even more ambit ious remedies using globalisation as a subject of 
governance. Lambin and Meyfroidt (2011), for example, propose 'new forms of global 
governance linking trade with environmental protection' (p3471). Such a proposal is 
fundamental ly aligned with the empirical evidence that has recently emerged on the impacts of 
trade, yet it also depends on effectively problematising international trade itself, including 
within the minds of governments and international organisations. And although current 
responses could be interpreted as demonstrating, on the one hand, that specific trades have 
been problematised, an alternative interpretation is that any momentum that might emerge 
behind governing trade as a whole is likely to be channelled into the more fragmented task of 
governing specific trades associated with specific impacts. As Chapter 2 argued, the problem of 
tropical deforestation has provided a lightening rod for emerging concern over the impacts of 
international trade, making current responses to it an ideal case study. However, as this chapter 
has argued, the subject of governance taken by these responses also suggests that neither 
processes of globalisation, nor volumes of international trade, have been understood by 
downstream actors as a worthy focus. (Chapter 7 will offer some modest exceptions.) 
For other environmental problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions, partial responses - i.e. 
based on a subset of international supply chains - are not viable. Responding to emissions from 
international trade therefore needs to be realised comprehensively, something that, as Cristea 
etal . (2013) note, has so far 'been overlooked' in international climate negotiations and 
agreements (p l53 ) . Further, when in 2012 the EU imposed a tax on all international aviation, 
including flights that either originated or terminated outside of Europe, there was a clamour 
from other countries, with some (such as the US and China) explicitly forbidding their airlines 
from paying this tax (ibid.). As a result, the tax was removed in 2013. (The EU has more recently 
announced that it would monitor emissions from shipping, though due to start only in 2018; 
ICTSD, 2014d.) This experience, combined with the institutionalised and generally-accepted 
promot ion of trade by powerful global actors, suggests that greater international trade is 
unlikely to gain traction as a subject of governance within the present context. To the extent 
that this prevents responses from targeting a deeper - or 'the principal' (Poynton, 2014) -
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driver of deforestation, their contribution to resolving that problem will inevitably be 
circumscribed. 
The second aspect of globalisation to wfhicb Conca refers is the lengthening of international 
supply chains. As Wiedmann et al. (2013) note, 'the increasing spatial separation of production 
and consumption in global supply chains leads to a shift of resource use and associated 
environmental pressures among countries' ( p i ) . Similarly, Lenzen et al. state that 'in today's 
increasingly globalised economy, international trade chains accelerate habitat degradation far 
removed from the place of consumption' (2012:109), and Kastner et al. (2011a) note 'that 
benefits in one place are intrinsically tied to costs and risks in other, often distant, places' 
(p955). 
These quotes beg the question of whether the lengthening of international supply chains is 
inherently problematic. Princen's concept of 'distance' suggests how this might be so; namely, if 
globalisation increases 'distance' across the dimensions of geography, culture, bargaining power, 
agency - and, as I've argued, transformative distance and complexity of impacts, then it can 
actively obscure the connections between ends of international supply chains. With these 
connections obscured, problems can be incurred and perpetuated more readily, both 
intentionally and unintentionally. Further, inter-jurisdictional distance shapes the ability and 
responses of downstream actors in ways that lessen the regulatory power of governments 
(Vermeulen and Kok, 2012), while imposing burdens of monitor ing on NGOs. 
These multiple dimensions of distance explain how globalisation can exacerbate problems, 
leading Challies et al. (2014) to the idea that 'since feedbacks function in tightly coupled 
social-ecological systems, they may be enabled through either reducing distance between 
production and consumption... for example, by re-localising aspects of globalising production-
consumption systems' (p36). Importantly, however, none of the current responses to tropical 
deforestation attempt to shorten these distances directly, although sustainability schemes 
(certification and Roundtables) may do so indirectly by seeking to provide oversight along the 
length of supply chains. Similarly, illegal logging laws and biofuels frameworks are likely to 
increase domestic production of relevant commodities, again with the indirect effect of 
shortening supply chains. These responses are therefore addressing, albeit indirectly, the 
dimensions of distance that make globalisation problematic. 
Casting a glance beyond tropical deforestation, governance responses for other international 
supply chains have more deliberately engaged with some of these dimensions of distance, as 
Princen (2002) notes when he recognises the potential for international trade to forge 
'alternative trade arrangements between Northern food cooperatives and Southern 
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communities of growers' (p l29) . These arrangements, Princen writes, can effectively 
compensate for high geographic distances by 'making cultural, bargaining and agency 
dimensions of distance... quite low' (pl29]. Princen could equally refer to the FairTrade 
sustainability scheme, as well as other, more niche schemes, which deliberately limit some 
distances - such as discrepancies in bargaining power - through mechanisms such as a 
min imum guaranteed price for producers. 
Thus the worst case scenario, where 'exploitation of superior economic might... distort[s] power 
relationships with suppliers' (Boyle and Simms, 2009:114) is not inevitable. Responses are 
beginning to be devised, albeit in very select cases, which prevent international transactions 
from being 'faceless, bland and destructive, the economic equivalent of aerial bombing, in which 
the pilot never gets to see the damage they cause on the ground' (Boyle and Simms, 2009:12). 
These examples provide an insightful comparison with current responses to tropical 
deforestation, for although there are clear similarities - including specific supply chains as a 
shared subject of governance - no responses to deforestation have yet emerged which aspire to 
shorten the distances of globalisation; there has been no attempt to simplify and shorten 
relevant chains. Instead, current responses to deforestation attempt to retrofit new values such 
as transparency to existing chains without amending their existence or length. While Chapter 7 
will note several modest exceptions, where actors have either sought to shorten these distances 
- or found that they had to in order to ensure new values were reflected - the germane question 
for this chapter is whether responses are limited by their neglect of these distances. 
The final aspect of globalisation, again following Conca (2002), is the 'shift towards post-Fordist 
modes of production' (p l36) . By this he refers to changes in the structure of commodity chains, 
which global value chain theory has done an exemplary job of demonstrating, with power 
increasingly concentrated in 'nodes' and production increasingly rearranged to allow fiexibility 
for the actors within those nodes. For the multiple suppliers feeding into these nodes, this 
flexibility is experienced through uncertainty and intense cost-cutting pressures. For the 
tropical deforestation commodities, the highest point of concentration resides with the major 
trading companies, such as Cargill and ADM; on the other hand, the highest point of leverage (i.e. 
Boyle and Simms' 'economic might') often resides instead with major retailers and 
manufacturers at the downstream end of chains (see Brack and Bailey, 2013, for an overview of 
relevant chains). 
The leverage of downstream retailers, manufacturers and supermarkets has afforded some 
productive opportunities in responding to the deforestation commodities. These opportunities 
are characterised as follows by Dauvergne and Lister: 'The supply chains of the world's largest 
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brand companies... offer vital leverage points to produce the range, response, and coordination 
necessary for more systemic global market changes' (2012:42]. Others, including Conca (2002) 
and Butler and Laurance (2008] echo this refrain. Thus this aspect of globalisation, while it has 
the exacerbating effect of further increasing some dimensions of distance, also provides a viable 
and effective target for NGOs and others seeking to improve sourcing policies, including for 
some deforestation commodities such as paper (O'Rourke, 2005). These dynamics are explored 
at length in Chapter 5. 
There is, however, one questionable outcome of flexing the muscle of major companies' 
sourcing policies. Because these policies are being enacted - or in some cases, demanded - by 
already powerful actors along supply chains, it is 'producers [and intermediaries] in the 
economic South who have to conform to an externally imposed regime of monitoring, while the 
often-questionable economic practices of distributors in the economic North are not subject to 
any parallel process' (McMurtry, 2009:35). Though this quote from McMurtry relates to the 
coffee, tea and chocolate (and now other products] sold by the label FairTrade, comparable 
dynamics can be observed in sourcing policies for palm oil, timber, soybean and beef Further, 
the 'questionable practices' of the economic North could well include its magnitude of 
consumption, suggesting the possibility that current responses' subject of governance may be 
deliberately chosen to obscure, or neglect, these sources of the problem. 
This dynamic creates a dilemma, for if responses to tropical deforestation do exacerbate the 
power biases inherent in contemporary international trade by increasing bargaining distance, 
yet they are effective in mitigating some tropical deforestation, which outcome is the more 
important? And which actors are to decide? Suffice it to note that any change to deforestation 
rates as a result of these policies would not be the sole change occurring; through flexing their 
economic muscle these companies may well be entrenching their position as the arbiters of the 
values that are paramount within international supply chains. 
To conclude, consideration of globalisation as a possible subject of governance necessarily 
requires an understanding of the three aspects that comprise it. Current responses neglect all 
three, though they do limit trade in problematic versions of specified commodities and they may 
also unintentionally shorten some dimensions of distances within supply chains. The silver 
lining of this exploration of globalisation vis-a-vis current responses is that it reveals that 
continuing shifts in modes of production, while exacerbating economic imbalances, have also 
exposed new possibilities for leveraging better governance. 
One final subject of governance - capitalism - warrants very brief consideration as a last 
alternative subject of governance. For some authors, the processes of globalisation or 
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consumpt ion still fall short of acknowledging a deeper system driving environmental impacts; 
further scrutiny is required of capitalism itself. In a piece entitled 'the elephant in the room', 
New/ell (2011) surveys the environmental changes sweeping the planet and states: 
'Hegemony is never complete, but the extension and deepening of the logics of 
capitalism to new geographical and ecological areas of the planet appears to be 
unprecedented. This process needs to be adequately understood as a political and 
economic phenomena with important social and environmental consequences of 
interest...' (p6]. 
Newell continues that, if the 'extension and deepening of the logics of capitalism' continues, 
'The governability of capitalism then becomes key... What forms of regulation and 
governance might be appropriate, effective and enforceable for harnessing the power to 
do good while restraining the destructive potential of global capitalism?' (emphasis 
added; p6]. 
Appropriat ing a phrase from Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2013), capitalism could perhaps be 
defined as a driver of 'the transformation of the Earth's resources into wealth through industrial 
activity' (p382). This would imply that other subjects of governance, such as consumption and 
globalisation, are ultimately enabled by capitalism, meaning that responding to contemporary 
environmental problems requires attention to capitalism itself. In this light, the three aspects of 
globalisation begin to appear as the consequences of something deeper - capitalism - rather 
than independent processes. 
Newell's call for attention to the 'governability of capitalism' is a daunting one for research, let 
alone practice. Yet to the extent that international trade in the deforestation commodities is an 
expression of capitalist logic, then responses to deforestation can be understood as attempts to 
enact governance of that trade. This study can therefore be construed as an exploration and 
examination of how downstream actors have chosen to attempt that governance project, by 
focusing on a particular subset of capitalist activity (international trade) as well as a particular 
subset of that trade (the deforestation commodities). This claim is not emphasised, nor 
proposed here unequivocally. Yet regardless of its potency, the more immediate conclusion to 
draw is this: that if Newell is right in identifying capitalism as 'the elephant in the room', then 
current responses, focused as they are on the comparatively narrow subject of specific 
international supply chains, fail to identify, let alone acknowledge and respond to, the deeper 
driver of that problem. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter buids on the previous chapter's survey of empirical literature on the connections 
between current patterns of international trade and specific environmental problems. For 
tropical deforestation, as with each of these problems, a governance gap exists, whereby its 
drivers have outpaced the responses to it. Current responses to deforestation are an at tempt to 
remedy, or bridge, this gap, which persists despite responses to deforestation being both more 
numerous and innovative than those for other problems. The 'teleconnections' concept offers a 
fitting characterisation of the spatial interdependencies between activity, such as consumption, 
in one location and consequences, such as deforestation, in another. Two forms of these 
teleconnections, 'socio-economic' and 'institutional', allow this chapter to accurately depict and 
describe the nature of the governance gap that exists for deforestation. 
Yet a crucial question then emerges: what is the appropriate 'subject of governance' for closing 
this gap? Almost universally, current responses to deforestation use international supply chains 
as this subject. They are therefore premised on an ability to purge connections to deforestation 
from these chains without requiring changes in consumption levels or patterns, the structures 
or practices of globalisation, and the logic of capitalism that - perhaps - underpins those 
alternative subjects of governance. 
Other literatures proffer their scepticism about this premise. Consumption literature asserts 
that neglecting the magnitude of consumption of relevant commodities may undermine the 
benefits of the fraction of consumption being verified as 'deforestation-free'. This literature also 
portends that deforestation might be displaced rather than resolved through these efforts, and 
highlights the potential for perverse consequences through the rebound effect, even if 
individual supply chains can be purged of a connection to deforestation. An attention to 
globalisation, on the other hand, suggests that current responses neglect one crucial aspect of 
globalisation, are ambiguous in relation to another and might possibly have an exacerbating 
effect on the third. 
The importance of these perspectives is, firstly, to show that taking supply chains as the 
responses' subject of governance is only one of multiple alternatives, and secondly, that this 
decision has consequences in how the 'problem of deforestation' is framed and responded to. 
Responses problematise the sourcing of unsustainable or illegal versions of specific 
commodities that are implicated in tropical deforestation. What is left unproblematised may 
limit these responses' contribution to slowing deforestation. 
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This chapter has advanced a deeper understanding of these responses and clarified their nature 
as a result of one pivotal, unifying characteristic: their subject of governance. The insights from 
this chapter, especially concerning responses' subject of governance, will be returned to in the 
following chapter's conceptual examination of responses' limitations, as well as Chapter 7's 
empirical exploration of whether, and how, responses might overcome some of these limitations. 
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Chapter 4 Conceptual findings 
Chapter 2 defined the primary research question that guides this study and the methods used to 
pursue it. This chapter approaches the study's first research sub-question by exploring the 
limitations that emerge from the conceptual nature of responses. The chapter identifies and 
develops several limitations on the contribution that responses can make to slowing tropical 
deforestation, including responses' inherent framing of the underlying problem of tropical 
deforestation and their fractional 'coverage' of commodity production. In addition, several 
possible limitations are identified from analysis of responses' orientations and interactions; 
these possible limitations are only discernible from the platform for collective analysis that is 
enabled by this study's effort to gather responses together. 
Particularly in relation to these comparative and interactive limitations, this chapter identifies 
multiple further questions that must be answered to in turn inform a full answer to the 
conceptual sub-question. In other words, answering this study's conceptual sub-question 
necessitates seeking answers for a series of further questions. One major contribution of this 
chapter is to clarify and delineate these questions (presented in Table 4.1}; however, the nuance 
of some of these questions means that not all are able to be approached here, either within this 
chapter or the larger study. To be clear, then, this chapter does not seek to systematically 
answer these questions, although later empirical chapters will introduce relevant material to 
develop several of them (also noted in Table 4.1). The finding that these questions are 
significant is nonetheless consistent with this study's two-tiered ambition: to clarify, wherever 
possible, the limitations on current responses; and, failing that, to identify possible limitations 
warranting further attention. 
F r a m i n g as a l im i t a t i o n 
In its summary of the science of contemporary deforestation. Chapter 1 demonstrated that a 
handful of agricultural commodities, produced commercially, have been firmly identified as 
major drivers of deforestation in the tropics. This study's responses are subsequently targeted 
at these commodities. As Chapter 1 also noted, however, other drivers of deforestation exist and 
are even dominant within certain locations, such as subsistence agriculture and timber 
harvesting for fuel use in Papua New Guinea and much of Africa, respectively. Weaving these 
two threads together, it is clear that current responses are framed by a particular understanding 
of deforestation; namely, that commercial agriculture is the most (if not the only) significant 
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Table 4.1 Further questions emerging from an exploration of responses' conceptual nature (in 
the sequence in which they appear). 





How accurate is responses' framing of the deforestation 
commodities as major drivers? 
No. 
Framing (of subject of 
governance) 
Will ignoring alternative subjects of governance, such as 
consumption and trade, limit responses' contribution? 
Ch7 
Coverage Can responses achieve influence beyond coverage? Ch7* 
Diversity of 
motivations 
Does the range of motivations affect either a) the design 
of responses or b) their behaviour once implemented? 
No. 
Multiple objectives Does the presence of multiple objectives affect the 





Are mandatory responses necessarily stronger than 
voluntary ones? 
Ch7 
Dichotomy 2 (legality 
vs. sustainability) 
Are sustainability responses necessarily stronger than 
legality ones? 
Ch7* 
Interactions Are interactions between responses mutually inhibitive 
or complementary? 
Ch4, 5*, 7 
* Indicates a deliberate attempt to answer the relevant question using empirical evidence; other instances 
suggest the return of questions naturally during the course of introducing other evidence. 
driver. This framing contains the seed of an inherent limitation, because responses' contribution 
to slowing tropical deforestation is therefore contingent on the extent - at any given moment in 
time - to which this framing reflects the underlying reality of that process. Against emerging 
evidence that suggests some shift in the drivers of deforestation, then, responses' framing may 
begin to act as a limitation on their contribution. 
This possibility does not necessarily imply a failing on the part of responses, of course. In fact, it 
is entirely possible that a shift in the drivers of deforestation might actually result from the 
success of current responses [as well as other actions outside this study's scope) in responding 
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to the impacts of commercial agriculture on tropical forests. For example, the increasing 
importance of smallholder agriculture in Amazonian deforestation (Godar et al., 2014) and any 
shift towards locating palm oil on degraded lands (which actors such as WWF, WRI and IPC are 
strongly advocating) would both be consistent with such a claim. However, other examples of 
shifts in the drivers of deforestation, such as proposed dams in the Amazon (Buder, 2014a), coal 
exploration and mining in Indonesia (Fogarty, 2014a), and roads through a major national park 
in Thailand (Erickson-Davis, 2014), all pose a threat for tropical forests that are all clearly 
beyond the remit of current responses, it is not the case that responses have failed to address 
these threats; rather these threats are beyond responses' framing of deforestation as a problem 
driven by commercial agriculture. In other words, responses are limited first and foremost in 
their contribution to slowing deforestation by their design. 
Further, regardless of the contribution that responses have so far made to addressing 
deforestation - Chapter 2's unanswerable question - the future potential of existing responses 
will be determined by the accuracy and completeness of their framing. Against evidence of a 
changing backdrop in the drivers of deforestation, then, a structural mismatch is emerging (or 
more specifically, being enlarged) between these drivers and existing responses. The extent of 
this mismatch, which to repeat, occurs by design, is therefore one critical limitation of current 
responses to deforestation. Responses structured on a particular conception of the drivers of 
deforestation will lose the (incomplete) traction they initially had. 
A further nuance of responses' framing extends this limitation. Chapter 3's discussion concluded 
that responses are framed around a very particular 'subject of governance'; namely, illegal or 
unsustainable versions of the deforestation commodities. In other words, responses make a 
distinction between, for example, palm oil and tropical timber as commodities, which are not 
deemed inherendy problematic, and the versions of these commodities that are directly 
implicated in deforestation, which are deemed problematic. Perhaps in the absence of 
displacement and rebound effects, this distinction could be drawn neatly; yet if these effects are 
either present or even 'inevitable', as Boucher et al. (2011:98) allege, then the clarity of that 
distinction wanes. The magnitude of consumption of these commodities, as well as the 
processes of globalisation that have enabled them to become ubiquitous both within and 
beyond the tropics, are similarly disregarded by current responses' framing of the problem they 
intend to address. Again, the traction that responses can have on the problem they intend to 
address depends on the accuracy of the assumption, implicit within their use of supply chains as 
a subject of governance, that the consumption of solely unproblematic versions of commodities 
will contribute to slowing deforestation. 
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To summarise, then, this chapter has so far identified two limitations on responses' potential, 
both of which that derive inherently from their framing of the underlying problem. In the first 
case, the mere existence of other drivers of deforestation reveals that responses' framing 
contains a limitation. In the second case, the limitation of responses' current subject of 
governance is strongly suggested, though not yet able to be confirmed, by arguments from 
consumption, globalisation and capitalism literatures canvassed in the Chapter 3. This 
l imitation derives from responses' assumption that they can contribute to slowing deforestation 
without needing to look beyond problematic versions of commodities. (Chapter 7 will introduce 
evidence that this assumption is flawed.) Each of these limitations is listed in Table 4.1. 
Coverage as a l imitat ion 
A further l imitation of responses derives, again by necessity, from their concern with 
international supply chains for the deforestation commodities. As Chapter 1 mentioned, and this 
section will expand upon, the fractions of these commodities that are traded internationally 
comprise only a subset of total consumption of these commodities. It is beneficial here to 
introduce the concept of 'coverage', which at least at first is simplest to comprehend at a 
jurisdictional level. 
The responses included within this study all originate from outside the tropics, primarily from 
the Western jurisdictions of the EU, the US and Australia. The focus of these responses on 
international supply chains means they can only directly affect the fraction of commodity 
production (or part thereof] that is subsequently exported. Stated differently, responses cannot 
target, or expect to directly affect, domestic consumption of these commodit ies within producer 
countries, given that responses work by acting on international supply chains. 
This poses something of a problem for responses' ambit ions to address tropical deforestation, 
because for most of the deforestation commodit ies domestic consumption within tropical 
producer countries comprises a more significant fraction than exports. For Brazilian beef, for 
example, 'approximately 19 percent' is exported (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2010, in Richards 
et al., 2012:456), while for palm oil, approximately 20 percent (of palm fruit) is exported 
(calculated from Brack and Bailey, 2013). Sometimes there is disagreement on export figures, 
especially for timber-derived products. For example, Marx and Cuypers (2010) use FAO data to 
put the percentage of industrial roundwood (timber) exported at 'less than 10 percent' (p427), 
whi le Kastner et al. (2011a), also using FAO data, note that 'compared to industrial roundwood 
production', global trade in wood products was 35 percent in 2007 (p950). Of all relevant 
commodit ies, soybean provides the exception to these figures, with 'approximately 70 percent' of 
117 I P a g e 
Brazilian soybeans exported for consumption abroad (Richards et al., 2012:456). Table 4.2 shows 
the figures for respective commodities. 
Table 4.2 Fraction of'deforestation commodity' production that is internationally-traded. 








1997-2007 10-33% (Marx and Cuypers, 2010; Kastner et al., 2011a) 
2010/11 70%, including 95% of Malaysian production 
(Wikipedia (Palm Oil)) 
2012/13 65-70% (Brack and Bailey, 2013) 
2012/13 10-11% (Brackand Bailey, 2013) 
Unspecified 'the vast majority' (Brack and Bailey, 2013) 
2010 'the hulk' (Brack and Bailey 2013) 
t Tropical producers only; figures include author's own calculations based on listed sources. 
These numbers show both that there is significant domestic consumption of relevant commodities, 
especially beef and timber, and that the importance of international trade differs significantly by 
commodity. Yet importantly, the residual of these figures still does not reflect the fraction of 
production that responses can directly affect. This results from the bias whereby only Western 
jurisdictions have implemented responses to traded deforestation. Consequently, some exports 
are not 'covered' by any responses to traded deforestation. 
Remaining at a jurisdictional level for the moment, the obvious question to pose is as follows: 
'How significant are the 'active jurisdictions' of the EU, US and Australia as export destinations for 
the deforestation commodities?'. Again, the relevant fractions differ by commodity, and indeed, 
given that some of the commodities - soybean, palm oil, timber - can take myriad different forms, 
each derivate of these commodities necessarily has its own unique profile of both trade and 
consumption. These profiles will not be canvassed comprehensively here; for a neat overview of 
global production and international trade in palm oil, soybean, beef (as well as leather and cacao), 
see Brackand Bailey (2013). 
Despite the diversity of these profiles, however, it remains possible to state that with the partial 
exceptions of timber and soybean, the fractions of commodity production exported to 
environmentally-sensitive jurisdictions are generally small. Table 4.3, below, details the primary 
export markets for these commodities as a fraction of total exports (with data now confined to 
tropical countries for timber, as noted). 
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Table 4.3 Export destinations for internationally-traded fractions of the deforestation 
commodities. 
Commodity Export markets, in order of importance 
(with % of total imports) 
Source 
Timber^ (logs) China (52), India (36) ITTO,2012 
Timber^ (sawn wood) China (40), Thailand (23), EU (15) ITTO, 2012 
Timber^ (plywood) Japan (44), EU (14), South Korea (12), US (8) ITTO, 2012 
Palm oW EU and China (33 together), Malaysia, India, Pakistan Brack and Bailey, 2013 
(66 total) 
Soybean China and EU (53 together) Brack and Bailey, 2013 
Soybean (from Brazil) China (49), EU (37) in 2008 Richards etal., 2012 
Beef Russia, US, )apan. South Korea, EU Brack and Bailey, 2013 
Beef (from Brazil) Russia (30), EU (10) Brack and Bailey, 2013 
Leather China (37), EU (Italy), Hong Kong (62 total) Brack and Bailey, 2013 
Cacao* EU and US (50 together) Brack and Bailey, 2013 
Wl timber, palm oil and cacao figures are from tropical producers only. 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the repeated prominence of several jurisdictions across the 
international trade profiles for these commodities. The EU, which has been one of the most 
active jurisdictions in responding to traded deforestation at both a governmental and company 
level, is a globally significant importer of both tropical sawn wood and tropical plywood, palm 
oil, soybean, leather and cacao. The US is a significant importer of tropical plywood and cacao. 
For almost all these commodities and categories, however, China is often the foremost export 
destination. China is the world's largest importer of tropical logs and tropical sawn woods, as 
well as soybean (including Brazilian soybean) and leather; it is also the second largest importer 
of palm oil. Unlike the EU and US, China is typically regarded as a 'non-environmentally 
sensitive' jurisdiction [Cashore et al., 2006:14], a label that for present purposes is reflected in 
the absence of meaningful regulatory or policy responses to traded deforestation. (China 
currently has a draft code of conduct for 'overseas sustainable forest products trade', which the 
Environmental Investigation Agency finds wanting for its voluntary, non-regulatory approach; 
EIA, 2014.] Other 'non-sensitive' jurisdictions, including India, Japan and South Korea, are also 
important destinations for exports of these commodities. As Table 4.3 demonstrates, however, 
their role is less consistent and instead relates to specific commodities. 
There are three overarching conclusions to be drawn from these figures: firstly, that domestic 
consumption of the deforestation commodities is in almost all cases more significant than the 
fraction that enters international supply chains. Secondly, no single export destination 
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[importing jurisdiction) is monopsonistic for any of the commodities or derivates that are 
traded. Thirdly, and most pertinently for this study, trade in almost all commodities (except 
possibly palm oil] is dominated by 'non-sensitive' jurisdictions, most typically China. 
The meaning of these conclusions is as follows. Recall that current responses to traded 
deforestation can only directly affect the international supply chains leading to the handful of 
environmentally-sensitive jurisdictions from which they originate. This limitation is inescapable, 
and the fractions of total production that these supply chains form, or 'cover', are often minimal. 
For example, the EU's palm oil imports amount to 15-17 percent of the traded total, which in turn 
is approximately 70 percent of total production. Multiplying these quantities, the EU's palm oil 
'coverage' at a jurisdictional level is 10.5-12 percent; non-negligible, certainly, but by itself less 
than significant. To reiterate, then, responses' intention to slow tropical deforestation is highly 
circumscribed by the fraction of implicated commodities that responses cover. 
There are two assumptions behind this calculation that are worth mentioning. Firstly, 
jurisdiction-based figures are premised on the assumption that responses cover entire 
jurisdictions. For some responses, such as illegal logging regulations, this assumption is clearly 
sound, yet in others it is likely to be less so. Only a part of the EU's imports of palm oil, for example, 
is covered by the RED biofuels framework; similarly, only some of the EU-based companies that 
use palm oil have developed sourcing policies requiring sustainability. Consequently, alternative 
framings of coverage, based on different end-uses or use by different types of companies, can 
reveal a more nuanced picture than a jurisdiction-based framing. These ideas are developed 
further in a section that follows below. 
Prior to that discussion, however, it is necessary to note a second assumption relevant to coverage, 
which is that responses will translate fully, equally and perfectly from what is announced to what 
is enacted on the ground. In other words, this discussion of coverage [as well as this study more 
broadly] assumes that the conditions set out within a given policy or regulation can and will be 
mirrored within the practices that occur at the points of production and trade. Thus, when 
Unilever implements a policy for the 3 percent of global palm oil production that it purchases, the 
full 3 percent will come to resemble the details of that policy. There are multiple reasons to 
remain sceptical of this assumption, not least because actors - and particularly NGOs - continue to 
find evidence of forests being cleared by suppliers to companies that have vowed to eliminate 
such practices from their supply chains (Mongabay, 2014b]. For present purposes, then, it would 
be prudent to interpret coverage figures as a maximum or best-case scenario of a given response's 
direct effect. 
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iLirisdictional trends, past and future 
The figures in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 generate a static picture of the current state of exports and 
major destinations for traded deforestation. Clearly, any trends within these trade profiles will 
also come to be reflected in responses' coverage through time, thereby affecting the scope of 
their potential contribution. These trends, by and large, suggest a reduction in coverage for 
current responses over time. For example, recent demand growth for palm oil has come 
primari ly from China, India and the EU (which are also the largest consumers by volume). As 
Brack and Bailey report, these three 'were responsible for about half of global demand growth 
from 2000 to 2010' (2013:46). With approval looming of the EU's plan to cap the use of first 
generation feedstocks in achieving its biofuels targets (Lewis, 2015), continuing increases in 
palm oil imports to the EU become less assured. 
The EU's growing demand for palm oil actually demonstrates another germane point for this 
discussion, since a large part of this growth appears to have been the result of other policies 
pursued by that jurisdiction. Two especially relevant policies include: the introduction of 
biofuels targets in 2004, which subsequently diverted much of the EU's rapeseed oil production 
towards biofuels; as well as the introduction of a genetically modified (GM) labelling 
requirement for all EU-consumed soy, which reduced soybean imports (Brack and Bailey, 2013). 
Both of these policies created a shortfall in the availability of vegetable oils that could be used 
for both cooking and biofuels, a gap into which palm oil has stepped. 
The importance of these two examples is that they reflect past displacement. In its attempt to 
resolve perceived problems with genetically-modified crops and (somewhat paradoxically) 
greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector, the EU inadvertently set itself up to import 
much greater volumes of a crop - palm oil - that has been strongly implicated in deforestation. 
The EU's looming cap on 'first-generation' feedstocks, possibly to be set at 6 of its 10 percent 
biofuels target, is a subsequent attempt to address this problem, and an example of adaptive 
management in action. But whi le this decision is likely to diminish the EU's demand growth for 
palm oil in future years, it simultaneously limits the fraction of palm oil production that is 
'covered' by the EU's biofuels framework. If production is ultimately unchanged, this unwanted 
share of palm oil will likely be further displaced towards other consumers, or consumed 
domestically. 
The EU's recent relationship to palm oil provides an interesting case study in how policies have 
ramifications beyond their intended target. Yet the EU's policy twists and turns may also be less 
important to the future of palm oil consumption than it first appears, since the rationale 
underp inn ing intended expansions in production in both Indonesia and Malaysia stems from 
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'the sector's potential contribution to rural and socioeconomic development' (Guariguata et al., 
2011:15), as well as alleviating energy concerns through greater domestic biofuels consumption. 
The level of demand for palm oil in Western jurisdictions such as the EU is at best marginally 
relevant to these intentions (and as Chapter 2 noted, palm oil production is highly likely to be 
supply-driven). On these bases, Sheil et al. [2009) conclude that 'the future for palm biodiesel is 
therefore likely to lie within Indonesia and Malaysia themselves, and perhaps in other key 
consumer countries outside the European Union (i.e., China and India)' (pl8) . 
The trends in demand for soybean exhibit some similarities to those for palm oil. As Brack and 
Bailey (2013) note, 'over the last decade, China alone has accounted for almost two-thirds of 
global demand growth, trailed distantly by Argentina and Brazil' (p56). In this case, China, a 
jurisdiction yet to enact supply-chain responses, is the most prominent in both recent and 
expected demand growth (along with both major tropical producers of the crop). Again, too, 
policy decisions taken in Western jurisdictions led - probably unintentionally - to an increase in 
soybean imports into those jurisdictions. Prior to the EU's aforementioned GM-labelling policy 
for soy, which led to a substitution away from soybean and towards palm oil, the EU had in 2002 
banned 'the widespread practice of using animal carcasses and waste meat' as animal feed, 
which led to significant increases in soy imports (Brack and Bailey, 2013:57). Thus the 
consequences of the GM-labelling requirement (less soy, more palm oil) can be understood as a 
partial reversal - for soy - of the consequences of this earlier policy (less meat, more soy). 
Simultaneously, in the US, another instance of displacement was caused by the US' biofuels 
framework, which diverted domestically-produced corn and soy towards use as ethanol and 
biodiesel, in turn stimulating larger imports of soy from Brazil and Argentina [Brack and Bailey, 
2013). 
What these examples collectively show is, firstly, displacement in action; where policies 
targeted at resolving one problem [even environmental ones) have unintentionally led to 
increased imports of the deforestation commodities. As with many other examples of 
displacement, they are necessarily enabled by the greater interconnectedness of economic 
activity wrought by processes of globalisation. Returning to Boucher et al.'s (2011) succinct 
quote: 
'Leakage is not an accident; it is the inevitable result of economically driven 
deforestation in a globalised world. There is no way to prevent it from happening 
entirely; the point is to minimise it, restrict it, and guide it to places where it does the 
least environmental and social damage' (p98). 
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Secondly, these examples also show that unintentional displacement occurs in the absence of an 
a priori concern about deforestation imports, but tifiat this can be amended by retrofitting these 
policies with more conscious attention to relevant commodities. Such efforts are perceptible in 
the introduction of both sustainability criteria (in 2009) and the cap on the contribution of 
first-generation feedstocks (expected in 2015] for the EU's biofuels framework, RED. 
Thirdly, and on the other hand, leakage is sometimes even further from accidental, with notable 
examples existing of intentional displacement of timber production to tropical countries, with 
very clear consequences for tropical forests. One well-documented case comes from the world's 
most prominent timber importer, China. As the ElA concludes in its report. Appetite for 
Destruction (2012): 
'China's government has done virtually nothing to curb illegal imports, while putting in 
place policies to ensure supply from some of the worst illegal logging hotspots in the 
world ' (p26). 
The ElA accuses China's state-owned companies of playing 'a strategic role in securing supplies 
of forest resources from overseas', collectively accounting for '46 percent of the total volume' of 
tropical logs the country imports overall (p8]. As Hance reports on Mongabay, 
'Ironically, even as China has increasingly depended on raw logs and timber from 
abroad, it has undertaken herculean efforts to grow and protect forests at home. In the 
last two decades, China's forest cover has grown by 30 percent—while forest cover 
wor ldwide continues to plummet' (2012b]. 
Yet there need be nothing ironic about this situation; it is merely the process of displacement or 
'leakage' chronicled by Meyfroidt et al. (2010) in a number of reforesting countries. It may even 
be inevitable if restrictions on domestic production are introduced while the overall magnitude 
of demand remains unchanged (recalling Chapter 3's discovery that current responses have 
mostly framed consumption levels as irrelevant). And as already noted, displacement need not 
be accidental; the EIA's analysis suggests that China's displacement of timber towards regional 
producers is deliberately encouraged by import-export tariffs and taxation regimes (ElA, 2012). 
Using this real and current case of displacement as an example, one further point warrants 
mention. Namely, complete displacement from one country, such as China, to others may not be 
inevitable. According to Meyfroidt et al.'s analysis, 'for China, the displacement is smaller than 
its accumulated reforestation and offsets 45 percent of its reforestation in total (and 74 percent 
during the last 5 years) ' (2010:20919). Thus, overall reductions in forest area cleared have still 
occurred, even if a significant (and growing) share of China's afforested area has been displaced. 
123 I P a g e 
Of course, as Chapter 1 sought to emphasise, heterogeneity in the carbon, biodiversity and other 
values of specific forest areas are highly relevant here, meaning that simple area-based 
calculations are insufficient for comprehending the full consequences of displacement for 
tropical forests. 
In summary, then, current trends in demand for the deforestation commodities suggest an 
increasing prominence for jurisdictions such as China, from which supply chain-focused policy 
and regulatory responses have yet to emerge for those commodities. But before concluding this 
discussion of the limitation of fractional coverage, two further and more nuanced applications of 
coverage warrant attention. 
Further forms of coverage 
Applying the concept of coverage at a jurisdictional scale is intuitive and allows countries to be 
divided into two neat categories of 'environmentally-sensitive' and 'non-environmentally 
sensitive'. Other applications of coverage can also reveal further nuances, and additional 
implications, across current responses. The presence and importance of these applications will 
be noted only briefly here, and will not be furnished with figures, for reasons that will become 
clear. 
A first alternative application of coverage differentiates between companies that have, and 
those that have not, implemented sourcing policies for traded deforestation. As Chapter 5 will 
soon expand upon, NGO campaigns have almost exclusively targeted companies with a high and 
branded 'profile', including retailers and manufacturers (such as Unilever, Nestle and Mars], as 
well as supermarkets (Marks and Spencers, Coles, Woolworths). The 'consumer' end of supply 
chains therefore remains highly fragmented, with sourcing policies biased towards major, 
branded companies. The extent of this fragmentation is revealed, for example, through 
Unilever's palm oil purchases, which although accounting for a mere 3 percent of global 
production nonetheless establish that company as the world's single largest corporate 
purchaser. In coverage terms, 3 percent of global production (approximately 1.5 million tonnes) 
is by no means trivial, yet an undeniable tension exists between this direct coverage and 
Unilever's intention to 'transform the palm oil industry' suggests a looming challenge. 
Distinguishing between 'branded' and 'unbranded' companies enables two subsequent 
implications to be revealed. The first is that when surveying the companies that have 
implemented sourcing policies for traded deforestation, there is a clear and strong bias towards 
branded companies. However, this bias does not necessarily reflect the underlying connection to 
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traded deforestation of these two categories of company. As Dauvergne and Lister (2012) note, 
'branded retail goods only comprise a segment of world consumption; for every branded 
product, there is at least one unbranded one' [p43). These authors also crucially note the 
potential for displacement between these two categories of company, enabled by the incomplete 
coverage of the latter; they write that 'protecting some things in a branded market may well 
simply shift the consumption elsewhere' [ibid.]. 
The second implication builds upon the bias detected in the first; namely, that the current 
'model' of naming and shaming through which NGOs pressure and then collaborate with 
companies in relation to traded deforestation lacks traction with the unbranded category of 
companies. For mostly obvious reasons (explored thoroughly in Chapter 5), the companies most 
vulnerable to such pressure are those that are consumer-facing and have a high brand-profile. 
For unbranded companies, where neither relationships with end-consumers nor protection of a 
well-known brand are of paramount importance, NGOs have floundered to find alternative 
strategies. Indeed, as Chapter 7 will demonstrate, both NGOs and branded companies assert 
'theories of change' that essentially assume their responses to traded deforestation will 
precipitate or inspire responses from unbranded companies. 
Another useful application of coverage differentiates between different end-uses of the 
deforestation commodities. As alluded to earlier, even some notionally jurisdiction-based 
responses, such as the EU's biofuels framework, only address the fraction of palm oil that is put 
towards a specific end-use. That framework cannot (and is not intended to] directly address the 
palm oil imported and consumed in supermarket products, for example. For reasons touched on 
in Chapter 3's discussion of transformative distance, some end-uses of deforestation 
commodities have generated responses while others have not. For palm oil, which is present in 
minute quantities within literally thousands of products; for timber, which can take the form of 
paper napkins or cardboard; and for soybean, which is mostly not consumed directly but used 
instead as animal feed, the perception of a connection between specific consumer products and 
tropical deforestation often lags behind the physical connection. As with unbranded companies, 
then, the NGO model sits uncomfortably with end-uses that are 'hidden' or removed from 
consumers' experiences within supermarkets. 
One example comes in the form of the increased use of palm derivates (mainly residues) as a 
feed for livestock, especially during drought. By 2010, this use for palm residues had elevated 
New Zealand to the sixth largest palm oil importing jurisdiction (Brack and Bailey, 2013]. Yet 
the absence of policy attention to these imports reveal that this end-use is equally difficult to 
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'problematise' as the diversion of 80 percent of global soybean production for animal feed 
(Brack and Bailey, 2013). 
Uneven coverage of different end-uses is not often recognised explicitly, although a consultant's 
report to the UK Department of Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) provided a notable exception. 
When DEFRA was considering its response options for palm oil imports, this report noted that, 
'To date, the animal feed sector has not been subject to the same level of market interest 
or pressure for sustainably sourced product, and therefore offers the potential for 
significant gains in sustainable sourcing through targeted aw^areness-raising and 
support' (Proforest, 2011:3). 
In this quote Proforest makes the argument that low levels of'market interest' and 'pressure' 
for sustainable sourcing within the animal feed sector actually reflects an opportunity for 
'significant gains'. While this argument is not incompatible with the observation that NGO 
campaigns depend on high-profile, branded target companies, it does beg the question of 
whether the further involvement of DEFRA is required to overcome the limitations of the NGO 
model; in essence, for the public sector to pick up where civil society leaves off. As a later 
section in this chapter notes, however, public sector actors have tended to frame the problem of 
traded deforestation as - essentially and primarily - one for the private sector to respond to, 
thus undermining the likelihood of complementary public sector responses. (Chapter 5 
identifies several further limitations on consumer governments in responding.) 
There are practical barriers that prevent equal treatment across different end-uses, even for a 
given commodity. As stakeholders in DEFRA's palm oil mapping project later noted, 'some palm 
oil products can be more easily sourced as certified than others' (Proforest, 2011:4). 
Stakeholders in the DEFRA project use this as a basis for 'a stepwise approach to 
implementation for different types of palm products' (p4). (In Chapter 7, participants stress the 
importance of actor 'learning' through greater engagement with their supply chains.) At the 
very least, the fact that some products are 'more easily sourced as certified' calls renewed 
attention to the multitude of uses for three of the deforestation commodities - palm oil, soya 
and timber - which are now included within literally thousands of products. The processes of 
globalisation canvassed in Chapter 3 have effectively let the genie out of the bottle, with the 
fragmentation of these commodities into such a diversity of end-products making the challenge 
of bridging trade's governance gap ever more difficult for responses. 
Summarising then, these two alternative applications of coverage - which distinguish, 
respectively, between branded and unbranded companies, and between different end-uses -
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provide a finer-grained understanding of liow current responses for traded deforestation are 
structurally limited. With the sole exception of illegal logging laws, responses are not evenly 
applied across jurisdictions (even then, there is the potential for differential implementation 
across countries within the EU; Saunders, 2013). Sourcing policies exhibit a strong bias towards 
branded companies, and these and other responses (biofuels frameworks, public procurement) 
are also biased towards certain end-uses (supermarket products) and away from others (animal 
feed). These two applications of the concept do not match neatly with its jurisdictional 
application. In particular, many branded companies, while headquartered in an 
environmentally-sensitive jurisdiction, may nonetheless have significant sales in other 
jurisdictions, including China, India, japan, and other countries appearing in Table 4.3. If 
companies' sourcing policies are applied across all their operations - i.e. globally - they can 
therefore blur, in a positive sense, the distinction between environmentally-sensitive and other 
jurisdictions. 
The limitation of fractional coverage also raises an important question (Table 4.1). To what 
extent might responses be able to inspire or provoke changes to the large fractions of 
production beyond the supply chains they cover? In other words, can responses achieve 
'influence beyond coverage', effecting change that can 'cascade up' or 'ripple out' from the 
fractions that are directly covered? This possibility will be explored - empirically - in Chapter 7, 
which identifies the pathways along which such change might conceivably occur. One such 
pathway is the potential for multinational companies to introduce responses into otherwise 
non-environmentally sensitive jurisdictions, a possibility that both companies and other actors, 
such as NGOs, are alive to. 
C o m p a r i n g responses by or ien ta t ion 
While this study's effort to gather together responses enables comparisons to be made across 
the set of responses, crucially it also enables interactions to be identified between responses. As 
this and the next section will demonstrate, pursuing each of these tasks reveals further 
limitations on responses' contributions to slowing deforestation, even if clarifying the extent of 
that limitation often depends in turn on subsequent questions. Outlining the remainder of this 
chapter, then: this section will make careful comparisons between responses, while the 
following section will begin to explore their interactions (a task continued in this study's 
empirical chapters to come). 
Comparisons across this study's set of responses reveal multiple differing aspects of their 
orientations that are worthy of further elaboration. This section will explore four such aspects 
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in accordance with their pertinence to the limitations on responses' contribution to slowing 
deforestation. Namely, these aspects are: 
> the presence (and relative importance] of objectives in addition to slowing deforestation, 
> which actors take (or are given] responsibility by responses, 
> whether responses use legality or sustainability as a reference point, and 
> whether compliance is mandatory or optional. 
Multiple objectives and motivations 
As Chapter 1 made clear, this study's responses share the objective of slowing tropical 
deforestation; however, further comparison across responses reveals variance in actors' stated 
reasons for pursuing this objective, as well as - and more importantly - that addressing 
deforestation is often only one of multiple objectives responses pursue. 
Firstly, actors' stated objectives for responses reveal a variety of motivations for responding to 
tropical deforestation. These reasons draw on the multiple values embodied by tropical forests, 
as canvassed in Chapter 1, which also concluded that the combination of values applicable to 
tropical forests may be what distinguishes them and explains their current prominence. 
While the specific motivations of actors are not always divulged, the Consumer Goods Forum 
provides an example where the motivations behind its 'deforestation-free supply chains by 
2020' commitment are made explicit: 
'The initial focus was on activities which would address climate change. Climate change 
is a major strategic threat, potentially affecting our customers, our businesses and the 
wider economy and society' (CGF, 2014b]. 
This statement draws on the relevance of tropical deforestation to climate change mitigation, 
which the CGF identifies as a 'major strategic threat' not just to its business (though this is 
acknowledged] but also to the 'wider economy and society'. A second, more detailed, example is 
provided by Nestle in relation to its Responsible Sourcing Guidelines, where it argues, 
'The success of Nestle is intimately connected with the health of the forests and forested 
landscapes from which it sources some of its raw materials. Nestle recognises that the 
standards and practices followed by its suppliers can impact positively or negatively 
upon the forests, through the expansion of agriculture or forest plantations into forested 
areas, and the stewardship of forests from where raw materials are sourced. 
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'Nestle believes that improving the sustainability of our raw materials will create shared 
value across the supply chain from local communities all the way through to consumers' 
(Nestle, 2011:1]. 
Like Nestle, governments have often been forthcoming about their objectives. For example, the 
UK Government's flagship programme on tropical forests - the Forests, Governance and 
Markets Programme - explicitly poses the question, 'What need are we trying to address?', 
which it then answers as follows: 
'Deforestation and forest degradation harm biodiversity, contribute to climate change 
and increase poverty... [They] also deprive forest-dependent people of their 
livelihoods... [And] a substantial proportion contravenes national regulations and laws' 
(excerpts only; DfID, 2011:1). 
The UK Government's Palm Oil Statement similarly notes, 
'There is growing awareness that the greater production of palm oil can increase the 
risk of destruction to tropical rainforest and drainage of peatland areas causing major 
impacts on biodiversity, climate change and the land rights of local peoples... 
'By taking steps to source their palm oil more sustainably, UK companies at all stages of 
the supply chain can help to reduce the negative impacts associated with palm oil 
production. The EU is a major global market for palm oil, and the UK is one of the most 
influential players in that EU market. Through co-ordinated action, the UK supply chain 
can influence other consumers and producers and support the global drive to make 
palm oil production and consumption more sustainable' (DEFRA, 2012a:l}. 
Finally, the inter-governmental joint Statement (undated) issued by five consumer country 
governments (the US, UK, Germany, Norway and Australia) provided its motivations as follows: 
'The urgency of tackling climate change is clear. We agree to continue our efforts to 
address climate change and recognise the need for increased mitigation ambition in the 
period to 2020, with a view to doing our part to limit the increase in global temperature 
below 2-C above pre-industrial levels, consistent with science. Significant reductions in 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries before 
2020 will be critical in this context' (pi) . 
As is evident from these examples, actors advance multiple rationales and reveal multiple 
motivations behind their responses to traded deforestation. These motivations reference many 
of the values ascribed to tropical forests in Chapter 1. The first two examples come from the 
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pr ivate sector and both assert that there is a business case fo r maintaining 'the health o f the 
forests and fores ted landscapes ' (Nest le , 2011:1 ) , both in itself and for its contr ibut ion to 
address ing the 'ma jo r strategic threat ' of c l imate change (CGF, 2014b ] . Each of these examples 
also go beyond this na r r ow business case argument , h o w e v e r , wi th the CGF recognis ing the 
threat that c l imate change poses to ' the w i d e r e c o n o m y and soc iety ' ( ibid. ) , and Nest le expl ic i t ly 
acknow ledg ing its o w n responsib i l i ty fo r forests on the basis that 'the standards and pract ices 
f o l l owed by its suppl iers can impact pos i t i ve ly or negat ive ly upon the forests ' ( 2011 :1 ) . 
Similarly, g ove rnments have echoed the impor tance of de fores ta t ion because it can 'harm 
biodivers i ty , contr ibute to c l imate change, increase poverty. . . and dep r i v e f o res t -dependent 
peop le of their l ive l ihoods ' (DEFRA, 2012a ) as we l l as 'critical ' ro le o f reducing de fo res ta t i on in 
'tackling c l imate change ' ( j o in t Statement, unda ted : l ) . 
Given the range of actors that have imp lemented responses, perhaps it is unsurpris ing that they 
are supported by this d ivers i ty of mot ivat ions. For this sect ion's purposes, the impor tance of 
this d ivers i ty lies in whe the r and h o w it has shaped responses themselves , as we l l as actors ' 
support for them. Phrased as a question, then, has the presence of mult ip le ob jec t i ves a f f ec ted 
e i ther the design or behav iour of responses? (This quest ion wi l l n o w be br ie f l y exp lored , 
although it also appears in Tab le 4.1.) 
Consider the mult iple ob jec t ives sought by the illegal logg ing laws that have been imp lemented 
in the US, EU and Australia. These regulatory e f for ts have been included within this study's set 
of responses in large part because gove rnments have expl ic i t ly made the link b e t w e e n illegal 
logg ing and tropical de forestat ion. For example, mi r ror ing the UK Government ' s Statement on 
Palm Oil, the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF ) notes that 
illegal logging, 
'...is a signif icant global issue. It degrades forest env i ronments , contr ibutes to 
g reenhouse gas emissions, reduces biodivers i ty , results in a loss o f g o v e r n m e n t r e venue 
and depr ives local communi t i es o f owne rsh ip rights and oppor tuni t i es to i m p r o v e their 
quality of l i fe ' (DAFF, 2014a ) . 
In the US, Senator Ron Wyden , one of the t w o polit icians sponsor ing the A m e n d m e n t s to the 
Lacey Act, argued that, 
"... this Act helps address an illegal logg ing crisis. From the A m a z o n to the Congo Basin, 
f r om Sulawesi to Siberia, illegal logg ing is des t roy ing ecosystems. It is gutt ing local 
economies . It is annihilating w a y s o f l i fe" ( W y d e n , 2007:1 ) . 
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Finally, the website for the EU Timber Regulation makes the following arguments, including one 
that explicitly connects illegal logging to deforestation: 
'In economic terms illegal logging results in lost revenues and other foregone benefits. In 
environmental terms illegal logging is associated with deforestation, climate change and 
a loss of biodiversity. In social terms illegal logging can be linked to conflicts over land 
and resources, the d isempowerment of local and indigenous communities, corruption 
and armed conflicts' (EC, 2015a). 
These statements show that, both in the minds of policymakers as well as subsequent policies, 
illegal logging and deforestation are positioned as overlapping problems. They are viewed as 
important for similar reasons, and responses to one are implemented with at least one eye on 
addressing the other. But as the following quotes will demonstrate, there is a second objective 
pursued by these illegal logging laws: to prevent foreign sources of cheap timber undercutting 
and undermin ing domestic forestry industry within the US, EU and Australia. In 2011, for 
example, the following statement was made as the Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill was 
introduced into the Australian Parliament, 
"Illegally harvested t imber also undermines well regulated and sustainable industries, 
including the Australian industry, by undercutting legally harvested timber products" 
(Kelly, 2011]. 
Senator Wyden, who sponsored the Amendments to the Lacey Act in the US, stated before his 
ment ion of the 'illegal logging crisis': 
"I am proud to introduce [a precursor to the Lacey Amendments] to halt the trade in 
illegal t imber and t imber products. This Act will help to level the playing field... for all 
American manufacturers across the country struggling to compete against imported, 
low-priced wood and wood products harvested from illegal sources..." (Wyden, 2007:1). 
And finally, in addit ion to the 'economic' and 'social' problems with illegal logging, the website 
for the EU TR states that, 
'Illegal activities also undermine the efforts of responsible operators by making 
available cheaper but illegal t imber and t imber products in the market place' (EC, 
2015a). 
It is clear, then, that while US, EU and Australian regulations for illegal logging are based at least 
in part on its connection to deforestation, another major, domestic objective is also intended to 
be served by these regulations. It is this second (though not necessarily secondary) objective 
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that led domestic forestry industries in ail three jurisdictions to support these regulations, even 
though they would themselves bear the associated regulatory burden of these laws (on which 
Chapter 6 elaborates at length). Environmental NGOs, on the other hand, provided their support 
for the regulations on the basis of the former objective, meaning that in all three jurisdictions 
the laws created 'bootieggers and baptists' coalitions between actors that are more frequently 
critical to one another's objectives (Evans, 2012). 
These broadly-supported laws provide an opportunity to propose a tentative answer to the 
question introduced earlier: whether the presence of multiple objectives has affected the design 
or behaviour of responses. The political dynamics behind illegal logging legislation in the US 
suggest that the answer might be 'yes'. In that jurisdictions, the first enforcement raids under 
the amended Lacey Act were targeted at the well-known and much-loved Gibson Guitars, based 
in the home of American country music, in Nashville, Tennessee. Undoubtedly, targeting such a 
well-known business (and brand] in these first enforcement raids was intended to demonstrate 
the seriousness behind the new laws, and encourage other businesses to undertake the due 
diligence that was now a legal requirement. However, those raids, and the prominence of their 
target, also had the effect of challenging domestic business support for the regulations, by 
driving home the fact that the US Government's crackdown on illegal timber imports (the 
objective that appealed to the domestic forestry industry) would be enacted by monitoring of, 
and enforcement against, domestic timber importers and businesses. 
In the wake of these first raids, domestic businesses began to voice new concerns about the 
Lacey Act, citing its 'draconian' nature and the absence of 'innocent owner' provisions (Dalsing, 
2012). The owner of Gibson Guitars publicly announced his support for the Tea Party, an 
arch-conservative national political party, in the lead up to the 2012 US presidential elections. 
Crucially, he worked with the Tea Party to encourage a piece of reactive legislation to the Lacey 
Act amendments of 2007. Although this legislative backlash, which was called the RELIEF Act, 
has now failed, the environmental objective of the Lacey Act was clearly threatened by its 
perceived failure to realise the economic objective of supporting domestic industry and 
businesses. As one participant in this study also noted, while no legislative backlash to the Lacey 
Act has been established, the laws can be undermined by other, more surreptitious means; 
chiefly, by not funding agencies to enforce them (Boucher et al., 2011), In this case, the presence 
of multiple objectives created the risk that a drop in support for one objective would 
simultaneously threaten the other. 
Institutional responses, such as the NGO-industry Roundtables and the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification, also pursue multiple objectives simultaneously. These 
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responses seek to balance the environmental , social and economic objectives of their members 
in relation to a given commodity. Sometimes these institutions are structured to facilitate this 
balance. The equality of these objectives is reflected in the FSC's three, equally-weighted 
governance chambers, for example, while the RSPO intends to achieve its balance through the 
carefully balanced (though contested) composit ion of its executive board. 
Despite the origins of the FSC in the failure of international negotiations to specifically address 
deforestation (Synnott, 2005], however, the FSC does not mention deforestation in its vision or 
mission statements (FSC, 2014d). Nor does the RSPO, despite the motivations of actors behind 
its formation, including the W W F and major retailers such as Unilever, to respond to the 
connection between palm oil and tropical deforestation. In fact, neither the first iteration of the 
RSPO's principles and criteria, nor their first major review in 2012-13, enacted protections for 
either the highest ecological value forests or greenhouse gas-laden peatlands (Mongabay, 
2013b). 
Researchers of these Roundtables have proposed that the presence of multiple objectives might 
necessitate trade-offs between these objectives. If this were the case, Roundtables would 
provide further evidence for an affirmative answer to the question at hand, since the behaviour 
of responses could be affected by multiple, even competing objectives. For Roundtables, the 
question to be answered can be made even more specific: does the need to entice producers to 
join undermine the strength of the scheme's criteria? The weakness of the RSPO's 
environmental criteria, for example, suggests that its objective to 'advance the production' of 
certified palm oil (RSPO, 2014a) has come at some expense to the protection of tropical forests 
at risk of clearance. Proposals to shore up the latter, primarily through the aforementioned 
review of principles and criteria, have been slowed and stymied. The FSC has also been 
criticised along similar lines, especially when it first introduced a 'FSC Mixed Sources' label 
(where only 70 percent of the t imber volume need be FSC-certified) and when it began 
certifying t imber supply chains in addition to t imber and wood products. (These are somewhat 
contested assertions, however, and will be explored in Chapters 5 and 7 in light of interviews 
with practitioners, supporters and critics of these schemes.) 
As with the backlash to the Lacey Act from domestic businesses in the US, then, some actors -
especially environmental NGOs - have been disappointed by the collective decisions made by 
the FSC and RSPO in their brief histories. In both cases, reactions have at times been both public 
and openly hostile. These two examples demonstrate the difficulties that inhere in governance 
responses that simultaneously seek to pursue other objectives, a factor that may limit - by 
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curb ing the s t rength with which t h e y can p u r s u e the i r e n v i r o n m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e - the 
contr ibut ion that t h e s e r e s p o n s e s can m a k e to s lowing defores ta t ion . 
A provis ional a n s w e r s e e m s poss ib le to the ques t ion o f w h e t h e r mult iple o b j e c t i v e s might 
c o m p r o m i s e , o r o t h e r w i s e affect, r e s p o n s e s design and behaviour . With r e f e r e n c e both to the 
political dynamics that ensued a f ter the f irst t i m b e r raids u n d e r the Lacey Act and to t h e 
s t rength of the s t a n d a r d s of (espec ia l ly) t h e RSPO, it s e e m s p r o b a b l e tha t the n e e d to rea l i se and 
b a l a n c e mult iple ob jec t ives may c r e a t e a l imitat ion on a n y s ingle ob jec t ive , of w h i c h s l o w i n g 
defores ta t ion is one. This c h a p t e r leaves its explorat ion of this ques t ion at this point , to e x a m i n e 
a s e c o n d a s p e c t of r e s p o n s e s ' or ienta t ions . 
Responsibi l i ty 
A s e c o n d useful c o m p a r i s o n a c r o s s r e s p o n s e s c o n c e r n s the a c t o r s tha t take (or to which 
r e s p o n s e s give) responsib i l i ty for enac t ing change . T h e r e are two levels at which respons ib i l i ty 
is a l located, both of which r e m a i n to s o m e e x t e n t unset t led , re inforc ing Weinzet te l e t al. 's ( 2 0 1 3 ) 
s t a t e m e n t that the ' t rans locat ion of e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r e s s u r e s is confounding the issue of 
responsibi l i ty ' ( p 4 3 7 ) . T h e first level c o n c e r n s a l locat ing respons ib i l i ty b e t w e e n p r o d u c e r and 
c o n s u m e r countr ies (usually at a g o v e r n m e n t a l level) , whi le the s e c o n d level c o n c e r n s the 
a l locat ion of responsibi l i ty within c o n s u m e r countr ies . 
Are producers ul t imately r e s p o n s i b l e for the social and e n v i r o n m e n t a l impacts of the i r 
product ion? Or a r e c o n s u m e r s driving these impacts through the i r c o n s u m p t i o n ? T h e 
discuss ion of key t e r m s in Chapter 2 b r o a c h e d this as a ques t ion of s e m a n t i c s that ul t imately 
hinged on a d e e p e r concept ion of the re la t ionship b e t w e e n internat ional t rade and a given 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l problem. At tempt ing to de l ineate and a t t r ibute responsibi l i ty , even at the b r o a d 
scale of p r o d u c e r and c o n s u m e r countr ies , is a difficult and e th ica l ly-charged task. In their 
a t t r ibut ion of g r e e n h o u s e gas e m i s s i o n s from the Brazil ian Amazon, Zaks et al. ( 2 0 0 9 ) opt for 
equal s h a r e s for producers and c o n s u m e r s on the basis that full a l locat ion to e i t h e r group would 
resul t in incent ives for p e r v e r s e o u t c o m e s . As a m o r e a c a d e m i c exerc ise , Lenzen et al. ( 2 0 0 7 ) 
explore var ious a l locat ions for ecological footprints . 
T h e mot ivat ions of a c t o r s e x a m i n e d in the previous sec t ion d e m o n s t r a t e that, genera l ly though 
not universally, a c t o r s in c o n s u m i n g soc ie t ies do a c c e p t s o m e respons ib i l i ty for t h e i r 
contr ibut ion to traded defores ta t ion . Nestle 's R e s p o n s i b l e Sourc ing Guidelines s t a t e this m o r e 
explicit ly than most . At a g o v e r n m e n t a l level, p r o d u c e r countr ies have c o n s i s t e n t l y po inted out 
the need for c o n s u m e r c o u n t r i e s to a c c e p t s o m e responsibi l i ty . In 2 0 1 1 , for e x a m p l e , the 
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Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, encouraged timber-importing countries to 
be more vigilant against accepting illegal t imber exports from his country, stating, 
"Other countries should stop fencing illegally felled timber. That's the kind of deal we 
need to work on" (quoted in |akarta Globe, 2011], 
In 2010, the Indonesian Forestry Minister, Zulkifli Hasan, voiced an identical sentiment when he 
noted that, 
"... we have asked other countries to make the same commitment to eradicate illegal 
logging by not buying wood whose origin is not clear. Do not only protest and criticise 
Indonesia" [quoted in Antara News, 2010). 
Further, in an example from Brazil, the Brazilian Roundtable on Sustainable Livestock noted in 
relation to its industry's environmental impacts, that 'there is still much to be done and this 
requires foreign help' (GTPS, undated). 
The Australian Government department that is overseeing its illegal logging legislation 
apparently seems to concur with the sentiment of these statements, arguing the need for its 
legislation on the grounds that, 
'[It is] in Australia's interests as a responsible member of the global community to protect 
plants and animals and the environment, promote sustainable forest management and 
reduce the depletion of exhaustible natural resources that are threatened by illegal 
logging' (emphasis added; DAFF, 2014a). 
Other governments have consciously cast their responses to tropical deforestation in the light of 
expressed intentions of producer countries to do the same. The UK Government, for instance, 
noted that 'political commitment to tackle deforestation is evident in a number of contexts' as it 
proposed its own actions on tropical deforestation (UK ICF, 2013:2). Abundant examples of this 
'political commitment ' were then listed, as follows: 
'... Indonesia has committed to work towards an ambit ious reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions of 26 percent by 2020... rising to 41 percent with international assistance. 
Brazil has committed to a 36 percent reduction from business as usual by 2020, 
including an 80 percent reduction in deforestation in the Amazon and a 40 percent 
reduction In deforestation in the cerrado. Colombia has set out an ambitious goal to 
reduce deforestation its Amazon region to zero by 2020. Many African countries. 
Including Ghana, Liberia and the Congo Basin countries are implementing important 
forest sector governance reforms' (ibid.). 
135 I P a g e 
Examples from other environmental problems demonstrate both how and why consuming 
country governments have accepted responsibility. For instance, with respect to the blue fin 
tuna trade, an endangered species of which Japan is the world's largest consumer, a [Japanese] 
Chairman of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas stated in 2 0 0 5 
that '[Japan] feels some responsibility for this mess. Japanese buyers are running all around the 
world and buying as many fish as possible' (Revkin, 2 0 0 5 ) . 
More recently, and less explicitly, the current US President, Barack Obama, released the US' 
National Strategy for Combating Illegal Wildlife Trafficking, noting that '[illegal wildlife 
trafficking] is a global challenge requiring global solutions' (Obama, 2 0 1 4 : 1 ) . At the same event, 
the Conference Declaration concurred that 'action needs to be taken at all points along the 
illegal supply chain in source, transit and destination countries. International cooperation is 
essential' (London Conference Declaration, 2014 :3 ) . 
Knitting together these examples from both within and beyond traded deforestation, the blue 
fin tuna example provides a clear and important exception for not relying on the illegality of the 
trade in question. (A later section in this chapter will note how governments have tended to 
actively frame and respond to the environmental problems of international trade as legality -
rather than sustainability - problems. Using participants' perspectives. Chapter 6 will then 
expand significantly on the importance of legality in the minds of consumer country 
governments.) An important commonality across the above examples, however, is the language 
of a need for a 'shared' or 'global' commitment from both producer and consumer countries to 
addressing illegal logging. Yet tellingly, governments have refrained from making similar 
statements (and indeed, responding) on the non-timber commodities connected to traded 
deforestation, despite clearly pronouncing concern for deforestation. 
A partial explanation is obvious. For reasons that - again - Chapter 6 will expand on, other 
commodities, and especially palm oil, evoke severely defensive producer government reactions 
to perceived threats to those industries. In this charged environment, even recent research 
identifying widespread legality within the palm oil sector (Lawson, 2 0 1 4 ) is unlikely to be 
sufficient to create the possibility of a 'shared' or 'global' commitment for responding to 
non-timber commodities such as palm oil. The result of these tensions for present purposes is 
that responsibility is accepted by both producer and several consumer governments, but only 
for timber, while for the other deforestation commodities the picture is more mixed. For palm 
oil in southeast Asia, neither producer nor consumer governments has been as forthcoming 
with their language, nor responses, while for beef and soya, the major producer country - Brazil 
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- has been notably attentive, whi le consumer governments - including both China and the EU -
have not. 
A second level of responsibility rests across actors within consumer countries, including 
governments (as regulators and procurers), traders, manufacturers and retailers, and floating in 
the background, consumers. (As Chapter 1 noted, other actors, such as banks, and other actor 
roles, such as government aid programs, are excluded from this study.) This section will 
demonstrate that there is also an unsettled allocation of responsibility at this level. Beforehand, 
however, an obvious point needs noting, namely that the mere existence of this study's 
responses demonstrates that unsettled responsibilities have not prevented actors from 
responding to traded deforestation. Clearly the limitation that unsettled responsibility might 
suggest is not absolute; yet as empirical chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate, it has left the door 
open for both NGOs and governments to largely pin responsibility for traded deforestation on 
the private sector, which has its own implications. 
Wi th in consumer countries, responsibility is sometimes accepted explicitly. Nestle's statement 
from the previous section provides one example where responsibility was accepted, and other 
such statements have been made by both industries and governments. The Dutch Palm Oil 
Taskforce, for instance, acknowledged that it shared 'joint responsibility' along the palm oil 
supply chain as a basis for its target that 'by the end of 2015 all palm oil destined for the Dutch 
market has to be sustainable' (Taskforce, 2010:1-3). Recalling this chapter's exploration of 
coverage, one interesting point about the Dutch Taskforce's commitment is that it relates only 
to the volumes of palm oil that are consumed domestically, while the larger volumes that the 
Dutch industry imports for onward trading are exempt (ibid.). 
Governments have also articulated their contentions about responsibility, both explicitly as well 
as implicitly within the design of their policies. For example, in a speech in April 2012, the UK 
Development Minister argued his government's rationale for acting against tropical 
deforestation as follows: 
"...this British passion for trees extends overseas, and there is deep public concern about 
the loss of tropical forests. Given this passion, it makes little sense for us to contribute 
indirectly to the destruction of forests through everyday purchasing decisions. The same 
applies to the UK Government" (O'Brien, 2012). 
This argument provided the basis for the UK Government's Palm Oil Statement (DEFRA, 2012a), 
which included provisions for public procurement of that commodity. Whi le this Statement set 
out something of a 'society-wide' response to palm oil's implication in tropical deforestation, it 
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remained voluntary to sign up, which attracted criticism, including from companies that had 
already made more ambitious policy objectives than that contained with the Statement [Scott-
Thomas, 2 0 1 2 ] . (The 'mandatory versus voluntary' aspect of responses is expanded on below.) 
A revealing case study into the allocation of responsibility within consumer countries can be 
found in the three responses to illegal logging that have been introduced by the US, EU and 
Australia. As already noted, a source of contention of these regulations derives from the fact that 
they impose the responsibility for due diligence onto domestic businesses; government itself has 
only a regulatory, monitoring and enforcement role. But even across the three sets of laws, a 
discrepancy exists in the actors to which responsibility is allocated, and degree to which they 
can be found culpable (Brack and Buckrell, 2 0 1 1 ] . Specifically, the Lacey Act is designed such 
that any actor along a timber supply chain can face prosecution for failing to exercise due 
diligence, although notably this responsibility is differentiated by knowledge (ibid.J. In contrast, 
the EU TR and Australian Prohibition apply only to importers ( ' t imber operators') and not to 
subsequent purchasers; EU traders and downstream actors are nevertheless required to keep 
records of their shipments for traceability purposes (ibid.). 
In designing illegal logging laws, governments have simply had to take a stance on where 
responsibility is allocated. For the other commodities connected to traded deforestation, to 
which consumer governments have generally devoted scant attention (and not yet enacted 
regulatory responses), governments have instead emphasised the 'primary' responsibility of the 
private sector. Sometimes this claim rests on the 'can implies should' argument that because 
major companies have the opportunity to act on international supply chains, responsibility 
therefore lies with the private sector. The UK Government, for example, states in its 'Forests and 
Climate Change' discussion paper that, 
'The private sector is the primary agent of change across many forest landscapes... and 
[it] offers an opportunity to reach farmers, land owners and land managers with a 
degree of scale and efficiency that the public sector cannot match... ' (UK ICF, 2 0 1 3 : 2 ) . 
Yet the UK Government has at other times appeared to claim the lead role for itself, exhorting 
the private sector to join in with its efforts. For example, in 2 0 1 2 , speaking to a meeting of the 
private sector and civil society, the UK Development Minister expounded his view, 
"And that takes me on to my third point, which is to recognise that the public sector 
can't do this alone, and to challenge you to work with us to make a real and lasting 
contribution to halting deforestation" (O'Brien, 2 0 1 2 ) . 
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Similarly, in making the announcement of the Palm Oil Statement that same year, the UK 
Environment Minister claimed that: 
'The Government is leading the way by ensuring that only environmentally friendly 
sourced palm oil is used in its central food and catering services' (Benyon, 2012). 
This minister then appeared to recognise, however, that UK business were both already 
contributing and would need to contribute further, saying, 
'Producers, manufacturers and charities will continue working together to speed up the 
move to 100% sustainable palm oil in everyday products' (ibid.]. 
The notion that the UK government is 'leading the way' with palm oil procurement is hard to 
sustain, unless that statement is a reference to the inaction of other governments rather than a 
comparison to the responses of private sector actors within and beyond the UK. Further, the 
dependence of the UK Government's procurement on the RSPO standard, which suffers 
numerous environmental shortcomings, makes it a considerably weaker procurement policy 
than the UK Government has for timber, for example. 
Yet the Environment Minister's second statement - implying that the private sector would need 
to take further responsibility - seems to be consistent with a broader trend of governments 
casting themselves in a supporting role on traded deforestation, with company-driven efforts 
playing the lead. For example, when it joined with the Consumer Goods Forum to create the 
Tropical Forest Alliance, the US Government explicitly stated its intention to 'conduct private 
sector outreach' and 'discover opportunities for enhanced collaboration' to reduce 
deforestation (USAID, 2012). As comfortable as this rhetoric may be for governments, the form 
such collaboration takes or results it produces remain difficult to identify, in any jurisdiction. 
(Chapter 6 will explore some of the reasons for, and shortcomings of, the TFA in relation to the 
undefined role of the US Government.] 
Governments, then, appear to be conflicted by the differing conclusions reached at the two 
levels of responsibility. They accept that they share some responsibility for tropical 
deforestation, along with producer governments, yet - beyond public procurement responses 
for timber - they have primarily interpreted their role as offering ill-defined 'support' for the 
private sector. Vermeulen and Kok (2012] note both this general patterns and its importance, 
finding: 
'...examples of state actors seeking to promote the self-regulating capacity of private 
parties, stimulating them to tackle sustainability issues that are considered collective 
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problems (Glasbergen and Groenenberg, 2001). In doing so, private parties from the 
mari<et and from civil society are assigned a more prominent and - important here -
sometimes even a protagonist role in the public arena' (pl85). 
When regulatory options are excised from the possible means of support, which the US 
Government explicitly demurs on within the TFA (TFA, 2013), the role of protagonist falls by 
default to the private sector (and subsequently, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, civil society). 
It is probable that the unsettled nature of responsibility within consumer countries has played a 
primary role in spurring a range of actors to respond, through a variety of response-types, to 
traded deforestation, generating this study's 'age of experimentation' over the last two decades. 
Yet in concluding this section on responsibility, it is safe to conclude that the proliferation of 
responses might have been largely averted had responsibility been situated decisively with any 
actor, even the private sector, but even more so with the public sector. For this study's larger 
purpose, the important question here is whether the current diversity of actors and responses 
has expanded or limited the contribution that responses can make to slowing tropical 
deforestation. While this question is merely noted here, the following section of this chapter as 
well as multiple empirical chapters will develop it further. 
Two dichotomies 
Comparisons across responses to traded deforestation reveal two further aspects worthy of 
examination. Each of these aspects relates to a dichotomy, Firstly, between whether responses 
are mandatory or voluntary, and secondly, whether responses take legality or sustainability as 
their reference point. Identifying where any given response sits in relation to each of these 
aspects looks straightforward at first. Clearly, for example, illegal logging laws place a 
mandatory burden on timber importers (and in the US, subsequent traders) to exercise due 
diligence on the legality of the timber products they trade. Yet in other instances responses' 
positions on these aspects is more blurred. For example, although the timber procurement 
policies of the governments of )apan, New Zealand and the UK require, or mandate, the legality 
of all wood products, they also express a preference for sustainable timber (Brack, 2008). 
Considering the mandatory versus legality dichotomy first, multiple examples demonstrate how 
what on paper appears to be mandatory responses in turn depends on other factors, such as 
enforcement and funding. On joining the RSPO (which companies do voluntarily), for example, it 
is then mandatory to lodge a 'time-bound plan' for all of a company's plantations or purchases to 
comply with the RSPO's principles and criteria. Despite this requirement, however, compliance 
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rates have been consistently low, while policies are often either patchy and go unimplemented. 
The RSPO has been reluctant to suspend memberships on this basis; at the time of writing this 
had only occurred for one palm oil producer (Mongabay, 2014c} while a few others have been 
issued ultimatums (Duff, 2010). The 'mandatory' nature of the RSPO's time-bound plans is 
therefore more tenuous than its requirements - on paper - would suggest. 
For company sourcing policies, which are usually announced and implemented individually, a 
degree of uncertainty also lingers over the prospects for enforcement. In these cases, the clarity 
of the targets (eg. 100 percent certified palm oil by 2015) is nonetheless threatened by their 
self-imposed nature. (The extent to which these commitments will fall short remains unknown, 
of course, because - for palm oil - the general deadline of end 2015 has not yet been reached.) 
The prospect that companies might either fall short or weasel out of these commitments 
become more likely with the discovery that most RSPO purchasers, for example, currently 
demonstrate their compliance through purchase of paper-only 'GreenPalm' certificates, rather 
than through deeper engagement with the physical sustainability their own supply chains. 
(Chapter 7 will identify such engagement as a necessary precursor to robustly addressing 
traded deforestation). Indeed, even joining the RSPO in the first place can be seen as a strategy 
to deflect criticism, if no accompanying actions are taken towards addressing a company's 
underlying connection. The WWF, wise to this possibility, has announced that consuming RSPO-
certified palm oil is no longer sufficient in itself (in Mongabay, 2013b). 
For illegal logging regulations in the US, some allege that 'mandatory' due diligence has been 
undermined - albeit through a different route - in the political repercussions following the 
Gibson raids. As described earlier in this section, by denying adequate funding to the agencies 
that undertake monitoring and enforcement (Boucher et al., 2011), the ability of the legislation 
to achieve its objectives is destined to suffer. Here too, then, a purportedly mandatory response 
actually occupies a slightly blurred position along a spectrum between mandatory and 
voluntary. 
One question to emerge from this discussion (captured in Table 4.1) is: 'To what extent might 
the mandatory or voluntary nature of responses affect their potential?'. While intuition suggests 
that mandatory responses should be stronger and therefore capable of a greater contribution to 
slowing traded deforestation, Chapter 7 will introduce evidence to suggest that - at least 
initially - a voluntary approach might lead to greater positive change by enabling stepwise 
(learning) approaches. 
A second dichotomy exists between those responses that take legality and those that take 
sustainability as their reference point. For reasons foreshadowed above, and delved into in 
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much greater depth in Chapter 6, governments have displayed a bias towards legality in their 
responses to traded deforestation. As cases in point, each of the US, EU and Australia's illegal 
logging laws has the stated intention of addressing traded deforestation, yet focuses on the 
narrower problem of illegal logging. Although some legal logging may be unsustainable, and 
some illegal logging may be sustainable, there is generally considered to be a significant (though 
unquantifiable) overlap between illegal logging and unsustainable logging (Cashore and Stone, 
2012]. (As Chapter 1 noted, the relationship between forest clearing and logging, whether legal 
or illegal, is also complex, with time lags compounding the dynamic and making attribution 
difficult.) As a result of these complexities, responses targeting illegal logging alone are at best 
likely to be some help in contributing to slowing deforestation, while falling short of what 
equivalent responses oriented towards sustainability might achieve. 
For the other commodities implicated in deforestation, the challenges pertaining to the legality 
versus sustainability reference point are of a greater order. Even generating agreement on 
definitions for 'illegal' palm oil, beef or soy agriculture is difficult (Brack and Bailey, 2013), 
although recent research (Lawson, 2014) has sought to overcome important obstacles 
(including definitions) that lie in the way of the design and subsequent implementation of future 
responses. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, and as this study's empirical chapters will firmly 
show, the political sensitivities surrounding these industries are also much greater than those 
for timber. For these reasons, rather than an absence of illegality in these industries' practices 
and trade, it is unlikely that current regulatory approaches for timber - chiefly, illegal logging 
legislation - will be replicated for agricultural commodities. 
As with the dichotomy between mandatory and voluntary, one obvious question to arise from 
the above discussion is whether responses that use sustainability as a reference point hold an 
inherently greater potential to address traded deforestation than those that instead use legality. 
This question is captured in Table 4.1, and it is developed further through the use of 
participants' insights, especially in chapters 6 and 7. 
Interactions between responses 
The above comparisons across responses are enabled by this study's effort to gather them 
together as a set, on the basis of their shared objective and shared use of international supply 
chains as their mechanism. This section builds on the comparisons made in the previous section 
by exploring how responses fit together as a set, through specific attention - here - to their 
formal interactions. The section will begin by grounding this holistic enquiry in 'regime complex' 
theory (and to a lesser extent, 'poly-centric governance theory'), which raises a critical - and 
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this chapter's final - question of responses to traded deforestation. In examining how responses 
interact, this section will note a distinction between the two broad 'roles' that responses 
perform. In its deliberate exploration of the nature and consequences of interactions between 
responses, this section commences a critical task that will be returned to empirically throughout 
in the remainder of this study. 
Regime theory: A potted history 
The task of gathering together this study's set of responses can be usefully understood with 
reference to two recent contributions to 'regime complex' theory. Writ ing about responses to 
climate change, Keohane and Victor [2010) note that, 'the structural and interest diversity 
inherent in contemporary world politics tends to generate the formation of regime complexes', 
which involves a mult i tude of individual responses with 'no overall architecture that structures 
the whole set' (p2]. Responses to traded deforestation strongly reflect this explanation for why 
regime complexes emerge. Citing not just 'differences in interests', these authors also refer to 
'lack of strong hierarchical authority in the issue-area, uncertainty about effects, and contrasting 
beliefs about responsibility for damage' as reasons leading to the proliferation, and 
fragmentation, of responses [pl6]. These reasons are clearly consonant with several of this 
chapter's findings, including actors' mult iple motivations for responding to traded deforestation, 
the range of actors and variety of responses that have emerged, as well as the unsettled 
responsibility for responding. In addition, and just like Keohane and Victor's discussion of 
climate change, traded deforestation is also a 'multivalent' problem, meaning one that contains 
mult iple values and is therefore open to multiple interpretations (Marshall, 2014:94). 
These characteristics of responses to traded deforestation have similar consequences as have 
emerged for the responses to climate change examined by Keohane and Victor. Specifically, the 
characteristics of traded deforestation have been instrumental in creating what Chapter 2 
referred to as an 'age of experimentation', characterised not just by a proliferation of responses 
but also by a lingering uncertainty over both what these responses are capable of achieving and 
how they might achieve it. For climate change, Keohane and Victor write that 'efforts [to 
respond] are akin to the Cambrian explosion—a wide array of diverse institutional forms 
emerges, and through selection and accident a few will be chosen' [p9]. Evidence will soon be 
introduced to test this latter suggestion - that 'a few will be chosen' - but suffice to say that the 
design of some responses, such as the PEFC and POIG, already suggest that consolidation is 
already underway among deforestation responses. 
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Building on Keohane and Victor (2010], and again writing in relation to responses to climate 
change, Abbott (2011) notes that, 
'Some less desirable effects predicted by [regime complex] theory may also arise among 
transnational schemes. For example, the creation of multiple [carbon] offset and 
commitment schemes reflects regime shifting, in which norm entrepreneurs move issues 
to new forums in pursuit of desired standards. The resulting proliferation increases 
fragmentation and transactions costs' (emphasis in original; p584). 
Here Abbott is arguing that the proliferation of responses to climate change may not be 
cost-free, and the 'interest diversity' that Keohane and Victor identify as causing the 
fragmentation of governance responses may in fact compromise the collective potential of those 
responses. Others have been led to ponder similarly, with Bernstein and Cashore (2012) asking 
whether 'different influences along different pathways... [might] interact in productive ways... 
or conversely, produce fragmentation or work at cross-purposes' (p603). Posed as a question 
for this study, the insights of all of the authors above can be condensed as follows: 
'Do responses behave in ways that are complementary or mutually inhibitive, to achieve 
their shared objective of addressing traded deforestation?' 
Recall that this question was introduced above in relation to whether the unsettled nature of 
responsibility had led to the proliferation of responses for traded deforestation. In the form it is 
presented here (and captured in Table 4.1], this question guides much of the analysis that 
follows in this section, and returns as a strong theme in the study's empirical material. Indeed, 
one of the primary achievements of this study's collecting together of responses is its ability to 
discern and respond to this question. In the absence of interactions between responses, of 
course, research conclusions on any given response could simply be tallied up across responses. 
Yet more complex dynamics can now be uncovered and explored. 
It can now be asked, for example, whether there might be some benefits to fragmentation. 
Keohane and Victor (2010] note both flexibility across issues and adaptability through time as 
possible benefits, though they maintain that these 'do not arise automatically' (pl9]. A related 
literature - polycentric governance theory - 'suggests that an array [or set of responses] can 
produce effective collective action, support learning, and to some extent function as a coherent 
system' (Abbott, 2011:586). Chapter 7 lends some support to these claims by identifying the 
importance of learning, both between responses and actors, as one pathway for responses to 
achieve a positive influence beyond their coverage. 
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However, Abbott (2011) is similarly tentative about the inevitability of such benefits arising. He 
notes that, 
'Of course, neither polycentric governance nor small-scale action is guaranteed to 
resolve complex problems such as climate change. If nothing else, actions at larger scales 
are necessary to control 'leakage', free-riding, and other pathologies' (p585}. 
Recalling the insights from consumption literature introduced in Chapter 3, these 'pathologies' 
are equally applicable here: leakage (or 'displacement'] has already been discussed at length, 
both in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, and free-riding is an established problem in many 
NGO-industry Roundtables (noted and explored further in Chapter 5 and 7]. Further, should the 
proliferation of responses prove to be detrimental to, or limiting on, attempts to address traded 
deforestation, this would clearly qualify as an additional pathology. Finally, according to regime 
complex theory, some way of'orchestrating' (Abbott, 2011:584] fragmentation could be 
pursued. This study will delve into the possibility that some orchestration may occur, both 
directly and indirectly, with Chapter 5 exploring the prospects for consolidation among 
responses, while Chapter 6 will illuminate the constraints on governments which may prevent 
them from assuming a role as regulators (for which, read 'orchestrators']. 
Tools and drivers 
Before examining specific examples of formal (and less formal] interactions between responses, 
one important distinction must be made between the two broad roles that responses perform. 
Although Chapter 1 introduced this study's policy, regulatory and institutional responses as 
comparable on the basis of their objective and focus, a necessary distinction can be made 
between, on the one hand, responses that act as a 'tool' for demonstrating and verifying 
improvements in international supply chains, and on the other, responses that act as a 'driver'of 
these improvements. 
Interpreting the roles of individual responses can sometimes be straightforward. Institutional 
responses, for example, generally act as tools for improving - and demonstrating - the legality 
or sustainability of commodities within supply chains. Specifically, certification schemes (such 
as those endorsed by the PEFC] are used by companies and governments to measure and 
demonstrate the legality or sustainability of their timber supply chains. On the other hand, 
many policy and regulatory responses - such as corporate and public sourcing policies, biofuels 
frameworks, illegal logging legislation and labelling legislation - generally act as drivers of 
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changes to supply chains. These drivers often draw on one, or several, tools to demonstrate 
these improvements. 
Some responses actually perform both roles simultaneously. NGO-industry Roundtables such as 
the RSPO and RTRS, for example, develop a certification system (a tool) but also create a 
membership-based 'Roundtable' that encourages companies to enact policies (drivers) for 
further uptake of that system. Similarly, the EU's FLEGT program (FLEGT licences, none of 
vifhich have yet been issued) creates a tool to recognise the legality of forest products from 
specific countries. At the same time, FLEGT acts as a driver for that tool by actively engaging in 
partnerships with producer countries to strengthen forest governance, as well as by ensuring 
that any future FLEGT licences will be recognised under the EU's illegal logging laws. 
One response - labelling legislation - does not appear to fit neatly as either a tool or driver. Both 
versions of the failed Australian legislation were intended to require palm oil to be specifically 
labelled, rather than permit it (like other oils) to be listed genetically as 'vegetable oils'. (The EU 
legislation enacts a much broader reform of labelling laws, which happen to also achieve what 
was sought by the Australian legislation.) Neither the Australian nor EU legislation requires the 
uptake of any scheme (tool), such as RSPO-certified palm oil, instead seeking to ensure more 
specific labelling of ingredients for consumers. However, as the speeches made by its 
proponents clearly show, the various permutations of the draft Australian labelling laws were 
intended to act as a driver for improvements in palm oil supply chains, including - explicitly -
uptake of RSPO-certified palm oil (Xenophon et al., 2009). 
Mapping formal interactions 
Formal interactions between this study's responses usually involve a driver and at least one tool. 
A stereotypical interaction, for instance, would involve a company sourcing policy committ ing 
to (and then demonstrating) improvements to its supply chain through the uptake of certified 
commodities. This is the form taken by many companies' commitments to '100 percent certified 
palm oil by 2015', for example, including Unilever and both major Australian supermarkets. 
Coles and Woolworths (Davidson, 2013b). 
Unlike companies, the sourcing policies of many governments cannot legally require that 
products are certified by a given sustainability scheme (or schemes). This legal constraint is 
contained within the WTO's General Procurement Agreement (to which most EU member states 
are signatories), which requires that governments always allow for a non-certification 
('alternative' or 'Category B' evidence) route to demonstrate compliance. A similar constraint -
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albeit from a different source - is inherent within the US and EU illegal logging regulations, 
neither of which specifies schemes that would comprise sufficient due diligence (the EU in fact 
states that neither PEFC or ESC are 'sufficient in themselves'}. As Chapter 6 explores, this 
constraint derives from EU and US fears that the WTO would interpret such a requirement as an 
unjustified barrier to trade. In the Australian illegal logging legislation, in contrast, both the 
PEFC and FSC are explicitly recognised as sufficient for due diligence, while an alternative route 
is also available to ensure WTO compliance. 
In stark contrast to its illegal logging regulations, the EU's biofuels framework, RED, also 
establishes formal interactions with specific schemes. At the time of writing, 17 schemes had 
been recognised as sufficient for imported biofuels to qualify towards member states' mandated 
biofuels targets (EC, 2015b} . The apparent contradiction between the EU's approach to illegal 
logging and biofuels is perhaps best explained by the fact that RED does not seek to affect trade 
in biofuels per se, since unlike illegal timber, biofuels that do not meet the standards can still be 
freely imported into the EU. Instead, RED simply determines the eligibility for biofuels that 
count towards the mandatory targets. 
In practice, the absence of a formal interaction between 'tool' and 'driver' responses does not 
preclude informal interactions (sometimes with the exact same result} occurring in practice. If 
the Australian palm oil labelling legislation had been passed by the country's parliament, for 
example, it is highly likely to have generated an increase in demand for RSPO-certified palm oil 
(as Chapter 7 will note, at least one major multinational - Unilever - has publicly cited the EU's 
labelling reforms as a driver for its own commitment towards certified palm oil}. A further 
example comes from procurement policies and illegal logging legislation, which cannot 
specifically require PEFC or FSC timber, yet these schemes still provide by far the dominant 
route for demonstrating compliance (Brack, 2008 } . 
Indeed, there is also a dynamic aspect to the interactions between schemes and drivers. The 
utility of the PEFC and FSC for timber procurement and illegal logging, for example, is not 
coincidental; both have adapted themselves to better suit these purposes. For its part, the PEFC 
strengthened its environmental criteria after it was initially assessed as insufficient for UK 
timber procurement policy (Steering Committee, 2012} , while the FSC recently expanded its 
legal criteria to match up with the EU TR (Hontelez, 2012 } . The EU's biofuels framework 
provides further examples of schemes adapting themselves - indeed, creating separate 
standards - which culminates in a formal interaction. A collaboration between the EU and the 
RSPO, for instance, resulted in the 'RSPO-RED', which contains additional criteria for 
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as protection of peadands and high value forest. Both 'RSB-
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RED' and 'RTRS -RED' schemes have also been created. These dynamics are potentially 
examples of drivers stimulating influence beyond coverage, which Chapter 7 is dedicated to 
exploring. 
The above examples demonstrate an inconsistent approach on the part of governments to 
formally interacting with sustainability schemes. However, formal interactions are prevalent 
between government drivers (policies and regulations) and government tools. The EU's illegal 
logging regulations, for example, accept that 'FLEGT-licensed products and CITES products with 
valid permits and licences are by EU TR definition legal' (EC, 2013c). Some public procurement 
policies, such as the UK Government's timber policy, similarly accept ELECT licences, though 
this is due to expire in 2015 when a requirement for sustainable timber becomes active. (These 
drivers accept ELECT timber in large part so they do not undermine the incentives for 
timber-producing countries to engage with the EU through its ELECT platform; ibid.) 
The EU TR is also designed to formally interact with - i.e. recognise and accept - CITES licences, 
a decision that effectively 'out-sources' the robustness of the EU TR to an external tool. This 
relationship differs from the EU TR's formal interaction with ELECT licences because in the 
latter case the EU itself approves a timber-producing country's system. In contrast, CITES 
licences can be created by any 'range state' government (CITES, 2013), with the consequence 
that default acceptance of CITES-licensed timber may jeopardise the EU TR's intent. Adverse 
outcomes could result from the potential forgery of CITES licences and corruption in relation to 
CITES, as well as the more nuanced possibility that the EU TR's acceptance of CITES may shift 
timber demand towards those (already threatened) species that are ClTES-listed (Cooney et al., 
2012). 
Finally, formal interactions also occur beyond the standard driver-tool model, for instance 
through alliances between schemes. The PEEC is an obvious example, since it is essentially an 
umbrella scheme that certifies (or 'endorses') national timber industry standards to create an 
internationally-recognised scheme. In 2013, the PEEC endorsed the Malaysian timber standard, 
the MTCC, and it endorsed the Indonesian and Chinese standards the following year (PEFC, 
2014). In a similar dynamic to the EU TR's recognition of CITES, however, the ability to combine 
PEFC-certified timber from multiple sources means that this timber can only be guaranteed to 
the level of the PEFC's weakest recognised scheme. Another example of an umbrella scheme is 
the International Standards Evaluation and Assessment Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance, which is a 
grouping of schemes across commodities - including the FSC, RSPO and RSB - that aims to 
'strengthen sustainability standards systems for the benefit of people and the environment' 
(ISEAL, 2014). Formed in 2009, individual schemes can apply for ISEAL membership and must 
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demonstrate compliance with the ISEAL Codes of Good Practice and represent industry best 
practice. 
Already these examples reveal several notable characteristics of interactions between 
responses, some of which are reiterated and emphasised in the empirical material of 
subsequent chapters. The political nature of companies formally interacting with ('recognising') 
schemes comprises the entirety of Chapter 5, which identifies the benefits for - and unlikeliness 
o f- greater coordination, if not harmonisation, between schemes. The sensitivities and 
constraints on governments deriving from the WTO and other sources comprise Chapter 6, 
which concludes that the legal constraints of the WTO are not the root cause of consumer 
government trepidation. Finally, an effort to identify informal interactions between responses -
the pathways through which responses influence one another - comprises Chapter 7. 
Trends in interactions 
To reiterate, this section's introduction of regime complex theory poses a clear question for 
traded deforestation: 'Do responses behave in ways that are complementary or mutual ly 
inhibitiveT If it were a straightforward case of 'the more responses, the better', then the ongoing 
experimentation with new responses could be welcomed by all actors concerned with the 
problem of traded deforestation, since each additional response could only assist in addressing 
it. 
Yet there are at least two reasons why caution is warranted, pertaining respectively to new 
drivers and tools. Firstly, the 'age of experimentation' that Chapter 2 identified as characterising 
the last two decades has only intensified in the latter decade. Many of the more recent 
responses, including illegal logging legislation and the reinvigoration of CITES, have introduced 
legality as a benchmark, rather than adhering to and advancing the already-established 
reference point of sustainability. It seems at least conceivable that illegal logging legislation 
(and some public procurement policies) may detract from deeper changes desired in relation to 
the sustainabilily of t imber harvesting from tropical forests. On the other hand, such responses 
could provide additional momen tum to existing, sustainability-focused responses, such as illegal 
logging appears to have done for the FSC and PEFC to date. The point to be emphasised, then, is 
that the answer to whether these new driver responses complement or inhibit existing 
responses depends in turn on the subsequent question of whether t imber legality comprises a 
constructive step towards sustainability, or simply provides a lower benchmark. Chapter 7 will 
provide some evidence on this latter question, in order to sketch out an answer to the former. 
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Secondly, with respect to new tool responses, it is undeniable that some of these act as 
competitors with existing 'tools'. Some responses, such as the PEFC, as well as several national 
level legality schemes in producer countries, were explicitly designed with the intention of 
competing with existing schemes (Djama et al., forthcoming). But competition can also yield 
improvements to schemes (such as the widely-cited case of the PEFC's evolving standard). So 
again the verdict appears elusive when approached conceptually. As both Chapter 5 and 7 will 
demonstrate empirically, however, there are examples where competition has both improved 
schemes' potential contribution to slowing deforestation as well as inhibited it. Chapter 5 will 
conclude that harnessing the positive side of competition can be made more possible through 
changes in actor behaviour. 
To summarise, then, both new driver and new tool responses can either complement or inhibit 
existing responses (or both], with mixed results for the collective potential of the set. The 
proliferation in responses over the last decade has shown some signs of being tempered, such as 
the CGF looking to avoid replicating existing responses and the POIG explicitly opting not to 
create a rival scheme to the RSPO. These examples suggest that actors are at least becoming 
aware of the potential disadvantages - for the overarching objective of responding to traded 
deforestation - that accompany even the existing multitude of responses. In relation to the 
overall question of complementarity, however, the effects of the expansion in both new tool and 
new driver responses are in some cases only beginning to be observed. This study will now turn 
to the analytical contributions it seeks to make empirically on these questions. 
Conc lus ion 
This chapter has examined the conceptual nature of responses - their framing and design, the 
motivations behind them, and their interactions - to determine how these features could affect 
responses' potential contribution to slowing traded deforestation. A number of limitations were 
soon evident in responses, beginning with their framing of the underlying 'problem of 
deforestation' and their subsequent blind-spots, as well as in the inherent limitations posed by 
responses' incomplete coverage of both commodity production and international supply chains 
for any given deforestation commodity. 
The chapter then shifted its analytic focus to the collective, first comparing several 
consequential aspects of responses before turning to the implications of their formal 
interactions. From these explorations many further questions emerged and were clarified, 
before being tabulated in Table 4.1. These questions are best characterised as a set of 
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sub-questions that will or could bear on this study's primary research question about responses' 
limitations. Not all of these sub-questions are pursued further by this study, although further 
discussion ensues where pertinent empirical material is raised by participants (as also marked 
in the table). Questions that are not pursued directly are perhaps best considered as 
'rabbit-holes'; that is, they are recognised by this study as being of some significance but 
necessitate a more thorough exploration than time, space and material afford here. 
On the other hand, some of the sub-questions that emerge from this chapter's findings are 
pursued directly in the chapters that follow. Specifically, Chapter 5 will expand on one 
particular form of interaction - namely, that between company sourcing policies and 
sustainability schemes - to analyse whether the consequences of these interactions are 
productive for responses' contribution to slowing deforestation. In turn. Chapter 6 explores the 
behaviour of governments and identifies perceived constraints and sensitivities that have 
shaped this behaviour, including discovering why government responses tend to be 
legality-focused. Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to extending and identifying pathways of 
influence through which responses might overcome the limitation imposed by coverage. In 
doing so, this chapter also advances its examination of one of its major contributions: the 
various forms and consequences of interactions between responses. 
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Chap te r 5 The Politics of Recognition 
This chapter marks the beginning of this study's empirical approach, which critically examines 
the perspectives of participants so as to better understand the behaviour of responses and the 
consequences that emerge from those behaviours. This chapter uses company sourcing policies 
as a lens through which to understand the tensions inherent in private sector and civil society 
responses to deforestation. (Quotes from empirical material will be interwoven through this 
chapter's examination of that subject, as explained in Chapter 2's Methods section.) 
This chapter undertakes two tasks: firstly, it conducts an indicative survey of company sourcing 
policies and reveals the variety of relationships they have established with sustainability 
schemes. These relationships are referred to as 'recognition strategies' and are formalised into a 
typology. The significance accorded to these strategies by other actors, notably schemes and 
NGOs, hints at the politicised nature of sourcing policies as well as their consequences for the 
behaviour of others. Exploring these aspects - or what could be called the 'political economy' -
of sourcing policies, is this chapter's second task and is undertaken using the typology's 
recognition strategies as a platform. 
This exploration will highlight the dynamics of competition between schemes, and the 
importance of both different recognition strategies and NGO behaviour in shaping that 
competition. The chapter will conclude that, in light of certification's well-known limitations, at 
least some part of the dynamics surrounding sourcing policies has become a distraction from 
more productive contributions that actors could make to slowing deforestation. Despite this 
conclusion, however, actors are nonetheless behaving rationally in pursuing valid objectives at 
the individual level, meaning that short of dramatic changes to this context of competition, the 
scope for implementing substantial change in overall dynamics is limited. 
Company sourcing policies 
Chapter 3 highlighted the increasing concentration of power in global supply chains at the 
nodes occupied by major retailers and branded manufacturers. As that chapter noted, this 
concentration has been identified by some actors as an opportunity to leverage social and 
environmentally-focused changes to distant production practices (eg. Conca, 2002). In the 
words of a Greenpeace activist quoted in Gereffi et al. (2001), for NGOs the ability to campaign 
directly against companies 'was like discovering gunpowder' (p64). 
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One of the first major subjects of these campaigns were companies' sourcing of timber. As 
Chapter 1 detailed, for the first decade following the creation of the FSC (and marginally later, 
the PEFC], these schemes and related company sourcing policies for t imber effectively 
comprised the entirety of supply-chain focused, downstream responses to deforestation. After 
the FSC had been formed, NGO campaigns suddenly had an explicit goal for the companies they 
campaigned against: to pressure them into committ ing to FSC-only sourcing policies. Many of 
the first sourcing policies, then, were enacted after companies were targeted by such campaigns. 
And as the RSPO emerged from 2004, so campaigns were able to pressure companies to adopt a 
simple commi tment on palm oil sourcing [about which, more to come]. 
Whether as a direct result of NGO campaigns or from other motivations, large numbers of 
companies have adopted sourcing policies for the deforestation commodities. Given the 
processes of globalisation that, as Chapter 3 canvassed, have made company supply chains 'vital 
leverage points' for sustainability [Dauvergne and Lister, 2012:42], this would seem to be a 
promising - and straightforward - trend among downstream responses to deforestation. 
However, research into the way that companies currently approach sustainability (eg. 
Dauvergne and Lister, 2012; Gouldson and Sullivan, 2013] has often reached pessimistic 
conclusions on their prospects. The conclusions of these authors 'caution against relying on... 
voluntary company commitments, noting that their scope is limited' (Gouldson and Sullivan, 
2013:1] and that companies' 'aim is to leverage sustainability for business growth while... 
reducing the intensity of environmental impacts' (Dauvergne and Lister, 2012:36]. In other 
words, companies generally focus on improving efficiencies and reducing product intensities 
without attending to total volumes of impacts. Chapter 3's noting of the magnitude-blindness of 
current responses, and its potential to undermine their effect, is therefore echoed in these 
authors' research. 
Other research (eg. Bloomfield, 2014] has highlighted the limitations of the NGO 'shame 
campaigns' focused on particular companies, even as these campaigns result in promising and 
demonstrable commitments from individual companies. High-profile examples of success 
include, for instance, Disney's sourcing policy (Disney, 2012] for the paper used in its children's 
books following sustained advocacy from the Rainforest Action Network (RAN, 2011], and 
Nesde's 'Commitment on Deforestation and Forest Stewardship' (Nestle, 2011] and later 
Responsible Sourcing Guidelines (Nestle, 2012, Nesde, 2013] for multiple commodities after 
Greenpeace's palm oil campaign against it (Greenpeace, 2010]. Yet even these successes, which 
are widely respected, do not disprove authors' bigger picture conclusions that NGO campaigns 
can have a distorting and distracting effect on private sector-civil society dynamics (Bloomfield, 
2014]. As this chapter will demonstrate, these dynamics emerge from actors pursuing 
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individually sound objectives, yet collectively they can be less than conducive towards robust, 
consistent responses to slowing deforestation. 
The design of c o m p a n y sourc ing pol icies 
For companies seeking to source, measure and demonstrate their disconnection from 
deforestation, numerous pathways are available. One immediately obvious pathway -
substituting away from a given problematic commodity - is rarely taken up, and usually only by 
minor users of a commodity. For example, the Australian branches of two global companies, 
Kentucky Fried Chicken and Cadbury, stopped using palm oil after initial trial periods (Gray, 
2012; Davidson, 2013a). Arguably, the rarity with which companies have opted for this pathway 
reinforces Chapter 3's finding that the problem of deforestation has been framed by 
downstream actors in such a way that the subject of governance is problematic versions of 
commodities, rather than the straightforward use of those commodities (or other alternatives). 
The 'message' for companies implicit in this framing is that they need only source 
unproblematic versions of these same commodities, rather than ceasing to use them altogether. 
Another pathway through which companies can disassociate their sourcing from tropical 
deforestation is to work directly with their suppliers 'behind the scenes', changing production 
practices and securing supply chains against problematic versions of commodities. While this 
pathway is capable of achieving the underlying objective to source unproblematic commodities 
(and Chapter 7 will conclude that such engagement with suppliers may indeed be necessary), it 
has the disadvantage of not facilitating easy measurement and demonstration of progress 
towards legal or sustainable sourcing. Within the politicised context that surrounds the design 
and implementation of sourcing policies, including not only NGO pressure but also consumer 
concern, companies are understandably eager to be able to demonstrate their progress to 
external audiences. This eagerness is even more pointed in situations where companies are 
branded, high-profile multinationals, and consequently especially vulnerable to NGO campaigns. 
With few exceptions, then, the internal pathway for companies to disconnect their supply chains 
from deforestation is also rarely opted for. 
There are two further pathways available, both of which meet companies' multiple sourcing, 
measuring and demonstrating objectives. These pathways are referred to in De Man and 
lonescu-Somers's (2013) 'Practitioner's Guide' manual (see also Boucher et al., 2012; Steering 
Committee, 2012). The typology that this chapter will introduce, drawing on an indicative 
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survey of the sourcing policies of branded, high-profile companies, explores just these two 
pathways. 
Figure 5.1 depicts these two pathways, and the five recognition strategies they encompass, in 
the form of a 'decision tree' from a company's perspective. For a given commodity, a company 
first decides between the two pathways outlined here and then opt for one of its recognition 
strategies. (Full definitions and examples of recognition strategies are provided in Figure 5.2], 
Figure 5.1 Decision tree for companies deciding on recognition strategy 
The first of these two pathways is also, to date, the most prevalent: where company sourcing 
policies establish and rely on direct relationships with sustainability schemes, such as the FSC 
or PEFC for timber, the RSPO for palm oil, and so on. The communication advantages of this 
pathway are instantly apparent, with companies able to identify a target of their sourcing to be 
certified (usually 100% by a given year) and report a percentage uptake against this. One more 
nuanced advantage, which will be elaborated on further in the discussion below, is being able to 
deflect responsibility for the robustness of a scheme's standard (and therefore a company's 
purchases] to the institution, rather than face these criticisms directly. Within this pathway, the 
typology identifies three, notionally-discrete 'recognition strategies' (Simple, Hierarchical and 
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Equivalent), each of which establishes specific relationships between a sourcing policy and 
relevant schemes. Briefly, Simple recognition entails sourcing from one scheme only; 
Hierarchical recognition entails sourcing from more than one scheme but with an established 
preference for one; while Equivalent recognition entails sourcing from multiple named schemes. 
The second pathway captured by the typology refers to companies that create their own, 
notionally-independent set of sustainability criteria or standards for suppliers to meet, which 
are nonetheless made public. These standards are often framed as a (company-specific) 
'scheme', 'model' or 'guidelines', as with Starbucks' 'C.A.F.E.' coffee programme, M&S' 'Model 
Forest Program' for timber and - particularly relevant to this study - Nestle's Responsible 
Sourcing Guidelines. This pathway encompasses two discrete recognition strategies. Briefly, 
Non-recognition reflects a policy in which no relationship is established to existing schemes (eg. 
M&S' Model Forest Program); while Partial recognition denotes that schemes are later 
measured up against a company's independent standards and endorsed in full or part (eg. 
Nesde's RSG for timber and palm oil). This pathway has been used even when pertinent 
sustainability schemes exist, for reasons that will shortly be discussed. 
Further attention to the design of company sourcing policies, and particularly the recognition 
strategy they establish with relevant schemes, is timely. As Chapter 4 argued, with the 
proliferation of new 'tool' responses to traded deforestation there is an exponential increase in 
the number of possible interactions between drivers and tools. At the same time, awareness is 
growing that the proliferation of new responses has complicated and confused the dynamics of 
certification (Gulbrandsen, 2004; Saunders, 2010; WWF, 2010), that certification itself is 
hamstrung by a number of empirical and conceptual limitations (eg. Moogetal., 2012), and that 
NGO campaigns may be similarly flawed (eg. Wright, 2012; Bloomfield, 2014). Understanding 
how company sourcing policies for the deforestation commodities, and other actors' behaviour, 
create, exacerbate or attenuate these dynamics is essential to enable an understanding of how 
conducive these dynamics are for responses', and actors', contributions to slowing deforestation. 
5 recogni t ion strategies 
This chapter provides a platform for discussing and analysing both the design and the 
consequences of company sourcing policies. The recognition strategies that companies opt for 
have nuanced implications for other actors, including schemes and NGOs, which in turn affects 
both their behaviour and the nature of their contribution to slowing deforestation. In making 
these dynamics more prominent, this chapter intends to advance discussion of sustainability 
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schemes beyond the overly simple formulation of 'X is stronger than Y in these areas'. To date 
no settled vocabulary exists for companies to form and communicate their policies. Such a 
vocabulary is needed, in turn, to allow other actors to understand, collaborate and hold 
companies to account for their sourcing of deforestation commodities. The five recognition 
strategies found in Figure 5.2 provide just such a vocabulary. 
Recognition strategies are presented neatly in written company sourcing policies, and therefore 
in this chapter's typology. In practice, however, there can be a 'blurring' between strategies as 
they are implemented. [This blurriness itself partly reflects the lack of a common vocabulary to 
inform and guide policy formulation.) Two examples demonstrate how recognition strategies 
can differ in practice from their written form. Firstly, Nestle's sourcing policy for t imber states 
that, ultimately, 'no certification scheme is currently able to explicitly certify compliance with all 
the RSGs [Responsible Sourcing Guidelines], especially forests with high carbon values' (Nestle, 
2012:6). Yet that document concludes that because 'FSC certification is able to provide the most 
comprehensive verification of compliance with Nestie's Forest RSGs' then it will 'therefore use 
FSC to demonstrate compliance' (ibid.). Nestle's internalised "Partial" policy for t imber thus 
morphs into something approximating an externalised "Simple" recognition strategy as it is 
implemented. Secondly, the difference between "Hierarchical" and "Equivalent" strategies can 
only ever be a matter of degree. Both strategies are 'inclusive', in the sense that they ultimately 
recognise two or more schemes, meaning that the distinction between them is determined by 
the effort or cost that a company with a "Hierarchical" strategy incurs before it is begins to 
accept supplies from its secondary scheme. In the absence of any effort or cost, the outcomes of 
these two strategies become identical. 
However, whi le it is true that these strategies are often less discrete in practice than the 
language used in company sourcing policies allows (and reflected in Figure 5.2), important 
differences remain. Specifically, strategies differ in the signals they send to, and communicate 
about, sustainability schemes. As the empirical material below will demonstrate, it is by 
indicating their support (or otherwise) for individual schemes that sourcing policies can affect 
the perception of those schemes, and therefore affect the behaviour of other actors in relation to 
those schemes. 
Company considerat ions 
Before exploring the consequences of these recognition strategies, it seems justified to first ask 
why companies opt for the strategies they do. Clues to this explanation can be found in the 
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occasions, as Figure 5.2 notes, where a single company chooses to adopt different strategies 
across the different commodities it sources. For its paper and board, for example, Nestle has 
adopted a Simple recognition strategy for the FSC, whereas for its palm oil Nestle has adopted a 
Partial recognition strategy for the RSPO (Nestle, 2013). Similarly, Walmart has developed its 
own programme (a Non-recognition strategy) for beef and an Equivalent strategy for seafood 
(Walmart, 2013:69), while Unilever has a Simple recognition strategy for palm oil (Unilever, 
2008) and a Hierarchical strategy for board and packaging (Unilever, 2010a). As De Man and 
lonescu-Somers (2013) note, 'evidently, one company may be a 'leader' on one commodity and a 
'follower' on others' (p39). Companies clearly do not feel bound to enact any single strategy 
across the commodities they source. 
One frequently-voiced consideration for companies is a shortage in the supply of certified 
versions of commodities, in particular some FSC-certified timber products and RTRS-certified 
soy. (Outside the forest sector, the same shortage applies to wild-caught seafood.) For its board 
and packaging supplies, Unilever justifies its decision to 'rely on other certification schemes 
under the condition that our "Non-controversial Sources" requirements are met... in cases 
where FSC is not available' on the basis that 'there is not enough FSC material on the market at 
present, and FSC is challenging to achieve for smallholders' (2010b:2). Unilever's Hierarchical 
strategy therefore allows it to maintain a preference for FSC products while still accepting other 
certification schemes as required. 
In an example from beyond the deforestation commodities, Walmart's Senior Vice President for 
Sustainability, Andrea B. Thomas, explains that company's seafood policy along similar lines: 
"We soon figured out that there wasn't enough MSC-certified seafood for us to meet the 
demand that we had. So we tried a broader approach, saying we'd sell certified seafood 
without specifying the certifying body. That still didn't get us enough seafood. We 
ultimately decided we could have the biggest impact by asking all of our seafood 
suppliers to start improving, knowing that they're all starting in different places" 
(Thomas, in McKinsey, undated). 
Although barely conceivable, one alternative response to a shortage of certified supply would be 
to limit the volume of those products sold (simultaneously driving their price higher, possibly 
inducing further supply). If a company considered that FSC-certified timber and wood products, 
for example, really are the only acceptable versions of that commodity that it could sell, then it 
would need to restrict its sales in line with that shortage. Yet this reaction is clearly untenable, if 
conceivable, to companies like Unilever and Walmart, who maintain enormous product volumes. 
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These decisions provide empirical support for Chapter 3's finding that the prevailing paradigms 
within downstream countries, including continued expansion of economic growth and 
international trade, shape actors' framing of the problem of deforestation, inherently limiting 
their responses. 
A second consideration in accounting for the diversity in strategies adopted is the fact that for 
any given company, not all commodities are likely to be equally important. Companies may 
therefore seek to become 'a 'leader' on one commodity and a 'follower' on others' according to 
their relative importance (as suggested by De Man and lonescu-Somers, 2013:39). In other 
words, companies use a 'triage approach' to guide their attention on sourcing. Mars, for example, 
uses only small volumes of palm oil and instead concentrates its attention on its cacao 
purchases, where it purchases 12 per cent of global production (IDH, 2013). As Chapter 1 
detailed, companies such as Unilever and Nestle have publicly identified the commodities to 
which they intend to dedicate their attention. 
A third consideration for companies is the critical point that not all sustainability schemes are 
alike. While there is a diversity across multiple aspects of current schemes, including their 
longevity and their significance (eg. familiarity and coverage) within the industry, the more 
important considerations within a politicised context are the robustness of schemes' standards 
and - in conjunction - their reputation. The FSC, for example, is usually held in higher esteem 
than the RSPO on the basis of its environmental and social criteria. Because one objective of 
company sourcing policies is to demonstrate a commitment to more sustainable sourcing, these 
differences in reputation can strongly affect company decisions. Given their role in pressuring 
and assessing companies' policies, NGOs' judgements of schemes are highly pertinent to 
company decisions, as acknowledged and explored later in this chapter. 
These three considerations are by no means exhaustive, yet they hint at the mixture of 
pragmatism and politics that determine companies' approach to their sourcing policies and 
recognition strategies. As the first two considerations make clear, there are pragmatic 
considerations relating to the volumes of commodities that companies use, and their 
importance to a company's products. Undoubtedly, these considerations affect company choices 
of recognition strategies. Yet equally, there is a politicised context in which these choices are 
made, encompassing the judgements and campaigns of NGOs, the choices of other companies, as 
well as perceptions of relevant schemes. There are therefore multiple tensions that companies 
attempt to navigate through their design of sourcing policies. 
Crucially for this chapter's exploration of the political economy of sourcing policies, while 
companies' choices of recognition strategy are not straightforward for companies, nor are the 
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consequences of these decisions straightforward for other actors. In establishing specific 
relationships to sustainability schemes, recognition strategies - especially those of large, 
high-profile companies - have consequences, firstly, for the behaviour of other actors, and 
ultimately, for the dynamics of private sector-civil society responses to deforestation. These 
dynamics are novi- explored through analysis of the empirical material collected for this study, 
beginning with two particularly polarising themes that emerged from these discussions and 
warrant consideration. 
P o l a r i s i n g t h e m e # 1 ; ' i n t e r n a l i s i n g ' v e r s u s ' e x t e r n a l i s i n g ' v a l u e s 
Mirroring the two pathways encompassed by this chapter's typology, De Man and lonescu-
Somers ( 2 0 1 3 ] state that 'there are basically two approaches' to sustainable sourcing: a 
company can either 'define its own sustainability criteria for a particular commodity, or it can 
use an existing standard developed by an external organisation' (p29). These two pathways 
represent the first juncture in the typology, as well as the first polarising theme to emerge from 
participant discussions. 
Surprisingly, the literature on forestry sustainability schemes for the deforestation commodities 
are almost completely silent about the consequences of companies embarking down these two 
pathways. In constrast, participants held strong opinions on this decision, and the consequences 
that flow from it. One participant conceptualised the decision between companies designing 
independent standards or instead relying on existing schemes as "one of internalising values or 
externalising them" [RW], The Forest Trust (2013) argues that designing independent standards 
is the only pathway through which companies can 'take full ownership of their sustainability 
performance, rather than externalising' their sourcing standards to sustainability schemes (pi) . 
Indeed, there is some evidence that more companies are coming to view the environmental (and 
social) problems within their supply chains through this lens (Steering Committee, 2012) , which 
is likely to have dynamics consequences for the momentum of schemes. 
Advocates of independent standards see dangers in the alternative - and to date far more 
common - approach of relying on sustainability schemes: for example, that it can lead to 
"complacency" [RW] on the part of companies. Yet for some companies, the opportunity for 
complacency may actually be an attraction of some existing schemes. According to one 
participant working for a major multinational, many of that company's peers within the RSPO 
are "happy to play the waiting game" [3], As this chapter noted earlier, the protection that 
Roundtables can provide is that no single company can be critiqued for the robustness of the a 
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consensus-driven organisation's standard, especially when it has many hundreds, if not 
thousands, of members. Undoubtedly this provides a level of cover for companies that are 
looking to defuse or deflect NGO attention without radically revising their sourcing of 
deforestation commodities. 
Participants from schemes offer even stronger perspectives to offer on companies designing 
their own standards, generally perceiving this move as a threat to their organisations. One 
scheme representative put it bluntly: "Vou cannot come out unilaterally with a standard That is a 
danger for us..." [8], Interestingly, this statement was made with respect to a commodity for 
which only one major scheme is established. Expressing a similar view, the Chairman of the 
RSPO took aim at Nestle for designing and implementing its Responsible Sourcing Guidelines, 
stating that 'stewardship involves taking the lead, but not in running away with the torch' (in 
Marx, 2013:32). Exactly why companies designing their own standards can be perceived as a 
'danger' hinges on understanding the delicate balance that schemes, especially Roundtables, are 
trying to attain (and maintain). As the previous chapter noted in recognising Roundtables' 
multiple objectives, this balance is sought between, on the one hand, having a sufficiently robust 
standard to satisfy NGOs and companies pushing to disconnect a commodity from tropical 
deforestation, while on the other hand ensuring that standard is both attractive and achievable 
to entice large numbers of producers to encourage their membership. (Interestingly, the Marine 
Stewardship Council provides an exception here among schemes, since in the words of one 
participant it is "a standard that's accommodated the idea it will [only] capture the top [10-15%] 
of the industry" ]7]. This frees the MSC up to cater the robustness of its standard to this fraction 
of the industry, rather than aspiring to more widespread representation.) 
In addition to their views on the 'dangers' of companies designing independent standards, 
scheme participants raise several other reasons why they feel that companies should define 
their sourcing policies in relation to existing schemes. These reasons include the "differences in 
credibility" ihat apply "in the market" [9], with some company-specific standards regarded as 
"green-wash" in comparison to multi-stakeholder, "consensus-produced" schemes [8]. 
Nonetheless, there is a subtext within these arguments that independent company standards 
remain a 'threat' to schemes. One way this threat could manifest is as follows. When companies, 
especially large, branded multinationals, overlook existing schemes in designing their sourcing 
policies, they send an implicit signal that the scheme has not been judged as credible. For 
schemes intending to achieve substantial coverage of an industry, such a signal is threatening 
both because it undermines the momentum of that scheme, since the company has not included 
itself in the scheme's ambit, and because other companies and suppliers can pick up this signal 
too, leading to the possibility that they might also disregard the scheme. Clearly, each actor that 
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opts not to join reduces a given scheme's coverage. As one company participant in tliis study 
confirmed, Nestles RSGs for palm oil - which accept RSPO certification for only 4 of its 6 criteria 
- were "initially misunderstood, being seen as undermining the RSPO, both by the RSPO and it's 
close supporters" [15], 
These perspectives reveal the seriousness with which schemes view independent company 
standards. In addition to the view that such standards undermine schemes, however, a more 
practical concern also exists. As one scheme participant noted, "It is a challenge for us when 
companies develop their own standards, because it is very time-intensive" to be consulted and to 
offer advice [12], This comment demonstrates that, even where they are not formally recognised 
within company sourcing policies, schemes may nonetheless have important, practical 
contributions to make to companies' efforts to better sourcing. To the extent that this 
consultation draws the efforts of schemes away from other purposeful activities, this is a further 
way that independent company standards are alleged to detract from schemes. 
An analysis of these perspectives reveals that the ways in which schemes and companies make 
their contributions to slowing deforestation can exist in unresolvable tension. For a scheme 
such as the RSPO, which relies on widespread membership to foster changes in palm oil 
production practices, companies - especially major ones - that do not opt into its scheme are 'a 
danger'. Yet for companies, such as Nestle, likely to suffer NGO scrutiny on the missing criteria 
within the RSPO - greenhouse gas emissions, peatland conversion and conversation of high 
biodiversity-value areas - their strongest direct contribution can be made by enacting 
independent standards that rectify these missing criteria. In the process, however, they can be 
accused of'undermining' the RSPO. 
These dynamics can change markedly through time, too. As one participant noted (in March 
2013] in relation to the dynamics within the palm oil industry, "It's hard to remember but a year 
ago we were still living in 'RSPO-world', and suddenly we're living in a world of much more 
ambitious standards... so I really do feel a sea change in what the benchmark is" [19], While 
earlier on within the RSPO's lifespan, NGOs were encouraging companies to become members of 
that scheme, now they are pressuring for commitments that go beyond the RSPO standard. (In 
comparison, the dynamics within the two major forestry schemes remains simpler; the FSC 
continues to be perceived as the most robust of the two standards, with the result that NGOs, 
such as the WWF, continue to push companies towards that scheme as an end-point.) To the 
extent that going beyond the RSPO standard would force companies to engage directly with 
their suppliers. Chapter 7 of this study will argue that that would be a productive, if not 
necessary, step towards successfully disconnecting a company's palm oil supplies from 
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defores ta t ion . Yet clearly, this t rend conta ins a t h r e a t to the RSPO's contr ibut ion to tha t s a m e 
ob jec t ive , s ince it could struggle to gain fur ther increases in coverage . 
To conclude, then, the in tended contr ibut ions of c o m p a n i e s , such as Nestle, genuine ly 
c o m m i t t e d to changing its sourc ing pract ices , and s c h e m e s , such as the RSPO, a iming for 
substant ia l industry coverage , conta in a fundamenta l tens ion. This tens ion is only h e i g h t e n e d in 
light of the fact that c o m p a n i e s t h e m s e l v e s cite pract ical c o n c e r n s o v e r the a l te rnat ive p a t h w a y 
avai lable to them, specif ical ly including the effort requi red to engage with s c h e m e s a c r o s s the 
range of c o m m o d i t i e s they source . Indeed, m e m b e r s h i p of any single s c h e m e , such as the RSPO, 
usually n e c e s s i t a t e s specif ic report ing r e q u i r e m e n t s and a t t e n d a n c e at annual meet ings and 
working groups, the burdens of which the W W F has acknowledged can resul t in ' s t a k e h o l d e r 
fatigue' ( 2 0 1 0 : 2 0 ) . In addition, De Man and l o n e s c u - S o m e r s ( 2 0 1 3 ) notes the r isks to c o m p a n i e s ' 
reputat ion in relying on any s c h e m e s that are not regarded as credible , which at the t ime of 
wri t ing perta ins m o s t significantly to the RSPO, and can serve as a fur ther spur for c o m p a n i e s to 
pursue their own standards. 
According to part ic ipants , in addition to s c h e m e s , i n d e p e n d e n t c o m p a n y s tandards also 
adverse ly affect a n o t h e r actor : NGOs. As the example of Nestle d e m o n s t r a t e s , c o m p a n y 
s tandards can be more robust than compl iant m e m b e r s h i p of a s c h e m e , which begs the quest ion 
of why NGOs would express frustrat ion at the trend t o w a r d s c o m p a n i e s pursuing this option. 
T h e a n s w e r is as follows: part ic ipants allege that for every Nestle, t h e r e is likely to be m o r e than 
one c o m p a n y using independent s tandards to wriggle out of any o n e r o u s r e q u i r e m e n t s that 
form part of s c h e m e m e m b e r s h i p . And the role of assess ing the individual mer i t s of this 
prol i ferat ion of c o m p a n y policies falls, ult imately, to NGOs. As Marcus Colches ter notes as part 
of his pithy character isat ion of private sector-civi l soc ie ty dynamics (in Moog et al., 2 0 1 2 ) , 
"Almost without realising it, conservat ionis t s have replaced the organs of democracy . . . w e now 
have NGOs in watchdog roles replac[ ing] the execut ive" ( p l 8 ; quoted in full be low) . An NGO 
part ic ipant in this s tudy conf irmed, 
"We need to ask whether companies are picking and choosing their own policies according 
to what might be easiest to meet, i.e. designing their own policies can create loopholes" [5]. 
To a n s w e r this quest ion requires a certain a m o u n t of effort on the part of NGOs. To the ex tent 
that this effort could be m o r e fruitfully expended e l s e w h e r e , perhaps by pressur ing lagging 
c o m p a n i e s to enact responses , or work ing with g o v e r n m e n t s to suppor t b r o a d - b a s e d repor t ing 
r e q u i r e m e n t s for such companies , the need to m o n i t o r and a s s e s s individual c o m p a n y polic ies 
can be conceived as a distract ion and a f rustrat ion for NGOs. T h e fact that s o m e c o m p a n y 
policies a r e s t r o n g e r ('lifting the bar ' ) than s c h e m e s ' , whi le o t h e r s a r e w e a k e r ( ' g r e e n w a s h ' ) , 
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means that both the detail of the policy, and the robustness of existing schemes, matter greatly. 
Yet it is this ambiguity that in turn necessitates the burden of monitoring and assessing policies 
for a handful of NGOs. As the next 'polarising theme' to emerge from discussions with 
participants will show, however, NGOs also play an active role in exacerbating the very 
dynamics that distract them from the aforementioned tasks. 
Within this first polarising theme, the overall trend is clear. More and more companies are 
creating independently-designed standards [Steering Committee, 2012], which as the 
perspectives of participants here show, has consequences in shaping the behaviour of other 
actors (NGOs] and affecting the momentum of other responses [schemes] in their contributions 
to slowing deforestation. 
P o l a r i s i n g t h e m e # 2 : ' exc lus iv i ty ' v e r s u s ' i n c l us i v i t y ' 
A second polarising theme brought out by participants, within the external pathway of relying 
on existing schemes, concerns the 'exclusivity' of sourcing policies. One scheme representative 
stated that for schemes, "the most important consideration" [12] in the design of sourcing 
policies was whether a company recognised multiple schemes (for example, '100% certified 
timber by FSC, PEFC or equivalent'] or just a single scheme ( '100% FSC-certified timber']. This 
perspective downplays the more nuanced difference between Equivalent and Hierarchical 
recognition in light of their shared inclusivity [a view further supported by the potential 
similarity of these strategies in practice]. 
As with the decision between 'internalising' and 'externalising', whether company sourcing 
policies are 'exclusive' or 'inclusive' generates several consequences for schemes. One 
consequence occurs at the level of the forest, as the scheme participant quoted immediately 
above explained, saying that a "monopolistic [exclusive] situation takes away the desire or need 
for continual improvement, and leads to a relabelling of forests rather than an expansion of 
certification..." [12], This 'relabelling of forests' is a reference to a number of European forests 
that, although already certified to the PEFC's standard, were re-certified to the FSC's standard in 
order to be eligible for certain company sourcing policies that recognise only FSC forests. Some 
actors now contend that 'dual FSC and PEFC endorsements are a benefit' [K.W. Doggett, 
undated]. To the extent that these two schemes' standards exhibited sufficient differences that 
this relabelling could guarantee a higher degree of environmental protection, for example, it 
may have been justified; and indeed, for at least the FSC's first decade it outperformed the PEFC 
in its environmental criteria. Yet the PEFC standard has recently been assessed as broadly 
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comparable to the FSC's, according to the UK Government's assessment (DEFRA, 2013], In this 
light, the relabelling of these forests appears to be a distortion of actor effort and a case of 
"misguided resources"[12] generated by exclusive sourcing policies that would not accept PEFC-
certified forest products. 
Other participants maintain, however, that exclusive recognition can have desirable 
consequences, for example in avoiding a situation where "broad recognition inspire[s] a race to 
the bottom"[4] and also in encouraging "other schemes to improve [by] having a strong system" 
[1], As referred to earlier, one strongly-evidenced case of "ratcheting up other standards" [1[ 
occurred between the two major forestry sustainability schemes, with the PEFC evolving 
rapidly in competition with the more reputable FSC (Overdevest, 2010). 
While all of these participants agree that exclusivity intensifies competition between schemes, 
then, participants differ in their views of how constructive that competition is for forestry 
standards. On the one hand are scheme participants who feel that competition is inherently 
destructive, such as the participant quoted above, as well as another from the RSPO, who noted 
bluntly that, "As far as competition is concerned, of course [that causes problems] because they 
[other schemes] become our competitors" [8[. One the other are participants who see the 
potential for inclusive recognition to generate a 'race to the bottom' and exclusive recognition to 
generate a strengthening of other schemes' standards. 
One NGO participant expressed a more nuanced view than these positions, however, elaborating 
as follows: 
"/ accept that competition can become counter-productive, and that there is potential to 
undermine broader efforts if schemes spend too much time battling. But corporations can 
use the differences between schemes as loopholes for their own policies, i.e. they know 
when one isn't as strong and they use that as a loophole" [5], 
This perspective shows a clear parallel with the same participant's concern - expressed in the 
previous section - over the burden of monitoring company policies falling to NGOs. From NGOs 
perspectives, then, companies using inclusive recognition strategies could 'use the differences 
between schemes as loopholes', a possibility that it again falls to NGOs to detect. Yet this 
appears to be a no-win situation for NGOs, since they can either renege on the monitoring and 
pressuring role that has fallen to them, leaving companies to 'use loopholes', or they can expend 
effort to ensure stronger company policies, in turn sacrificing effort that could have been put to 
use elsewhere. 
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Clearly then, there are consequences for other actors - schemes and NGOs - which follow from 
company decisions on the exclusivity or inclusivity of their sourcing policies. Yet by and large, 
the decisions that fuel these competitive dynamics are decided without these consequences in 
mind. This is because companies are themselves attempting to resolve a tension between, on 
the one hand, having credible enough policies to deflect NGO attention or pressure, while on the 
other, satisfying the pragmatic needs of ensuring adequate supplies at m in imum cost and with 
max imum availability. (Recall, again, that the possibility of al lowing their activity to be 
constrained by shortages of supplies has been implicitly rejected by companies.] In trying to 
balance the two sides of this tension, companies have crafted careful positions on exclusivity, in 
general tending to indicate a preference for those schemes that are perceived as robust 
(satisfying NGOs], while nevertheless keeping a door open for alternative options (satisfying 
pragmatic concerns]. Consider, for example, one statement by a participant from major retailer, 
who noted: 
"We use only recognised schemes, until something else comes along that we can recognise" 
[3], 
This sentiment was echoed in the remarks of a Walmart representative, julian Walker-Palin, at 
the 2012 RSPO annual meeting, prior to which that company had formally recognised the 
Rainforest Alliance's palm oil standard: 
"the RSPO is the route that we currently see to deliver sustainable palm oil, but we 
would also accept any equivalents to RSPO as they arose... [for example] this year we 
recognised Rainforest Alliance palm oil... This doesn't detract from RSPO at all, in fact, 1 
think it enhances it" (Walker-Palin, 2012]. 
Whi le these quotes reveal a pragmatism in not ruling out any schemes, they are careful not to 
appear too lenient in accepting just any scheme. Much hinges on the words 'equivalent' and 
'recognised', prompt ing the unanswered questions of 'who judges a scheme as 'equivalent'?' and 
'who first recognises a scheme?'. (In what is perhaps a unique exception, Nestle clearly states its 
position on the former, noting that a scheme must be approved by an 'executive board member' 
of the company; Nestle, 2011:3] Yet even without explicit answers to these questions, it is 
possible to interpret in company behaviour the broad contours of those answers. And in short, 
in addit ion to the roles this chapter has already identified, NGO approval is likely to be crucial to 
both (a later section will discuss NGOs more fully]. 
Before turning to the mult iple roles of NGOs within these dynamics, however, one further topic 
warrants exploration. Although the two polarising themes already identified have been shown 
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to affect the efforts of other actors, including NGOs, it is worth being more definitive about the 
consequences for schemes of the competition between them. The following section turns to this 
task. 
Consequences of competition between schemes 
The quotes from scheme participants above reveal the sensitivity generated by the two themes 
of 'internalising versus externalising' and 'exclusivity versus inclusivity'. The history of forestry 
certification suggests an additional reason why schemes would be concerned about a lack of 
support: it could portend the emergence of rival schemes. 
Some schemes, such as the national forestry standards that amalgamated under the umbrella of 
the PEFC, emerged largely in reaction to the FSC (Auld et al., 2008]. There is a strong suggestion 
that this trend might now be replicated through the emergence of multiple national timber 
legality schemes (inspired at least partly by the requirements of the FLEGT VPAs) as well as 
national palm oil 'schemes' in Indonesia (the ISPO) and Malaysia (the MSPO). These latter 
examples are sometimes schemes in name only; more accurately they are an attempt to collect 
and forge a coherent set of laws relevant to palm oil production. Yet nonetheless their 
establishment in opposition to existing schemes - namely, the RSPO - can be seen in the 
statement of a Malaysian official that 'the RSPO [has become] more of a burden to the industry 
[than a benefit]' (Mongabay, 2013c]. Perhaps not coincidentally, this statement was made 
around the same time that the Palm Oil Innovation Group (POIG] was created, signalling an 
intent to make the RSPO standard more robust. These developments clearly reveal the 
dynamism inherent in the set of sustainability schemes for any given commodity. 
Indeed, nor is the standard of each scheme itself fixed, but rather they are capable of evolving 
through time, as Smith and Fischlein (2010) propose in their exploration of 'the competitive 
nature of multiple private networks' (p512]. Importandy for present purposes is the fact that 
company sourcing policies can be directly responsible for shaping this dynamism, including by 
applying upward pressure on the standard of a weaker scheme. As an example of this outcome, 
Gereffi et al. (2001) conveys that when two major timber retailers - Home Depot and Lowe's -
'declared their preference for FSC-certified products... the [non-FSC] industry had little choice 
but to push standards toward FSC levels' (p61]. (And as the previous chapter noted, 
government procurement policies, and specifically the timber policy of the UK Government, 
have exerted a similar influence.] However, this generally-accepted example (see Overdevest, 
2010, Smith and Fischlein, 2010) has yet to be met with parallel examples for the other 
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de fo res ta t i on commodi t i es . This is at least part ly due to the lack of strong rival schemes for the 
RSPO (recal l that the Palm Oil Innovat ion Group explicit ly demurred f rom establ ishing an 
a l ternat ive standard] , RTRS and others. It remains unknown, then, and - in the absence of 
c ompe t i t o r schemes - perhaps largely i rre levant, h o w transferable this inf luence of sourcing 
pol ic ies might be. 
The r e are severa l reasons to be l ieve , howeve r , that the capacity fo r schemes to e vo l v e is not 
infinite, and may in fact be highly l imited (Smith and Fischlein, 2010) , regardless of the extent of 
the external pressure placed on them. Scott Poynton, the Executive Director of the The Forest 
T r u s t , a not - for -pro f i t organisat ion that assisted Nest le in deve l op ing its RSGs, contends that 
'cert i f icat ions wou ld like to be m o r e dynamic, but they f ind it really hard. These are systems set 
up ten or twen ty years ago that are struggl ing to change due to their governance systems' (in 
SustainAbil ity, 2011 :22 ) . Equally, the structure of Roundtables creates di f f icult ies for evolv ing, 
as one part ic ipant made clear w i th respect to the RSPO: "There are constraints with a consensus 
based system with what you can achieve and the pace that you can go. You are not going to move 
the fastest You are moving at the median pace, [held back by] the lower SO per cent" [22], 
The assumption implic i t in the argument above is that schemes necessari ly e vo l v e to become 
more, rather than less, robust. Yet s ome research suggests that the ' converg ing ' ( p 5 1 2 ) of the 
FSC and PEFC standards noted by Smith and Fischlein may have resulted through both schemes 
evo lv ing ; in the FSC's case, by weakening its standard. Accord ing to IVIoog et al. (2012 ) , 'one of 
the most ser ious consequences of the intense compet i t ion wi th other labell ing schemes... [is] 
the w a y in which the race fo r market dominance has prevented the FSC f rom holding a hard line 
on its o w n standards ' ( p l l ) . One FSC part ic ipant in this study did not agree wi th this 
assessment, nor the character isat ion of the compet i t ion be tween FSC and PEFC as a 'race for 
market dominance ' . Specif ically, this part ic ipant asserted that, for the FSC, 
" This isn't a competition over hectares" [1], 
Yet even if this s tatement does accurately por t ray the FSC's v i e w of compet i t ion, that scheme 
has nonetheless earned notable detractors, including the Rainforest Foundation UK and the 
European fo res t group, FERN, o v e r its decisions to begin cer t i fy ing both plantations and supply 
chains, as we l l as establ ishing its Mixed Sources label (Mongabay , 2013a) . Crucially, then, strong 
percept ions exist that schemes have e vo l v ed to b e come both more and less robust through 
compet i t i on wi th each other. This compet i t ion has in s o m e instances been clearly inspired by 
the recogni t ion strateg ies chosen wi th in company sourcing policies. 
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Mindful of the possibility that competition might bring negative effects for schemes, then, 
several adverse trends appear to be emerging. Firstly, there is the emergence of rival schemes, 
some of which establish legality as a baseline, and a retreat to national standards, similarly 
focused on legality (Djama et al., forthcoming]. The POIG provides a unique example of a new 
institution that is not intended to compete with the existing scheme; the remainder can best be 
understood as doing precisely that. The competition that will likely result from these new 
schemes and standards is highly likely to encourage displacement and segregation - as well as a 
'lowering of the bar' to legality - within production of timber and palm oil, notwithstanding the 
EU's efforts - through FLEGT - to holistically approach timber production in VPA countries. 
A second emerging trend is the increased willingness of companies to forgo existing schemes 
and design independent standards for their fraction of production. Again, this tendency can be 
perceived as coming at the expense of schemes, as Nestle's Sustainability CEO noted in response 
to the RSPO's allegation that company was 'running away with the torch': "it's unfortunate if 
people think that... we're undermining the RSPO. Not at all" (in Marx, 2013:30). Yet this message 
can be a hard sell, particularly - as one participant noted - "...at a time when RSPO was seen by 
all key opinion leaders as the one and only place to discuss and make progress on palm oil" [15]. 
That this perception has now evolved, to reflect a 'post-RSPO' vision of change within the palm 
oil industry, only underscores the challenges facing even major schemes in the face of these two 
trends. 
What do these trends mean? For schemes, they are an affront to their vision of transforming 
their industries by reaching sufficient coverage [either in and of itself, or through reaching 
tipping points in that coverage; see theories of change in Chapter 7]. For companies, the 
fragmentation of schemes may only embolden their willingness to devise independent 
approaches to their sourcing policies, further fuelling the problem for schemes. And finally, for 
NGOs, these trends must at the very least prompt some rethinking about their traditional 
formula of pushing companies towards existing schemes and designing sourcing policies on that 
basis. The rationale for supporting consensus-driven schemes appears to be failing, which could 
be perceived as an opportunity to support stronger sourcing policies, even though this currently 
requires much greater involvement and effort by NGOs. (A later section will consider whether 
collaboration and harmonisation could ease this burden.) Given that NGOs are key instigators 
and directors of company decisions, it is worth now exploring their behaviour in more detail. 
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NGOs as wa tchdogs and more 
T h e impor tance o f NGOs for the dynamics of both company and scheme behav iour has long 
been recognised . For example , Guibrandsen ( 2 0 0 4 ) notes that for many companies forest 
cert i f icat ion is a ' r esponse to the act iv ism and pressures exer ted by env i ronmenta l 
organisat ions ' and 'a precaut ionary s trategy to avoid confl icts wi th NGOs' (p93 } . As Bloomf ie ld 
( 2 0 1 4 ) wr i tes , 'Direct ly target ing f i rms has proven e f f ec t i ve at spurring corporat ions to reduce 
their exposure to such attacks by changing their practices, co l laborat ing wi th environmental ists , 
and commi t t ing to var ious non-state regulatory initiatives... ' ( p264 ] . Recall too the Greenpeace 
representa t i ve quoted at the beg inning of this chapter saying that attention f rom NGOs on 
individual compan ies was ' l ike d iscover ing gunpowde r ' in its abil ity to flush out company 
responses ( in Geref f i et a l , 2001:64 ] . 
De Man and lonescu-Somers ( 2 0 1 3 ) note that the use of sustainabil ity schemes is most useful 
w h e n 'deal ing wi th commod i t i e s that are l inked to intensive public debate on sustainabil ity 
issues' ( p37 ) . But as this chapter has a l ready noted, not all schemes ' reputations are alike. And 
wh i l e ISEAL states that, 'the reputat ion of a standard is the main criter ion [ for companies ] when 
dec id ing whe the r to use a particular standard' ( ISEAL, 2010:20] , it is by now clear that NGOs 
play a critical ro le in mediat ing these reputations, and thereby af fect ing company behaviour. 
Company part ic ipants in this study vary in the candour wi th which they discuss the role of NGOs 
in their decisions, y e t overal l the impor tance of that role is clear. As a participant f r om a ma jor 
t imber retai ler noted, in relat ion to his company 's pro-FSG t imber policies: "there is a general 
perception that FSC is a stronger scheme" [14], whi l e the Sustainability Director of the large, 
Austral ian t imber retai ler, Bunnings, added, "we like to see NGO testing [of schemes] so that we 
can take a position of comfort" (Gomm, 2013) . Unlike the UK and Dutch governments , then, both 
of which have undertaken deta i led assessments of the FSC and PEFC, companies tend to rely 
just as much on percept ions of a scheme 's mer i t - in other words , its reputation. And as the 
latter quo te reveals, these percept ions can hinge largely on NGOs' judgements about individual 
schemes. 
Not all part ic ipants in this study w e r e comfor tab l e wi th the paramount importance g iven to 
scheme reputat ions, nor the ro le of NGOs in shaping those reputations. One scheme 
representat ive , f o r example , lamented that companies might choose one scheme ove r another 
mainly "to make sure NGOs are happy" [12], Company representat ives express similar 
f rustrat ions that their pol ic ies should be 'based on percept ion or politics, not science' 
(SustainAbi l i ty, 2011:20 ) . Yet w i th in a highly polit icised context in which companies can be 
s ingled out and campaigned against by NGOs, company behav iour - wh i l e de f ens ive - can 
171 I P a g e 
nonetheless be seen as a desirable 'precautionary strategy' (Gulbrandsen, 2004:93). An 
anonymous company representative within a W W F report confirms that: 'if you include critical 
actors [NGOs] then the process [of designing sourcing policies] is less prone to attack' (Anon, in 
WWF, 2010:27). Clearly then, NGOs have assumed 'watchdog' roles over the responses to 
tropical deforestation emanating from the private sector, making their scrutiny of schemes an 
essential - and inevitable - part of the dynamics of private sector-civil society responses. And 
not all are content with NGOs' roles within these dynamics, as the fol lowing section will explore. 
By now it is established that NGOs exercise considerable influence within the dynamics of 
private sector-civil society responses, primarily by assessing the robustness and legitimacy of 
schemes [including 'recognising' and judging 'equivalence'), and by influencing company 
policies on that basis. But there are other ways in which NGOs have shaped the dynamics of 
private sector and civil society responses to tropical deforestation. Indeed, a primary example is 
the WWF's Market Transformation Initiative, which played the foundational role of identifying 
the 15 most significant internationally-traded commodities for generating environmental 
problems (WWF, 2012). The Market Transformation Initiative has since structured the WWF's 
attempts to collaborate with the major companies involved within each of the associated 
industry for these commodities, which include the four - timber, palm oil, soya and b e e f -
implicated in tropical deforestation. Yet the NGO-industry Roundtables that have been 
established do not just identify relevant commodities; they also play a critical role in framing 
the nature of the underlying problem and - according to their critics - 'promoting a regulatory 
culture based on market solutions and individual responsibility, while ignoring deeper systemic 
issues' (Bloomfield, 2014:267). As Chapter 3 concluded, the current framing precludes the 
magnitude of consumption and any need to fundamentally revisit the system of international 
trade that has enabled transnational problems to emerge. As Chapter 4 then noted, the 
responsibility of the state - of governments - is largely dismissed within these private 
sector-civil society collaborations, a framing that consumer governments have both accepted 
and promulgated in subsequent statements about the primary role of the private sector. 
Two roles for NGOs have so far been identified. At the macro, framing level, NGOs (and 
especially the W W F ) have identified problematic commodities in international trade and 
formed collaborative institutional responses. NGOs then play a subsequent, critical role in 
assessing schemes and influencing company policies on that basis. (Of course, NGOs also seek to 
influence the behaviour and standards of those Roundtables, within limitations, where they are 
often-prominent members.) Yet there are also less explicit roles for NGOs within the dynamics 
of private sector-civil society responses, and in particular in influencing or even designing 
company sourcing policies. 
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For instance, a Resources for the Future report (2005) noted that the major timber retailer 
'Home Depot has pledged not to purchase uncertified wood products sourced from the 10 most 
vulnerable forest eco-regions in the world, as identified by WWF' ( p l l ) . In this example, the 
WWF was responsible for determining geographical areas of high environmental concern, 
convincing Home Depot to avoid purchases from these areas. On what basis these areas were 
determined is not revealed. Although recent research that identified the 'most ecologically 
irreplaceable' areas globally (Le Saout et al., 2 0 1 3 ) seems to support - at a much higher level of 
resolution - the 9 forest regions where WWF is most active (WWF, 2015) , the WWF's influence 
on particular company sourcing policies nonetheless prompts questions on the reliability - not 
to mention transparency - of that influence. Other examples where companies have announced 
intentions to stop sourcing from given countries and regions are outlined by Global Witness 
(2011b :18) . (Chapter 6 will add a further note of significance to these examples, showing that in 
contrast to companies, governments are unable by international law to distinguish - or 
differentiate - between source regions or countries for internationally-traded commodities.) 
A final example of NGO influence on company sourcing policies is provided by the 5 minimum 
requirements of IKEA's Code of Conduct for timber sourcing, which also calls into question the 
independence - as proposed in this chapter's typology - of supposedly independent policies. 
The requirements in question are in fact carefully matched with the FSC's Controlled Wood 
certification, and the WWF and IKEA are equally proud of their partnership (see Woolford, 
2015) , which formally began in 2002. While such policies might appear to be independent from 
existing schemes, the involvement of the WWF has clearly (and publicly) led to a policy with 
clear potential for recognising one particular scheme. As one scheme participant confirmed on 
the basis of this case, "Companies don't just dream up the policies on their own, they usually look 
for guidance" [12], 
Clearly, then, NGOs such as the WWF have played critical roles: firstly, in structuring the 
landscape of responses to deforestation by establishing Roundtables for each problematic 
commodity, in turn framing the private sector as primarily responsible for responding to those 
problems, and secondly, by pressuring companies to engage with Roundtables and schemes, 
and advocating and pressuring for company sourcing policies to give priority to one scheme 
over another. Yet the dynamics of voluntary governance are shifting, with companies -
especially major multinationals - increasingly opting for independent standards, a prerogative 
accorded by their position at critical nodes within international supply chains. NGOs necessarily 
take a reactive approach to this shift, since it imposes on them the burden of monitoring and 
assessing individual policies. (Schemes, too, take a reactive approach, primarily suffering 
through a loss of momentum, coverage and adverse signals about their reliability.) These 
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changes take place within an overall context where the limitations of certification have 
increasingly come to be recognised. Placing this discussion of actor behaviour within the 
context of that behaviour is the task to which the following section will now turn. 
Voluntary governance's 'failure' as context 
Not everyone is content with the dynamics that have emerged around voluntary governance, 
despite some contending their 'increase[d]... ability to tackle a range of contemporary 
[environmental] challenges' (Newell et al., 2 0 1 2 : 3 6 6 ] . Yet as Marcus Colchester lamented 
during a speech to the lUCN World Conservation Congress in 2 0 0 4 ; 
"1 think there is a major problem with the current model of self-regulation, which gives 
no role the State, to the rule of law, or even to leverage for reformed governance by 
governments itself. Instead, almost without realising it, conservationists have replaced 
the organs of democracy: we now have consumers instead of enfranchised citizens; we 
have NGOs in watchdog roles to replace the executive; we only have recourse to the 
media - the 4th Estate - as a court of appeal" (Colchester, in Moog etal . , 2 0 1 2 : 1 8 ] . 
Colchester's critique goes beyond the involvement of NGOs in influencing company sourcing 
policies and draws on long-standing discontent with certification as an instrument of change. 
According to Cashore et al. ( 2 0 0 4 ] , this critique has existed within the forestry sector from the 
outset of the FSC, where 'NGO activists... [are accused of] dedicating a disproportionate amount 
of their energy to the certification issue, at the expense of other important conservation goals' 
(in Moog etal . , 2 0 1 2 : 1 8 ] . 
Yet already this chapter has demonstrated that NGOs are - to an extent - required to play some 
of these roles, including scrutinising both company sourcing policies and schemes, and pushing 
companies towards more robust schemes. These roles are necessitated by the lack of regulation, 
or even broad-based guidance, that could otherwise be drawn on to structure company sourcing 
decisions. And the lack of regulation, in turn, is determined by the near consensus within 
Western countries that responding to problems such as tropical deforestation is primarily a 
private sector responsibility. (Other transnational problems, particularly trade in hazardous 
materials, are instead governed by regulation.] 
Yet Colchester's critique lingers. Is it possible that actors, including NGOs and schemes, are 
overly focused on certification? And in answering, perhaps it is first worth addressing the 
question of the opportunity cost of actors expending their effort on certification. That is, which 
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issues do not receive sufficient attention as a result of schemes and NGOs lobbying companies 
over their sourcing policies? 
One scheme representative in this study proposes that, for schemes, one consequence of these 
efforts is that "schemes do not then need to adapt to the needs of forest owners who are currently 
uncertified" or "focus on building institutional capacity for those owners" [12], In other words, the 
focus of schemes on competing for attention at the 'downstream' end of supply chains comes at 
the expense of paying attention to the actual production of relevant commodities, including 
tailoring their schemes to producers' needs. To the extent that this criticism holds true, it would 
suggest that schemes have perceived - or assumed - that focusing on the drivers that interact 
with them will automatically activate the desired improvements in production practices at the 
opposite end of supply chains (i.e. by 'looking downstream', schemes will 'affect upstream']. For 
the FSC in particular, with its shortage of supply, this seems optimistic, though the same applies 
to all schemes that have so far only affected marginal fractions of production. 
Companies also perceive misguided resources in the current scenario, expressing frustration 
that schemes can 'require us to change our processes for no reason' (Anon, in SustainAbility, 
2011:20), and that the inertia of schemes - in failing 'to adapt to new knowledge or processes' -
'hampers [company] innovation' (ibid.). Companies within Roundtables also perceive 'a 
'mis-weighting' between procedural requirements and performance requirements' (Anon, in 
WWF, 2010:26). No doubt some of this expressed dissatisfaction - from all actors - reflects the 
limited success, to date, of sustainability schemes in resolving the considerable environmental 
problems that precipitated their creation. As the concluding section to this chapter will explore, 
two decades of certification has delivered only modest percentages of trade in each given 
commodity. As one scheme participant concluded blundy, "so far, certification has failed, because 
we haven't found the solutions" [12], 
As participants have argued, certification's shortcomings are likely to be exacerbated - if not 
caused - by the demands of competition on schemes. For example, a representative of the major 
homeware company Office Depot complained that 'each [scheme] is very tied to its own 
approach and methodology. If they organised themselves as a group and improved their 
business model, interest would escalate dramatically. They are all protecting their tiny slice of 
the pie, but the pie could be much bigger' (in WWF, 2010). Of course, these effects from 
competition are likely to be differentiated across commodities and mediated by the specifics of 
each sustainability scheme. For the timber, wood, pulp and paper industries, where a strong 
rivalry exists between two major schemes, the side-effects of competition are most acute. This 
situation is ironic given recent assessments of the FSC and PEFC by government agencies in the 
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UK and the Netherlands, which in validating both schemes provide further support for Smith 
and Fischlein's (2010} conclusion of convergence between the two schemes. 
For NGOs, in turn, efforts focused on voluntary governance - i.e. certification - have been 
severely criticised. As Bloomfield (2014) writes, certification fails, 
'to address problems of over-consumption and economic inequality, both of which can 
be seen as fundamental sources of environmental destruction. In fact, the certified 
product that results could actually be viewed as a step backward by making the industry 
and its products more palatable to socially and environmentally conscientious 
consumers' (p271). 
These criticisms reinforce the points made earlier at a conceptual level, whereby the framing of 
the problem of tropical deforestation has entrenched problematic versions of commodities as 
the appropriate subject of governance, blinding responses to alternatives and condemning them 
to underachieve in direct proportion to the importance of those alternatives to the underlying 
problem. As Moog et al. (2012] continue, 
'Celebrating [sustainability schemes] as a solution to social and environmental problems, 
critics claim, could have precisely the apposite effect: limiting opportunities for 
meaningful public debate and regulation' (p3]. 
These alternative foci of NGO attention - over-consumption and economic inequality, 
meaningful public debate and regulation - are overlooked while NGOs focus on certification. 
This is a serious criticism. Yet even above and beyond these blindspots, there are other 
shortcoming that this chapter has revealed of the current 'model' of change, which hinges 
largely on 'market-based shame campaigns' conducted by NGOs (Bloomfield, 2014:277). This 
model of change involves NGOs chasing, pressuring and 'shaming' companies to force them to 
respond to the sustainability of their supplies, primarily through commitments to certified 
sourcing. Concurrently, both NGOs and progressive companies attempt to bolster the 
robustness of these schemes from within (and with the POIG, beyond). Yet as this chapter has 
demonstrated, even when these objectives are realised, perverse outcomes - through wasted 
effort - are not just possible but inevitable. 
Further, the possibility of critiquing company and industry plans for continual expansion, or of 
understanding how improvements in one location or for one commodity might simply be 
displaced elsewhere, can be neither grasped nor addressed from within the current model of 
addressing the problem. In fact, such arguments - as introduced in Chapter 3 - necessitate a 
critique o/the current model of change. These arguments shine a spotlight on both ends of 
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global supply chains, which is perhaps part of the reason many actors are comfortable focusing 
their attention on the current model. Through this view, traded deforestation becomes not 
s imply a problem of sourcing, but also of consuming. The actors most able to act on these 
concerns are - not coincidentally - those that have been sidelined by the current model of 
governance: governments. As the responses introduced in Chapter 1 demonstrate, governments 
have recently become more active - including through regulatory means - in responding to 
tropical deforestation (primari ly via illegal logging), which is timely given the local, regional and 
global public interests involved in tropical forest conservation (eg. New York Climate Summit , 
2014). Yet the bulk of the legwork is still enacted by NGOs, who remain the guarantors against 
weak responses. 
Arguably too, the continued and implicit acceptance of the current model of change is now even 
less justifiable than it has been previously, given the growing consensus that certification is a 
highly limited instrument for direct transformative change. (Chapter 7 will consider whether its 
indirect effects might yet prove substantial.) These limitations include the following: self-
selection biases in its patterns of adoption (Auld et al., 2008), its inability to produce the 
'enabling environments' necessary for effective collective action and accountability (in 
McCarthy, 2012:1878), its limited applicability to the 'bottom of the market' (Steering 
Committee, 2012:xiv), and its likelihood of flourishing 'in only a limited set of circumstances' 
(Mayer and Gereffi, 2010:i). Perhaps the most effective antidote for these understandings would 
be if a scheme gained sufficient coverage to affect a significant share of production for any 
commodity. But no scheme yet has, and so at best certification is increasingly understood - at 
best - as a partial solution to the environmental (and social) problems of international trade. 
Indeed, companies are highly aware of these limitations, as a representative of one major 
retailer expressed as follows, "We are determined to tackle some of the difficult issues, and to do 
so we need the "context" of standards and certification schemes, but we need to work outside them 
to make real progress" [15], 
Taken together, these limitations have led even the chief proponent of the WWF's Market 
Transformation Initiative to conclude that, 'as standalone instruments, voluntary certification 
programs won' t get us where we need to be' (Clay, 2012). Similarly, the Rainforest Action 
Network concludes bluntly that ' t imber certification is not enough to save rainforests' (Butler, 
2010). Indeed, some authors recall that certification was 'Plan B' right from its beginnings 
(Moog et al., 2012:10), brought about by the inability of governments to agree on an adequate 
publ ic sector response to tropical deforestation. 
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Looking to the future, then, some experts contend that '[schemes] will fade into a quieter, 
background role, acting as trust marks for those who seek it and leaving brands - and 
consumers themselves - to take the lead' (SustainAbility, 2011 :27] . Yet as this chapter has 
already shown, the shift towards more individual company - 'brand' - approaches to sourcing 
policies has consequences for the direction of NGO effort, as well as possible deleterious 
consequences in the (continued) fragmentation of policies. Fighting against this tendency 
towards fragmentation are multiple 'collaboration' and 'harmonisation' agendas, which are 
considered below, along with two other possible opportunities to remedy the dynamics this 
chapter has identified. 
Oppor tun i t i e s to r emedy counter-product ive dynam ics 
Collaboration and harmonisation 
One strategy to reduce the fragmentary and counter-productive effects of competition between 
sustainability schemes could be to embrace its opposite: 'collaboration'. How much 
collaboration, then, is already taking place between schemes? For some of the minor 
commodities associated with traded deforestation (specifically cacao, coffee and tea), some 
movement in this direction can be observed. FairTrade, Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified, for 
example, have recently announced that they were 'working together to reduce the level of 
complexity and cost for farmers and to seek further cooperation in the field' (in SustainAbility, 
2011 :31) . For participants in this study from the major forestry schemes, however, their 
perceptions were less encouraging in their assessments of the state of collaboration. One NGO 
participant admitted that he "knows of one or two instances of collaboration [between FSCand 
PEFC]", but that these occurred only "where it suited both parties" [5], And while a scheme 
participant conceded that "things [between FSC and PEFC[ are better than they have been 
previously" [12], any optimism he held for future collaborations remained heavily guarded. 
Yet collaboration can be discerned - implicitly - in the umbrella structure of the PEFC, with 
multiple national forestry standards joining it rather than seeking to create novel international 
schemes. And perhaps too some amelioration of the adverse effects of competition might be 
possible even in the absence of concerted efforts to collaborate. As Fischer et al. ( 2 0 0 5 ) note, 'in 
the long run, market forces are likely to foster harmonisation among the multiple systems' 
(p l9) . This harmonisation could manifest from various trends, including 'mutual recognition (a 
forest certified through one system could carry the product label of another), a common chain-
of-custody standard, or the creation of a common certification framework that would apply to 
all systems' (ibid.). 
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From schemes for the deforestation commodities, there are some encouraging signs of 
harmonisat ion agendas, albeit modest in scope. One example is the efforts of the Forest Peoples 
Programme, an NGO, to bring together forest-related sustainability schemes to discuss - and 
ideally streamline - recognition of indigenous peoples within their standards. Forest 
consultancies such as Proforest, which chairs the Secretariat for the High Conservation Value 
Resource Network, have done similarly in an attempt to create consistent recognition and 
protection of HCV areas across schemes. More substantially, the November 2014 workshop 
(The Forests Dialogue, 2014] that sought to agree definitions for 'deforestation-free' sourcing, 
might - if adopted en masse - supersede schemes' own definitions, forcing them to either 
change their standards or face the (further) redundancy of their policies. 
Another form of harmonisation, which Gulbrandsen (2004:85) mentions as 'mutual recognition', 
could perhaps better be termed 'consolidation'. Indeed, forestry's two decades of experience 
with sustainability schemes suggests the subtle power of this force. As Smith and Fischlein 
(2010) summarise, 
'Interestingly, over t ime and in ways not well understood, such networks [of schemes] 
appear to consolidate—often converging with regard to system content, and therefore, 
to a certain level of environmental or social quality. This market vetting rarely 
culminates in a single accepted standard, though through this process, accepted norms 
emerge and rules of the game are established and codified' (p512). 
)ust as the effects of competit ion in the business sector tend to produce consolidation, then, so 
too may it result for schemes. Indeed, there are practical constraints that would appear to lend 
themselves to this outcome, as one participant notes, stating that, "there is no way that all these 
standards can maintain themselves with the associated costs over the long term", so "/ think 
eventually there will be some kind of consolidation or shake out" [22], 
This situation broadly reflects the experience of the schemes for forestry. Once a scheme 
reaches an established or dominant position, other actors may be less inclined to develop their 
own [competing] processes and procedures. Resources For the Future (RFF) provides evidence 
that this occurred for the Sustainable Forestry Initiative in America, which decided to 'leave 
such certification processes to the PEFC (2005:22). In that sense, the strength of the PEFC and 
FSC schemes in the forestry sector have long been a force for consolidation. The 'mature' state 
of competit ion between the forestry schemes is not, however, matched for palm oil. The 
decision by Malaysian palm oil producers to leave the RSPO to establish a domestic, national-
level scheme (a move that, at the time, Indonesian producers were expected to join) suggests 
that a balance between schemes has not yet been reached; there are both fragmentary forces as 
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well as consolidating forces. The case of palm oil is simply one example of a trend towards 
national-level schemes. 
Harmonisation has also been pursued explicitly by some actors. The ISEAL alliance holds 
harmonisation as an explicit objective, aiming to 'increase the compatibility between the 
members, something that could be seen as a harmonising effort to enhance the international 
recognition of these schemes as facilitators ... to trade' (in Auld et al., 2008:203). On the basis of 
extensive interviews, ISEAL (2010) summarised its members' perspective that 'standards 
systems should strive to build a coherent landscape', with 'only very few [respondents to the 
study's survey] seeing 'one catch-all eco-label' as the solution (p20). Instead, and consistent 
with Smith and Fischlein's conclusion, ISEAL's respondents suggest the value of'a small number 
of standards, tailored to the respective sector, geography or sustainability criterion' (ibid.). 
Yet the impetus towards competition may not be so easily overcome, even once the value of 
collaboration and harmonisation have been explicitly recognised, for one very important reason: 
companies also use sustainability schemes as a means of differentiation from their own 
competitors (Steering Committee, 2012). While this may guard against any given scheme 
remaining weak (since if standards 'become too low, we can't differentiate ourselves'; 
SustainAbility, 2011:20), it also creates another mismatch between, on the one hand, the 
ambition of schemes to expand their coverage, and on the other, the desire of the companies 
that recognise them to differentiate themselves. This desire for differentiation on the part of 
companies is certainly a large part of the motivation for schemes to themselves differentiate 
themselves from their competitors. The more companies support a given scheme, 'the less the 
consumer is likely to notice, and the less of a differentiator they become for any one [company]' 
(SustainAbility, 2011:24). In other words, the use of schemes as a means of demonstrating 
difference strongly encourages the competitive behaviour of schemes themselves and the choice 
of company sourcing policies. These motivations suggest a limit to the possibilities of 
collaboration or harmonisation, while simultaneously underscoring the extent to which 
competition between schemes is a structural feature of current private sector and civil society 
dynamics. 
Changes in company and NGO behaviour 
Improving the current 'model' of industry-wide change will undoubtedly require changes in the 
behaviour of its central actors. Arguably, companies have already embarked on a shift in their 
own behaviour by increasingly overlooking schemes as the route to their sourcing dilemma; 
evident, for example, in the earlier quote from a representative of a major retailer, "We are 
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determined to tackle some of the difficult issues, and to do so we need the "context" of standards 
and certification schemes, but we need to worii outside them to make real progress" [15], 
NGOs too need to reassess the directions that they push companies towards. As Wright (2012) 
notes, 
'The first, and most obvious, point to make is that NGOs must become more self-aware. 
This is a prerequisite to combating the problems discussed in the present review...' 
( p l 3 1 ) . 
And perhaps NGOs are beginning to reconsider their current approach in light of the lessons 
about competition's potential to produce 'misguided resources'. A strong example is provided 
by the POIG's decision - to which multiple NGOs were party - to attempt to influence the RSPO's 
standards rather than create an alternative scheme, especially given the known weaknesses of 
that incumbent scheme. But participants also recognise the relevance for these lessons in 
relation to the two timber schemes, as one NGO representative noted in acknowledging the 
need for "a more sophisticated approach" [5], In his view, there are two sides to this approach: 
"WWF must be willing to criticise when FSC doesn't meet the standards we expect; on the 
other side WWF needs to be able to applaud PEFC when it does reach those standards" [5], 
This participant also noted a growing awareness within his NGO of the need to ensure that its 
actions advance certification's broader goals, concluding t h a t " / f e e l that we need to be more 
nuanced and balanced in our approach" [5], This realisation is especially welcome given the 
damning conclusion of another participant that, "certification has so far failed" [12], 
Schemes, on the other hand, are perhaps the least likely to reconsider their current behaviours, 
since they have narrowly commercial as well as broader strategic ambitions. Further, all major 
schemes for timber and palm oil have adopted a vision for change that hinges on the 
widespread adoption of their scheme, enabling tipping points in coverage to be reached. 
Chapter 7 considers the merits of this vision further; suffice it to note that until a scheme 
experiences this transformation in practice, it remains only a hypothetical possibility. Thus 
schemes are likely to continue lobbying companies to adopt their scheme, and theirs alone, 
perpetuating the current model of change despite growing company - and perhaps - NGO 
awareness of its shortcomings within the broader certification context. 
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T r a n s p a r e n c y ( repor t ing r e q u i r e m e n t s and s tate s h a r e h o l d e r ac t iv i sm] 
Whi le the fol lowing c h a p t e r will c o n s i d e r the c o n s t r a i n t s on g o v e r n m e n t regula tory act ion, 
a l ready a product ive role for g o v e r n m e n t can b e d i scerned in re lat ion to t h e d y n a m i c s of the 
private s e c t o r and civil society. Specifically, g o v e r n m e n t s can s p u r m o r e proac t ive b e h a v i o u r by 
c o m p a n i e s through multiple, re la ted ac t ions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s t r a n s p a r e n c y , for e x a m p l e 
through introducing m a n d a t o r y repor t ing r e q u i r e m e n t s . Whi le s o m e voluntary inst i tut ional 
efforts, such as the Global Report ing Initiative, have d o n e similarly, at least o n e g o v e r n m e n t has 
also fostered g r e a t e r t r a n s p a r e n c y through report ing. S ince O c t o b e r 2 0 1 3 , the UK G o v e r n m e n t 
has required 'all UK quoted companies ' , which c a p t u r e s all t h o s e listed on the London S tock 
Exchange, 'to repor t on their g r e e n h o u s e gas e m i s s i o n s as part o f the i r annual Direc tors ' Repor t ' 
(DEFRA, 2 0 1 4 ) . 
Separate ly , and at a sub-nat ional level. T h e New York State Comptrol ler Office has led a 
' shareholder act ivism campaign ' on behal f of the New York S ta te C o m m o n R e t i r e m e n t Fund, 
target ing 'a n u m b e r of m a j o r palm oil buyers ' and resul t ing in c o m p a n y c o m m i t m e n t s to using 
only susta inably-produced vers ions of that c o m m o d i t y [Mongabay, 2 0 1 4 e ] . With in the 
polit icised dynamics that c o m p a n i e s o p e r a t e within and that this c h a p t e r has canvassed , this 
act ion by a public authori ty has filled a s imi lar niche - and so far, produced c o m p a r a b l e resul ts 
- to the NGOs w h o s e campaigns force c o m p a n i e s to focus on the i r e x p o s u r e to the defores ta t ion 
commodi t ies . 
T h e s e two examples hint at the e m e r g e n c e of a new, m o r e nuanced b a l a n c e of responsib i l i ty 
within c o n s u m e r countr ies . Although the private s e c t o r has cons is tent ly b e e n given p r i m a r y 
responsibi l i ty for responding to the problem of t raded defores ta t ion , this c h a p t e r has detai led 
the difficulties that pervade and s u r r o u n d private sector-c ivi l soc ie ty dynamics , result ing in 
pract ical l imitat ions on the r e s p o n s e s that e m e r g e . T h e r e are also s ignif icant conceptual 
prob lems with the reif ication of the private s e c t o r as p r i m a r y r e s p o n d e n t : as V e r m e u l e n and 
Kok ( 2 0 1 2 ) remind, ' g o v e r n m e n t s remain respons ib le for public goals' , and they ' m a y try to 
support and acce lera te desired activit ies as o n e of the m e m b e r s of such n e t w o r k s o f ac tors ' 
( p l 9 0 ] . While accept ing that 'in s o m e cases , g o v e r n m e n t s , NGOs and c o r p o r a t i o n s c o m p e t e and 
may hinder each others ' ac t ions ' (Lambin e t al., 2 0 1 4 : 1 2 9 ] , then, oppor tuni t i es c lear ly remain 
for m o r e product ive e n g a g e m e n t by g o v e r n m e n t s with private s e c t o r and civil soc ie ty dynamics , 
even if they 'are hardly in the posit ion to r e s u m e the i r t radit ional regulat ing role in global 
supply chains ' (Vermeulen and Kok, 2 0 1 2 : 1 9 0 ] . Indeed, such e n g a g e m e n t may b e essent ia l ; as 
Mayer and Gereffi ( 2 0 1 0 ] conclude, 'unless private g o v e r n a n c e is s u p p l e m e n t e d and re inforced 
by public inst i tut ions of governance , it c a n n o t provide a d e q u a t e g o v e r n a n c e capac i ty for the 
global e c o n o m y ' ( p l 9 ] . 
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The actions taken by the UK Government and the New York State Comptrollers' Office reflect an 
acknowledgement, however implicitly, that private governance is by itself 'a second-best and 
partial solution to the governance challenge posed by globalisation' (Mayer and Gereffi, 2010;20) 
and demonstrate a willingness by public authorities to re-accept a greater degree of 
responsibility than has typically been demonstrated by consumer country governments over 
the last two decades. While the following chapter, Chapter 6, will explore the problem of traded 
deforestation from a consumer country government perspective, detailing a number of 
sensitivities and limitations that has affected behaviour. Chapter 7 will return to the topic 
introduced here; namely how government responses can constructively influence and interact 
with other, private sector responses to deforestation. 
Conclusion 
A broad shift is occurring within the dynamics of private sector-civil society responses to 
deforestation. The shift can be characterised in broad terms as an apparent reorientation of the 
focus of the largest companies, away from sustainability schemes as an instrument of change, 
and increasingly towards developing independent company standards across a range of 
commodities. The weaknesses of the RSPO, as well as concomitant perceptions of those 
weaknesses by major actors, have been one component of companies' impetus towards 
independent standards. Often, these standards are premised on a deeper engagement with a 
company's supply chains (and as Chapter 7 will demonstrate, longer-term supply contracts and 
more generous payments to suppliers), which may prove crucial for their capacity to actually 
alter production and trading practices (see Chapter 7]. 
Inevitably, this shift poses several challenges, both for schemes and NGOs. For schemes, the fact 
that companies are looking elsewhere for a mechanism through which industry change can be 
realised is a self-fulfilling act, since it threatens to undermine their own role and therefore 
potential contribution. Where schemes are reliant on ever-greater coverage and this coverage is 
not forthcoming, other actors - including those both within and without those schemes -have 
begun to question whether the compromises made as part of those schemes are ultimately 
worthwhile in contributing to slowing deforestation from timber and palm oil. 
For NGOs, this same shift imposes a burden of monitoring and assessing individual company 
policies, undermining the ability to gather companies together within the tent provided by a 
single, consensus-based scheme. Yet the harmonisation of policies through the CGF's efforts, for 
example, could ease this burden considerably. Even greater assistance could arrive in the form 
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of either mandated reporting requirements on purchases of the deforestation commodities and 
associated carbon emissions, the latter of which is now required of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, or in an increase in state shareholder activism, such as currently 
pursued by the New York State Comptroller's Office. Indeed, the importance of these examples 
is in their suggestion that, while not being in a position to regulate production of the 
deforestation commodities directly, governments nonetheless have several options open to 
them to better and more robustly engage and support private sector (and by default, NGO] 
responses. In light of the now increasingly-understood limitations of certification, these 
possibilities will be increasingly important to negate the behavioural-derived limitations of 
private sector-civil society dynamics and to better prosecute governments' role as keepers of 
the public interest. Yet governments are also subject to limitations on their responses to traded 
deforestation, especially of a regulatory variety. The following chapter canvasses and examines 
these limitations. 
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Chapter 6 Policymakers' perspectives: Sensitivities & constraints 
The previous chapter explored the current dynamics - or model - within which the private 
sector and civil society respond to traded deforestation, concluding that these dynamics are 
prone to counter-productive outcomes and misguided efforts. The premise of that exploration 
was the idea that mult iple processes of globalisation have strengthened the hand of major, 
branded companies within supply chains. This chapter will now turn to another implication of 
that premise, which is that the processes of globalisation have weakened, or at least posed 
addit ional challenges, for governments who seek to respond to the problem of traded 
deforestation. Specifically, the chapter will examine the perceived constraints and sensitivities 
for consumer country governments in their current attempts to respond to traded deforestation, 
providing a complementary understanding to that of the previous chapter. 
Immediately, the challenge of responding to traded deforestation is more complicated for 
consumer governments than for companies, because governments perform a broader set of 
relevant roles. Whi le governments, like companies, are purchasers (procurers) of commodities 
in their own right, they also perform two additional roles, in shaping the regulatory context for 
other domestic actors, and entering into bi- and multi-lateral agreements with other 
governments. Governments have already developed responses to traded deforestation within 
each of these roles, specifically by: 
• developing public procurement policies for timber (26 national governments; plus the 
UK for palm oil); 
• creating laws requiring domestic businesses to undertake due diligence on imports (and 
in the US, subsequent domestic trade) of foreign t imber products (the US, EU and 
Australia); and 
• signing agreements with timber-exporting countries to improve forestry governance 
(the EU through VPAs with six countries, and the US through chapters in select bilateral 
trade agreements, eg. with Peru). 
Underlying existing government responses - and just as importantly, responses that have not 
been enacted - are a set of sensitivities and perceived constraints that shape policymaker 
perceptions of their need and capacity to respond to traded deforestation. To understand why 
consumer governments have not simply mandated the 'sustainability' of all t imber or palm oil 
imports, for example, or publicly demanded an immediate halt to tropical deforestation from 
other governments, requires an awareness of these sensitivities and constraints. The task of 
identifying them, and mapping their consequences, is the task towards which this chapter is 
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dedicated. If further, o r m o r e robust, responses are to e m e r g e f r om consumer gove rnmen t s , 
these sensit iv i t ies and constraints wi l l need to be nav igated and o v e r come . 
G o v e r n m e n t s a n d t r a d e d d e f o r e s t a t i o n : t h r e e t h e m e s 
As the prev ious chapter detai led, NGOs have been instrumental in raising compan ies ' awareness 
of t raded deforestat ion, o f ten through confrontat ional means. Through the design o f their 
sourcing policies, their part ic ipat ion in Roundtables and through mult ip le w o r k s h o p s (such as 
Innovat ion Forum, 2014 ) a imed square ly at instigating action, companies are be ing act ive ly 
courted and harr ied by NGOs to respond to de fores ta t ion commod i t i e s wi th in their supply 
chains. All of this activity and m o m e n t u m represents the f raming, which NGOs have act ive ly 
perpetuated, of t raded de fores ta t ion as pr imar i ly a pr ivate sector prob lem, as the prev ious 
chapter also noted. 
An obv ious question for this ' companion ' chapter on gove rnmen t s to pose, then, is w h a t level of 
awareness about traded de forestat ion exists wi th in consumer gove rnments , especia l ly the 
Wes t e rn gove rnments that have a l ready enacted responses? Discussions wi th part ic ipants 
famil iar wi th the dec is ion-making of the US, EU, Austral ian and NZ go v e rnmen t s revea led three 
re lated themes, each of which is presented be l ow . The f irst theme was part ic ipants ' consistent 
assertion that po l i cymakers genera l ly exhibi ted a l ow level of awareness of the prob lem, as the 
f o l l ow ing quotes demonstrate : 
"It [traded deforestation] is not terribly much on the horizon, I don't think it's had too 
much of an impact on government as yet" [20], 
"I don't think the debate on this issue is really that mature yet It's beginning to be talked 
about in the EU by civil servants, but not so much by politicians yet..." ]21], 
and, 
"Something that's been quite striking to me... is the degree of ignorance about the 
importance of forests and the fact that they are being converted to grow commodities that 
we then import. The level of awareness about the basic relationships is pretty low..." [19[. 
It is a lmost unimaginable that such ' l ow level of awareness ' could exist wi th in the leadership of 
any company invo lved in sourcing de fores ta t ion commodi t i es , due large ly to the success of 
NGOs' ( var ious ] tactics. Yet it is unclear w h e th e r the lack o f awareness within g o v e r n m e n t s is 
cause or e f fec t ( o r bo th ] of NGOs' decis ion to instead target the pr ivate sector. Certainly, as 
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Chapter 4 reported, the unsettled responsibility for traded deforestation within consumer 
countries has to date allowed governments to echo NGOs in defining it as a private sector 
problem. These quotes also draw attention to the likelihood that governments do not always 
conflate tropical deforestation, a problem that has been publicly discussed for its relationship to 
climate change, and traded deforestation, the aspect of that problem that is of particular 
relevance to jurisdictions beyond the tropics. Although perhaps a more nuanced picture of 
government awareness is required; more than one participant noted that governments are "not 
monolithic", and consequently, as one participant continued, "there's a high degree of awareness 
in certain pockets and zero awareness in other pockets and it depends on the policy instrument 
you're talking about" [19], These perspectives support Vermeulen and Kok's (2012] finding of 
'the absence of an integrated, coherent policy strategy, with various ministries [within the 
Dutch Government] each stressing different main goals and making different choices in applying 
instruments' (p l94) . 
As both chapters 1 and 4 noted, existing government responses have exhibited a number of 
biases, including towards timber at the expense of the other commodities implicated in 
deforestation. The above quotes indicate the possibility that this bias towards timber may in 
fact stem from a low 'level of awareness of the basic relationships' between certain commodities 
and contemporary tropical deforestation, the science of which was set out in Chapter 1. While 
this possibility is by no means overturned by the material introduced later in this chapter, it will 
however become clear that there are other reasons why this bias may have emerged. Any 
expectation that, by itself, remedying governments' low levels of awareness would lead them to 
develop policy and regulation for the non-timber deforestation commodities is probably 
unrealistic, even if it remains a necessary condition for any such response. 
A second theme to emerge from discussions with participants was that even within the 'pockets' 
of awareness about traded deforestation, there was nonetheless little clarity on how consumer 
governments could - or should - respond to the problem. After being asked directly whether 
there was clarity on the role of governments in relation to this problem, one NGO representative 
noted, 
"Probably not. Some of these things are quite new. That probably points to another reason 
that we think it's more effective and more efficient to work with industry. Traditionally 
industry are far better at innovating and evolving markets, if it's left to government it's 
going to be too slow, it's going to be too lowest-common-denominator" [5], 
Other experts similarly felt that, 
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"...at the very highest level there's not a great degree of awareness about either the 
importance of the forests or the new drivers of deforestation and what can be done about 
them, you know, I just feel that the level of political awareness is pretty limited" [19; 
emphasis added], 
and, 
"Even those countries that are publicly committed to addressing the drivers of 
deforestation as consumer countries really didn't know what they could do... Developed 
country governments feel at a loss for what to do... I think that's really [the problem]... but 
I'm not saying that's an excuse!" ]18]. 
Even within areas of government where awareness of the 'basic relationships' of traded 
deforestation exists, then, there is an even greater uncertainty over the possible responses that 
governments could enact. Explaining why governments might be 'at a loss for what to do' 
necessarily goes beyond the tangible problem of the import of illegal and unsustainable 
commodities. Were this the sum total of the challenge, the efforts of at least two governments 
[the EU and US} to canvass possible responses - through the publicly available EU Consumption 
Report series (EEA, 2 0 1 0 ] and the latter behind closed doors and referred to below - would 
have probably been sufficient. But consistent with this chapter's direction, governments' sense 
of impotence on this policy problem - not to mention the reasons why governments have 
tended to exhibit biases towards timber and legality - is intertwined with the constraints and 
sensitivities they perceive, and which this chapter seeks to locate. 
Together with a low level of awareness and a sense of uncertainty about how to respond is a 
third theme identified through discussions with participants: the distinct lack of profile given to 
traded deforestation within policymaking circles. One participant emphasised this theme in 
relation to two separate responses that the US Government is involved with, noting: 
"/ don't think any of those [pockets] - maybe with the exception of the biodiesel one [the US 
biofuels framework] - would be on the radar screen of a cabinet-level political official", 
and in relation to the Tropical Forest Alliance, 
"This Just doesn't feel like a thing [that has] a lot of energy and urgency behind it" [19[. 
These three themes are, understandably, inter-related; a policy is unlikely to have 'energy and 
urgency behind it' in either the absence of an awareness of the original policy problem, or under 
uncertainty over the most appropriate response. And as later sections in this chapter will 
demonstrate, when responses do achieve a higher political profile (as occurred after the first 
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raids under the Lacey Act Amendments, for example, or the pending determination on palm oil 
under the US biofuels framework), this stature is an indicator of significant sensitivities or 
constraints which may undermine as much as contribute to responses' capacity to contribute to 
slowing deforestation. 
On the whole these themes of low government awareness, certainty and profile are just as much 
symptoms as problems; by themselves they could be easily remedied. However, as the 
remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, what these themes suggest is the implicit presence 
of deeper concerns entangling, and shaping, consumer country government responses to traded 
tropical deforestation. Three major 'categories' of constraint - foreign audiences, international 
trade law, domestic audiences - were identified through careful analysis of existing policy 
documents and with the aid of discussions with participants. These three categories form the 
bulk of the chapter and are now explored sequentially. 
Constraints from foreign audiences 
Respect for sovereignty 
The nation-state system of governments rests on the principle that each country is sovereign 
over its own jurisdiction. One of the immediate difficulties of trying to ameliorate tropical 
deforestation from beyond the tropics, then, is the implicit need to try to change practices, 
behaviours and even norms within another sovereign state. And while foreign companies are 
sometimes faced with the accusation of interfering in the sovereignty of states, foreign 
governments are especially vulnerable to this accusation given the foundational position that 
respect for sovereignty occupies in the international system. 
Forming a backdrop to these accusations is the added issue of significant disparity in levels of 
economic development between relatively wealthy consumer countries - the US, EU and 
Australia - and the primary producing states for the deforestation commodities - including 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil but also many smaller nations from southeast Asia, west Africa 
and Latin America. Many of these latter countries are regarded - economically - as developing 
or transitional. Wi th respect to traded deforestation, the importance of this disparity between 
countries is that it affords producers of the deforestation commodities a series of arguments 
with which to react to any (proposed) downstream responses that could be construed as 
threatening to domestic timber, palm oil, soya and beef industries. As the discussion below will 
show, producer countries have readily deployed the following three arguments: 
• 'we have a right to make our own decisions' (the sovereignty argument); 
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• 'we are still developing' (the developing-as-special-case argument); and 
• 'you are trying to discriminate against our industry' (the WTO law argument). 
So how, firstly, does the need respect sovereignty inhibit consumer country governments? One 
participant noted the example of the US Government being unwilling to publicly commit to 
certain over-arching objectives, such as 'no-deforestation', that tropical countries - those that 
are mainly deforesting - might perceive as an intervention in their jurisdictions. Contrast this 
with the private sector's current coalescence around 'no net deforestation' as an objective, as 
evidence by a recent workshop aiming to align working definitions of this term (The Forests 
Dialogue, 2014) . 
The reluctance on the part of the US Government to entertain this term emerged during the 
development phase of the Tropical Forests Alliance (TFA), after it had joined the Consumer 
Goods Forum (CGF) and was deliberating on the nature and scope of its involvement. When the 
TFA was announced at Rio+20 in June 2013, the two major actors (other governments have 
since joined) were yet to agree an overarching objective for the initiative. The CGF, however, 
was already clear about its own objectives, having decided at a board meeting in November 
2010 to 'mobilise resources within our respective businesses to help achieve zero net 
deforestation by 2020 ' (CGF, 2014b) . For the US Government in its own right, this objective was 
less straightforward to adopt. As one expert reports, 
"I have seen [respect for sovereignty] play out even in terms of being hesitant to define the 
objective... The US Government wos not vt/illing to sign on to an objective of zero 
deforestation by 2020 by anybody... So within the TFA or other efforts in this area, [the US 
Government] is very hesitant to use the phrase 'deforestation-free' or 'zero deforestation' 
or 'zero net or gross deforestation "' [16]. 
There are multiple sources for this reluctance, although the need to respect sovereignty remains 
primary. There are also significant technical difficulties involved in assessing deforestation, for 
example, including whether plantations are classified as 'forests' (a controversial decision that 
underlies the significant expansion of China's forested area over the last few decades; FAO, 
2010) . Also relevant is the historical - and current - fact that the US (as well as other consumer 
countries) cannot claim itself to be 'deforestation free'. The above expert confirmed these as 
supporting factors, continuing, 
"...but we [the US[ can't also say zero deforestation because we don't even meet that 
[objective[,you know, we clear forests ourselves. We... took advantage of that when we 
cleared our forests a hundred, two hundred years ago" [16[. 
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Indeed, even one participant who was disdainful of the use of arguments to respect sovereignty 
- "I've heard them a lot. I don't buy it" [20] - was quici< to acknowledge this as a basis of 
complaint, saying that, 
"What I do buy is the argument that essentially it's hypocrisy. There's a lot of hypocrisy 
around, [for example], like expecting [other] countries to adopt stronger environmental 
standards than we've got in our own countries..." ]20]. 
Another downstream country, Australia, is perhaps even more vulnerable than the US to the 
hypocrisy argument, given that FAO data from 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 5 places it alongside Brazil and 
Indonesia as the only countries with forest clearance rates of over 5 000 square kilometres 
annually (Economist, 2011] , At the time of writing, the Australian Government has also moved 
to delist a UNESCO World Heritage site containing old-growth temperate rainforest in Tasmania 
in order to allow logging in parts of that area. This domestic record becomes a vulnerability 
when, for example, Australia's current Minister for the Environment claims 'Nothing would do 
more to rapidly decrease the risk of climate change than a major plan to protect global 
rainforests' (Hunt, 2013) . 
However, despite the importance of technical difficulties and vulnerability to claims of 
hypocrisy, by far the biggest concern for the US Government in considering a 'no-deforestation' 
objective was the desire to avoid being "seen as impinging on developing countries' rights to 
define those objectives themselves" or "telling producer countries what their goals should be, not 
respecting their sovereignty to develop" [16]. There was a strong sense within the US 
Government, then, that it couldn't "define the [deforestation[ goals ourselves, because the goals 
should be coming from these sovereign producers" [16]. It is this sensitivity that led the US 
Government to take the eventual step of signing on "to support the CGFin its objective to 
eliminate deforestation"[16], which is further reflected in the final language found in the TEA 
2 0 2 0 Factsheet, namely 'the goal of reducing the tropical deforestation associated with key 
global commodities' (TFA, 2013 :1) . As the participant conveying this narrative, who was close at 
hand to see it unfold, concluded, "That's a subtle but important difference" [16[. 
An acute perception of the need to respect sovereignty, then, can affect downstream 
governments' behaviour in defining the objectives of possible responses to traded deforestation, 
lust as importantly, another participant suggests that this perception can explain the absence of 
further regulatory responses, such as illegal logging regulations, for other traded commodities: 
"Maybe because of the sensitivities of affecting what goes on in another country, I don't 
think there's a great willingness to create a regulatory system for sustainability..." [18]. 
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Yet without further regulatory-based responses to traded deforestation, what options remain 
for governments? Judging by governments' rhetoric on responsibility, introduced in Chapter 4, 
and confirmed above by participants, governments have instead opted to cast themselves in a 
non-regulatory, supporting role for the private sector. The TFA merely provides an 
institutionalised case of this role. The participant confirmed the attraction of this approach for 
governments, explaining, 
"... and so what all the governments are looking to do is create a system in which they're 
promoting companies who are doing sustainable activities or purchasing sustainably 
produced products" [18], 
This explanation is equally apparent in the )oint Statement made by the UK, Norway, the US, 
Germany and Australia, which included a commitment to 'Support efforts to transform the 
supply chains of the commodities that put pressure on the forest' (Joint Statement, undated: 1], 
as well as the UK Prime Minister's intention to 'work closely with businesses in pursuit of these 
goals: to source and produce sustainable timber and palm oil and to tackle the wasteful and 
inefficient practices that are driving deforestation' (O'Brien, 2 0 1 2 ) . 
Overall, then, the sovereignty line of argument has prevented governments from responding to 
traded deforestation through regulatory means, instead channelling their efforts into a 
supporting role for the private sector. Yet how genuine are these intentions? Participants were 
generally sceptical, pointing - for example - to the lack of any notable contribution that the US 
Government had made to the TFA: 
"... I got the distinct impression from [the US Government] that their role was to cheerlead 
rapid implementation of the CGF commitments... there didn't seem to be any impression 
that they as a government that had signed up to this thing needed to make any 
commitments of their own. So... all this hand-waving about public-private partnerships but 
-you know - what are you going to do differently? What are you bringing to the table 
there? And the last time I checked, I still hadn't heard a good answer to that question..." 
[19]. 
One concrete action taken by a government is the UK Government's palm oil mapping project 
(Bottriell et al., 2011) , which established an understanding of both the magnitude of imports of 
that commodity as well as rough estimations of its end uses within the UK. This project formed 
the basis for the UK Palm Oil Statement (DEFRA, 2012a) , which as Chapter 5 noted was met 
with disappointment by the section of the private sector that had already adopted more 
ambitious targets for that commodity. Unfortunately too, despite the UK's initiative in mapping 
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its imports, this example does little to disprove the possibility that governments feel compelled 
to 'do anything differently' at all. As another participant concludes, 
"I'm not sure any developed country government has really figured out what this 
relationship is... they all talk about engaging the private sector, but I have really yet to see 
any example of what that actually means" [18], 
Another point to consider is whether consumer governments are overplaying their deference to 
sovereignty. Multiple participants had reservations about the sincerity of the use of that 
argument by producer country governments, with one proposing that, 
"[Sovereignty] can be a device to avoid scrutiny of one's own environmental standards" 
[20]. 
and another noting, 
"[Sovereignty] is always a good excuse not to do anything..." [21 [. 
The sensitivity shown by consumer country governments for the sovereignty of other countries 
has been highly consequential. It has helped to cruel the prospects of regulatory responses to 
the deforestation commodities and reinforced the extant framing of traded deforestation as 
primarily a private sector problem. And yet it may not be that essential to defer to it so 
profoundly, because - as participants allege - producer countries can be less than authentic in 
their use of the argument. Indeed, the WTO tribunals are replete with cases where countries -
including the EU, US and Australia - apparently felt no such need to refrain from regulatory 
action on the basis of sovereignty. This suggests that sovereignty is merely one of several 
sensitivities perceived by downstream policymakers, and in itself unlikely to be a sufficient 
constraint. 
Deforestation as development 
'Development' is the battleground to which many arguments on sovereignty eventually lead. In 
emphasising the US Government's need to "respect [countries'[ sovereignty to develop" [16], this 
participant notes a particularly salient, and fractious, point. Given the aforementioned disparity 
in the levels of economic development between countries, the governments of (the generally 
wealthy) consumer countries are wary of displaying any intentions that could be perceived as 
interrupting, or restricting, the developmental processes of producer countries. 
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Yet if this unwillingness were carried to its ultimate conclusion, it would necessitate silence on 
the continuing deforestation within producer countries. This position seems untenable in the 
abstract and has been countered in practice by statements - albeit carefully-worded -
proposing reductions in deforestation. So how intricate is this bind, and can it be navigated? Can 
a concern with tropical deforestation co-exist with a default acceptance of all and any further 
development when, for example, that might be realised through the continued expansion of the 
palm oil industry in southeast Asia and central Africa, or the soya and beef industries in the 
Amazon? 
The problem with accepting the 'development' argument outright is that it may not be possible 
to completely disconnect development from further clearing of forests (Butler, 2013b]. In fact, it 
is strongly likely that pursuing continued economic expansion of the industries behind the 
deforestation commodities will result in similar outcomes for tropical forests to those witnessed 
- and objected to - over the last three decades. While significant effort has been targeted at 
resolving this tension, by identifying degraded lands in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) onto 
which palm oil could expand, for example, entrenched legal barriers remain (Rosenbarger et al., 
2013). More systemic difficulties also persist, as Lambin and Meyfroidt (2011) identify when 
they note that in 'cases involving cash crops for rapidly expanding global markets' - such as 
soybean in Brazil and oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia - 'agricultural intensification 
encouraged more [rather than less] cropland expansion' (p3468). Similarly, Bartley (2010) 
reports that for timber in Indonesia, 'the [government] has encouraged the growth of industries 
with an insatiable appetite for timber and a reliance on natural forest concessions to feed that 
appetite' (pl5). In an interesting echo of the 'too big to fail' narrative heard in the US during the 
2007-08 financial crisis, Bartley contends that 'the government won't let the industry collapse 
from lack of raw materials because plywood is too important for the economy' (ibid.). 
These examples demonstrate a clear difficulty in consumer governments' tendency to tiptoe 
around the development argument: the very pathways and processes of development that many 
producer countries are intent on pursuing are structured around the continuing expansion -
economic, though almost inevitably also physical - of the industries currently implicated in 
deforestation (Butler, 2014b). (Even more broadly, many other development activities - such as 
an expansion in Indonesian coal mining or Peruvian gold mining - are also being realised at the 
expense of tropical forests.) At the same time, the industries producing the deforestation 
commodities, especially palm oil in southeast Asia and Africa, are strongly supported and 
sponsored by producer governments for their development outcomes (Djama et al,, 
forthcoming). The national importance of these industries is intricately tied to their potential to 
contribute to the further development of producer countries. 
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The perceived importance of the industries to producer countries is observable in the reactions 
that have emerged to proposed consumer governance responses. The examples of the proposed 
Australian palm oil labelling and proposed French palm oil tax - both of which failed to be 
adopted - evoked the following vociferous reactions from the Malaysian Government and the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Council, respectively: 
'[The Australian 'Truth in Labelling' Bill] reflects that the Australian Parliament is going 
against their own policy by restricting economic development in Malaysia... Given that 
Malaysia is a developing nation, the Malaysian Government also wishes to express 
concern that the Australian Senate is seeking to create prejudice in Australia towards 
products produced in developing nations and seeking to hinder the growth and 
economic development in developing nations' [emphasis added; Malaysian Government, 
2011 :1 and 11], 
and, 
'The passing of the palm oil amendment by the French Senate was not based on science, 
and was an unjustified attack against hundreds of thousands of small farmers across 
Malaysia' (emphasis added; MPOC, 2012) . 
For participants in the present study, these reactions are assured for any consumer government 
response. As one expert concludes, 
"I think [for] entities like the Malaysian Palm Oil Council it's their full-time job to 
manufacture those story lines [opposing perceived threats to the industry]... and now 
[those storylines] are deeply embedded in a lot of the heads of business leaders and 
government officials and it's going to be hard to dislodge them" [19]. 
The palm oil industry in particular has been the subject of consumer government scrutiny over 
the last decade, with concomitant reactions from producers. Additional government responses 
to bear the brunt of palm oil industry lobbying include the US biofuels program, the RFS 2, 
which is expected to make a determination on the sustainability requirements for that crop in 
early 2015 . At the multilateral level, the World Bank's review of its palm oil lending policy (a 
response technically beyond the scope of this present study, due to its financial nature and 
production-focus) provoked the wrath of a Nigerian public intellectual, Thomas Ayodele, who 
authored a New York Times editorial called 'The World Bank's Palm Oil Mistake', touching on 
familiar themes: 
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'[The World Bank's review of its lending policy] undermines poverty alleviation 
programs in Africa and will increase food insecurity on the continent. Despite the 
Bank's acknowledgement of the palm oil sector's successful role in alleviating poverty, 
sector support has been undermined by radical Western environmentalists' hijacking of 
the Bank's lending policies... The Bank should reaffirm its commitment to supporting 
development and reducing poverty, and firmly reject dictating to and limiting industry 
and sovereign governments' [emphasis added; Ayodele, 2010]. 
In this editorial, several lines of argument - including both development and sovereignty -
deployed by producer countries are run together, combined with a brash reference to unnamed 
'radical Western environmentalists'. Overall, these outbursts are reflective of both the 
development priorities of producer countries in the abstract, as well as entrenched economic 
interests, and consequently power, in practice. As one participant confirms, this combination -
subsumed under arguments around 'development' - has been critical for consumer government 
behaviour: 
"/ think this all partly helps to explain why this debate [on non-timber deforestation 
commodities] isn't moving very fast It's more complicated than the illegal logging thing 
was, and you're involving bigger industrial interests of course, and trade interests, and so 
on, so it is trickier" [21 ]. 
Arguments about development, like those about sovereignty, can be calculated to dissuade 
consumer governments from enacting certain responses to traded deforestation. At the very 
least, they are intended to shape responses favourably for producer country industries, such as 
securing the best possible treatment within biofuels frameworks. So far these arguments can 
claim to have been successful, contributing to the failure of both the Australian palm oil labelling 
and French palm oil tax, as well as limiting the range and number of responses that consumer 
governments have enacted for non-timber deforestation commodities. This sensitivity, then, of 
needing to maintain a code of silence on other countries' development pathways, is at least a 
latent - if not an already activated - constraint on consumer government responses. 
Apparently paradoxically, examples from beyond the problem of traded deforestation show that 
some of these same governments have at other times been willing to contravene this silence. 
Consider the National Illegal Wildlife Trafficking Strategy (Obama, 2014), for example, which 
stated (alongside the usual harmonious intention to 'encourage, collaborate and support all 
other interested governments'; p9] that it would. 
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'respect cultural and national sensitivities even as we ask communities to reconsider 
longstanding traditions that might incentivise or contribute to wildlife trafficking' 
(Obama, 2014:9], 
Even more antagonistic was the UK Government's opposition to a British company's plans to 
conduct exploratory drilling for oil in Virunga National Park in east Africa, a park that is home to 
one of the two remaining populations of the highland gorilla (Hance, 2012c]. (The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Government responded in a style characteristic of such debates: 'We'll see 
whether we'll respect the park or not. It's up to us'; ibid.] Just as with sovereignty, these 
examples suggest that the code of silence around other countries' development pathways and 
priorities is not immutable. However, these examples remain exceptions rather than the norm, 
even more so when consideration is limited to the responses to traded deforestation. The 
Tropical Forest Alliance, for its part, holds a clear position on both sovereignty and 
development when it states that the TFA will: 
'Recognise the authority of national and domestic regulatory systems for land and forest 
management', 
and, 
'Emphasise the importance of country ownership and responsibility, tackling the drivers 
of tropical deforestation using a range of different tools that are appropriate to 
achieving each member's goals' (TFA, 2013:2]. 
As the perspectives introduced here have shown, the sensitivity which this development must 
be treated - especially as it relates to major foreign industries - is a significant constraint both 
on the emergence, and ultimate shape, of consumer government responses. 
Affecting trade flows 
A further consideration constraining consumer country governments is the potential effect on 
trade flows and trade relationships that responses could precipitate. As one NGO participant 
records, 
"there are opportunities [for further government responses]... but there is also the issue of 
governments being reluctant to upset trade partners,... diplomatic relationships, and that 
sort of thing" [5]. 
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As with arguments about both sovereignty and development, the sensitivity about affecting 
trade flows shown by policymakers provides producing countries with a further line of 
argument to attack downstream regulation and policy. (Domestic actors also voice this concern, 
as noted in a later section in this chapter.) There is no doubt that this fear is genuinely held, as 
evidenced at 2013's United Nations Forest and Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) meeting. 
As one participant in this study conveyed, consumer country governments were alleged to have 
inserted text into a draft of the meeting's report that not only recognised traded deforestation 
but also allocated responsibility with the consumers of the deforestation commodities: 
"[So the story is that] there's this language [in the draft UNFCCC documents] that says 
deforestation is because of consumption, but it was actually the developing countries that 
didn't want that language and completely opposed it... [My opinion of the story there is 
that] the countries that produce a lot of these commodities were really uncomfortable with 
any language that might look to their governments when they brought it home that it 
might be imposing any trade restrictions or going to affect their trade at all" [18]. 
This report from the frontline of inter-governmental negotiations on tropical forests is 
remarkable, for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that despite the sensitivities involved, consumer 
governments have been willing to publicly acknowledge the role that their consumption of palm 
oil, soya, beef and timber plays in driving deforestation. Such acknowledgement is likely to be a 
necessary precursor for some downstream jurisdictions to justify responses to domestic 
audiences (about which, see below). So the assertion made in Chapter 4, that responsibility for 
traded deforestation remains unsettled, therefore needs to account for the fact that it may in 
fact be deliberately left unsettled. Secondly, despite their frequent outrage at the criticism these 
industries receive for their roles in driving deforestation, producer countries are unwilling to 
accept the problematisation of their industries, presumably due to fears of its consequences in 
terms of precipitated responses. 
At least part of the explanation behind this stance consists of suspicion over how genuine the 
basis might be for consumer country concerns about traded deforestation, in government and 
beyond. As one expert explained: 
"Yeah, it's a huge problem. I was in Indonesia about a year ago and it was astonishing to 
me the degree to which so many of the government officials and private sector people 
associated with the [palm oil] industry genuinely believed that all of the concern about 
palm oil was a wholly fabricated creation of the US soybean oil lobby, and that all of this 
NGO advocacy about forest fires or orang-utans or anything else was all a made-up 
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campaign financed by protectionist interests in the US. I mean... they genuinely believed it. 
That's what they thought: All of this palm oil stuff was protectionist-motivated" [19], 
The paradox of these concerns, as the following section in this chapter will show, is that 
international trade law is in fact so firmly oriented towards preventing any protectionist 
regulation - whether in motivation or consequence - that this law is itself a significant 
constraint on consumer governments' potential to address traded deforestation. Within a 
governance framework structured to prevent protectionist regulation, producer countries' 
defence against any such regulation is in many senses actually stronger than consumer 
governments' capacity to address their own connections to traded deforestation. 
At this point, it seems necessary not only to note but to explain the clear exceptions to these 
arguments, in which consumer governments have initiated and enacted regulatory responses to 
traded deforestation: namely, the US', EU's and Australia's illegal logging laws. All of the 
sensitivities identified so far in this chapter - sovereignty, development, effects on trade and 
protectionist intentions - would seem to apply equally to t imber as to the other deforestation 
commodities; t imber industries are domestically significant in many producer countries and 
they are relevant to countries' development objectives; regulatory responses to t imber imports 
could also be perceived as an intrusion on sovereignty and threatening to these industries' trade 
flows. So how can the emergence of these laws within this context be explained? And more 
opportunistically: given these remain the only regulatory responses for a deforestation 
commodities, what has been their effect on trade flows? 
One of the crucial advantages that this legislation has is its focus on illegal logging, which is a 
recognised environmental problem certainly, but at the same time an economic problem that 
costs timber-producing governments significant lost revenues. This problem has become so 
severe that producer countries have themselves called for foreign help, as Chapter 4 noted. In 
comparison, until recent efforts (Lawson, 2014), knowledge of the widespread illegality that 
also exists in the production and trade of other deforestation commodities lagged significantly. 
(Acceptance of this knowledge certainly lags still.) So the profile, understanding and acceptance 
of illegal t imber as a problem - including crucially, by producer governments - provided a 
smoother path towards regulatory responses than exists for other commodities. 
With respect to sovereignty, Cashore and Stone (2012) note that illegal logging laws 'focus on 
reinforcing governing capacity and hence sovereign authority in producing countries' (p l8 ) , 
with: 
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'preliminary indications that government officials in both countries now see the EU and 
US legislation as evolving to currently pose little or no infringement, on their own 
domestic commitments' (p l8 ) . 
Participants in the present study agreed, noting that because illegal logging is defined on the 
basis of the laws of the harvesting country, these laws are effectively "just a way of supporting 
and importing good governance, and supporting legal requirements" [17], A second participant 
concurred: 
"/ think one of the positive aspects of the EU FLEGT and VPA kind of approach is that at 
least ostensibly it's a partnership where the control of illegal imports into Europe is 
directly linked to what the exporting countries want to do within their own country... So 
'we're helping you enforce your own law' type of thing, so it's not an evil Western 
imposition of values that don't match up..." [19]. 
The focus of illegal logging laws on legality, in addition to helping to navigate international trade 
law (the subject of the next section], also helped to defuse the potential sovereignty concerns of 
producer countries. However, other sensitivities remained undiminished. In its submission to 
the second Senate Committee enquiry on the draft Australian illegal logging laws, the 
Indonesian Government objected to various elements of the Bill and stated that 'it is essential to 
ensure that the proposed bill does not cast a shadow over our overall trade relations' 
(Government of Indonesia, 2012:2) . Even after the Australian illegal logging laws were passed 
by the Australian Parliament, concerns over the laws' impact on trade flows continued to be 
expressed by representatives of two other major countries involved in the global timber trade. 
For example, after the Australian delegation's presentation of the details of its newly-passed 
laws at an APEC Illegal Logging Working Group in 2013, the Russian delegation effectively asked, 
"Why is Australia doing this?" and the Chinese delegation noted that "it would be a shame if this 
affected trade from China to Australia" (personal notes; June, 2013) . 
Addressing this latter comment, it is pertinent to now ask: what effects on trade flows can be 
attributed to illegal logging laws, as the sole consumer government regulation targeted at 
traded deforestation? Given the EU's status as the world's largest timber-importing jurisdiction, 
the impacts of its version of illegal logging laws - the EU TR - are being keenly observed. Even 
prior to its implementation, research on its predicted impacts was commissioned, for example, 
by the Bolivian timber sector, due to a 'fear that from the introduction of the EU TR in March 
2 0 1 3 there would be no possibility of continuing exporting Bolivian timber products to the EU 
market, without there being a signed Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) [with the EU]' 
(Garden et al., 2012:3) . Research on the observed effects of the EUTR is also being conducted by 
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the European Timber Trade Federation and the International Tropical Timber Organisation 
[ITTO], among others. The ITTO's Market Information Service asserted in the first half of March 
2 0 1 3 that 'the plywood market has already been significantly affected by the EUTR' [ITTO 
2013 :1 ) . Interestingly, the (limited) evidence presented suggests a surge of imports of Chinese 
plywood into the EU at the end of 2012 and in early 2013, before dropping off with the 
introduction of the EUTR. Ceterus paribus, this trajectory would suggest that there is some 
portion of the EU's timber industry that benefits from unscrutinised timber imports, whether 
that derives from illegal timber or simply from avoiding the new due diligence requirements. 
As suggested by the US experience with its illegal logging laws - the Lacey Act Amendments - a 
tension also exists between the determinedness with which these laws are enforced and their 
likely effects on trade flows of timber. With weak enforcement, effects on trade flows may be 
minimal; conversely, with diligent enforcement, those effects will be maximised. Both the 
importance of maintaining domestic support within the EU, US and Australia for these laws (as 
explored in the 'Domestic audiences' section below) and the consumer government concern that 
trade flows be minimally affected push in the same direction; specifically, towards weaker 
enforcement and smaller 'distortion' of existing trade flows. As Chapter 4 explored, these laws 
are an example where the multiple objectives of a response threaten to result in trade-offs 
between those objectives. 
The notoriously complex structure of global timber flows (Dauvergne and Lister, 2011) also 
means that realising effective enforcement of illegal logging laws cannot reside solely within the 
consumer jurisdictions that have implemented them. In order to meet consumer country 
requirements for due diligence and legality, processing countries such as China and Vietnam 
first need to enforce those requirements on their own imports, the bulk of which arrive from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, PNG, the Solomon Islands etc. Thus the willingness of processing countries 
to encourage compliance from source countries is paramount. If these processors disregard 
these requirements from the consumer ends of their supply chains, the EU, US and Australia 
would then face a puzzle in either compromising on the objectives of their legislation or 
consciously affecting any trade flows that transition through processing countries. One 
policymaker in this study appraised the situation guardedly, saying "We are all waiting to see 
who [between the EU and China] will blink" [ 11]. 
Of course, this political and economic struggle over who 'blinks' carries different connotations 
for the EU, at one extreme, compared to Australia at the other, with the latter's far less 
significant timber import volumes. This differential vulnerability recalls Chapter 4's 
introduction of the concept of coverage, which translates readily to market power. For 
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Australian policymakers, this vulnerability is "front of mind" [11], though it is likely to be 
mitigated by the prior Implementation of both US and EU illegal logging laws, creating an 
opportunity for learning. 
Given the difficulties consumer governments have faced in responding to trade in illegal timber, 
a problem that producer countries have themselves acknowledged and called for help in 
addressing, the prospects for additional regulatory responses for other deforestation 
commodities seem very modest. At least partly, the difficulty of that challenge stems from the 
need to address, or manoeuvre around, producer country concerns that sovereignty will be 
intruded upon, development interfered with, trade flows affected and protectionism pursued. 
Consumer governments currently sit at an impasse, rendering existing illegal logging laws -with 
their success not yet assured - a possible high water mark in government responses to traded 
deforestation. Further constraints and sensitivities, including both the structure and spirit of 
international trade law, make responding to non-timber commodities even more challenging, as 
the following section examines. 
Constraints from international trade law 
Governments are not free to regulate as they choose in matters that affect international trade. 
The primary body through which international trade is governed is the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which oversees the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), agreed 
in 1994. The 'General Exceptions' provision of the GATT - Article XX - includes the following 
statement and clauses: 
'Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: 
(b] necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption' (extracts from GATT, 1994, in Perez, 2006:395). 
Even while allowing for these two 'general exceptions' of particular relevance to traded 
deforestation, this provision enshrines the overarching principles of preventing 'a disguised 
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restriction on international trade' or 'discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail'. The first of these principles reflects two familiar arguments - the 
protectionist intent of regulation and affecting trade flows - that producer countries have 
deployed against consumer governments in relation to the deforestation commodities. 
Perez (2006) explains that there are 'two types of trade-environment conflicts within the WTO 
system: inward-oriented and outward-oriented', where the latter concerns the protection of 
'extra-territorial environmental features' (p396). Traded deforestation, where consumer 
country governments are unable to directly regulate production and harvesting processes, is a 
stereotypical case of an 'outward-oriented' trade-environment problem, where the central 
question raised is 'the freedom of WTO members to respond with trade measures to the 
environmental policies of their trading partners which they find problematic...' (ibid.). 
One of the key principles that articulates this freedom, thereby defining the constraints on any 
possible consumer government regulatory responses, is the 'principle of non-discrimination', 
which is otherwise known as the 'like products constraint'. As the WTO explains: 
'The principle of non-discrimination stipulates that a member shall not discriminate... 
between "like" products from different trading partners, or between its own and foreign 
products' (WTO, 2015). 
Critically for the commodit ies implicated in traded deforestation, the criteria used to determine 
'like' products includes, 'the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or 
similar end-uses' (ibid.). The like products principle has profound implications for consumer 
governments' regulatory options, which this section explores in detail. Perhaps surprising are 
the nuances of how this constraint affects governments' options for responding to traded 
deforestation, chiefly through its interweaving with - and amplifying of - a raft of other 
constraints and sensitivities. 
Dimension 1 - Legality versus sustainability 
With in environmental governance literatures, the most commonly-discussed dimension of the 
'like products' constraint is a perceived inability for consumer governments to use regulation to 
differentiate between sustainable (usually certified] and uncertified versions of the commodities, 
such as t imber or palm oil, that enter their borders. According to Humphreys (2003], under the 
General Exceptions provision of the GATT, 
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'states cannot discriminate against 'like products' (that is, products with similar 
characteristics or end uses) on the basis of their manufacture (Taylor 1999]. This 
provision effectively rules out discrimination in favour of forest products manufactured 
according to 'sustainable criteria" (p47]. 
This point is elaborated on by Moog et al. (2012) as follows, 
'In the current neo-liberal context, governments are prevented from supporting global 
sustainability goals by restricting trade within their borders to the 'highest common 
denominator' products, such as FSC-labelled timber and wood products, as such 
preferences could be prosecuted as constituting non-tariff barriers to trade (Humphreys 
2006; Bartley 2007; Bernstein 2002)'(p20). 
Based on this analysis, the conclusions drawn by these and other authors understandably 
advocate for allowing governments the discretion to differentiate between sustainable and 
unsustainable products. For example, Biermann et al. (2012) argue that, 
'Changes in world trade law to discriminate between products on the basis of 
production processes are critical if investments in cleaner products and services are to 
be encouraged, for example, through special recognition for environmentally-friendly 
products and technologies' (pl307). 
Of course, given the arguments already developed in this chapter, major producers of palm oil, 
soybean and beef can be expected to use the WTO to challenge any moves towards 
discriminating on the basis of sustainability. Biermann et al. (2012) appear to acknowledge this 
likelihood when they propose that 'such discrimination, however, must be based on multilateral 
agreement to prevent protectionist impacts' (pl307). Yet it seems fair to question the 
plausibility of multilateral agreements arising amidst such pronounced producer country 
sentiment, suspicion and interests. Indeed, an insight into the likely strength of resistance can 
already be perceived in the existing attitudes of producing country governments towards 
sustainability schemes, such as the FSC, RSPO and - outside the forestry sector - MSG. 
Participants from these schemes have a similar experience of these attitudes, which they 
express as follows, 
"The producer countries always use that [argument that sustainability standards are trade 
barriers] as an excuse not to do anything. So they are not happy [with any role for 
standards]" [8], 
and, 
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"When [consumer country governments] start using something lil<e sustainabiiity, 
especially if they use a private standard, it would definitely be a trade barrier suit. It's 
something [we] already struggle with without governments adopting a private standard. 
Accusations are thrown around that developing countries can't meet [our[ standard and 
therefore it's a trade barrier, blah blah blah"[7]. 
Perhaps thankfully, then, the disdain shown by producer governments to sustainabiiity schemes 
is both predictable and concrete than the above authors' interpretation of international trade 
law. In fact, both recent research and the outcomes of actual WTO disputes suggests that the like 
products constraint may not in fact prove to he a barrier to regulation based on sustainabiiity. 
In other words, despite its long-running status as a controversial and contested feature of 
environmental-trade literatures (spurred on by the outcomes of early trade dispute cases], 
consumer governments may actually be legally able - under the WTO - to differentiate between 
sustainable and unsustainable versions of imported commodities. As Brack and Bailey (2013] 
explain, 
'In fact... no such language [preventing differentiation] exists in the WTO agreements, 
and the outcome of a number of more recent disputes suggests that discrimination on 
the basis of'process and production methods' could be permitted as long as it is 
carefully targeted... [and adheres to the other aspects of non-discrimination principle]' 
(p l5] . 
Nevertheless, as these authors go on to note, any such regulation would need to express 'the 
criteria for sustainabiiity on which the measures are based... in terms of performance' (p l6] , 
rather than with reference to any particular sustainabiiity scheme, and further 'it is very likely 
that trade preferences could only be used for trade in segregated commodities' (p l6] . For the 
deforestation commodities, especially palm oil and soya, which are usually handled in 'bulk' and 
which can be troublesome to segregate, these requirements pose significant challenges. Yet in 
theory there is no WTO constraint that prevents a jurisdiction from implementing regulatory 
responses based on sustainabiiity. Even so, responses based on legality both 'raise fewer WTO 
issues' (Brack and Bailey, 2013:16] and are less vulnerable to the accusations of producer 
countries raised above. 
For these reasons, then, as much as any perception of a hard WTO constraint, governments have 
opted to focus existing regulatory responses on the legality of imported products. One 
participant from a sustainabiiity scheme confirms that,"/ think that's exactly right that 
governments are much more within their rights ]focusing on legality]..." [7[. Another participant 
confirms that: "it's hard for developing countries to object too strongly when it's legality, so there's 
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some real torque" [16], It is no accident, then, that illegal logging legislation emphasises the laws 
of the producing country and is therefore seen as 'reinforcing... sovereign authority' (Cashore 
and Stone, 2012:19}. 
This orientation towards legality has not been without consequence. As Chapter 4 noted, a host 
of legality verification schemes - new 'tool' responses - has since been generated, with as-yet 
undetermined effects on existing sustainability schemes (Cashore and Stone, 2012, canvass 
various hypotheses of these effects). Sitting under the umbrella of regime theory's contribution 
that additional responses will not necessarily further responses' objective, a further question of 
importance for this study is whether an extant regulatory focus on legality will limit the 
contribution of consumer governments to slow traded deforestation. On this topic, participants 
in the study were vocal yet disunited. One participant from a sustainability scheme argued that, 
"[The distinction between legality and sustainability] has been a concern for some people 
in Europe. I personally don't feel that concern at all. I think first of all that legality is a very 
important first step towards sustainability... I'm sure that in most countries, legal 
management of forests is better for workers, people in the neighbourhoods, but also better 
for the environment than illegal logging. Maybe there's some exceptions, where the laws 
are so lousy that it doesn't matter, but I'm sure in most countries it does make a difference. 
So I think legality is very important" [4]. 
Another participant concurs, noting that, 
"/ think right from the very beginning legality was seen as the way into the argument, 
because in general fewer people are opposed to excluding illegal timber from world 
markets than they are for excluding unsustainable timber" [21 ]. 
This logic was paralleled in a briefing note for the EU's FLEGT programme, which explicitly 
answers the question of why that program is focused on 'legal and not sustainable timber': 
'Legal compliance, which forms an essential component of many sustainable forestry 
definitions, should be a more achievable target, and a first step in progressing towards 
sustainable forest management... Dealing with illegal logging and its associated trade... 
[should establish] a base from which to progress to sustainability' (EC, 2004:1). 
Accepting this logic, one US-based expert went on to note that this tactic - using legality as a 
gateway objective - had been regrettably overlooked with respect to the non-timber 
commodities involved with traded deforestation: 
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"/ think one of the major issues is that the link between iliegaUty and a lot of those 
[non-timber] products has not been made. That's probably a failing of the environmental 
movement \Ne made it really clear on timber, but certainly it's a lot easy for the 
government to take action on something that's illegal rather than just unsustainable... You 
know, if we could prove that all of the palm oil coming into the US was illegal, or even a lot 
of it, I think it would be a lot easier to get the government to take action on it" [18]. 
Indeed, recent research (Lawson , 2 0 1 4 ] aims to rect i fy precise ly that oversight. The promot ion 
o f legal i ty as an 'entry-point ' is not, howeve r , universal ly accepted, wi th one a l ternat ive 
hypothes is be ing that focusing on legal i ty might actually detract f r om ( f o r many actors ) the 
intended end-po int of sustainable consumpt ion and production. For example, the NGO Friends 
o f the Earth concludes a lack o f 'mean ing fu l changes on the ground ' despite 'the establ ishment 
o f var ious pol ic ies on 'sustainable ' and ' legal ' t imber ' , arguing that, 
'A d i spropor t i ona te amount of emphasis seems to have been focused on e l iminat ing the 
t rade of il legal t imber, at the expense of the e f for ts to ensure the sustainable product ion 
and consumpt ion of tropical t imber products ' ( 2013 :12 ) . 
No t e that this s tatement 's call f o r attention to both product ion and consumption a f f i rms 
Chapter 3's f inding that current responses to traded de forestat ion have been des igned as 
magnitude-bl ind. Meanwhi le , s ome academics acknow ledge 'a possible conflict... be tween the 
pr inciples of legal i ty and env i ronmenta l sustainability', which could thwart the strategy of 
focusing f irst on legal product ion wi th the v i e w that sustainable product ion wi l l f o l l ow 
(Guariguata et al., 2011:14 ) . Similarly, Cashore and Stone ( 2 0 1 2 ) summar ise as fo l lows: 'most 
s takeholders agree that by itself, the re lat ive ly na r row focus on ' legality ' wi l l be unable to 
ame l i o ra te key g lobal forest gove rnance challenges, including de forestat ion f rom land use 
change ' ( p l 3 ) . Fo l l ow ing this line of thinking, one part ic ipant f rom the FSC noted the 
impl icat ion of the or ientat ion t owards legality for that organisat ion: 
"Then of course at FSC we have the challenge to advocate that legality is not identical to 
sustainability, and that depends very much on how the laws look like in a particular 
[producing[ country" [4]. 
In practice, g iven the o v e r w h e l m i n g use of FSC and PEFC - i.e. cert i f ied sustainable t imber - to 
m e e t the r equ i r ements o f both illegal logg ing legislation and public p rocurement pol ic ies for 
legal t imber , the a rgument against 'settl ing for ' legal ity seems largely moot . As one part ic ipant 
argues, 
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" ...ifyou put in place a lot of the mechanisms you need to make sure your timber is legal, 
you're quite some way along the road to making sure it's sustainable as well... most people 
thought [legality] was a good way into the argument and it opens up space for further 
developments" [21 [. 
Another participant agreed and - drawing on some of the regime complex theory's more 
encouraging arguments - foresaw a potential for synergies between illegal logging laws and 
public procurement, with the former providing a baseline while the latter created incentives for 
reaching sustainability: 
"There's still room for improvement within public procurement; in fact, this is a way to 
keep raising the bar [from illegal logging legislation[" [17[. 
Of course, some counter-arguments to this potential for synergies between responses have 
already been raised by this study. As Chapter 4 noted, if segregation between sustainable and 
'other' timber, with the former directed towards jurisdictions with illegal logging laws and 
public procurement policies, for example, then as the volume of imports grows (over the 
medium to long term) there may be greater demand of sustainable timber than supply, enabling 
legal timber to satisfy the shortfall. Equally possible is the scenario where the jurisdictions 
demanding sustainable timber are the only ones implementing responses for legal timber, 
meaning a broadening of coverage, perhaps, but a lowering of the bar. Despite the optimism of 
participants, then, the distinction between legal and sustainable distinction may be most 
applicable only "in the short term" [21]. It also seems unlikely that the 'discovery' of 
considerable illegality within other industries relevant to traded deforestation will allow 
legality to function as a similar entry-point in light of the "bigger industrial... and trade interests" 
involved. 
Summarising, then, the like products constraint has been widely interpreted as restricting 
governments' ability to regulate on the basis of sustainability criteria; yet, with numerous 
caveats (not limiting to a particular scheme, for example), this interpretation is no longer 
complete. Nonetheless, consumer governments have felt 'more within their rights' to enact 
responses - illegal logging laws, chiefly - that utilise legality rather than sustainability as a 
reference point. The belated exploration of illegality in non-timber deforestation commodities 
may conceivably open a door to further responses based on legality; equally, however, the 
producer country sensitivities identified in the previous section may stifle any movement in that 
direction. Both these points will later be reiterated by highlighting the unambitious behaviour of 
consumer governments in policy areas beyond the reach of the 'like products' principle, such as 
public procurement, as a later section will explore. 
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Dimension 2 - Equality across source country 
A second dimension of the 'like products' constraint - this time with a firm and unequivocal 
legal basis - is that a consumer government 'shall not discriminate... between "like" products 
from different trading partners...' (WTO, 2015). This constraint clearly affects governments' 
options for the deforestation commodities, since, as Kastner et al. (2011b) note in relation to 
soybeans, 'when talking about [environmental] impacts such as land use, deforestation or GM 
crop-related issues, it clearly makes a difference whether soybeans originate from Brazil, the US 
or Germany' (p l033) . 
The fingerprints of this dimension of the constraint are apparent on the illegal logging laws 
enacted by consumer governments. As Chapter 1 made clear, contemporary deforestation has a 
tropical face, and these laws are consequently aimed, in large part, at deforestation occurring in 
Indonesia, Brazil and Peru, Madagascar, west Africa, and the countries of the Pacific (Russia is 
the only non-tropical country with widespread illegal logging). So tropical deforestation is the 
intended target of these laws, yet this dimension of the 'like products' constraint prevents the 
singling out of tropical countries, both in general and individually, within legislation and - more 
equivocally - its application. 
The immediate consequence of the constraint is to prevent governments from undertaking and 
publishing a risk assessment identifying producer countries where illegal logging is known to be 
occurring, on the grounds that this would discriminate between countries. This inability has 
spurred frustration among the actors affected by these laws, as one participant explains: 
"I've been involved in a range of workshops and a lot of people have said [the government] 
needs to give businesses more assistance on risk assessment and risk mitigation. For 
example, we knovf where the vast majority of illegal logged timber is coming from: it's 
coming from Indonesia, PNG, Solomon Islands; it's not coming from Canada, NZ, or 
Europe..." [5], 
This participant continues, 
"The government accepts that in principle, yes there's data that points to those facts. 
However, [it] is adamantly unwilling to officially play any role in country-based risk 
assessment profiling. So it will not come out and say 'imports from Canada or NZ can be 
deemed low risk, while those from Indonesia or China can be deemed high risk'. They will 
not come out and say that and have point-blank refused, pointing to WTO obligations 
where they can't ...where that would be... treating goods from one country differently to 
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another. So that's an example where WTO requirements around fairness and equality can 
potentially conflict with the need to assess risk based on certain regions, for example" [5], 
In their submissions to the Australian Parliament on its draft illegal logging laws, both the 
Canadian and New Zealand governments argued - in effect - for regulatory exemptions from the 
laws on the grounds that the forestry industries within their countries are well-regulated and its 
products are consequently legal (Government of Canada, 2011; Government of New Zealand, 
2011). Yet just as this dimension of the like products constraint prevents the Australian 
Government, along with the US and EU, from being able to target specific countries in its 
legislation, it also prevents the exemption of any countries from the legislation. 
The clarity of this dimension of the like products constraint explains why several of the options 
pursued by companies in responding to traded deforestation have not been emulated by 
governments. While companies may still need to deal with the lines of argument explored in the 
previous section, they can nonetheless explicitly exclude supplies from the tropics, or particular 
countries, or regions within countries, or even given producers (a discretion on which NGOs 
leverage significant pressure). For example, one major European timber retailer has decided to 
strongly curtail its use of all tropical timber on these grounds: "the first is the price, the second is 
the controversy" [14]. Regardless of its reasons or their soundness, consumer governments 
could not enact laws that emulate this blanket exclusion. 
A positive flip-side also exists in the discretion allowed to companies and denied to 
governments, since companies can also support supplies from - for example - particular regions 
where governance is improving and where additional safeguards are being implemented. As 
one expert explains, 
"There are jurisdictions in the world that are achieving reductions [in deforestation ratesj 
rapidly enough to satisfy critics... and [t[here are companies that are willing to step up and 
say 'yeah this a direction we'd be wiUing to go - we'd be willing to sign purchasing 
agreements, we'd be willing to shift our purchasing to preferentially buy from jurisdictions 
that are verifiably meeting these objectives'" [16[. 
Companies can therefore target not just their safeguards but also their support at a finer-grain 
scale than is permitted, under this dimension of the like products constraint, for government 
regulation. There are, however, ways in which governments can minimise the rigidity of this 
constraint in its application to illegal logging laws. For example, under the Australian laws 
(which had the benefit of emerging after initial lessons were apparent from the US and EU laws), 
importers are required to undertake due diligence according to the risk that a given import 
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could be illegal. In other words, rather than the Australian Government identifying risk levels 
from given countries, importers are in effect required to do 'their own homework' and take 
commensurate precautions, themselves applying differentiated levels of risk mitigation 
between imports from Canada, for example, versus Indonesia or China. As a participant explains, 
"So presumably, when we move from risk assessment to risk mitigation, [domestic business] 
can point to things like the fact that timber comes from Canada therefore we've done 
nothing to mitigate that risk" [5], 
While achieving the balancing act sought by the Australian Government, however, this tactic in 
itself has the consequence of imposing a greater burden on timber importers, reinforcing the 
tendency for the problem of trade deforestation to be framed as primarily a private sector 
responsibility. Yet in direct contrast to the US' and EU's laws, the Australia Government has 
sought to make risk mitigation easier by recognising within its laws the sustainability schemes 
of the FSC and PEFC. Thus a second consequence of this dimension of the like products 
constraint in the Australian case has been to reinforce the prominence of the FSC and PEFC 
within the range of forestry certification and verification responses. Thus in two senses, the 
Australian Government's illegal logging laws have strengthened the role and responsibility of 
multiple other, non-public actors. 
To the extent that this requires companies to engage more deeply with their supply chains, 
which Chapter 7 will argue is a necessary condition of effective downstream responses to 
traded deforestation, at least the first of these consequences could be viewed positively. Yet 
given Chapter 5's conclusions on the limitations - conceptual and behavioural - inherent in the 
dynamics of private sector and civil society responses, and in the absence of further responses 
from the public sector, the laws' cementing of responsibility with non-public actors may 
ultimately outweigh the positive effect of encouraging greater supply-chain engagement by 
Australian importers. 
Overall, the Australian illegal logging laws suggest it is possible for governments to adhere to 
this dimension of the like products constraint without heavily compromising on the need to 
target the most obvious sources of illegal timber. But governments - Australian and other - may 
not have extricated themselves completely from discriminating between source countries, since 
in implementing and enforcing those laws they will need to audit the due diligence efforts of 
domestic actors. An open question then is whether in doing so they will give equal weighting -
in numbers, and rigour - to audits of shipments from all countries, including those where illegal 
logging is known not to be a problematic issue. A survey of EU member states ahead of the 
implementation date of the EUTR (in March, 2014} revealed that at least 75 percent of states 
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planned to use 'source country' as a way to refine their audits of shipments, while some of these 
also planned to use 'source region' (45 percent) and 'source concessions' [30 percent) 
(Saunders, 2013:16). At the same time, within an APEC meeting in June, 2013, the Indonesian 
Government made it clear that it wants to be satisfied that audits of Its timber exports to 
Australia (and presumably the US and EU) are dealt with 'fairly' (personal notes, 2013). 
Some tensions remain within illegal logging laws, then, which will need to be resolved one way 
or another. According to one consumer government policymaker working on this issue, even 
resolving these tensions through a WTO dispute tribunal - an often combative route - might be 
desirable; 
"[Although] WTO rules were 'front of mind' in the design of the Australian Prohibition, no 
illegal logging legislation has yet been tested in the WTO courts. There's one opinion that it 
would be good [for everyone) to have it tested, to be proven legal and legitimate" [11], 
Given the design of illegal logging laws to reinforce producer country sovereignty, any challenge 
to the laws within the WTO would require a producer country or countries to effectively argue 
against the application of its own laws (Fishman and Obidzinski, 2014). This seems unlikely, 
even given the economic stakes for timber industries (ibid.). A more realistic challenge to illegal 
logging laws - within the WTO or diplomatically - could concern the even-handedness of 
government auditing efforts. Yet if and until this occurs, consumer governments appear to have 
successfully navigated this dimension of the like products constraint, albeit with the 
consequences of further channelling responsibility towards the private sector, sustainability 
schemes and civil society. 
A final element to the second dimension of the like products constraint is the complementary 
requirement that a country's regulation 'shall not discriminate... between its own and foreign 
products' (WTO, 2015). This principle, designed to guard against protectionism, is foundational 
to the WTO. It is also highly consequential for any responses to traded deforestation, since it 
requires that regulating governments on illegal timber, for example, subject domestic timber 
producers to comparable requirements as those applied to foreign producers. The effect of this 
principle is to dash the possibility that, under international trade law, any foreign-focused 
regulation could be 'cost-free' for domestic producers. One participant confirms that these 
producers are aware of this legal implication: 
"These industries are well aware and certainly understand that any legal restrictions that 
are put in place for imports will apply to their domestic production as well... So these 
elements of WTO and international law force the US producers to ask themselves very 
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carefully 'well, what does that actually mean if we are going to start to require 
certification of legality or ofsustainability? What is the burden that we will face in having 
to meet that?"'[16], 
Within the three jurisdictions that have been most active in responding to traded deforestation 
- the EU, the US and Australia - there are significant domestic industries that would be affected 
by any further regulation targeted at the deforestation commodities. As the world's largest 
producer of soybean, for example, the US cannot regulate imports of Brazilian soybean without 
imposing some form of requirements on its domestic industry. The US, Australia and some 
member states of the EU, such as the UK, are also major producers of beef This dimension of the 
like products constraint therefore plays a critical role in amplifying the potential resistance to 
further regulatory responses that comes from domestic audiences, as explored further below. 
Dimension 3 - Equality across commodities 
A third dimension of the 'like products' constraint requires governments to apply regulation 
evenly across mult iple products that 'are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses' [WTO, 
2015). Again, this dimension has significant implications for the deforestation commodities, 
especially palm oil and soybean. 
These implications have already affected at least one proposed consumer government response: 
the palm oil labelling legislation introduced into the Australian Parliament in 2009, and again in 
2011. Because this proposed legislation singled out palm oil, requiring product manufacturers 
to specifically identify that ingredient within their products, it was most likely incompatible 
with WTO trade law (Sheargold and Mitchell, 2011; Economics Committee, 2011]. This likely 
breach of WTO law, which would have enabled palm oil producing countries to challenge the 
law and have it overturned, derives from the proposed law's singling out of palm oil while 
leaving other vegetable oils unaffected. The proposed palm oil labelling law therefore 
discriminated between like products in the sense that other vegetable oils - soybean oil, canola 
oil, sunflower oil, etc. - would not have been subject to the same requirements applied to palm 
oil. (The proposed French palm oil tax would likely have been judged similarly.) The Malaysian 
Government, which had already sent an envoy to Canberra to lobby against the proposed law, 
had international trade law on its side, as recognised by the Committee of the Australian 
Parliament that scrutinised the law [Economics Committee, 2011). 
For oil palm and soybeans, both of which can be used to produce vegetable oils, this dimension 
of the like products constraint is critical. Whi le none of Australia, the EU and US produces palm 
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oil, all three produce large quantities of other vegetable oils. To use one example, the US Is the 
world's largest producer of soybean, which means that it can neither single out Brazilian 
soybean imports for regulation (under the second dimension of the constraint) nor single out 
palm oil (under the third]. In this way, even consumer governments of jurisdictions where no 
palm oil is produced are still constrained in their capacity to target, through regulation, that 
commodity. As one expert, when asked whether the US was effectively prevented from acting on 
palm oil on this basis, responded, 
"Exactly, that would not pass WTO muster" [16], 
The EU's labelling reforms, which were implemented in late 2014, bypass this constraint by 
requiring all vegetable oils to be specifically identified on packages. These reforms demonstrate 
the likely path that consumer governments would need to pursue to label palm oil while 
protecting themselves from challenges under the 'like products' constraint. In Australia, since 
the failure of its proposed palm oil labelling law, successive governments have neglected the 
loophole allowing palm oil to be hidden as simply a 'vegetable oil'. In fact, a review of Australia's 
labelling system was even more dismissive, relegated environmental concerns to the category of 
'consumer values issues', which was then argued to require only limited government 
involvement (Blewett et al., 2011]. This example demonstrates how the like products constraint 
has prevented at least one, and possibly two (the French tax], consumer government responses 
from being further considered for implementation. 
One critical effect of this third dimension of the constraint is its potential to amplify domestic 
resistance to regulatory responses to traded deforestation. While the second dimension of the 
constraint has the effect of making support from domestic producers of the exact same 
commodity especially important, the third dimension makes support from domestic producers 
of competing - or 'like' - commodities important too. And while the coalitions that formed 
around illegal logging laws prove that domestic support from the former category is possible, 
support from the latter has proven a more difficult river to bridge. As one UK participant 
explained, 
"In the UK, we don't produce palm oil, soy or cacao. IVe do produce some beef, and the EU is 
quite a big beef producer. Unquestionably, it [the need to apply regulation equally to 
domestic producers of like products] is a constraint There's no way around that really; it 
just makes it more difficult" [21 ]. 
This is perhaps the most important consequence of the like products constraint for traded 
deforestation: that in broadening the support needed for a given response across multiple 
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industries, the constraint induces significant resistance from domestic actors to ostensibly 
outward-focused regulations, since they know that they will be required to adhere to those 
same regulations in order for WTO compliance to be achieved. Domestic support, and resistance, 
is attended to in a section below, its importance affirmed by another expert: 
"Absolutely, that's this intersection between WTO and international law dimensions and 
some of these domestic political support dimensions" [16], 
The 'DNA' of the trade communi ty 
The above discussion has explored the effect on government regulatory responses posed by the 
'letter' of WTO trade law, particularly through the 'like products' constraint. Yet analysing the 
discussions with participants in this study, a larger barrier to consumer government regulation 
on traded deforestation emerges in the 'spirit' of the WTO; namely, the consensus on promoting 
trade liberalisation enshrined and underpinned by that organisation. One participant states it 
clearly: 
"/ think [the] analysis is correct that for the most part most of the policies we'd like to see 
put in place are consistent with WTO. [Trade agencies] know that, they understand that 
But their objective is not simply to follow international trade law; their objective - part of 
the DNA of trade agencies - is to explicitly work towards the reduction of trade barriers 
and reduction of tariffs" [16], 
Another participant agreed, stating, 
"But it's more that the whole sort of aim and thinking of the trade community has been 
towards reducing barriers to trade... the whole thrust is towards reducing tariffs" ]21 ]. 
These perspectives reveal that the 'trade community' - trade departments, agencies and their 
representatives - is either not apprised of, not convinced by, or not motivated by the growing 
empirical literature connecting international trade to specific environmental problems, as 
detailed in Chapter 2. Specifically with respect to traded deforestation, these perspectives reveal 
that the challenge of addressing this problem precludes the possibility of enacting regulatory 
responses that, in the opinions of trade community, might run counter to the overarching 
objective of further liberalising trade. Where responses to traded deforestation require further 
regulation of international trade, then, they are anathema to the fundamental raison d'etre of the 
WTO. This tension - between what might be necessary to achieve environmental objectives and 
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what is promoted (or acceptable) to the trade community - has long been recognised. For 
example, as Humphreys (2003] concludes, 
'the core interests of the global economy set the parameters within which responses to 
global environmental degradation are made. Any clauses proposed in environmental 
law negotiations that interfere with free trade meet with a degree of structural 
resistance both inside and outside formal multilateral processes...' (p49). 
Similarly, Princen (2002], whose exploration of'distance' served as a platform for discussion in 
Chapter 3, notes that 'in the contemporary policy environment, [economic] interventions are 
assumed to have net benefits and those who would promote sustainability goals must prove 
otherwise' (pl30; he goes on to note that reversing this burden of proof might enable more 
balanced outcomes]. For the foreseeable future, responses to traded deforestation must 
therefore emerge from within an unfavourable paradigm. The experts quoted above continue, 
"You have Co come from that mindset in trade negotiations, and that's quite tricky... I mean 
if environmental policymakers were in charge of the whole trade agenda you might see 
different outcomes, but they're not; trade negotiators are, and they think differently, and 
they have different objectives" [21], 
and, 
"While erecting a barrier for trade in illegal commodity production is perhaps good policy 
and perhaps consistent with WTO from a legal standpoint, it is perceived as being 
inconsistent with international trade regimes in terms of their overall objectives and their 
tendency towards openness. So that is not a fear of impacting trade flows or trade wars; 
that is really about how do these folks think about their broad objectives" [16]. 
This perspective suggests that, for all the adverse implications of the like products constraint, it 
is instead the 'spirit' or 'mindset' behind international trade law that acts as the major constraint 
on government regulatory responses to the environmental problems of international trade. For 
all the criticism the WTO receives, from academics to activists, it remains the case that its 
mandate and objectives are merely a manifestation of the trade community's valorisation of 
trade liberalisation. As the expert above continues: 
"...you quickly move from an agency that is assessing the legal and mission considerations 
to political considerations" [16[. 
This participant elaborates: 
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"...the US Trade Representative, and I suspect the trade ministries in most developed 
country governments, really have as their objective increasing exports of domestic 
production wherever they can. They are trying to sell America. So their clients, in a sense, 
are very nervous about additional regulations, additional trade barriers. 
"The US Trade Representative would hear very much from the large buyers and also the 
large sellers, the ADMs, the Cargills, but also the soy association, the beef association ... 
'what the hell are you doing? This is the wrong direction' if they were working towards 
additional criteria for what is acceptable to buy and sell internationally" [16]. 
To reiterate these perspectives, then, the most deeply-set constraint facing any proposed, 
conceivable or existing regulatory response to an environmental problem of international trade 
can be characterised as less 'its feasibility under international trade law', and more 'its 
desirability, in light of what is enshrined in that law'. Such a constraint (and its accompanying 
mindsets] has been referred to as the 'prevailing deep structure', by Young (2011] for example, 
who writes that 'to be effective, [environmental regimes] must be generally compatible with the 
essential features of the prevailing deep structure' (p5]. At the moment of writing, participants' 
views assert within this deep structure the presence of a foundational commitment to continued 
trade liberalisation, institutionalised within the WTO's mandate but also propagated by actors 
within national trade communities, such as the US Trade Representative. If this commitment to 
trade liberalisation quashes potential regulatory responses to traded deforestation before they 
emerge, then the potential of addressing that environmental problem is compromised, with 
emphasis shifted, or deflected to, the private sector, and perhaps camouflaged in the process. 
The statements made by governments on where responsibility rests for traded deforestation, 
canvassed in Chapter 4, suggest just such a deflection. 
Yet it also becomes essential to ask: 'How rigid is this prevailing deep structure?'. Are 
governments inevitably and forever constrained by their cultivated obsession with trade 
liberalisation? Young (2011] offers some comfort on this front when he notes that, 
'it is easy to carry this line of thinking [on compatibility with the prevailing deep 
structure] too far. The deep structure of international society is not static. ... As long as 
the normative gap is not too great, the development of innovative regimes can play a 
role in driving the evolution of the deep structure of international society' (p5]. 
There are in fact possible sources of optimism that the primacy of international trade need not 
conclusively preclude regulatory responses to environmental problems. One such source relates 
back to the letter of international trade law; and specifically to the ambiguities that remain over 
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the permissibility of government regulation on environmental grounds. To cite one recent case 
that 'deals with the thorny topic of how public morality goals relate to international trade rules', 
when the EU banned the import of any seal products, the regulation precipitated led to a 
challenge in the WTO by Canada and Norway (ICTSD, 2014b). Yet in November 2013, a WTO 
dispute panel ruled that 'the EU's seal regime did restrict international trade', but also found the 
public morality grounds to be valid (ibid). Similarly, the interpretation of Article XX[b) and (g ) -
the provisions within the WTO allowing for measures under certain conditions that restrict 
trade on sustainable development grounds - continues to evolve (Perez, 2006), seemingly in 
ways favourable to environmentally-focused regulation. The US-Mexican 'tuna-dolphin' case, 
which ran in two separate versions from 1990 until 2013, when the US implemented reforms 
(WTO, 2014), and the 'shrimp-turtle' case (again involving the US, with a final ruling in 2001) 
serve as landmarks for WTO interpretations of these Articles. (They have also been 
instrumental in shaping governments' understanding of the WTO's interpretations, which has 
sharpened in some areas while - regrettably - becoming more confused in others; Trujillo, 
2012.) Importantly for this discussion, a WTO tribunal's upholding of a US requirement that any 
imported shrimp be caught using turtle excluder devices leaves a door decidedly open for 
sustainability criteria to be applied to imports (Brack and Bailey, 2013). 
Implicit within these examples is a second source of optimism: the willingness of some 
jurisdictions - incidentally, those that have also enacted illegal logging legislation - to 
implement legislation even if it is unknown whether it breaches international trade law. (In fact, 
it is through such cases within WTO tribunals that trade law has tended to be clarified.) One 
question to be answered, then, is whether such boldness is again required for consumer 
governments to test regulatory responses to traded deforestation. Perhaps one modest 
contribution to this testing will not be too long coming, given the uncertainties surrounding 
illegal logging laws that one participant believes would be "good for everyone" [11] to resolve. 
A third source of optimism can be found in the statements of notables at the WTO's annual 
Public Forum in October, 2014. At the opening plenary, the Director-General of the WTO, 
Roberto Azevedo, stated that, 
"The trade agenda of opening markets and promoting an interconnected global economy 
is not just about dollars and cents... rather this is about the quality of our lives... 1 want 
to put the human dimension at the heart of our work, to change the terms of debate, to 
change this organisation" (ICTSD, 2014c). 
Speaking at the same event, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that "the question is: 
'how can we make trade a better driver of equitable, sustainable development?'" and noted "it is 
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important to 'promote policy coherence' across areas ranging from environmental sustainability 
to the trade and financial systems" (ICTSD, 2014c}. Chapter 2's canvassing of the literature 
connecting specific international trades to environmental problems pinpoints some issues 
where trade can jeopardise sustainable development, yet without answering Ki-moon's larger 
question of how these trades could or should be approached (a question to which this study can 
make several contributions). Yet despite the unprecedented offering of these sentiments by 
such powerful and prominent individuals, seated deep within the prevailing paradigm, it 
remains to be seen how palatable these organisations are to any answers that might emerge in 
the negative, i.e. where avoiding or ameliorating environmental problems would require trade 
to be restricted, or otherwise more carefully controlled. Despite the promising rhetoric, then, 
the 'DNA' of the trade community remains directly opposed to any such considerations. 
Two counter-factuals 
Before turning to the constraints that domestic audiences pose for consumer government 
behaviour, this discussion proposes and explores a counter-factual to help determine the 
contributions, respectively, of the 'letter' and 'spirit' of international trade law in constraining 
consumer government responses to traded deforestation. There are two response-types 
included within this study that, unlike illegal logging laws and labelling legislation, are not 
subject to the WTO's 'like products' constraint: biofuels frameworks, and public procurement. 
As neither of these response-types are 'at the border' measures (the first is regulatory but only 
in determining eligibility for a subsidy; the second is not regulatory], the premise of this 
exploration is that these response-types can reveal the influence of the like products constraint. 
Firstly, what do the biofuels frameworks in the EU (the Renewable Energy Directive, RED) and 
the US (the latest Renewable Fuels Standard, RFS2] reveal in their handling of palm oil imports? 
In contrast to timber, trade in biofuels is 'largely driven by state policies and regulations (e.g. 
blending targets, premiums, sustainability criteria applied to sourcing] which shape its 
magnitude and dynamics' (Pacheco et al., 2011:3). As Chapter 4's discussion detailed, this 
outsized role for the state is evidenced by the EU's diversion of domestic vegetable oils towards 
its biofuels targets, which first stimulated imports of palm oil. 
Both major biofuels frameworks apply sustainability criteria to imported biofuels to determine 
their eligibility for the biofuels subsidy. While these criteria do not affect the actual act of 
importing, they nonetheless contribute to the demand for those commodities. This difference is 
explained as follows by one expert: 
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"There are de-facto deforestation-free standards in the US for the Renewable Fuels 
Standard. The RFS feedstock criteria state that feedstocl<s only qualify for the blending 
mandates if they come from land that was not cleared after 2008. So a feedstock grown on 
recently cleared land is disqualified from counting towards the mandate. It's not a 'we will 
not import this stuff, it's a 'we will not give you [credit] for this stuff [16]. 
Thus, no restrictions are placed even on biofuels that do not meet the relevant criteria; they 
simply will not be counted towards mandated blending targets. (In the US this target is 
expressed as a volume of biofuels, while the EU's target is a percentage of total fuel volume.] In 
the EU, it is the responsibility of member states to ensure that biofuels counted towards the 
target percentage meet sustainability criteria, an obligation that - in theory - is passed to 
domestic actors (EC, 2010). In the US, renewable energy generators, and - where relevant -
importers, are responsible for recordkeeping (EPA, 2013b]. 
Concern over potential impacts on both tropical forests and food prices from stimulating trade 
in some biofuels, including palm oil, has led the EU to the brink of agreeing on an upper limit for 
the contribution of agricultural crops towards its target (no more than 6 of the 10 percent total 
target; Lewis, 2015]. Prior to the implementation of the RED in 2009, the Dutch Government 
had taken a less forgiving approach, singling out palm oil for exclusion (temporarily] from its 
national green energy subsidy scheme 'because of the uncertainties of certification and 
sustainable production' (Sheil et al., 2009:47). These actions demonstrate the willingness of 
consumer governments to act to prevent undesired outcomes, including where that necessitates 
singling out one particular commodity (as in the Dutch example). These actions would not be 
possible under the WTO's framework; it would not be possible to restrict the volume a given 
commodity that could be imported, nor would it be possible to single out one commodity for 
exclusion. As a result, these actions are indicative of possible consumer governments responses 
that are currently prevented from occurring under the WTO. 
The limitations that have been placed on biofuels frameworks, however, are in effect 
restrictions on the promotion of trade in relevant commodities. In theory, then, biofuels' role in 
promoting trade could mitigate against producer government arguments about sovereignty, 
development and trade flows made by producer countries. In practice, however, the need to set 
appropriate sustainability criteria - in some cases for each crop - has simply created new fora 
where these robust exchanges can occur. For example, the RFS2's pending determination on the 
sustainability criteria of palm oil led one US policymaker to demur from participation in this 
study on the grounds that the subject was "just too sensitive" [6]. (The determination remains 
pending in early 2015.) 
220 I P a g e 
One major difference between these two biofuels frameworks is their different approaches to 
recognising sustainability standards. While both jurisdictions have established baseline 
sustainability criteria, which include a requirement to reduce greenhouse gases by set levels, 
the EU has also explicitly encouraged 'industry, governments and NGOs to set up 'voluntary 
schemes' to certify biofuel sustainability' (Guariguata et al., 2011:5}. It is from these origins that 
the EU collaborated with the RSPO to create the 'RSPO-RED', a version of the RSPO standard for 
palm oil that assures compatibility with the RED framework. In contrast, the US' RFS2 
programme has not only avoided collaborating with sustainability schemes such as the RSPO; it 
has also avoided directly recognising - or otherwise relating its framework to - them. An expert 
confirmed this US Government position, saying that, 
"Absolutely [this has come up]. The US Government explicitly say 'we are not in the 
business of picking winners or losers, we will not set forth any requirement that is tied to a 
privately determined certification'" [16], 
However, this is not to say that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency behind 
the development and implementation of the RFS, is neglecting to engage with relevant schemes 
entirely, as a representative of the RSPO revealed: 
"Yes, we are heavily involved in [the EPA's development of the RFS2[. An EPA delegation 
came to Malaysia last year, and we briefed them..." [8] 
This US reluctance to recognise sustainability schemes not only marks a difference with the EU's 
framework but also the Australian illegal logging laws. As such, it is not an inherent feature of 
either logging laws or biofuels frameworks that links are not established with sustainability 
schemes; in each case an exception exists. These exceptions uphold the argument made in 
relation to the first dimension of the like products constraint, that links to sustainability 
schemes may indeed be possible under international trade law. Rather, this difference between 
the RED and the RFS approaches to schemes suggests a simple difference in orientation towards 
that possibility on the part of their backing governments. As Chapter 5 explored, the decision 
whether or not to recognise such schemes is also faced by - and creates difficulties for -
companies. Yet for governments, as representatives of the public interest within their 
jurisdictions, there are perhaps additional considerations in weighing up the merits of 
recognising or not. As one participant expressed (in relation to timber in public procurement): 
"[Why not recognise?[ I think it's usually the fight between lawyers and practitioners. The 
environment ministries would be quite pleased if they didn't have to check companies 
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working with certificates, but the lawyers would consider that too big a liability, because 
you 're giving a blessing to entities that are not public" [4], 
The difference between the RED and RFS approaches should not obscure one commonahty 
between the two frameworks: that governments decide their own sustainability criteria before 
determining compatibil ity with schemes (similar to Nestle's Responsible Sourcing Guidelines). 
These criteria are in fact evidence that consumer governments may be open to pursuing further, 
and stronger, regulatory responses for the non-timber commodit ies implicated in deforestation, 
were it not for the constraints inherent within international trade law. 
A second response-type to provide a viable counter-factual, public procurement policies, also 
involves governments setting its own sustainability criteria, although exceptions exist, with 
Germany's t imber policy simply requires FSC or PEFC, wi thout an underlying set of criteria, and 
the UK's palm oil policy is explicitly 'based on the certification scheme of the RSPO' (DEFRA, 
2012:1). 
The value of public procurement policies as a counter-factual is their capacity to reveal what 
responses consumer governments might consider enacting in the absence of constraints within 
international trade law. Yet the 't imber bias' of consumer governments evident in illegal logging 
laws is borne out equally by these policies; of the four major traded deforestation commodit ies, 
26 consumer governments have implemented public procurement policies (of some type) for 
t imber (Brack, 2014), while only the UK (for palm oil) has followed suit for any other 
commodity. This disappoints one participant: 
"Out of27[EU] countries there are maybe only 8 public procurement policies [for timber]. 
Another problem is that there are only a couple of countries that are implementing them, 
or ensuring they're enforced. The UK is [one of those]..." [17], 
Similar to the US' illegal logging laws after significant reductions in its enforcement funding, 
procurement policies are also only as good as their implementat ion. These costs can be very 
minimal: the UK's Central Point for Expertise on Timber (CPET), which is responsible for 
providing advice to domestic importers and businesses on the UK's public procurement policy, 
runs a budget in the vicinity of half a mill ion pounds per year. Yet to date only the UK has 
established an entity with this role. 
In theory, too, public procurement policies provide a greater flexibility to opt for sustainability -
rather than legality - as a reference point, as one participant notes: 
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"Procurement is always easier You can set higher standards for your own government 
buying than for the country as a whole" [21 ]. 
This chapter earlier noted that even though a reference point of sustainabiiity appears to be 
possible under international trade law, there are nonetheless fewer complications with legality. 
Despite that greater flexibility though, only 5 governments (the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Denmark) currently require sustainable timber for their procurement (Brack, 
2014). Given this record, it seems unavoidable that international law can claim only minimal 
responsibility for orienting consumer governments towards illegal, rather than unsustainable, 
logging laws. 
Perhaps most importantly for the current context, consumer governments have shown a 
willingness to both ignore and to breach the WTO's Guidelines on Procurement Agreement 
(GPA), which the EU (and therefore its members) is a signatory to. At the lesser end of the 
infringement scale, allegations abound that a German procurement policy does not actually exist 
and that only FSC or PEFC-certified timber will be accepted. If true, Germany's breach is merely 
that it does not provide an alternative route (i.e. outside of a scheme) to demonstrate 
sustainabiiity. Substantially bolder is the Norwegian procurement policy, which explicitly bans 
tropical timber from being used for public projects. The fact that neither Norway nor any 
tropical timber-exporting country are signatories to the GPA is perhaps the only reason this 
more brazen approach survives uncontested. Yet clearly this policy runs counter to the 
principles enshrined not just within the GPA but also the broader WTO, signifying Norway's 
willingness to cut against the grain of international trade law (in both letter and spirit) in order 
to pursue its objectives. These objectives almost certainly include the protection of the domestic 
timber industry, though a concern for tropical deforestation is also highly likely (with this same 
combination underpinning illegal logging laws). 
Using biofuels frameworks and public procurement as counter-factual response-types, this 
discussion has demonstrated that the 'timber bias' and 'legality bias' of consumer government 
regulatory responses (i.e. illegal logging laws) largely reflect the biases already inherent in 
public procurement. As such these logging laws cannot be regarded as 'lowering the bar' so 
much as maintaining it. In contrast, the willingness of biofuels frameworks to use sustainabiiity 
criteria to determine eligibility, and in the EU's case to limit the total contribution to the target 
of first generation feedstocks (which include palm oil) suggest that stronger consumer 
government responses to non-timber commodities may be being constrained by international 
trade law. 
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Constra in ts f rom domes t i c aud iences 
Regulatory responses to traded deforestation from consumer governments face sensitivities 
and constraints not just from foreign audiences and international trade law, as the arguments 
above reveal, but also - and crucially - from domestic audiences. Domestic businesses and 
industries have articulated concerns about at least two aspects of such regulation: firstly, the 
capacity for trade flows to be affected, and secondly, the regulatory burden that governments 
might impose on them. These will be discussed sequentially. 
Similar to the concerns of producer country governments, as canvassed earlier in this chapter, 
domestic actors within the private sector have also voiced concerns over the capacity of 
responses to traded deforestation to adversely affect trade flows. One expression of these 
concerns can be found in the public submissions on the draft Australian illegal logging laws, 
with - for example - the submission from the Australian Timber Importers Federation asserting 
that, 
'The Australian economy increasingly needs to be able to freely trade and import timber 
products to assist economic growth. The proposed legislation needs to complement, 
rather than restrict this objective... Imported timber products are growing in 
significance and will be central to the performance of the Australian building and 
construction industries in the future' (ATIF, 2012:1-2], 
These concerns over the effect of the Australian illegal logging laws clearly dovetail with those 
of producer countries who perceive a threat to their industries' exports. As a result, consumer 
governments are effectively being called on by both domestic and foreign audiences, firstly, to 
justify the need for any regulation, and secondly, to convince them of the regulation's ability to 
effectively quarantine an intended target [illegal timber, or unsustainable palm oil) while 
otherwise affecting trade flows to the minimum possible extent. Australian policymakers 
involved in designing its illegal logging laws were highly conscious of the need to address illegal 
flows of timber without "adversely affecting the ability [for domestic actors] to import" [11 ]. (This 
awareness was also reflected in the semantics of that legislation as 'promoting trade in legal 
products', rather than restricting trade in illegal products; DAFF, 2014a.) As one participant 
concludes, 
"[As for] public opinion, and lobbying opinion... It's unlikely that governments would 
]interfere in trade flows] in total disregard of public opinion. I think public opinion on 
tropical timber was reasonably strong and you are able to adapt, to source imports that 
respect sustainabiUty on tropical timber" [20]. 
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Nonetheless, some domestic actors within AustraHa would no doubt have empathised with the 
Russian delegation's question - 'Why are you doing this?' - following the Australian delegation's 
presentation in the APEC Illegal Logging Workshop of its illegal logging laws (personal notes, 
2 0 1 3 ) . 
The trade community's predisposition towards further liberalisation - the spirit behind 
international trade law - clearly enjoys domestic support, not least from actors within the 
private sector, including importers, traders, and wholesalers of timber. While as a sensitivity it 
is not new to this discussion, then, the refrain from domestic actors creates added pressure on 
consumer country governments in navigating the central tension identified here; namely, in 
restricting problematic trades while simultaneously pursuing the deeply-engrained objectives 
of expanding overall trade and associated domestic economic activity. This is empirical support 
for the tension first exposed in Chapter 3, which identified responses' subject of governance as 
one of multiple alternatives, including tending to the continuation of multiple processes of 
globalisation. 
The second, and more pronounced, aspect of regulatory responses to traded deforestation that 
concerns domestic actors is the burden that regulations impose on them. Under any of the 
illegal logging laws, for example, the due diligence requirements are borne by timber importers 
(and subsequent traders, where specified]. A similar burden falls to any suppliers of timber to 
projects where national governments have enacted procurement policies. Indeed, this is true as 
a general rule: when consumer governments implement regulatory or policy responses to 
traded deforestation, the effort required to adhere to those requirements - tracing products and 
obtaining necessary documents - falls to the private sector actors involved. (The government 
usually retains an auditing and enforcement role, especially under illegal logging laws.) Concern 
over this 'regulatory burden' is a major factor in cases of resistance to possible future consumer 
government responses, as one participant confirms; 
"The other element to whether interests really are nationalist and protectionist or 
internationalist is the question of regulatory burden" [16], 
Importantly, resistance to regulatory burden is not uniform within the private sector. A clear 
dividing line is apparent between companies that have already designed policies targeting the 
deforestation commodities within their own supply chains and those that haven't. The former 
category actively anticipate and support regulation on the basis that it can 'level the playing 
field' with their competitors. As Mark Gomm from the Australian timber retailer, Bunnings, 
noted, 
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"The role we've played as an early-adopter...has certainly put us at a competitive 
disadvantage in the very early stages. When you're the only one, you're absorbing costs and 
it's not really a level playing field. That is the role that legislation can play in economies... it 
really helps level the playing field and remove some of the lov\/-end, questionable product" 
(Gomm, 2 0 1 3 ] , 
Th is s e n t i m e n t w a s also observable , for example , fol lowing the UK G o v e r n m e n t ' s S t a t e m e n t on 
palm oil (DEFRA, 2 0 1 2 a ) , w h e n s o m e m a j o r re ta i lers - as well as the RSPO - reac ted with 
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t that the a m b i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d in the S t a t e m e n t fell s h o r t of w h a t they had 
a l ready c o m m i t t e d to ( S c o t t - T h o m a s , 2 0 1 2 ) . (The UK S t a t e m e n t a lso fell s h o r t of m a t c h i n g the 
Dutch and Belgian palm oil industr ies ' c o m m i t m e n t s to e l iminate uncert i f ied v e r s i o n s of t h e 
c rop by 2 0 1 5 . ) 
T h e p r e s e n c e of c o m p a n i e s suppor t ing regulatory r e s p o n s e s to illegal logging has undoubtedly 
b e e n conducive to the implementa t ion of t h o s e r e s p o n s e s in t h r e e jur isdic t ions . Recall that, in 
addit ion to the des i red levelling of the playing field from leading c o m p a n i e s , illegal logging laws 
also d r e w on signif icant suppor t f rom d o m e s t i c t i m b e r industr ies that w e r e being u n d e r c u t by 
imported, illegal t imber . One US-based e x p e r t part ic ipat ing in this s tudy c o n f i r m s : 
"The forest products industry, the coalition that brought about the Lacey Amendments in 
2008 was a somewhat unique coalition, a strange bedfellows group. There certainly were 
protectionist messages that brought along US industry..." [16]. 
An obvious quest ion emerges , then, as to w h e t h e r s imi lar s u p p o r t could e m e r g e to s u p p o r t 
r e s p o n s e s to the o t h e r c o m m o d i t i e s impl icated in d e f o r e s t a t i o n ? T h e e x p e r t a b o v e w a s highly 
scept ical of that possibility, point ing to the fact that US soy and b e e f industr ies a r e not be ing 
undercut by foreign compet i t ion : 
"[These industries] are very difficult to approach on this topic [legal requirements for 
non-timber deforestation commodities]... So there is a dimension of them using their 
political power to avoid those kinds of issues and to prefer competing based on other 
dimensions, you know - 'How productive is US soy or beef compared to Brazilian soy, how 
cheap and well developed is our transportation structure?' ...so I think they would prefer to 
compete on other dimensions" [16], 
A further obs tac le to garner ing d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t for t h e s e c o m m o d i t i e s lies in t h e political 
or ienta t ion of these industries , as the e x p e r t conc ludes : 
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"These industries [US soy and beef], both on the basis of real and perceived slights, feel like 
they are overregulated already and do not wish to see any additional burdens placed on 
them... Certainly... the industries are weighted towards the conservative end of the political 
spectrum. [They are] relatively anti-regulation, and as you know the US is in the middle of 
a 5-lOyear spasm of anti-regulatory fervour" [16[. 
The like products constraint dictates that any regulation consumer governments imposed on 
imports of soy and beef would also need to be met by domestic producers of those commodities. 
Within the US, if not more broadly within Western jurisdictions, this participant has revealed a 
preference among these industries to compete on dimensions other than legality or 
environmental record, as well as a pervasive antipathy to regulation. These characteristics mark 
a critical difference between the t imber and non-timber industries in these jurisdictions, since 
for the former widespread illegal logging had enabled foreign timber to gain a competitive 
advantage. As a direct result, there was more support for legality-focused regulation as became 
manifest within illegal logging laws. 
The like products constraint also has the implication that competing vegetable oils cannot be 
partitioned off from one another in any regulatory response. This is highly pertinent given that 
the US, EU and Australia all produce substantial volumes of vegetable oils, which led one UK 
participant to be sceptical of the possibility of regulatory responses emerging to palm oil, for 
example: 
"Yes, there would be domestic resistance [to action on palm oil, given domestic production 
of other vegetable oils[. Again, that's a reason why [these commodities are[ slightly more 
complicated than timber There's already some kind of framework for [assessing 
sustainability[ in the context ofbiofuels in EU, but that's for a quite specific part of the 
market..." [21[. 
One additional nuance to consider in this discussion is the internationalisation of some of the 
industries relevant to the deforestation commodities. Recalling Chapter 3's discussion of the 
processes of globalisation that have resulted in post-Fordist models of production and 
ownership, it becomes highly relevant that the industries competing with the deforestation 
commodit ies may not be wholly, or even mostly, domestically-owned. As a US-based expert 
explains: 
"[W]ith the soy industry in particular, the need to ensure domestic support is complicated 
by the fact that the power centres are not solely domestic. So if you look at Cargill and ADM 
and you ask what percentage of their trade volume is originating in the US, that 
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percentage is not that high, so instead of being a potential ally because they're gonna level 
the playing field for their American production, they actually see this as a potential threat, 
because you're gonna level the playing field against their Brazilian production. So in that 
sense ... the internationalisation of some of these industries... [affects] how these industries 
communicate to policymakers" [16; emphasis added]. 
These ownership dynamics undermine the level of support that consumer governments can 
bank on, since 'domestic' industries for many deforestation commodities own shares of 
industries within the tropical countries where environmental impacts are being incurred. 
Consumer governments therefore face significant constraints in attempting to leverage support 
from domestic audiences (some of whom have decidedly international outlooks on regulation). 
Yet the root of this constraint, as already noted, is that while regulation is the strongest 
response that consumer governments could enact, it inevitably imposes burdens on domestic 
actors. The conflict between concern over responding to traded deforestation and not wanting 
to impose these burdens can lead to a stalemate within consumer governments. The US 
Government's ill-defined role in the Tropical Forest Alliance provides a case study in the 
consequences of such a stalemate: 
"]The US Government] want to do something voluntary, but they don't even know what to 
do. I think that's really the ]problem]... That's why you get the TFA forming and then doing 
nothing. Yeah, they want to do something voluntary, but no one has any idea what that 
actually means... There's definitely a reluctance ]by the US, in the TFA or perhaps more 
broadly] to do anything that's too solid a commitment..." ]18]. 
Another participant agrees that, 
"...without the companies putting explicit policy recommendations on the table - which 
would go against their own self-interest, you know, the companies are not going to go out 
and say 'regulate me', but they came to the government and said 'we need help', and the 
governments have not yet been willing to say, ok we're happy to help and what we can do 
is regulate... So you've got this game where no one's actually willing ... to put what has to 
be done on the table" ]16]. 
These consequences - stalemate, impasse, inaction - are not confined to the TFA but are also 
perceivable in the general intention of consumer governments to 'support', or 'cheerlead', the 
private sector, as previous participants have termed it. 
How immutable is domestic resistance to further regulatory responses to traded deforestation? 
Lessons from existing responses - chiefiy the illegal logging laws - provide some hints of how 
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governments were in some cases able to pacify, or deflect, this resistance. As one example, the 
Lacey Act was generally perceived as inadequate in the guidance it provided for domestic 
importers and traders of relevant timber imports, as a participant notes: 
"With the Lacey Act it's all up to the business to figure out how to get it here legally. It's 
very much an attitude of 'we [the US Government] don't care, we're just gonna make sure 
that you're following the rule of law'" [18], 
The Lacey Act was also perceived to suffer from a lack of flexibility in the options it provided for 
companies looking to demonstrate legality. Yet each of these shortcomings have been remedied 
in other governments ' responses, showing the benefits of learning from the experiences of 
others (which is not limited to governments, of course, as Chapter 7 will highlight}. The UK 
Government-funded CPET, as already mentioned, deftly circumvents the lack of guidance for 
businesses, and for a remarkably low budget has been able to: 
"ensure that there is somewhere [for UK businesses] to go to get all your answers and 
also... run a lot of training sessions, so [it's] trained all the major contractors and suppliers 
across all sorts of sectors, so there's no excuse for not complying because you've only got to 
attend one of these sessions and you'll know what to do. CPET is a general support helpline" 
[17f 
Similarly, the Australian illegal logging laws, which had the distinct advantage of being designed 
and implement after the Lacey Act and the EU TR, create a clear and easy route to providing 
importers with flexibility simply by recognising both FSC- and PEFC-certified timber products. 
According to one participant from an NGO: 
"[The Australian] illegal logging [regulation[ requires business to undertake due diligence 
to minimise the risk.... Generally speaking, the government is looking to be reasonably 
flexible or non-prescriptive in what those due diligence systems look like, other than to put 
in some broad guidelines" [5[. 
In light of the sensitivities that consumer governments face with regards foreign audiences, too, 
the recognition of the PEFC in particular was a masterstroke within the Australian laws. Many 
timber producing countries are now developing their own timber legality systems (sometimes 
referred to as 'schemes']. Once these systems are mature, the PEFC will assess them for their 
acceptance within its umbrella scheme, the importance of which is that the Australian 
Government - unlike the EU under FLEGT - avoids needing to make its own determinations on 
these schemes on a case by case basis. (According to one Australian policymaker, timber 
producing countries have already been lobbying for explicit recognition for their systems under 
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the Australian logging laws [11]-] Were the Australian Government to assess other countries' 
frameworks and in some cases need to reject these frameworks, the lines of argument purveyed 
by producer countries - explored earlier in this chapter - could re-explode into prominence. 
Thus it seems a wise strategic move for Australia to avoid being forced into such a position by -
effectively - outsourcing the task of assessment and recognition to the PEFC. 
Conclusion 
Consumer governments have a wider range of possible responses with which to respond to 
traded deforestation than any other actor beyond the tropics. They are also the only such actor 
capable of enacting regulatory responses to this problem, a capacity to date reflected in the 
illegal logging laws of three jurisdictions. Yet consumer governments also face significant 
sensitivities and constraints in gathering support for their responses. Inconsistent outcomes -
across commodities, and across governments - reflect an unresolved willingness and ability to 
confront these sensitivities and navigate these constraints, where it is indeed possible to do so. 
Arguably, then, the largest piece of the puzzle of responses to traded deforestation has yet to be 
put firmly in place. 
This chapter explored three categories of sensitivities and constraints facing consumer 
governments; in confronting the often-vociferous arguments of producer country governments, 
in abiding by the letter and spirit of international trade law as governed by the WTO, and in 
garnering domestic support for regulatory responses. Of these three categories of constraint, 
the body of trade law overseen by the WTO has long attracted the greatest ire from 
environmentalists, yet the perspectives of participants clearly show that a more nuanced 
approach is essential, for two reasons. Firstly, the objective of further trade liberalisation, and 
its widespread support from consumer as well as producer countries, is the underlying reason 
why trade law has taken its present shape and is therefore the constraint most embedded in 
societies' 'deep structure'. Secondly, for the traded deforestation commodities especially, the 
significance of trade law stems more from its ramifications for domestic support for regulatory 
responses than for its direct restriction on regulatory responses. With recent disputes within 
WTO tribunals suggesting that much stronger regulatory responses on deforestation 
commodity imports are legally permissible, the primary question remains whether they are 
politically possible, and desirable. 
A lack of domestic support remains the crucial constraint on consumer government regulatory 
responses, largely explaining why illegal logging laws have been implemented and why other 
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possibilities - unsustainable logging laws, and illegal palm oil laws, for example - have not. The 
internationalised ownership structure of soy and beef industries within the US (overlapping 
with that in Brazil) serves as a reminder that the retrofitting of responses to existing 
international trade patterns occurs within a context already shaped by the processes of 
globalisation. These constraints combine to make regulatory responses on non-timber 
deforestation commodities politically challenging, to say the least, for the foreseeable future. 
Yet consumer governments have been consistent in their insistence that tropical deforestation 
be halted. As one participant conveyed in this chapter, they have even been willing to propose a 
statement in the UNFCCC in which consumer countries would accept significant responsibility 
for traded deforestation. With that approach blocked by producer governments, and other 
approaches hemmed in and shaped by international trade law, more radical possibilities for 
responding to consumer countries' connections to traded deforestation could be considered. 
One such possibility would be to further test - or more brazenly, ignore - the constraints 
imposed by international trade law, freeing consumer governments to apply discriminatory 
regulation to specific commodities known to be driving deforestation, or specific countries 
where it occurs. The public intellectual Naomi Klein provides indirect support for such a 
re-imagining of the currently-established relationship between trade and environmental 
problems, when she writes (with respect to climate change and capitalism), 
'So what Anderson and Bows are really saying is that there is still time to avoid 
catastrophic warming [further tropical deforestation], but not within the rules of 
capitalism [global trade] as they are currently constructed. Which may be the best 
argument we have ever had for changing those rules' (Klein, 2013; inserts added]. 
Suffice to say that one obvious constraint on any such institutional reform is the 
aforementioned commitment, across governments at both ends of supply chains, to furthering 
the trade liberalisation agenda, even as the body of evidence grows challenging the benefit of 
this blanket goal. One counter-example stands out strongly in this context: Norway's disregard 
of the principles of international trade in its ban on the use of tropical timber for public 
procurement projects. Norway's actions, flagrant as they must appear in the midst of others' 
countervailing aspirations, are in fact a reminder that countries deliberate and actively decide 
to sign up to trade agreements and organisations, such as the WTO. To the extent that these 
decisions limit governments' potential to respond to problems, governments abrogate that 
potential. Conversely, should governments decide that certain problems necessitate the 
reacquisition of that potential, it can be rehabilitated. 
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Chapter 7 Influence beyond coverage 
This chapter will explore and examine the possibilities that responses might achieve an 
influence beyond what their coverage, and the limitations already revealed, would suggest. 
Recent chapters in this study have identified and analysed the limitations that emerge from the 
nature (Chapter 4] and behaviour of responses (and actors) within the private sector and civil 
society (Chapter 5], as well as from government (Chapter 6). Yet even within these chapters, 
several reminders have nonetheless appeared that responses may yet be capable of overcoming, 
or circumventing, some of these limitations. This chapter therefore seeks to provide a necessary 
balance to previous chapters' explicit - and warranted - focus on responses' limitations. 
Support for a focus on influence is also made most explicitly by Bernstein and Cashore (2012), 
who advocate - and develop a broad framework to support - a 'shift from 'effectiveness' to 
'influence" (p587). Other authors have identified a similar need, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
with Steering Committee's (2012) Assessment of certification identifying several 'mechanisms 
of interaction and indirect impacts' (p83), substantially building on Auld et al.'s (2008) initial 
foray into certification's 'unintended', 'spillover' and 'long-term and slow-moving' effects. This 
chapter will further find that many of the pathways of influence already identified for 
certification can apply equally to other downstream responses. 
Certainly, this study's collective approach to responses for traded deforestation allows for 
exploration of the possibility that interactions between responses could create greater influence, 
which literatures have identified as crucial (eg. Bernstein and Cashore, 2012; Newton etal., 
2013; Lambin et al., 2014). Although this study has already generated insights into how 
responses might behave in ways that are mutually inhibitive (in Chapters 4 and 5 especially), 
the premise of this chapter acknowledges and seeks to build on other authors' conclusions on 
the potential for 'synergistic' interactions (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012:589) or 
'complementarity' (Lambin et al., 2014:135) between responses, including 'synergies between 
[response] goals' (Newton et al., 2013:1768). This chapter's pursuit of pathways of influence 
also extends beyond interactions between responses, however, recognising specifically that 
such influence can also emerge in the absence of interaction between responses. 
The chapter will complete three tasks. Firstly, it expands on Chapter 3's discussion of 
displacement and Chapter 4's discussion of coverage with analysis of participants' perspectives 
on these phenomena. Secondly, it identifies and examines a range of active and passive 
pathways through which responses may 'over-achieve' and generate greater influence than 
their coverage would suggest. In scrutinising these pathways, several limitations on them are 
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also detected. Finally, this chapter will fit these pathways into three separate, though not 
mutually-exclusive, 'theories of change' discerned through discussion with participants. These 
theories of change are analysed in light of insights from previous chapters, both conceptual and 
empirical, to determine whether and how responses might overcome limits to coverage and 
thereby broadly transform the industries connected to tropical deforestation. 
1. O p e n i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s 
Coverage (and China's clout) 
Chapter 4 identified coverage as one crucial, and inescapable, limitation on the direct 
contribution that current responses from beyond the tropics can make to slowing deforestation. 
That chapter also revealed the central importance of China as the primary export destination for 
t imber and soybean, and as a major importer of palm oil. China's prominence has clearly not 
gone unnoticed; both participants in this study and practitioners in public fora have expressed 
concern that inaction from China and other jurisdictions might undermine the contribution of 
existing responses to slowing deforestation. As one example, at the Cross-Roundtable discussion 
at the RSPO's 2012 meeting, the Executive Director of the RTRS, Agusti'n Mascotena, noted that, 
"[Gjrowers are asking why they should go for certified sustainable [production practices] if 
China is buying anyway" (Mascotena, 2012). 
In relation to timber, the literature and participants are in agreement. As Gulbrandsen (2004) 
writes, 'forest holdings in tropical countries have litrie trouble selling uncertified and even 
illegally-sourced t imber on the world market' (p94). An FSC participant agrees, noting, 
"We have to be optimistic about China, otherwise the future will look quite grey" [4], 
Similarly for palm oil, a representative of the WWF noted that, 
"[Markets such as China are] a key focus..." [5], 
while an RSPO representative concluded that, 
"If we want to push for further uptake, we cannot Just look at Europe. We have to look at 
other countries as well" [8[. 
Finally, on the RTRS' behalf, Mascotena concluded that, 
"China is the world's main soybean importer... if a change in soya is needed, it must be 
focused on China" (Mascotena, 2012). 
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It seems hard, then, to overstate the importance of China for continued growth in coverage for 
many of the major sustainability schemes, including the RTRS, the FSC and the RSPO. In a debate 
hosted by Mongabay, the online rainforest new^s hub, the Executive-Director of the RSPO, Darrel 
Webber, vi'as asked whether there was any demand for certified palm oil in the emerging 
markets of China, Pakistan, India, Indonesia [etc.], to which he responded, 
"1 have heard this a lot of times and I get a little bit worried when people come with this 
question because I see where it comes from: China and India are so large so why even 
bother? But we have to take it step by step" (Sustainable Palm Oil, 2 0 1 3 ] . 
Webber's co-interviewee from Greenpeace, Bustar Maitar, concurred: 
"I agree with Darrel, we should not use China and India as a reason for companies not to 
move... We should not use China and India as an excuse" [ibid.]. 
These quotes reveal, most obviously, that companies have sought to do exactly that - to use 
China as an excuse. But other actors have had a different reaction to the challenge of slowing 
tropical deforestation without action from China. These actors - in particular major 
manufacturers and retailers - have instead chosen to frame this reality as a challenge, 
specifically of needing to achieve an influence beyond their own supply chains. Walmart's 
sourcing arm for palm oil, ASDA, for example, has expressed its intention to 'expand our reach 
further than our own usage' (Walmart, 2 0 1 3 : 6 7 ] , while a Unilever participant in this study 
revealed comparable aspirations as follows: 
"There is quite a strong commitment internally [within Unilever] to change the way we buy 
[and] essentially try to change the industry... That's our ambition, to try to change the way 
the industry worl<s. It's a big change. If we're on our own asking for just 3 per cent to be 
changed, that ]industry change] is never going to happen" ]3]. 
To critically examine the intentions of both these actors, this chapter presents and explores two 
interrelated sets of ideas. The first is a set of pathways through which actors might 'expand their 
reach' beyond their own usage, or in this study's vernacular, to achieve influence beyond 
coverage. The second is three alternate theories of change that provide a frame for 
understanding how the larger objective of 'changing the way the industry works' might occur. 
Before turning sequentially to those sets of ideas, however, participants' perspectives on 
displacement are briefly presented. 
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The danger of displacement 
This chapter's focus on how responses could achieve influence beyond coverage has a flip-side -
displacement - M/hich this study has already explored in chapters 3 and 4. This section 
demonstrates an awareness by multiple participants of the danger that, instead of leading to 
changes in production practices, responses could simply displace problematic versions of 
commodities to other destinations and markets. A Unilever representative signified an 
awareness of this possibility with reference to a government response to illegal timber 
deployed in the 1980s: 
"The EU's tropical timber ban in the 1980s 'kind of backfired'... the timber Just went 
elsewhere. That was a huge policy mistake" [3]. 
In light of this example, this participant approves of how consumer governments are currently 
"supporting sustainability as opposed to being completely against or blocking [a commodity]" [3], 
although France's failed attempt to levy a palm oil tax was cited as "unworkable... because when 
you've got a government coming in with rhetoric like that, it makes it quite difficult for us to push 
for sustainability" [3]. 
Within New Zealand, one of the few Western governments that has yet to implement illegal 
logging laws, the danger of displacement is perceived more tangibly. As one New Zealand 
policymaker noted, 
"[Importers'] main concern, as it has been articulated to me, is that exporters of wood of 
dubious legal status will see New Zealand as an alternative destination once the Australian 
market is regulated. This could either be as a domestic market in itself or for onwards 
shipping to Australia and other markets" [13]. 
Clearly, the timber imports that New Zealand intends to ship onward to Australia will need to 
comply with that jurisdiction's import-focused laws. The due diligence that these laws require 
of Australian timber importers, therefore, is effectively 'passed on' to prior New Zealand 
importers, placing them into a situation similar to Chinese and Vietnamese timber importers 
whose products are destined for the EU or US. As one pathway of influence introduced below -
influencing suppliers - describes, the Australian laws can have a disproportionate influence if 
NZ timber importers consequently decide to only import timber that complies with these laws. 
Similarly, this policymaker hints at another pathway of influence - collaboration - that could be 
exercised if New Zealand finds it's the destination for displaced illegal timber: 
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"At the moment the [NZ] Government's illegal logging policy is to encourage voluntary 
approaches by industry... [but] there is an action point to look at the possibility of linking 
with the Australian scheme once it is established" [13]. 
Displacement could potentially emerge at the landscape level too, as Chapter 4 noted, if 
certification encourages one set of practices for timber or agricultural commodities within a 
particular area while displacing problematic practices - deforestation, perhaps - beyond that 
area. One FSC participant responded to this possibility by saying, 7 haven't seen any evidence of 
that" ]1], while also admitting, however, that it was hard to preclude, noting that "the FSC is a 
positive tool, but it is just a tool" [1]. 
At least one example from current responses has been designed to directly mitigate the danger 
of displacement: the EU's FLEGT program. Through its Voluntary Partnership Agreements, 
FLEGT supports governance reform within producer country forestry sectors in order to create 
conducive conditions for legal exports to the EU, while also mandating the legality of those 
imports through its illegal logging laws. Further examples of pathways of influence that guard 
against displacement are canvassed and examined in the following section, to which this 
chapter now turns. 
2. Pathways of influence 
This major section of this chapter applies an empirical lens - through the introduction and 
analysis of participants' perspectives - to the limitation of coverage. Specifically, it discerns and 
explores the potential of pathways that participants argue - and hope - might overcome this 
limitation. Pathways are divided into the two categories of 'active' and 'passive', a distinction 
that is roughly analogous to the separation between 'intended' and Auld et al.'s [2008) 
'unintended' consequences (p200). This distinction also draws on Bernstein and Cashore's 
(2012] comment, in the course of presenting their own framework for analysing influence, that 
'the starting point for an examination of such influences is a focus first on purposeful efforts of 
institutions and actors... to steer policy and behaviour' (p586). 
As the section will demonstrate, both active and passive pathways suffer from shortcomings, 
with the former often subject to limitations of their own, while the greater difficulty for the 
latter remains their largely - and frustratingly - speculative nature, given difficulties in both 
observation and attribution. Further research may be able to elucidate, possibly at much more 
refined scales, the potency of these pathways. Figure 7.1 illustrates the potential contribution of 
current responses, showing the critical dependence on whether that contribution is 
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proportional to their coverage, is displaced (and so less than their coverage], or realises an 
influence beyond that coverage. 
Figure 7.1 Illustrative potential for reductions in tropical deforestation from current responses. 
No net change Responses, even if successful in 'purging' 
traded deforestation, merely displace it 
into other less-discerning supply chains 
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The three active pathways of leadership, convening and collaboration are presented here as 
conceptually distinct, yet in reality they rest along a spectrum. For instance, it is possible for a 
company, government or scheme to demonstrate leadership by setting a strong example and 
letting others follow; equally, leadership can be exercised by imploring others to 'pull their 
weight' within collaborative groupings of peers, an act that may appear from the outside as 
straightforward collaboration. In addition, peer pressure, which is categorised as a passive 
pathway and therefore explored later, may nonetheless be implicit within these definitions of 
leadership (equally it also may not). In short, while there is a clear distinction between what 
actors intend to flow from their behaviour (and responses] and what is unintended but may 
nonetheless occur, within these two categories the pathways are less distinct. This should be 
borne in mind as the pathways below are presented. 
Actors such as the major retailers Walmart and Unilever are accustomed to their market power 
enabling them to set the terms of production within given industries. For these actors, then, it 
was an unwelcome realisation to understand that their coverage of the deforestation 
commodities was insufficient to decisively affect the related industries. In relation to palm oil, 
for instance, a Walmart representative explained at the 2012 RSPO annual meeting that, 
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"Usually because we are such a large player we can drive change in supply chains through 
our procurement policies, but it became clear with palm oil that we couldn't do that 
because our purchasing is too small by ourselves" (Walker-Palin, 2012). 
As the single largest purchaser of palm oil globally, Unilever might seem well positioned to 
realise its professed commitment to change the palm oil industry in its entirety. One participant 
from Unilever confirmed this as the company's objective, stating, 
"That's our ambition, to try to change the way the industry works. It's a big change" [3], 
Yet the fragmentation of the consumption end of palm oil supply chains means that, even for the 
single largest purchaser, this objective is difficult to square with the percentage of global 
production it purchases, 
"If we're on our own asking for just 3 percent to be changed, [industry change] is never 
going to happen"[3], 
Leadership 
Leadership is one pathway that participants, especially from major retailers, identify as 
promising for achieving influence beyond their direct coverage of their supply chains. As 
recendy noted, leadership can be demonstrated in either an 'out in front' form, where one actor 
inspires its peers to follow suit, or a 'rallying the troops' form, where the focus is determinedly 
on motivating other actors (usually peers). A participant from IKEA, the major timber retailer, 
provides an example of the first form of leadership, saying, 
"On due diligence systems, IKEA is still number one... We do this... to give an example and 
to lead [our] peers" ]14]. 
In contrast, the Unilever participant quoted earlier elaborates that company's approach with 
reference to the second form of leadership, 
"So what we do very strongly is having discussions and going into forums [such as the 
RSPO] and talking about the need for change, giving examples of what we're doing and 
trying to get leverage that way..." [3]. 
Forums such as the RSPO, and the CGF, which Unilever is also active within, are discussed under 
the collaboration pathway below. This latter quote captures the confluence of three pathways 
discussed here, including leadership, collaboration but also - and more subtly - peer pressure, 
suggesting how difficult they can be to isolate for analysis. There is, however, an important 
reason for doing so: many pathways are subject to limitations of their own. That is, despite their 
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promise for overcoming the limitation of coverage, and participants' faith in their ability to do 
so, this chapter finds that no pathwfays - especially not active ones - are panaceas for that 
limitation. The leadership pathway bears out this point. 
One precondition for any actor intending to lead either its peers or any other actors is that it has 
its own house in order. The US Government concludes as much in its strategy to address illegal 
wildlife trafficking, noting that 'the US must curtail its own role in the illegal trade in wildlife 
and must lead in addressing this issue on the global stage' (Obama, 2014:12). The relationship 
between these two statements, framed as an a-casual 'and', could more accurately have been 'in 
order to', reflecting the US' role as a significant destination country for trafficked wildlife. This 
precondition for leadership has also had a bearing on US Government efforts to respond to 
traded deforestation. As Chapter 6 showed, one constraint on the US Government's ability to 
adopt a 'no net deforestation' objective within the Tropical Forest Alliance stems from the fact 
that it does not currently comply with - or wish to be held to - that objective within its own 
jurisdiction. This precondition is even more problematic for Australia, which nonetheless 
hosted the Asia-Pacific Rainforest Summit in November 2014 to 'look at practical tools and 
solutions to assist developing countries in the region to better manage their forests and land-
use change' [Department of the Environment, 2014). As Chapter 6 elaborated, Australia's recent 
record on land clearing led the Economist to rank the country alongside Brazil and Indonesia for 
forest loss between 2000-2005 [Economist, 2011), surely undermining Australia's ability to 
claim a leadership role on regional forest management. 
One major limitation on leadership, perceived in particularly by major retailers, is the low level 
of awareness demonstrated by consumers on the problem of traded deforestation. As 
representatives of two Australian timber retailers noted at an APEC meeting on illegal logging in 
mid-2013, 
"Consumers (in Australia) are not yet willing to pay more for timber products that are 
labelled sustainable or legally harvested" [john Simon, personal communication, 2013), 
and, 
"There is no driver from the consumer for sustainable products in Australia, talking as a 
mainstay rather than the market for boutique products" (Gomm, 2013). 
These retailers lament the absence of a demand or willingness on the part of consumers that 
might reward - including through price premiums - existing leadership, whether focused on 
legality or sustainability. At the RSPO annual general meeting in 2012, Walmart's representative, 
Julian Walker-Palin, noted a similar problem with palm oil, 
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"The challenge with palm oil is that it is not currently in consumers' minds... [Our sourcing 
decisions] are not being driven by consumers, [they are happening] despite the lack of 
pressure from consumers..." (Walker-Palin, 2012], 
This lack of awareness poses difficulties for retailers, as Walker-Palin expanded upon, 
"...[this] leads to further debate being needed. Is it sufficient that the big brands Just deliver 
this on behalf of consumers, or should we be putting more effort into education of 
consumers?" (Walker-Palin, 2012). 
While Walker-Palin posed this question rhetorically, at least one retailer has answered in the 
affirmative, with Unilever releasing a strategy - based on research by well-known sustainability 
and behavioural experts - for reducing the company's impacts. The release of this strategy was 
primarily aimed at consumers of its products, yet the company's CEO, Paul Polman, explicitly 
hoped to inspire Unilever's peers to follow its example, as he noted In the document's Foreword: 
'And for the first time we are publishing our own model for effective behaviour change. 
We call this approach the Five Levers of Change. It offers a practical tool... We hope 
others will also use it in tackling the big sustainability challenges we all face' (Polman in 
Unilever, 2011). 
So, multiple major retailers recognise that low levels of consumer awareness and willingness to 
reward leadership on traded deforestation in turn places a limit on their ability to demonstrate 
that leadership. However, as participants also note, illegal logging laws can play a valuable role 
in alleviating this limitation, at least in the timber sector, since, 
"Government legislation actually creates a shift in consumer awareness... [and] will give 
[us] more of a platform to communicate with customers about the things they care about" 
(Gomm,2013). 
This perspective reveals a promising, supporting role for government-led regulatory responses 
in assisting the private sector, through providing a platform, to communicate with its 
consumers about traded deforestation. There is a paradox here too, however, since 
governmental claims to a supporting role for private sector actions on deforestation may be 
most substantiated - and therefore, valid - only when government itself enacts regulatory 
responses. This finding does two things. Firstly, it further underlines the importance within the 
UK of the outreach efforts of publicly-funded Central Point of Expertise in Timber (CPET), while 
suggesting areas where the US Lacey Act, in particular, could be better supported. And secondly, 
the finding suggests that the 'anti-regulatory spasm' that has led the US Government to rule out 
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any regulatory responses to the Tropical Forest Alliance may deeply limit its contribution to 
that forum's efforts. More generally, government claims to be assisting the private sector are by 
necessity weaker when regulatory measures are absent. This is a crucial, and often overlooked, 
role for the illegal logging laws adopted in the EU, US and Australia, which as participants 
suggest, help to create a context conducive to stronger and broader private sector responses to 
traded deforestation. 
Convening power 
Another pathway that both Walmar t and the US Government refer to explicitly sits roughly 
halfway between leadership and collaboration. These actors note both their willingness to play 
'a convenor role' in bringing together other actors for collaborative responses, presumably to 
help achieve more than each actor would individually. Following on from his earlier quote, 
where Walker-Palin noted that Walmart 's purchasing of palm oil was 'too small' by itself to 
drive change in supply chains, this representative went on to explain that, 
"So the particular area we want to work on is to continue this convenor role... [because] 
while we alone can't drive changes because our volumes are too low, as a large company 
we have an influence, and we want to use that influence for good" (Walker-Palin, 2012). 
The merit of the 'convenor role' lies in the fact that coalitions and collaborations do not 
necessarily emerge organically; rather their formation can be aided by the dedicated resources, 
energies and attention of a major actor. Walmart clearly identifies the need for actors to play 
this role on palm oil, and perhaps other deforestation commodities. For its part, the 
US Government used the identical term in its announcement of its strategy to address illegal 
wildlife trafficking. Under a commitment to 'Encourage development of innovative approaches', 
the document reads: 
'We will leverage the US' technological expertise and our convening power to promote 
creative ideas, innovative solutions, and strategic partnerships to address... this illegal 
trade chain. We will challenge the private sector, the nongovernmental organisations 
and academic communities, and partner countries to think beyond business as usual' 
(emphasis added; Obama, 2014:11). 
As the US Government envisages it, then, a convenor role entails not just the ability to compel an 
audience but also to leverage that 'power' to influence the behaviour of the other actors present, 
to 'challenge' them to 'think beyond business as usual'. Convening power therefore implies an 
ability to bring together audiences that might otherwise not coalesce, and demand further 
commi tment from those actors than might otherwise eventuate. These audiences may then 
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b e c o m e formal or informal co l laborat ions , usually but not a lways a m o n g s t peers , such as the 
CGF, TFA and the POIG. T h e US G o v e r n m e n t ' s intent ion to d i rec t its c o n v e n i n g p o w e r t o w a r d s 
the pr ivate sec tor , as well as its peers , reveals the advantage that g o v e r n m e n t s have in engaging 
o t h e r ac tor - types . T h e abi l i ty o f private s e c t o r ac tors to achieve the reverse , engaging 
g o v e r n m e n t s , is l ikely to be m o r e highly c i r c u m s c r i b e d , as ev idenced by the CGF's - and 
mult iple part ic ipants ' in this s tudy - f rustrat ion with the i l l -defined role of the US G o v e r n m e n t 
within the TFA. 
Collaboration 
Combining aspec ts of leadership and convening power , a Unilever par t ic ipant in this s tudy 
explains that company ' s view of its role within the CGF, which br ings t o g e t h e r o v e r 4 0 0 of the 
world 's m o s t m a j o r reta i lers and m a n u f a c t u r e r s . As the par t ic ipant notes , 
"We find we have very strong leverage in the CGF in taking the lead on new commitments, 
and that influences our peers to take the same commitments. And so with that momentum, 
the idea is that there will be a change" [3], 
While this e x a m p l e clearly exhib i ts the qual i ty of leadership, it is e x e r c i s e d within a 
col laborat ive context . T h e s e co l labora t ions - w h e t h e r grouping of g o v e r n m e n t , industry 
associat ions , or o t h e r s - provide a n o t h e r p a t h w a y through which a c t o r s with insuff ic ient 
coverage of the defores ta t ion c o m m o d i t i e s can s e e k to leverage c h a n g e b e y o n d the i r supply 
chains. Actors have frequent ly recognised these opportuni t ies . For instance , the UK 
Deve lopment Minister argued in a s p e e c h that, 
"Bri tain has a small inf luence on the palm oil markets . T h e UK at large c o n s u m e s only 
1 percent of palm oil t raded internat ional ly . However , EU c o u n t r i e s t o g e t h e r a c c o u n t for 
2 2 percent of palm oil t raded internat ional ly , offering much g r e a t e r s c o p e to inf luence 
the m a r k e t " (O'Brien, 2 0 1 2 ] . 
T h e UK has played an outs ized role in encourag ing EU-wide act ion on t imber , beginning the 
introduct ion of its public p r o c u r e m e n t policy for t i m b e r and wood products ( suppor ted s ince 
2 0 0 4 by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of CPET). It has also been influential in encourag ing the EU's illegal 
logging laws, the EU TR, suggest ing that the UK has leveraged its own inf luence t o w a r d s a 
col laborat ive response , with g r e a t e r potential , to t rade in illegal t imber . As O'Brien a lso noted in 
his speech, perhaps that inf luence might be e x e r t e d to a d d r e s s o t h e r c o m m o d i t i e s , 
"With t i m b e r w e s h o w e d that by taking leadership and e n c o u r a g i n g o t h e r s to act , the 
ef fects of the public and private s e c t o r s taking act ion in o n e c o u n t r y could b e amplif ied. 
T h e s a m e is t rue of oil pa lm" (ibid.). 
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In addition to collaboration between governments, private sector actors can collaborate 
through industry associations to leverage larger change. Such concentrations of private sector 
actors also make these associations attractive to outsiders, including sustainability schemes, as 
one FSC participant in this research noted, 
"Industry associations and platforms are a great way of reaching a wider audience with 
fewer resources and having an influence on the message that is sent to the member 
companies. They are a tool for helping to reach more companies who otherwise might not 
engage with FSC. Some of these forums are also a good opportunity for direct engagement 
with high-level representatives and CEOs" [9]. 
Other industry associations, such as the Dutch and Belgian palm oil industries, which serve as 
entry-points for much of the palm oil that arrives in Europe, have proven highly amenable to 
sustainability schemes. Both of these industries have committed to ensuring that all palm oil 
imported for domestic consumption (in these two countries) would be RSPO-certified by 2015. 
However, as with the leadership pathway, participants note significant limitations with 
collaborations. As well as being a locus for inspiring actors, for example, collaborations such as 
the CGF and Roundtables such as the RSPO can also lead to inertia and afford actors the chance 
to 'hide' their inaction from outside pressure. As one supply chain expert explains, 
"The CGF is a place that collective options can be discussed, and can be acted on. Some 
businesses I've spoken to have said that they're so small in that group that their voices 
aren't heard, and they need to go away and develop their own approach rather than wait 
for [the CGF] to decide on the approach. But where businesses are particularly concerned 
they just need to push ahead" [10]. 
For small actors that are willing to enact responses to traded deforestation, collaborations 
where their larger peers are yet to reach agreement can lead to sitting on the sidelines; in effect 
resulting in less action than they would have produced alone. A disjunct can also emerge 
between the objectives of some members of a given association and the overarching position 
that the association itself takes. For example, Oxfam's briefing report on major food and 
beverage companies [the 'Big 10'] and climate change argues that, 
'...the Big 10 have, for the most part, remained silent in public debates over climate 
action. With a few notable exceptions - Unilever, Nestle, and, to some extent, Coca-Cola 
and Mars - most do not speak out about the need for governments and other businesses 
to act, despite spending millions of US dollars on political lobbying each year. 
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'Most refrain from publicly challenging the backward stances of trade associations that 
represent them' (2014:4]. 
This limitation recalls the 'lowest common denominator' criticism of the RSPO standard 
explored in Chapter 5. Consequently, the simple act of combining companies' clout within either 
trade associations or other formal collaborations such as the CGF cannot be assumed to lead to 
collaborative action equally as robust or timely as that which can be pursued individually. 
Indeed, while formal collaborations provide an opportunity for some actors to leverage greater 
influence, other actors may join these collaborations for precisely the opposite reason. As one 
supply chain expert participant in this study notes, 
"Complacency... there's a risk of that happening for sure. There hasn't been a huge rush of 
businesses saying 'we don't want deforestation in our supply chain'. I thinl< there's still a lot 
of businesses who are in a happy place, a safe place, with the RSPO..." [10], 
A participant from Unilever agrees, 
"There is an awful lot of companies sitting on the CGF who have made 2015 commitments, 
and to this date they have no clue what they're going to do in a couple of years' time. It 
says a lot about the way many other companies are moving" [3]. 
Thus Roundtables and other collaborations provide an opportunity to delay or avoid companies 
needing to design and enact individual responses to traded deforestation. Membership of these 
collaborations can in effect be used to shield companies both from the criticism of their peers 
and from NGOs whose campaigns often provide the impetus for company commitments. The 
sustainability scheme representative quoted above went on to state that, despite the advantages 
of targeting collaborations, 
"...working one on one with a company allows for a more in-depth collaboration [between 
schemes and companies] and tends to lead to more tangible and faster results" [9]. 
How then can companies shielding themselves from scrutiny by their membership of a 
collaboration be approached? One supply chain expert suggests the following, 
"[In order to deal with] the complacency aspect, I feel it needs to come to the point where 
NGOs [change their approach]... NGOs are the ones that are mainly driving what businesses 
are signing up to and what they're not. And to date a lot of the NGOs that are driving 
businesses to make RSPO commitments. It's not necessarily the businesses themselves in a 
lot of cases, it's pressure from local or international NGOs. They say 'Your competitors have 
done it, so why don 'tyou do it as well? Here's a scorecard..."' [10]. 
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This par t i c ipant is arguing that , part icular ly with r e s p e c t to the RSPO, the chal lenge of real is ing 
m o r e r o b u s t r e s p o n s e s from c o m p a n i e s essent ia l ly requi res a shift in the goalposts for c o m p a n y 
p e r f o r m a n c e . For c o m p a n i e s looking to d e m o n s t r a t e c redib le response , or - m o r e defensively -
t h o s e wishing to e x o n e r a t e t h e m s e l v e s from fur ther at tent ion, NGOs can inspire s t r o n g e r 
r e s p o n s e s by making their j u d g e m e n t s cont ingent on m o r e than s imply joining the RSPO. This 
part ic ipant ' s 'call to a r m s ' s i ts neat ly with - and indeed, ex tends - Chapter 5 's conclusion that 
the d y n a m i c s of private sector-c ivi l soc ie ty in terac t ions can be counter -product ive for 
responding to t raded defores ta t ion . This perspec t ive also p r e - e m p t s a later finding of this 
c h a p t e r that s t r o n g and pro longed e n g a g e m e n t with c o m p a n i e s ' own supply chains - i.e. 
prec ise ly what can be avoided by jo ining a Roundtable - is a prerequis i te for tangible and 
effect ive sourc ing policies. 
Yet p e r h a p s this shift a w a y from m e m b e r s h i p of the RSPO as the sole r e f e r e n c e point is a lready 
taking place, and for an ent i re ly di f ferent reason . Whi le NGOs may not yet have t ransformed 
their approach , the leadership s h o w n by cer ta in c o m p a n i e s - including both m a j o r purchasers , 
such as Nestle, and m a j o r suppliers , such as W i l m a r - in going beyond the RSPO's s tandard in 
their own c o m m i t m e n t s will l ikely have f low-on effects for the percept ion of o thers ' 
c o m m i t m e n t s . As o n e supply chain e x p e r t part ic ipat ing in this s tudy concluded (in March 2 0 1 4 ) , 
"it's hard to remember but only just a year ago we were still living in RSPO world, and 
suddenly we're living in a world of much more ambitious standards and a much more 
ambitious timeline, so I really do feel a sea change in whatthe benchmark is" [19], 
This e x a m p l e also af f i rms an ear l ie r pa thway this c h a p t e r identified, of leadership. While the 
shift in the b e n c h m a r k o r palm oil c o m m i t m e n t s has perhaps been modest ly aided by the 
e m e r g e n c e of the POIG, the real drivers of the shift have been the leadership shown by 
individual c o m p a n i e s , such as Nestle and Wilmar , as well as the lagging though still important 
co l labora t ions such as the CGF in c o m m i t t i n g to 'de fores ta t ion- f ree ' sourcing. T h e two are 
unlikely to b e mutual ly exclusive ; the wil l ingness of Nestle and Unilever to lead individually may 
in fact be a precondi t ion for the s u b s e q u e n t adopt ion of col laborat ive c o m m i t m e n t s within the 
CGF. Nor is this t e n d e n c y conf ined to the c o n s u m p t i o n end of supply chains; Wi lmar ' s 
c o m m i t m e n t is n o w been emula ted by o t h e r m a j o r t raders in deforestat ion commodit ies , 
including the m u c h - m a l i g n e d Cargill, ADM and Bunge. 
Another l imitat ion facing c o m p a n i e s might help to explain w h y leadership has so far proven a 
m o r e product ive p a t h w a y than col laborat ion . As a Unilever part ic ipant explains. 
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"Another thing to be aware of... [is that] there's always a danger of there being anti-trust 
and anti-competition. So it's a fine line between sharing commitments [between 
companies]... [and[ being well aware of anti-trust and anti-competition laws. 
"[Therefore we are] not actively trying to convert other companies [to particular sourcing 
policies]. Unilever can't be seen to influence the market So for example we can 'tgo to 
Nestle to say 'look we Ve got this deal so let's do this together'. That would be illegal" [3[. 
This limitation, deriving from competition law, applies especially to companies with the most 
significant market power; in effect, it is a constraint on what is perceived as undue use of that 
market power. This quote shows that companies are highly aware of this constraint, is it 
possible, then, that other pathways of influence, such as leadership and convening power, are 
being pursued simply because some collaborate pathways of influence are legally closed off to 
them? An account of actual events seems to suggest that in some cases the answer is in the 
affirmative. An NGO participant provided the following description of a case where Australian 
companies purchasing palm oil put forward a proposal that all palm oil imported into Australia 
should be RSPO-certified. (The quote below refers to the Australian Consumer and Competition 
Commission (ACCC], the regulatory watchdog for private-sector competition.] As the participant 
explains, 
"So [while] in theory most industry players were supportive of that [proposal], it raised the 
possibility of the ACCC getting involved because when the likes of [Australia's two major 
supermarket chains] Coles and Woolies are making joint decisions about procurement 
there is the very strong potential there could be collusion there, and so they'd be breaching 
certain regulations around that 
"So that pretty much scuppered that proposal [even though] their motivations were pure. 
It would have necessitated a costly process to get an exemption or support from the ACCC 
to get permission to go ahead with this cross-industry commitment. So that's where some 
of these regulatory requirements, [including[ anti-collusion regulation, can sometimes 
complicate these efforts" [5]. 
Despite broad industry agreement, then, Australia was unable to take the robust and 
comparatively easy path of ensuring only certified palm oil was imported, thereby negating the 
need to build costly separate facilities to handle certified and non-certified palm oil. As a result, 
the limitation of competition law prevented the simple conversion of the entire industry -
"overnight" [5] - on the basis of the unwillingness ofonly a few minor actors. As pithily 
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s u m m a r i s e d by a Uni lever par t i c ipant in this study, then, the l imitation of compet i t ion law 
m e a n s that , 
"until [others] are ready, it's still very much an individual matter to implement change" [3], 
One especia l ly n o t a b l e co l laborat ion - the Tropica l F o r e s t Alliance - is wor thy of further 
scrut iny h e r e on the basis of its co l laborat ion b e t w e e n actors . T h e origins of the TFA bear out 
Chapter 4 ' s d i scovery o f the mult iple ob jec t ives behind m a n y r e s p o n s e s to traded deforestat ion, 
s ince the co l laborat ion e m e r g e d primari ly out of a perce ived political need for the 
US G o v e r n m e n t to 'br ing s o m e t h i n g to the table ' at the ' R i o + 2 0 ' UNFCCC c o n f e r e n c e in 
m i d - 2 0 1 2 . As o n e par t ic ipant with in t imate knowledge of the col laborat ion explains, 
"Somebody who was interested and in a position of power was facing the prospect of 
Rio+20 with few US deliverables, [and] they were approached by some folks in the 
deforestation reduction community with some ideas of a new public-private partnership 
with corporations. The CGF was very interested in trying to engage governments in helping 
them meet their 2020 commitments for deforestation-free supply chains. So the stars 
aligned to generate sufficient interest and drive and a need for deliverables, so that the [US 
Government[ really did prioritise the launch of the TFA at Rio+20" [16]. 
T h e TFA has s ince enl is ted fur ther g o v e r n m e n t s , both d o w n s t r e a m - the Netherlands, Norway 
and the UK - as well as u p s t r e a m - Liberia, and active e n g a g e m e n t by Indonesia (TFA, 2 0 1 4 ) . 
Yet mult iple par t ic ipants in this s tudy s t r e s s e d that the TFA's formation does not in i tself augur 
any meaningful results . As two part ic ipants - a supply chain exper t and a sustainabi l i ty s c h e m e 
representa t ive , respect ive ly - note , 
"On the TFA, the US has quite a long record of setting up institutions that give an illusion of 
action but actually don't lead to anything much. I mean, think about the Major Economic 
Forum, which was supposed to (build momentum) on climate change..." [21 [, 
and, 
"The number of initiatives that we are supporting or have to participate in that have to do 
with tropical forestry, you can't count them. You have lots of these coalitions..." [12]. 
So the TFA's e m e r g e n c e in i tself is not necessar i ly cons idered a 'game-changer ' , despi te its 
innovat ive form. Yet these s a m e two part ic ipants e x p r e s s di f ferent conclus ions on its prospects , 
the f irst m o r e pess imis t ic : 
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"I rather think the TFA might be one of those [institutions that give an illusion of action]. I 
might be wrong, but I think not At some point you start to think, 'What's the point of 
setting up another institution, rather than just doing something yourseip'. So I'm a bit 
cynical about the TFA" [21], 
The second participant, on the other hand, expressed a more optimistic view, stating that, 
"...when it comes to this specific initiative we do have some hope, simply because the CGF is 
one of the drivers. The CGF has made some strong public commitments, it has the resources 
and it has the purchasing power to actually change behaviour, it is supported by the right 
players" [12]. 
In addition to being 'supported by the right players', this participant was also encouraged by the 
views of at least some actors involved in the CGF on where the collaboration could be most 
beneficial, 
"if there is anything that can help, then it's this initiative, especially because you have 
people like [Unilever CEO] Paul Polman saying 'well we don't want to replicate existing 
initiatives, we want to strengthen other initiatives like RSPO, FSC, PEFC in better delivering 
what they set out to deliver'. If that is the approach that comes through, then I think it may 
actually be a worthwhile initiative. If it helps stakeholders to agree and not to compete" 
[121 
In other words, this participant draws part of his optimism from the intentions of the certain 
members - and specifically, Unilever - not to allow the TFA to generate further responses for 
traded deforestation. This conclusion recalls one of the main conclusions of Chapter 5, which 
built on regime complex theory to demonstrate that the dynamics of competition between 
schemes, spurred by both NGO behaviour and company sourcing policies, can act as a limitation 
on the ability of private sector and civil society to contribute to slowing traded deforestation. 
Given Unilever's involvement in the POIG, which remains steadfast against creating a rival to the 
RSPO, it seems fair to conclude that within Unilever at least, if not more broadly, the 
counter-productive outcomes of proliferating responses are being recognised and heeded. 
As for the prospective contribution of the TFA, it remains unclear how that collaboration will 
become greater than the sum of its parts. The blanket dismissal of regulatory options by the 
governments involved - for reasons canvassed in Chapter 6 - stymies the possibility of 
productive interactions between regulatory responses and leading company commitments. 
Because the companies within the CGF had already committed to strong, collective sourcing 
policies for the deforestation commodities, they must have anticipated some kind of further 
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assistance in approaching the US Government. The US Government's early decision not to 
entertain regulatory options therefore demonstrates and emphasises the seif-fuifiUing 
prophetic nature of governments' tendency to cast traded deforestation as a private sector 
problem. 
Passive pathways 
The three pathways introduced above - leadership, collaboration and peer pressure - are all 
'active' in that actors deliberately seek them out in an attempt to achieve greater influence than 
is possible through their own coverage. Yet it is also worth considering evidence and 
perspectives on the possibility that actors and responses might stimulate greater coverage 
passively, akin to Auld et al.'s. ( 2 0 0 8 ) 'unintended consequences' (specifically for certification). 
This section will introduce that evidence, and perspectives on it, under the umbrella of four 
'passive pathways'. 
Peer pressure 
The FSC provides an excellent example of a well-studied response that has exerted an influence 
beyond its immediate coverage. As Chapter 5 canvassed, through its mere existence (i.e. 
unintentionally) the FSC put 'upward pressure' on the standards of various industry-backed 
forestry certification schemes that had emerged in reaction to the FSC (Smith and Fischlein, 
2010 ; Auld et al., 2008 ) . The FSC openly acknowledges, and in fact welcomes, the influence that 
it achieved through the dynamics of competition with the PEFC scheme. An FSC participant 
explains the lesson that the scheme took from this history: 
"One thing that we can do is by having a strong system, demonstrating responsibility and 
being credible, that gives us a competitive edge, but it also encourages other certifications 
to improve over the years in order to meet the requirements of public procurement policies, 
where they are compared with FSC. 
"If that has a positive impact on the forest, then that's us achieving our mission..." [1], 
The FSC has interpreted that its leadership in 'having a strong standard' can have a flow-on 
effect on its rivals' standards. Yet because its behaviour is not driven by an intent to generate 
this effect, but instead to 'gain a competitive edge', the pathway of influence can be regarded as 
passive. Furthermore, the strength of the evidence for the example of the FSC has led other 
sustainability schemes to espouse the potential of this pathway for other deforestation 
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commodities. For example, during the 'Roundtable of Roundtables' discussion at the RSPO 
general annual meeting in 2012, the Executive Director of the RSPO stated that: 
"We have come to terms with the fact that we are going to inspire others to come up with 
standards...at the end of the day the market decides, the market differentiates... [and] at 
the end of the day if every one of these standards delivers, we are in good stead" (Webber, 
2012} . 
Webber's claim is still in the process of being borne out, with notably different dynamics 
produced by the entrance of national palm oil standards in Indonesia and Malaysia (Djama at al., 
forthcoming]. Continuing one of the major themes of this study, however, there are also a priori 
reasons for scepticism over the claim that 'every standard might deliver'; more realistically, new 
schemes and standards are frequently designed to undercut existing schemes. As Chapter 5 
demonstrated, the simple existence of multiple schemes creates competition, the negative 
effects of which are often exacerbated by the behaviour of schemes and NGOs. When the POIG, 
launched in the year following Webber's comment above, decided not to develop a rival scheme 
to the RSPO, it demonstrated an awareness of the danger of these counter-productive effects. 
Further, not everyone is willing to accept Webber's claim that the RSPO might 'inspire others', 
since in stark contrast to perceptions of the robustness of the FSC's standard, the RSPO's 
standard is instead widely criticised for the weakness - or indeed, absence - of several 
obviously applicable environmental criteria. This might explain why one NGO participant in this 
study noted (prior to the POlG's emergence] that, 
"By all means if there are other schemes that are emerging that are stronger [than the 
RSPO] and can attract perhaps more niche but a higher quality standard, that's great, 
because it allows some of the leaders to set the bar even higher and not to be reduced to 
the common denominator of a broad based scheme" ]5]. 
The point remains that it is difficult to say a priori whether additional responses - competing 
schemes - will have a beneficial or counter-productive effect overall; the balance will likely 
differ on a commodity by commodity basis and depend heavily on the relative positions of the 
schemes involved. For timber, the major question is whether legality schemes will undermine or 
support the established sustainability schemes of the FSC and PEFC (Cashore and Stone, 2012] ; 
while for palm oil the question is whether the standards of the RSPO can be raised - including 
through possible competition - to encompass greenhouse gas emissions, protection of forests 
with high conservation value, and prevention of planting on peatlands. As a subsequent section 
in this chapter will argue, however, perhaps the more pertinent question is whether the RSPO, 
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with all its inherent problems, might be threatened and supplanted not by a new scheme but 
instead by deeper and more direct engagement between companies and their suppliers. 
As a pathway to influence beyond coverage, peer pressure is not limited to the private sector 
and civil society. Participants in this study detailed several examples from which it is obvious 
that peer pressure also operates passively among governments. A first example is the case of 
New Zealand, whose large neighbour, Australia, implemented Its illegal logging laws in late 
2014. Toge ther with the US and EU's own versions of those laws, then, markets are 
progressive ly being closed of f to illegal t imber imports. Chapter 3's concept of displacement is 
highly relevant here, and suggests a danger for New Zealand in these actions in the absence of 
its own government fo l lowing suit. As one pol icymaker f rom NZ explained (in mid-2013) : 
"We are receiving a number of requests from exporters, but also forest owners and wood 
processors for the implementation of regulation similar to that of Australia's. Their main 
concern, as it has been articulated to me, is that exporters of wood of dubious legal status 
will see New Zealand as an alternative destination once the Australian market is regulated. 
This could either be as a domestic market in itself or for onwards shipping to Australia 
and other markets" [13]. 
By this comment, it seems apparent that illegal logging laws in the US, EU and Australia might 
passively ratchet up the pressure on other governments, especially those with significant 
exports to those markets or which might be seen as 'alternative destinations' for illegal timber. 
It is also instructive here that the source of pressure on the NZ Government to fo l low suit comes 
only passively f rom other governments but far more overt ly f rom domestic actors with 
operat ions that depend on external t imber sources and final markets. The final section in this 
chapter will make the argument that ref lexive calls for regulation from domestic actors is likely 
to be a theory of change with substantial traction. 
A second example of peer pressure operating passively be tween governments was elucidated 
by an FSC participant familiar with the implementation of the EU illegal logging laws, who noted 
that, 
"Norway - even though it isn 't in the EU - has been keeping up with a lot ofEU [timber] 
legislation, in order to keep trade relations" [4]. 
Clearly, then, the EU's laws have achieved an expanded influence in motivating actors within a 
country outside the EU to nonetheless comply with those laws. A similar ef fect can be expected 
for any NZ exporters of tropical t imber products to Australia. 
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Peer pressure may also serve to streamline, or harmonise, responses across actors, which 
Chapter 5 concluded holds considerable potential to remedy the fragmentary tendencies of 
responses to deforestation. The effects of this pressure are especially visible across companies, 
which for example are working to align their respective 'no deforestation' commitments 
through The Forests Dialogue (2014). Governments also behave in ways suggestive of peer 
pressure, as one participant explained in relation to the EU illegal logging laws, 
"[There is a] strange paradox in the EU where governments want freedom of manoeuvring, 
but once they get that they want to know what other governments are doing and they 
don '£ want to do anything too differently, so you get this coordination of implementing 
rules" [4], 
This example demonstrates that peer pressure can result in a de facto harmonisation of policies 
across countries, even where no regulatory imperative demands it. A similar outcome might 
also result in situations where governments must make determinations with regulatory 
implications, such as the US Environmental Protection Agency's decision on the environmental 
standards for imported palm oil to qualify for the biofuels mandate. As the environmental news 
website Triple Pundit noted in relation to a previous decision by the EPA, 
'The EPA's decision will have far broader influence than just US biofuels markets. Other 
governments are looking closely at EPA's findings as a basis for their own assessments 
of palm oil's impact. In particular, Europe, which uses substantially more palm biodiesel 
than the United States, is currently assessing the shape of its own biofuels mandate' 
(2012). 
In all likelihood, this equation has since been reversed, since in early 2015 the EU is poised to 
limit the proportion of its biofuels mandate that could be contributed from 'first generation 
feedstocks' (which includes palm oil), while the EPA is still considering its 'determination' on 
palm oil. But the general point remains that peer pressure may lead governments to de facto 
harmonisation of policies across jurisdictions. Again, the importance of this outcome - and this 
pathway - is in its potential to ameliorate the fragmentation that results in the proliferation of 
both regulatory responses and sourcing policies. 
Finally, one important interpretation of this pathway permits peer pressure to also be 
recognised at the upstream end of supply chains for the deforestation commodities. For example, 
following the announcement of the soy moratorium in 2006, through which a broad coalition of 
domestic and international actors committed to severing the Brazilian soy industry from 
deforestation, Indonesia soon introduced its own moratorium on the granting of new timber 
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concessions. As the former Director General of CIFOR, Frances Seymour, explains, based on her 
experiences in Indonesia at the time, 
"When the Brazil [soy moratorium] was signed, maybe [in Indonesia] there was a little 
bit of a feeling that 'well, we could do that too'" (Seymour, 2014) . 
Peer pressure can be clearly detected at both up- and downstream ends of supply chains for the 
deforestation commodities. Similarly, it exerts itself on both public and private responses. Its 
has many possible effects, all of which are likely to be positive, including stimulating new 
responses, encouraging actors to voluntarily comply with responses that emerge in other 
jurisdictions, and harmonising details of existing responses. 
Infhiencing suppliers 
From the beginning, this study has confined itself to analysing downstream responses to traded 
deforestation, in light of the gaps in understanding that pertain to their limitations and potential 
contributions . As Chapter 6 noted, however, international ownership structures can complicate 
this picture, with - for example - nodes such as traders operating equally across Western and 
other producing countries of commodities such as soybean, beef and palm oil. Further, the 
supply chains of some actors, such as Cargill, stretch all the way from the consumption to the 
production ends of these chains, making it hard to accurately allocate some actors to either 
'upstream' or 'downstream' ends. These features of contemporary supply chains, which have 
emerged organically through the course of this study, become vitally important for the current 
discussion on pathways of influence, as contrary to their stymieing effect in Chapter 6 they 
actually expose further opportunities for that influence to be exerted. 
A representative for Unilever explains how one such manifestation of the influencing suppliers 
pathway functions, 
"While [our] purchasing 3 percent of [global production of} palm oil may sound small, we 
are the single biggest buyer. Unilever, just by the fact we're asking for sustainable and 
traceable palm oil, means that our suppliers will have to move... Suppliers will have to 
change the way they're buying palm oil in order to supply us with what we need..." [3]. 
In order to comply with Unilever's requirements, then, suppliers will have to themselves change 
their production practices (of course, if these suppliers rely on a further set of companies, the 
requirements will theoretically be 'passed on' further upstream). Clearly too, the size and 
therefore market power of the actor enacting the sourcing policy is a major determinant of its 
capacity to influence suppliers; for smaller purchasers, the possibility exists that suppliers 
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might instead opt to supply other customers (which would be a tidy instance of displacement). 
As the Unilever representative above continues, 
"Again I think it all comes back to the volumes. It's relatively easier for Unilever to make 
the business case [for our suppliers to change] because we buy the biggest amount of palm 
oil in the world. Then we can have an influence on the way our suppliers work... so we're 
using that to our advantage. But that clearly doesn't hold for some of the smaller buyers..." 
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This participant contends that market power is relevant for determining the ability of 
downstream actors to influence suppliers. Yet not all participants in this study agreed. As one 
supply chain expert noted, 
"Any business can do it [engage with their suppliers]. It's open to all in size, scale. In terms 
of leverage [scale] is an issue, but companies can find ways of going about this. They just 
need to look how they can work with other businesses, [using] a pre-competitive approach 
of working together and defining potential supply chain partners. That's where it's 
heading at the moment" [10]. 
A pathway introduced below - Signalling - will explore the possibility that even in the absence 
of sufficient market power, groups of actors can nonetheless contribute to influencing suppliers' 
practices. Yet according to the participant above, engaging directly with suppliers can still be an 
effective way for smaller actors to seek influence, especially in comparison with simply 
announcing a policy on paper. Such engagement may even be necessary to convert the policies 
that announced by actors, both big and small, into actual changes in practices within supply 
chains. But before exploring this argument further, it is necessary to recognise an important 
mechanism enabling influence on suppliers to generate broader influence than coverage 
suggests. 
That explanation begins with the knowledge that suppliers, as well as producers, generally have 
multiple customers. Suppliers also benefit from making their production practices and supply 
chains as simple as possible. As a result, if one customer demands a higher standard - such as 
'deforestation-free', or certified -a supplier might choose to meet that standard not just for that 
customers' supplies but also other fractions of its production and supply chains. An example of 
this influence emerged through the timber procurement policy of the UK Government. As Brack 
and Bailey (2013) note, 
'The evidence also suggests that [these policies] can have a much broader impact on 
consumer markets than simply through the direct effect of government purchases. 
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Suppliers' preferences for relatively simple supply chains magnifies the effect; if they 
need to supply sustainable t imber for public purchasers, for example, the evidence 
suggests that they are tending to prefer to supply the same products to their other 
customers too. 
'One estimate suggested that government procurement can achieve market leverage of 
up to 25 per cent of the market [compared w^ith about 10 per cent for direct purchases] 
when knock-on effects such as these are included' (p l9 ) . 
So suppliers' demand for simplicity across their production and supply chains can work in 
downstream actors' favour. This logic appeared to apply equally for the trader, Wilmar, which 
decided to implement a 'no deforestation' commitment across both production and trading of 
palm oil, firstly, but also of other commodit ies relevant to deforestation such as soy. Cargill, 
which also straddles both production and trading for palm oil and soy, among others, followed 
Wilmar 's example in late 2014. 
Even for retailers confined to the downstream end of supply chains, however, the lesson of the 
UK Government's t imber procurement policy is recognised, especially in light of the limitations 
on companies collaborating with their peers. As the Unilever participant continues, 
"Our [intention] is to try to change the industry first through our own suppliers, and then 
let's see what happens to the rest of our peers" [3], 
Indeed, as foreshadowed above, mult iple participants articulated this not as a desirable 
pathway for extending the influence of a policy, but as necessary for implementing those policies 
in the first place. The Unilever representative continued, 
"You can't just say 'we want to buy sustainable' without making links to your supply 
chain..." [3], 
Another participant agreed and explained why this is the case, 
"There's still a lot of knowledge that [remains] to be built within the palm oil industry, 
about how the industry can be supported to improve its practices" [10]. 
A third participant, Mark Gomm, the sustainability director for the major Australian t imber 
retailer, Bunnings, confirmed the importance of this missing knowledge, when he noted at the 
APEC illegal logging workshop, 
"One of the biggest challenges, for us as for others, has been education along the supply 
chain. 10years later [after it began implementing itssourcing policy[, Bunnings still has to 
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step into supply chains to build capacity in our suppliers, [to teach them] to know what 
questions to ask, etc. ..." (Gomm, 2013). 
This comment reinforces the under-discussed fact that designing and announcing a sourcing 
pohcy can surely count only as the beginning, rather than the end, of the process of changing 
supplies. As one participant noted, making that policy a reality requires "that companies start 
taking responsibility for their supply chains, really dig into the details and get their hands dirty..." 
[10]. \n this sense, a commitment to source only certified versions of the deforestation 
commodities is a double-edged sword; while it carries with it an intention, if it does nothing 
more than channel actors into large collaborations such as Roundtables, it may overshadow a 
deeper and more direct engagement with suppliers. Given that 'most firms still do not have good 
means to measure or manage upstream or downstream impacts' (O'Rourke, 2014:1126}, many 
companies will be coming from an exceptionally low base if, and as, they begin to engage with 
their suppliers. 
To the extent that this engagement is necessary for realising the changes in practices implied 
within those policies, participants suggest that the sourcing 'solution' offered by Roundtables 
and certification may distract from realising these changes. As one participant explains, 
"if [companies] can support certified growers that's fantastic, but really they also need to 
support the larger proportion of growers to implement better practices (and perhaps one 
day become certified)" [10]. 
Here a crucial junction emerges with Chapter 3's exploration of the changes to international 
supply chains wrought by processes of globalisation, since the post-Fordist nature of those 
chains renders it more difficult - if not impossible - for downstream actors to productively 
engage with their suppliers. Indeed, they may not even be wholly aware of who those suppliers 
are; fully half of global manufacturing executives 'do not have visibility beyond their Tier 1 
suppliers' (O'Rourke, 2014:1124). As a result, companies are actively redressing some elements 
of the post-Fordist structure of global production, including reducing multiple dimensions of 
distance, in order to achieve the necessary control over supply chains. For example, as a 
Unilever participant in this study acknowledges, that company has needed to make changes to 
its own sourcing practices, "...moving from short term contracts into longer term contracts in 
order to make these changes" [3]. Similarly, Mars provides another example, moving in 2009 to 
'unilaterally pay an extra £200 per tonne to their suppliers' for its cacao, on the basis that 'the 
start of the solution [for ensuring long term supply] would be an improvement in farmer income' 
(IDH, 2013:9). Other, more minor examples exist where supply chains for cacao have been 
256 I P a g e 
in tent ional ly s h o r t e n e d to e n a b l e qual i ty control and value capture within producer countr ies 
(Mann, 2 0 1 4 } . 
A minimal reading of these e x a m p l e s suggests the utility of influencing suppl iers in prevent ing 
the s imple d i s p l a c e m e n t of p r o b l e m a t i c vers ions of c o m m o d i t i e s to o t h e r purchasers . W h e n 
d o w n s t r e a m c o m p a n i e s m e e t their policies by 'digging into their supply chains ' to improve the 
prac t i ce of ex is t ing suppl iers , r a t h e r than s e e k out o t h e r compl iant suppliers , they can 
effect ively mit igate against the d a n g e r of d isp lacement . But there is also a m o r e powerful 
conc lus ion avai lable here . To the e x t e n t that the above e x a m p l e s r e p r e s e n t a b r o a d e r shift in the 
s t r u c t u r e of in ternat ional supply chains , that shift d e m o n s t r a t e s that the current s t ruc ture of 
internat ional t r a d e - post -Fordis t , with high d is tances and low a w a r e n e s s - is at the very least 
unconduc ive to a l lowing d o w n s t r e a m a c t o r s to respond adequate ly to traded deforestat ion; in 
fact, it may even be preventa t ive of those efforts . T h e behaviour of Unilever, Mars and others , 
then, provides conf i rmat ion of o n e of this study's m a j o r t h e m e s , raised in Chapter 3, that in 
l imiting r e s p o n s e s ' s u b j e c t of g o v e r n a n c e to prob lemat i c vers ions of certain commodi t ies , in 
ignorance o f viable a l ternat ives o r c o m p l e m e n t s , c r e a t e s a l imitation on the contr ibut ion that 
these r e s p o n s e s can then m a k e to s lowing defores ta t ion . 
Learning 
Learning is a fur ther pass ive p a t h w a y for expanding influence, cons is tent ly identified by 
par t ic ipants and s u p p o r t e d by mult iple l i teratures . One FSC part ic ipant in this study argued that 
s c h e m e ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n goes beyond the forests it cer t i f ies by creat ing condit ions w h e r e learning 
can occur, as he explains : 
"[it's] not Just about the forests that engage with FSC... [because] if by some forests getting 
certified that improves practices across a region, either through a change in attitude or a 
change in practices, then FSC is achieving its mission. By changing practices in one place 
you can influence practices in another" ]1]. 
F o r e s t r y cert i f icat ion l i tera tures often point to such ' indirect effects ' o r 'unintended 
c o n s e q u e n c e s ' of susta inabi l i ty s c h e m e s , with Auld et al. ( 2 0 0 8 ] , for example , concluding the 
i m p o r t a n c e of the ' b r o a d e r impl icat ions of cert i f icat ion ' ( p 2 0 0 } . (It is n e c e s s a r y to note, in this 
context , tha t even cer t i f i ca t ion 's direct ef fects are less than perfect ly unders tood, but are 
c u r r e n t l y be ing e x a m i n e d through a m a j o r co l laborat ive study; s e e R o m e r o et al., 2 0 1 3 ] . 
Multiple o t h e r a u t h o r s echo this par t ic ipant - and Auld et al.'s - claim, including those behind 
the c o m p r e h e n s i v e T o w a r d s Sustainabi l i ty A s s e s s m e n t , which 'found abundant case examples 
of i m p r o v e d prac t i ces d e m o n s t r a t e d by cert i f icat ion processes , then adopted m o r e widely ' 
( S t e e r i n g Commit tee , 2 0 1 2 : i x ] . At leas t part of the reason for this diffusion of pract ices w a s that 
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'the infrastructure put in place to enable certification... also promoted the learning and uptake 
of sustainable practices' (ibid.). 
However, not all participants in this study, including those from the FSC, were as convinced of 
the potency of these indirect effects as the authors above. As one participant concludes, 
"Ifyou look at our mission, it doesn 't say that [our influence] is only through certification, 
but I do think that the reality has been for quite a while that in practice it has [only] been 
about certification... I am probably a bit more pessimistic about the FSC's wider impacts, 
such as knowledge sharing, etc."[4]. 
Clearly, contrasting viewpoints coexist on the ability and potency with which sustainability 
schemes enable learning outside of certified forests or agriculture plantations. Contradictory 
perspectives such as these reinforce this chapter's claim that judging the importance of 
pathways is more often than not a highly speculative task. This section does not seek to decide 
either way on the potency of the direct versus indirect effects of sustainability schemes. 
However, it does make the separate claim, much more pertinent to this study's focus, that 
learning is a pathway to influence beyond coverage, and further, it is applicable to both ends of 
supply chains. 
At the downstream end of supply chains, learning can occur when practitioners' and 
policymakers' involvement with one response (or set of responses] leads to the opening of 
further possibilities. The EU's FLEGT Action Plan, which encompasses both Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements with timber-producing countries and the EU illegal logging laws, might 
yet prove instrumental in this regard. As one supply chain expert notes, 
"the FLEGT experience has been a good one, and people think it's been effective, and that 
shows how the EU can use its trade and market access to achieve good things" ]21]. 
This participant was optimistic that this positive experience might prove conducive for the 
design and implementation of a complementary EU Action Plan for agricultural commodities 
relevant to deforestation, noting, 
"So what we are trying to do is push for is an EU Action Plan like the FLEGT Action Plan, 
which triggered a whole lot of debate and discussion and options papers and all sorts of 
useful thinking, and we think if the EU would start that off it would help tremendously" 
]21] 
As set out in Chapter 6, however, the difficulties of regulating these commodities, combined 
with the enhanced sensitivity of producer countries vis-d-vis timber, considerably narrow the 
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political lassitude available to consumer countries to engage on palm oil, beef and soya. This 
participant said as much in acknowledging, 
"So far no one in the EU has said 'Yes, we are going to address this [traded deforestation] 
systematically'" [21 ]. 
Again, Chapter 6 revealed many of the constraints on addressing traded deforestation 
'systematically'. Yet for present purposes, it is also crucial to recognise that politicians have 
expressed optimism that their experience responding to timber supply chains [through 
procurement policies and illegal logging legislation] could prove valuable in any responses to 
agricultural commodities. As the UK Development Minister straightforwardly noted in 2012, 
"Experience gained from working on timber supply chains holds important lessons for 
oil palm and other commodities associated with deforestation" [O'Brien, 2012]. 
Governments have in fact already recognised the utility of allowing for learning to occur, for 
instance through phasing-in policies. As one participant describes with reference to the 
implementation of Denmark's new [sustainable] timber procurement policy: 
"Public procurement policy change will be applied to the easiest products first: office paper, 
then the construction sector, then moving into school pencils and other more tricky 
products later on. Yeah, in practice it will be a phased approach, to give people a bit of time 
to implement and also give suppliers time to catch up" [17], 
The idea of a phased or step-wise implementation of a given policy provides another lens 
through which to examine the tension between the two reference points of legality and 
sustainability, as developed through previous chapters. In light of a learning pathway, this 
chapter can now explain why multiple participants - including representatives of sustainability 
schemes - have been supportive of the trend towards legality as encouraged by illegal logging 
laws. As one supply chain expert contends, 
"...ifyou put in place a lot of the mechanisms you need to make sure your timber is legal, 
you're quite some way along the road to making sure it's sustainable as well. So [while 
some[ people were aware of the problem [offocusing on legality[ right from the beginning, 
and some NGOs were opposed... most people thought... it opens up space for further 
developments" [21 [. 
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Similarly, while noting that there are probably exceptions where "the laws are so lousy that 
[legality] doesn't matter" [4], two FSC representatives still considered legality to be a 
stepping-stone, or gateway, towards sustainability, 
"[The distinction between legality and sustainability] has been a concern for some people 
in Europe. I personally don 'tfeel that concern at all. I think first of all that legality is a very 
important first step towards sustainability" ]4], 
and, 
"On the whole, what we've seen in most places is that once you've got to the point of 
demonstrating that you're legal and have supply chain of custody then you've already 
made a big step to becoming responsible or sustainable... the benefits [of legality] 
outweigh the risks [that it could become a new baseline]" [1]. 
Others disagree, of course. A representative of the other major forestry sustainability scheme, 
PEFC, argued that, 
"We don't want to encourage baseline management guidelines [around legality], we want 
to make sure that people go directly towards SFM..." [12[. 
But that participant also noted the crucial need to "build the necessary capacity on the ground to 
enable forest owners to do that" [12], This perspective allows further clarification on the 
question of whether legality-focused responses support or undermine sustainability-based 
responses to be refined. Namely, the question then becomes whether the learning necessary to 
achieve legality is a supportive 'step towards sustainability' while simultaneously not 
encouraging producers to come to rest at this lower baseline. Again, this study is not designed to 
reach conclusive answers on this tension, but it is able to note its importance in determining 
whether the trend towards legality acts as a limitation on the potential contribution of existing 
sustainability-focused responses to traded deforestation. 
For this chapter's purposes, what is important to note here is that the basis for believing that 
legality will support sustainability derives - essentially - from the presence of a learning 
pathway. This claim rests on the idea that what actors at both ends of supply chains require to 
achieve sustainability is also required to comply with legality. Continuing to develop the 
conclusions reached in Chapter 6, then, this idea casts the illegal logging laws in a new light, as a 
baseline that will require suppliers to enact changes in practices that can then be leveraged 
towards further change to reach sustainability. Lambin et al. [ 2 0 1 4 ] provide support for this 
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notion when they note that 'progress on the learning curve associated with new instruments 
can only be achieved through implementation' (pl38]. 
Participants also saw the potential for this outcome, especially if other downstream responses -
chiefly, public procurement - provided an incentive to aspire towards sustainability. As one 
expert explained, 
"There's still room for improvement within public procurement: in fact, this is a way to 
keep raising the bar [from illegal logging legislation]" [17], 
This participant believes that the tension between illegal logging laws and public procurement 
can produce a fruitful dynamic. 
Other examples exist where learning is not just hoped for, but embedded within responses. 
Sustainability schemes, for example, usually seek to embed a similar tension conducive to 
learning. As one participant from the NGO, WWF, explains, 
"One of the key principles across all the schemes we're involved with is the notion of 
continual improvement, and differentiation from purely legal [even as that catches up over 
time)" [5], 
This participant suggests that schemes can embed 'the notion of continual improvement' - i.e. 
learning - in the behaviour of actors holding, or seeking, to be certified. 
A further angle on the relationship of schemes to learning is provided by the question of what 
schemes might themselves learn from one another. Literatures recognise the possible benefits of 
such learning. For example, the Towards Sustainability Assessment notes that 'comparison and 
learning among [certification] systems should also be encouraged, even when such systems 
focus on different commodities or resources, as many of the incentive, behavioural, and 
governance issues are related' (Steering Committee, 2012:xvi}. Similarly, Newell et al. (2012) 
are concerned by the potential for inter-scheme learning when they ask, 
'This, in turn, raises... the issue of innovation and learning within and across multi-actor 
governance [sustainability schemes]. How far do initiatives mimic one another's 
governance arrangements or modes of working that appear to generate success and 
learn from others' apparent failings? How far does this occur within particular sites of 
governance and across them, and what are the means by which this learning occurs?' 
(p379]. 
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Participants generally lamented the minimal extent to which schemes currently availed 
themselves of opportunities to learn from one another's experiences. Even the 
Cross-Roundtable discussion at the 2 0 1 2 RSPO meeting, which brought together 
representatives of the FSC, RTRS, MSC (fisheries] and Bonsucro (sugarcane], and would seem to 
suggest a degree of engagement between these schemes, was probably a fortunate coincidence 
more than a reflection of the intent for structured learning. As one FSC participant in this study 
reported, 
"[k was] accidental that [FSC representative] Alistair Monument went to the RSPO annual 
meeting. This engagement is 'driven by individuals' rather than a systematic approach to 
other certification schemes" [2], 
Clearly, an apathetic approach to the possibility of learning from other schemes is likely to 
undermine any collaboration - representing a greater level of inter-scheme engagement -
between them. Recall from Chapter 5 the perspective of an NGO participant, who claimed that, 
"I know of one of two instances of collaboration, where it suited both parties [major 
forestry schemes]" [5[. 
A representative of one of these schemes, the PEFC, agreed wholeheartedly, pointing not just to 
the possible benefits of collaboration with the FSC but also the RSPO. This participant stated 
that, 
"My argument is always when it comes to tropical deforestation, the major problem is the 
lack of collaboration between the major actors. I mean, on the one hand we have the RSPO 
sitting right next to us [in Europe]. How often do we actually talk to them? 
"What we are saying as a certification system is that everything that happens at the 
landscape level is something that must be clarified and detailed by governments, it's 
beyond the level of certification systems, which of course, is quite correct But there might 
be a chance for better collaboration to also consider landscape level changes" [12]. 
This lament about schemes' willingness to learn from each other, which is partly self-directed, 
demonstrates a key difference to the learning involved in the EU Action Plan and step-wise 
implementation of policies. It most likely reveals the effects of entrenched competition that 
were shown in Chapter 5 to be limiting - in many instances - the overall contribution that 
certification and Roundtables can make to slowing the deforestation connected to relevant 
commodities. In doing so, it suggests that the capacity for learning is further collateral damage 
from this competition. Even where the potential benefits are observed and understood, schemes 
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can be so focused on the parameters of increasing their coverage and creating direct effects that 
they forgo the possibilities of boosting their influence through more passive pathways of 
influence, including learning and collaborating. 
Signalling 
One final passive pathway - signalling - relates to the capacity for responses to traded 
deforestation to function collectively, and positively, providing a contrasting interpretation for 
the proliferation of responses that this study has canvassed. Multiple participants downplayed 
the fragmentary, conflicting features inherent in this proliferation in favour of emphasising the 
signals that responses collectively convey to upstream actors. This idea finds support from 
Bernstein and Cashore (2012], who note that, 'it is often the interaction of mechanisms and 
processes, sometimes along multiple pathways, that create collective influence' (p603]. The 
importance of this pathway, then, which is largely intangible, would be hard to overstate, 
especially in light of the magnitude and nature of changes that the industries for the 
deforestation commodities require. 
Speaking at the Cross-Roundtable discussion at the RSPO annual meeting in 2012, the 
Executive-Director of the RTRS, Agustfn Mascotena, summarised his view on the nature of the 
change sought in the soya industry: 
"at the end it's about more of a cultural change, a paradigm change in production and the 
supply chain..." (Mascotena, 2012). 
Multiple participants in this study concur with Mascotena on the need for a paradigm change 
within industries. At least one participant saw evidence that such a change could already be 
underway: 
"In terms of the wider picture, the whole debate about deforestation is starting to change, 
to the point where deforestation is becoming less acceptable politically, as well as 
practically... that's a change from twenty years ago. 
"Perhaps it's also becoming less acceptable to do forest management in some intact 
forests... that might continue changing in the future, particularly with high biodiversity, 
carbon or water values" [1]. 
Multiple participants were confident that current responses to traded deforestation will add to 
the impetus for this paradigm change, especially through the sheer collective weight of the 
responses that have proliferated over the last two decades, and in particularly the most recent 
decade. In the words of a supply chain expert: 
263 I P a g e 
"It's a 'bundle of signals' approach. You want to give as many signals as possible to the 
producer country governments that things are changing and they need to get on board. 
"One set of signals can come from domestic civil society, another set can come from 
domestic producers, another set can come from the international supply chain actors... 
another set of signals can come from consumer country governments, another set can 
come from international financiers..." [19]. 
According to this logic, it is the collective message inherent in current responses that will signal 
to upstream actors an emerging paradigm where certain requirements must be met in order to 
export, at the very least, to those markets covered by responses. This signal can in turn create 
an awareness for upstream actors that, along the lines of this study's argument, international 
t rade is being 'retro-fitted' with supply-chain focused governance, in this case specifically to 
disconnect consumers from the problem of tropical deforestation. A second supply chain expert 
expands on the signal pathway: 
"I think it was part of the drumbeat of inevitability that deforestation-free standards were 
coming, that we the community who care about forests have needed to bootstrap ourselves 
up to convince companies like Wilmar... and send the signals 
"...And this is 5 years, 10 years [of effort] and a lot of different processes - REDD, UNFCCC, 
supply chain sustainability-you know, there has been an increasing trend towards a 
global norm of deforestation-free production..." [16[. 
It is against this backdrop of a shift to 'deforestation-free production' that companies have been 
convinced that it is in their own interests to change their production and strive for compatibility 
with the requirements of responses to traded deforestation. The same participant expresses the 
'business case' for this change as follows: 
"These companies, who actually are in a position of power to change the way business is 
done, have been convinced that they were going to have to do that sometime soon, they 
might as well do it now they might as well get the kudos for being at the head of the line 
rather than being the laggard" [16[. 
The following section on theories of change will show how leading companies in turn place 
pressure on downstream governments (a theme briefly explored in Chapter 6), showing how 
company incentives to 'be at the head of the line' can - theoretically - translate into regulatory 
action. 
264 I P a g e 
More immediately, however, while the signalling pathway derives its potency from the sheer 
number and breadth of current responses, it remains the case that individual responses still 
have differentiated roles to play within that context. An FSC participant explains that as "WWF 
and Greenpeace are making the worst behaviour more transparent... the FSC can demonstrate 
that good tropical management is possible even in the 'worst' countries for forestry" [2], Further, 
this chapter has also already explored how illegal logging laws and public procurement policies 
can togerter construct a productive dynamic for timber, where legality becomes the baseline 
while producers still have an incentive to push towards sustainability. 
Signals can be strengthened when responses are endorsed by producer country governments. 
The Tropical Forest Alliance, for example, gained credibility with Indonesian palm oil producers 
and traders after a foundational meeting of the TFA was hosted by the Government of Indonesia, 
as one participant explained: 
"I do think the TFA has been successful in some critical ways. [One] service that the TFA has 
played a role in is in creating that echo-chamber [of reinforcing signals], 
"If the [TFA[ meeting in Jakarta achieved anything, it showed the Kadims and the medium-
sized producers, it showed Wilmar and it showed 101 that some of the biggest companies in 
the world are going to march into your own turf and tell you that they care about 
[deforestation], and your very own government is going to stand there next to them and 
agree. Those are some pretty strong signals" [16]. 
As this participant describes, this meeting enabled the TFA to send a clear message about the 
depth of downstream actors' intentions to Indonesia, the country with the highest deforestation 
rate. The host government's explicit support only added potency to this message. Clearly, then, 
the TFA is an example of an individual response that retains an ability to achieve influence 
individually. But even responses with negligible direct effects can nonetheless strengthen the 
signal emanating from the set of responses as a collective. As the above participant emphatically 
concludes, 
7 would not discount the value of global signalling,you know. We are essentially trying to 
create norms and while things like a ]hypothetical] deforestation-free procurement policy 
by the US Government is worthless in terms of tonnes [since] we don't import Brazilian soy, 
we don't import palm oil, and certainly the US Government doesn't buy it, because we have 
Buy American provisions in our procurement policies. 
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"[Rather] it is symbolic and it is part of global signalling, and that global signalling, that 
creation of a global norm, is what will provide a rising tide... The dominos will fall in front 
of that tide, even if they won't fall in front of specific actions" [16]. 
3. T h e o r i e s o f c h a n g e 
The above pathways offer current responses, and the actors that implement them, the promise 
of an influence beyond their immediate coverage, in the process offsetting the corollary 
possibility of displacement. This promise makes them important for a balanced and broad 
analysis of the potential contribution of current responses. 
This section presents one final, complementary set of ideas: three 'theories of change' that 
intensive analysis of relevant literatures and discussions with participants reveal as especially 
critical. These theories of change seek to describe how current responses might - including 
through the pathways of influence above - achieve the transformation of entire industries for 
the deforestation commodities. In other words, in resolving the ultimate connections of these 
commodities with deforestation, achieving influence beyond coverage might be necessary for 
responses, but may still be insufficient for the wholesale change that actors espouse and desire. 
Through mapping out these three theories of change, the claims and intentions behind 
responses are subjected to scrutiny, revealing their potential as well as further limitations. 
Tipping points 
A first theory of change - captured in the notion of a 't ipping point' - is widely supported by 
actors within the private sector and civil society. It has been publicly espoused, for example, by 
the Global Director of Sustainable Sourcing for Unilever, Cherie Tan, who at the RSPO 2012 
annual meeting claimed, 
"...ultimately there will be a tipping point, where conversion to sustainable palm oil will 
become automatic" (Tan, 2012]. 
A Unilever participant in this study expanded on this idea, asserting, 
"Industry will reach a tipping point, say in 5 years time, where the majority of palm oil 
coming into Europe, for example, will be sustainable, rather than the other way around. If 
you're not buying RSPO then you're in the minority... 
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"Suddenly [it will be] easier to be selling sustainable than unsustainable palm oil. It's not 
that we'll eliminate the unsustainable palm oil... but sustainable will just become part of 
the way that business works..." [3] 
A par t i c ipant f rom the RSPO c o n c u r r e d with this idea, even ascr ib ing a percentage figure for 
w h e n the t ipping point for palm oil might be reached, 
"When we reach the tipping point, the theory is that everything will come naturally. The 
uptake of sustainable palm oil then becomes normal... We believe that 16 percent is the 
tipping point If we can manage to get 16 percent of consumption to be sustainable, then 
we believe the rest will come naturally after that" [8]. 
T h e RSPO a l ready cert i f ies 1 4 p e r c e n t of global palm oil product ion, but b e c a u s e only half of this 
is purchased as cert i f ied product , that organisa t ion ' s ambit ion to reach 1 6 percent is largely a 
p r o b l e m of g e n e r a t i n g d e m a n d , r a t h e r than genera t ing supply. 
A par t i c ipant f rom the W W F , w h o s e Market T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Initiative has provided the impetus 
for mult iple susta inabi l i ty s c h e m e s , out l ines the a r g u m e n t s that suppor t the idea of a tipping 
point, 
"If some of our assumptions are correct... we think that the more the large players shift 
they'll drag the rest of the market with them because they'll have no choice if they want to 
access markets or secure supply... It's not a case of leaving the rest behind, it's more that 
the others will follow" [5]. 
This quote l inks b a c k to both the leadership and p e e r pressure pathways of inf luence descr ibed 
above, s ince it a s s e r t s that once ' large players ' s tar t to requi re 'defores ta t ion- f ree ' vers ions of 
c o m m o d i t i e s , the i r peers will have sound c o m m e r c i a l r e a s o n s - ensur ing a c c e s s to m a r k e t s and 
s e c u r i n g supply - for fol lowing suit. In this sense , the leadership d e m o n s t r a t e d by m a j o r 
reta i lers , for example , might c h a n g e the equat ion for rat ional behaviour by smal ler bus inesses . 
For ins tance . Mars ' decis ion to uni lateral ly pay extra to its c a c a o producers undoubtedly puts 
c o m m e r c i a l p r e s s u r e on o t h e r m a j o r p u r c h a s e r s to do l ikewise. As the Climate and Land Use 
All iance ( 2 0 1 4 ] r e c e n t l y noted, ' m a n y chal lenges lie ahead, but the disruption of the global 
c o m m o d i t i e s b u s i n e s s has begun. Bus iness laggards that a r e unable or unwilling to e m b r a c e the 
n e w d e m a n d s and oppor tuni t i es of the 2 1 s t century will lose out, as they have in o t h e r 
d is rupted industr ies ' (p5] . 
Interest ingly , t h e W W F puts a high figure on the point at which the s c h e m e s it's involved in 
could b e r e g a r d e d as successful , noting, 
267 I P a g e 
"I don't think we'd be considering any of them a success until [they get] up around the 40, 
50, 60 percent [of market coverage] mark... So yes we see 50 percent [or somewhere 
between 25-75 percent dependent on location) as our targets but we think those numbers 
will continue to increase as markets evolve" [5]. 
These figures are not directly comparable witli the 16 percent figure quoted by the RSPO 
participant above; that figure referred to a supposed tipping point whereas these figures refer 
to the point at which the WWF will regard schemes as 'a success'. However, the final sentence in 
this participant's quote demonstrates that the WWF foresees an essentially downhill slope once 
these levels are reached, indicating the expectation that a tipping point will have been passed 
and coverage can continue to increase automatically. 
Participants from the private sector, schemes and civil society clearly believe that tipping points 
exist, after which coverage can continue to increase naturally. Crucially, though, no scheme has 
yet reached such a point. This applies to the most mature of the Roundtable schemes, the FSC, 
which has existed for more than two decades and is perceived to have a strong standard; yet 
equally to the RSPO, which has been the fastest growing scheme over the last decade but is 
perceived to have a weak standard. This argument cannot be made unequivocally that tipping 
points might not exist, of course, though that is a possibility. Rather, the fact that none has yet 
been reached merely means that the supporting arguments put forward by participants - "it will 
be easier to import sustainable than unsustainable; market access and security of supply will drag 
the market; the rest will come naturally" - remain untested. The Towards Sustainability 
Assessment concludes similarly, noting: 
'It is less clear whether or when there is a point of "market tipping", when demand for 
certified products is great enough to make certification [or other assurances of 
improved performance) a de facto condition of market entry, and if so, what conditions 
would contribute to that effect' (Steering Committee, 2012:xiv). 
The present study suggests some conditions that are likely to detract from, or thwart, the 
possibility that industries could reach tipping points. Amid the turbulent dynamics of private 
sector-civil society responses explored in Chapter 5 - including new drivers of uptake for the 
FSC but also a trend towards legality, and a further trend towards bypassing the RSPO -
significant challenges are discernible for schemes to continue increasing coverage at all, let 
alone to such an extent where markets might 'tip'. In a more clear-cut example from earlier in 
this chapter, the legal constraints of competition law have already prevented one downstream 
jurisdiction - Australia - from effectively 'tipping' its palm oil imports instantaneously. Despite 
these limitations, however, and despite the as-yet unproven nature of tipping points, what this 
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study shows is that many participants hold firm to the idea that they might allow future 
increases in coverage to be more easily achieved, enabling entire markets to transform. 
Some participants in this study are considerably more sceptical about tipping points. A 
participant from TFT, a consultancy that helps companies engage with and drive change in their 
supply chains, is unconvinced that 'certification' - referring also to Roundtables - can transform 
an entire industry towards more sustainable practices. As he explains, 
"It comes back to a theory of change [for the palm oil industry]... is it by a certification 
approach? Our view is that no, that's not what's going to happen, it hasn't happened to 
date... I don't see certification being the mainstream, I think it's largely niche and I see it 
staying that way for the foreseeable future" [10]. 
If certification remains 'niche', at current levels, for instance, then clearly this would challenge 
the tipping point idea; even if they exist they could no longer be viewed as a realistic way to 
transform an industry. Recall that one attraction of the idea of tipping points is as an antidote to 
displacement. A tipping point would enable the leadership of some actors to produce conditions 
in which even the lagging actors are increasingly disconnected from deforestation. Yet some 
participants then revealed a paradox in this idea. As one FSC participant notes, the uptake of 
that scheme in its 'traditional' markets is trailing off: 
"... in some markets you'll see that slowing... already slowing in North America and other 
places, partly because... a lot of areas where the market is sensitive have been affected 
already" [1 ]. 
Although this participant maintained "I still see a lot of potential for growth" [1], this growth 
would be largely dependent on "a growth in market awareness in other places" [1]. This point 
was echoed by other participants for other commodities, including the Executive-Director of the 
RSPO, who said in an interview: 
"But we have to take it step by step. We need Europe, the US, Oceania and South East 
Asia to move; and if all these markets move, then China and India will also move" 
(quoted in Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013] . 
But the inevitability of this sequence did not seem to persuade a WWF participant discussing 
palm oil, who said, 
"/ agree [with tipping point theory]. Unfortunately, those markets in India and China make 
it difficult to reach a global tipping point" [5], 
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What these two participants are arguing is that further increases in coverage - and therefore 
progress towards tipping points - need to be reaMsed within non-environmentally sensitive 
mari<ets for the deforestation commodities. This would mean that reaching the points at which 
any lagging markets would 'naturally' and 'automatically' become sustainable in turn depends on 
the ability of schemes and NGOs to engage these lagging markets. It seems hard to avoid 
concluding that, with the possible exception of cacao, the 'solution' to the problem of lagging 
markets promised by the tipping point idea necessitates converting exactly those same markets. 
Participants in this study are not the only advocates for the idea of tipping points. The 
International Tropical Timber Organisation, for instance, notes that 'regulatory measures 
targeted at eradicating illegal timber products from international trade will have a much 
broader impact on demand because non-complying actors will gradually be eliminated from the 
supply chain' (ITTO, 2010:15). But the ITTO and consumer governments have less to lose than 
sustainability schemes and NGOs if the idea of a tipping point is not borne out in practice. As one 
WWF participant describes, 
"The whole basis for this [Roundtable] approach is around mainstreaming or transforming 
markets and the whole reason for the multi-stakeholder approach, the compromise 
approach, is to get a standard that is significantly better than current standards, 
significantly better than business as usual, but it's far from perfect..." [5]. 
If a point is reached where the objective of certifying a majority of production (or consumption] 
proves persistently elusive, this would undermine the entire raison-d'etre of the Roundtables 
that have been formed. The 'compromise approach' inherent in Roundtables is justified with 
reference to the tipping point that will enable industry transformation. Should that perception 
change, Roundtables may begin to appear as a misuse of key actors' energies, attention and time. 
This is especially the case given the increasing trend towards 'going beyond' some current 
schemes, such as the RSPO, which has been initiated by individual companies, such as Nestle, 
and institutionalised within collaborations such as the Consumer Goods Forum. 
Even though a failure to reach hypothesised tipping points does not disprove their existence, 
the more compelling argument against them is instead the paradox of needing to win over the 
current hold-outs from schemes in order to transform that industry. In other words, the 
challenge remains the same as it was when Roundtables for the deforestation commodities 
were initiated. 
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Nodes 
Regardless of whether or not tipping point exist and are reachable, participants recognise that 
significant increases in coverage can be achieved by targeting nodes within international supply 
chains. 'Nodes ' signify places where otherwise diffuse supply chains (or sets of chains] channel 
through a narrow 'pinch-point', otherwise known as a 'choke-point' or hub, but hereafter 
referred to as 'nodes'. The strategy of targeting nodes, especially given these actors' potential to 
spark several pathways of influence - peer pressure, influencing suppliers and signalling -
described above, also holds some promise of achieving influence beyond coverage, making it a 
second theory of change applicable for entire industries. 
Even though, as Chapter 4 's discussion of coverage noted, each supply chain for the 
deforestation commodities and their derivatives has a unique profile, these chains nevertheless 
tend to concentrate at certain points (Brack and Bailey, 2013). The ' new patterns of industrial 
organisation, notably the concentration of power in lead firms within global production 
networks ' (Mayer and Gereffi, 2010:5] were canvassed in Chapters 3 and 5, with authors (eg. 
Conca, 2002; O'Rourke, 2005; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; Dauvergne and Lister, 2012] agreed on 
the opportunities this concentration presents for changing industry practices. 
In a parallel with Chapter 4 's exploration of coverage, these concentrations can also be 
conceptualised at different scales. Here, just two are proposed: a national scale and an actor 
scale. Taking these in turn, one obvious concentration at the national scale is the fact that 
Indonesia and Malaysia together account for 90 percent of global palm oil production, meaning 
the palm oil industry is concentrated at the production end of supply chains. In contrast, the EU 
and US account for 50 percent of cacao consumption, meaning that the cacao industry is 
concentrated at the consumption end of supply chains (although Cote d'lvoire alone yields 30 
percent of global production, making it another point of concentration]. Sometimes the points of 
concentration occur in intermediate countries. China and Vietnam provide an example of 
concentrated processing points in international timber supply chains, importing raw timber 
from producer countries and turning it into furniture and other finished products to sell on to a 
set of consumer countries. This position is what has created the tension and some of the 
uncertainty surrounding the implementation and enforcement of the EU and US illegal logging 
laws. China, Italy and Hong Kong also play an intermediary role within international leather 
supply chains (Brack and Bailey, 2013]. 
At whatever 'end' of supply chains they occur, these concentrations have implications, not least 
for the idea of tipping points. These concentrations mean that achieving tipping points will 
likely require either the active support, or at least neutrality, from these countries. There are 
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two reasons for this: firstly, because in the absence of this support it will be harder - if not 
impossible - to reach tipping points, and secondly, because the changes in practices that tipping 
points are hoped to trigger 'naturally' and 'automatically' are still more likely to flow to 
countries where those changes are well-received. Many nodal countries for the deforestation 
countries - Indonesia and Malaysia for palm oil, China for soybean and timber - are proving to 
be difficult founding grounds for current responses. Indeed, the push for national domestic 
'schemes' for palm oil in Indonesia and Malaysia can be understood as one result of a mismatch 
between the intentions 'signalled' by consumer countries and the results that producer 
countries are amenable to. 
Even putting the idea of tipping points aside, the concentration of supply chains at a national 
scale presents difficulties for increases in response coverage. But there is another scale at which 
these concentrations can be understood - the actor scale - that provides some relief from these 
difficulties. Conceptualising nodes at an actor scale illuminates two things: that actors within 
any given jurisdiction are differently disposed to responding to traded deforestation; and that 
actors are not necessarily confined to a single jurisdiction but are instead situated across 
multiple jurisdictions. Each of these points has been noted in previous chapters, yet here they 
have new implications, which are now addressed in turn. 
Firstly, actors within any jurisdiction - including nodal countries that have shown reluctance to 
engage with existing responses - are differently disposed to responding to traded deforestation. 
Because many response-types operate at non-national scales, including sustainability schemes 
and company sourcing policies, they can still take root within - or emerge from - nodal 
jurisdictions. This is where the pathways above, especially peer pressure, learning and 
signalling could potentially gain traction, enabling responses to gain traction over time. As the 
Executive-Director of the Roundtable on Responsible Soy stated at the RSPO meeting's 
Cross-Roundtable discussion in 2012 , "our strategy is to go for local [certified] production [in 
China] to show that it is possible, then influence the imports" (Mascotena, 2 0 1 2 ] . In this case the 
RTRS hopes to initiate a process of learning, beginning with awareness-raising about the 
general idea of certification, within a jurisdiction not regarded as receptive to sustainability 
schemes. 
Secondly, and prominently, many of the retailers and manufacturers who have designed 
sourcing policies for the deforestation commodities operate across multiple jurisdictions. The 
supply chains of these actors, then, provide a way for responses to affect consumption even 
within jurisdictions that have not proven receptive to existing responses. Both participants in 
this study, and practitioners more broadly, are highly aware of this use of company nodes. For 
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example, Adam Harrison, Senior Policy Officer with the WWF and the Vice President of the RSPO, 
explained that, 
"We [RSPO] are encouraging other companies, multinationals to take a lead on that. We 
urge [them] to sell it to emerging markets, not just to European clients" (quoted in 
Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013) . 
And multiple 'multinationals', not least those who have committed to transforming the palm oil 
industry, seem to be heeding this message. At the RSPO annual meeting in 2012, for instance, a 
representative of Walmart announced, 
"we plan to use our scale to drive uptake across various geographical markets, particularly 
focusing on India and China..." (Walker-Palin, 2012) . 
A Unilever participant in this study echoed this line, noting that, 
"We 're working with partners on the ground to help lift demand for sustainabiUty in 
countries like India and China... we're looking for the change that we can bring into those 
countries" [3]. 
These statements would please MD Chandran, an adviser to the RSPO, who at the 2012 RSPO 
meeting publicly espoused this idea of targeting actor nodes to reach non-sensitive markets: 
"The other way is to get the multinationals who are operating in India and China. They 
have a global standard, they can't differentiate between one or other of their markets" 
(Chandra, 2012) . 
Contrary to MD Chandran's latter comment, some companies have indeed tried to 'differentiate 
between one or other of their markets'. A previous sourcing policy for palm oil - from a major 
trader, Cargill - makes very clear that the company will differentiate between final markets. In 
2012, Cargill announced that, 
"... By 2015, the palm oil products Cargill supplies to our customers in Europe, United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be RSPO certified and/or originated from 
smallholder growers (excluding palm kernel oil products). 
'By 2020, 100 percent of all palm oil products Cargill will supply to our customers 
worldwide from across all our oil and trading businesses will be RSPO certified and/or 
originated from smallholder growers' (Cargill, 2012) . 
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It is surely no coincidence that Cargill intends to implement its policy in a step-wise fashion, 
beginning with precisely those countries, comprising much of the West, that have proven 
conducive to current responses to traded deforestation. Another major trader, Archer Daniels 
Midland, has similarly committed to 'exclusively offer RSPO-certified sustainable palm oil to 
North American customers beginning in 2 0 1 5 ' (ADM, 2 0 1 4 ) . These policies contradict MD 
Chandran's claim that multinationals can't differentiate, showing not only that they can but that 
some of them already have. This differentiation has frustrated some practitioners - including a 
Unilever participant in this study - who expressed the following, 
"At Unilever, it's company-wide, so we're not saying 'we'll do this for EU and US', we're 
saying we'll do this everywhere. So by 2015 unsustainable product will not be able to enter 
our supply chains" [3], 
There is also a larger point, and until recently a strong limitation, to be drawn from the Cargill 
example introduced above. At an actor scale, many nodes occur in the middle of supply chains, a 
niche often occupied by a handful of major traders and processors. It is this pattern across 
supply chains, which extends well beyond the deforestation commodities, that prompted 
Oxfam's pioneering study of four major traders in international agricultural trade (including 
both ADM and Cargill, as well as Bunge and Louis Dreyfus; still others are relevant for palm oil]. 
That document - entitled 'Cereal Traders' (Oxfam, 2 0 1 2 ) - concludes that 'understanding the 
economic and political power of the[se traders] is essential to developing a smart strategy to 
realise changes' (p6). Similarly, the Towards Sustainability Assessment notes that, 
'It is particularly important to understand the "business case" or drivers for engaging 
actors at less-well-understood points in the supply chain (for example, brokers and 
traders) to improve overall sustainability outcomes within those chains' (Steering 
Committee, 2012:xviii) . 
The presence of these traders within supply chain nodes renders them a crucial leverage point 
for more sustainable practices. Yet although these traders are often headquartered in Western 
countries, they have nonetheless been relatively late to the table in announcing or implementing 
sourcing policies. At least one likely reason for this was expounded by one participant quoted in 
Chapter 6, who noted that the internationalisation of many of these (agricultural) industries 
means "their power centres are not solely domestic" [16], One implication of their international 
character, that participant continued, is that, 
"...[so] instead of being a potential ally [for regulatory approaches for soy] because [they 
are] gonna level the playing field for their American production, they actually see this as a 
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potential threat, because you're gonna level the playing field against their Brazilian 
production" [16], 
This may one reason why even when traders - again, until recently - announced policies, these 
had rarely been either ambit ious or comprehensive across their operations. As McCarthy (2012) 
observes, 
'There is some discussion of the need for large traders and buyers to certify across their 
complete supply chains, such as a few multinational buyers now do... Yet, to date, large 
traders have only begun to apply certification to their own production; they have 
avoided putt ing due diligence requirements on the majority of the crude palm oil 
derived from trade with small producers' (p l884}. 
Yet there are also other likely reasons why traders, including Western ones, have typically been 
laggards in adopt ing sourcing policies. As Chapter 5 noted, the type of company that has 
typically been most active in announcing sourcing policies are also, not coincidentally, the type 
of company for which the NGO model - of campaigning against, pressuring and critiquing -
functions best. These companies are usually 'branded', where their value derives significantly 
from their reputation, and they are 'consumer-facing', in that their business depends directly on 
their consumers. Major retailers and supermarkets are typical cases of such companies. Yet for 
traders, their operations are largely out of sight of consumers, and their products - often in 
commodity form - pass through multiple further companies before reaching consumers as 
products. As a result, NGO campaigns and boycotts find it difficult to directly target traders, 
given the absence of a connection, specifiable to consumers, between certain products that 
appear on supermarket shelves and (eg.) deforestation. 
Against a backdrop of unsettled responsibility for responding to the problems of international 
trade, a case made in Chapter 4 of this study, the invisibility of traders (and major processors) 
has made it easy for them to cast the responsibility for sustainability with other actors. For 
example, Cargill's previous palm oil policy, part of which was quoted earlier, contained the 
following opening stanza of its commitment: 
'We will continue to offer to supply RSPO certified palm oil products to our customers. 
In addition, we will continue to encourage and support our palm product supply chain 
partners to join the RSPO and become RSPO certified' (Cargill, 2012). 
In this statement of commitment , Cargill nonetheless suggests that the ultimate responsibility 
for choosing certified palm oil rests with their 'customers' and 'supply chain partners'. This 
characterisation seems to synch neatly with Chris Wille's frustration, that 
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"Those [traders] that manage the invisible commodities such as sugar, soy and palm 
oil... have pretended that sustainability is the responsibility of everyone else in the 
supply chain" (quoted in Webb, 2013). 
The coherent argument that this section has built, delineating the difficulties of gaining traction 
with traders of the deforestation commodities, necessarily needs to be revisited in light of a 
spate of recent commitments (and commitment upgrades). Both during and shortly after the UN 
climate meeting in New York in September 2014, several major traders committed to 
implement sustainable sourcing policies specifically for these commodities. These policies 
elided several distinctions that traders had previously made, namely between commodities that 
these traders produced (where operations stretched upstream) and those that they traded, and 
between a single deforestation commodity and all relevant commodities. 
This rather stunning reversal is also important in revealing the potency of multiple pathways of 
influence, most tellingly that of peer pressure. There is no doubt that the short spacing between 
these policies, after a long period where traders had fallen well behind other company-types 
such as retailers, owes much to this pathway. In order for peer pressure to emerge, however, 
there first needs to be an instance of leadership. It is clear that the leadership of other 
company-types was unsuccessful in itself prompting these commitments from traders, 
suggesting that the 'peer' in peer pressure could be relatively narrowly interpreted. Instead, it 
took the leadership - and therefore peer pressure - of Wilmar, a giant that accounts for 
45 percent of traded palm oil (recall that Unilever, the single largest purchaser, accounts for 
3 percent of total production). To paraphrase one participant, once 'that domino had fallen', the 
other traders were relatively quick to follow. 
Briefly, one further example where nodes have been successfully targeted - by NGOs, in 
collaboration with downstream retailers as well as elements of the Brazilian Government - was 
the 04 Cattle Agreement. Brazilian beef production is the primary driver of Amazonian 
deforestation, so critical NGO reports and legal problems with state public prosectors led the 
four biggest meatpackers in Brazil to join with Greenpeace in 2009 and 'set out a timeline by 
which these meatpackers would only buy from ranches in the Brazilian Amazon with no 
deforestation after the date of the agreement' (Walker et al., 2013:16). This agreement drew on 
another pathway of influence - collaboration - bringing together a broad range of actors with a 
shared concern, targeting the node occupied by major meat processing and packing companies 
within Brazil. Interestingly, only around 10 percent of Brazilian beef is exported, a factor 
perhaps compensated for by the strong roles of domestic actors, including not only Greenpeace 
Brazil but also government agencies. This example suggests that nodes for different 
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commodities may require different pathways of influence to activate, with Brazil in particular 
'reaching the limits of what top-down prohibition can do' and officials there wanting 'to shift to 
offering more incentives to make it profitable to keep the forests intact' (Economist, 2014). Such 
a shift finds support from Nepstad et al. (2014], who caution that 'the supply chain 
interventions that fed into this deceleration [in deforestation within the Brazilian Amazon] are 
precariously dependent on corporate risk management, and public policies have relied 
excessively on punitive measures' ( p l l l B ) . 
The overall point remains clear, however. Convincing companies within nodes to respond to 
deforestation is one fully-formed theory of change that practitioners and other agents of change 
have identified as a potential way towards transforming relevant industries. This conclusion 
enables the recalibration of a point made by Dauvergne and Lister (2012), who contend that, 
'the supply chains of the world's largest brand companies offer vital leverage points to produce 
the range, response, and coordination necessary for more systemic global market changes' 
(p42). According to the nodal theory of change, though, it may not be the 'world's largest 
branded companies' that are best placed to effect such change, but rather the often-elusive 
companies that occupy important niches within international chains. Newton et al. (2013) 
conclude as much in fmding that 'the roles of actors in influencing agricultural production 
depends on their position and influence within the supply chain' (pl761). Over the course of a 
single year, from the end of 2013 to the end of 2014, major traders switched emphatically from 
what many saw as a position of recalcitrance on the deforestation commodities, publicly 
announcing a set of ambitious sourcing policies. In the process, these companies created the 
best opportunity yet, at least from within the deforestation commodities, to watch the 
possibility inherent within the nodal theory of change unfold (a denouement that continues at 
the time of writing). 
Reflexive pressure for regulation 
Building on material introduced in Chapter 5 and expanded in Chapter 6, this study can now 
identify a third theory of change - reflexive pressure for regulation - that holds the potential to 
achieve broader transformation of relevant industries. With reference to Wilmar's 'no 
deforestation' commitment, Frances Seymour, the former Director-General of the Centre for 
International Forestry Research, articulates how this theory of change could operate: 
'Stay tuned, as the most important impact of the Wilmar announcement will be its 
influence beyond the company's own supply chain. 1 expect that Wilmar and its many 
suppliers will soon begin pressing the RSPO and governments in the producer countries 
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where they operate to require similarly high standards from their competitors' 
(Seymour, 2013). 
This quote captures the essence of this third theory of change, where existing (or new) 
responses to traded deforestation recalibrate the interests of actors to demand further 
responses from their peers, competitors and other relevant actors. While some pathways of 
influence, such as peer pressure, are likely to be relevant to reflexive pressure, what elevates it 
to a third theory of change is its potential to stimulate, prompt and demand regulatory 
responses from governments at both ends of supply chains. As Newell et al. (2012] surmise, 
'business groups... mobilise to participate in policy and shape agendas in ways that are designed 
to either stall or enhance environmental regulation, depending on whether they feel threatened 
by the prospect of action or see it as an opportunity to do well' (p368). The two-sidedness of 
Newell et al.'s analysis is clearly germane to the prospects for regulatory action on the 
deforestation commodities, as evidenced in Chapter 6 in the opposition voiced by some 
domestic actors. Yet the positive side of business 'mobilisation' and 'participation' need to be 
recognised too. Thus the Wilmar announcement is important first and foremost because of 
Wilmar's position at a significant node within deforestation commodity supply chains, but also 
because - in two ways - it holds the promise of much broader influence than this already-broad 
coverage: firstly, because peer pressure has already led to other traders making similar 
commitments (a pathway of influence], and secondly, because Wilmar's clout as a producer of 
palm oil can be used to support - or pressure - the producer country governments of Indonesia 
and Malaysia. It is this latter reason that Seymour refers to with some optimism. 
The Wilmar example also shows that this third theory of change could combine fruitfully with 
either or both of the first and second theories. The essential insight that the idea of reflexive 
pressure contributes is that only a handful of significant actors may need to enact 'leading' 
sourcing policies in order to then give producer governments their support for, if not to demand, 
a regulatory context that does not disadvantage them for leading. In other words, from the 
moment that leading companies enact their policies, it becomes in their interest to advocate for 
broader regulatory measures. As one participant in this study noted, 
"Step three is the most important step, when the [producer] companies that have made 
these commitments in good faith swing around to become constituents in the producer 
countries and start saying 'well, if we're not going to deforest anymore we're going to lose 
out competitively unless the government levels the playing field'. 
"This is precisely the key point is when business swings around to become a constituency 
for better forest governance, and we're starting to see that [in the traded deforestation 
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commodities]. So that's kind of the cascade. It can't be private-sector exclusive; ultimately 
it's got to be on the policy side [too]" [19], 
Clearly, the Wilmar announcement provides a source for optimism in relation primarily to palm 
oil, with which the company is most engaged, but potentially also for the other deforestation 
commodities, such as soy, that it trades. Reflexive pressure has already been applied within 
consumer countries for the deforestation commodities. At the APEC Senior Officials' Meeting in 
Medan, Indonesia, in 2013, Representatives of two Australian companies noted that they had 
been involved in lobbying their home jurisdiction for a regulatory response to illegal logging. As 
Mark Gomm, Sustainability Director for the large timber importer, Bunnings, said, 
"The role we've played as an early-adopter [of responsible sourcing],.. has certainly put us 
at a competitive disadvantage in the very early stages. When you're the only one, you're 
absorbing costs and it's not really a level playing field. That is the role that legislation can 
play in economies, and Bunnings very closely supported the Australian [illegal logging] 
legislation... it really helps level the playing field and remove some of the low-end, 
questionable product 
"That [legislative] process was brought about with some market-first collaboration [NGOs, 
industry, government) joining in a common platform to support the Australian 
Government" (Gomm, 2013] . 
This view was echoed by John Simon, a representative of another Australian timber importer, 
Simmonds Lumber, who explains: 
"We made the decision to invest in legality certification with the hope that the rest of the 
industry catches up, and then we'll have an edge. We want to see a level playing field" 
[personal communication, 2013) . 
These two companies have clearly been strong advocates for domestic regulatory measures to 
'level the playing field'. In light of Chapter 6's finding - that the support governments have from 
domestic actors is critical for the success of any proposed regulatory responses - the reflexive 
support theory of change showcases one way that support can arise: through company 
leadership. Given that company sourcing policies for the deforestation commodities have 
usually both more comprehensive across commodities (rather than limited to timber] and more 
ambitious (using the term 'no-deforestation'], the company leadership that is essential for 
activating this theory of change continues to develop and advance. In combination with both 
pathways of influence, such as peer pressure and signalling, as well as theories of change 
relating to tipping points and nodes, the idea of reflexive support is surely only growing more 
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potent. Whether it ultimately produces regulatory action atcin to the illegal logging laws, or 
leads alternatively to mandatory reporting requirements or state shareholder activism, this 
domestic support may yet prove critical in encouraging - if not demanding that - consumer 
country governments flex their regulatory muscles in responding to traded deforestation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified and analysed a set of pathways through which existing responses 
might achieve a broader influence than the supply chains they directly cover. The chapter also 
introduced and expounded three theories of change - tipping points, nodes and reflexive 
pressure for regulation - that emerged from intensive analysis of discussions with participants 
about their perceptions on how transformative changes could occur within the deforestation 
commodity industries. The importance of both these pathways and theories is in the balance 
they provide to this study's breadth of analysis focused on responses' limitations. Yet what was 
equally clear, once these pathways and theories were subjected to scrutiny, is that despite their 
potential to overcome several limitations this study has identified, they nonetheless often 
contain new limitations of their own. There is no 'silver bullet', then, and even the most 
promising pathways still require some optimism and imagination to envisage their ultimate 
possibilities. 
This chapter began by recalling one major and inescapable limitation of all current responses: 
their fractional coverage (Chapter 4). Fractional coverage leaves the door ajar for the further, 
negative possibility of displacement (Chapter 3], which could potentially undermine even 
changes in proportion to responses' coverage. Participants demonstrated knowledge of both the 
limitation of coverage and the danger of displacement, reinforcing this study's emphasis of 
these conceptual limitations. Yet careful attention to semantics used within relevant literatures 
and within discussions with participants allowed the identification of multiple pathways 
through which responses might not just meet these challenges but even achieve a broader 
influence than their coverage would suggest. These pathways were divided into active and 
passive pathways, with the latter signifying the importance of some positive influence occurring 
without being sought. 
Often, pathways were found to have their own limitations. Some active pathways, such as 
leadership, were limited by competition law, while others, such as collaboration, were limited 
by the reluctance of consumer governments to consider complementary regulation. On the 
other hand, all passive pathways, including peer pressure, influencing suppliers, learning and 
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signalling, show considerable promise, yet suffer ultimately from severe difficulties in ascribing 
any positive changes to their influence. Nonetheless, passive pathways may yet prove to be the 
most significant channels of influence. 
Finally, this chapter discerned and showcased three theories of change that are commonly 
espoused, including by participants, as potential means through any limitation provided by 
coverage can be overturned and entire industries transformed. The first of these theories, the 
idea of t ipping points, remains speculative since no industry has yet reached a point where 
further changes came naturally and automatically. Whether Wilmar's example, since followed 
by other major traders, could precipitate a self-propelling transformation of relevant industries 
is as yet unknown, but is by far the most promising development on traded deforestation in 
recent years. The Wi lmar example is just as relevant to a second theory of change - that of 
targeting nodes - which has become a means of identifying the most promising targets for NGO 
campaigns, collaborations and peer pressure. Unfortunately, as Chapter 5 noted, the NGO model 
for change has struggled to gain traction with these largely hidden, unbranded companies. 
That may be in the process of changing, and quite rapidly too. Until Wilmar's announcement in 
late 2013, it was generally held that trading nodes were occupied by disinterested actors. 
Clearly, the breadth and strength of responses from other major traders requires this 
assumption to be revisited. Finally, a third theory of change is generated from the tendency for 
leading private sector actors to display a pronounced interest in 'levelling the playing field' 
amongst their competitors, through regulation. Whether this support, as it continues to wax, 
will be enough to shift governments beyond their current sensitivities regarding domestic 
support, international trade and foreign audiences - in other words, to reclaim a greater share 
of the responsibility for traded deforestation - is yet to be seen. 
This chapter does not intend to locate the final balance that individual or collective responses 
might produce, between, on the one hand, fractional coverage and displacement, and on the 
other, influence beyond coverage and industry transformation. Instead, it has simply 
established and elucidated many of the most important opposing forces that will ultimately 
determine responses' contribution to slowing tropical deforestation. 
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Conclusions 
International trade, often in specific commodities, is being implicated with ever more precision 
in major environmental problems. Current responses to traded deforestation provide an 
unparalleled case study for examining how downstream actors approach their entanglement, 
through international trade, to an environmental problem that is both contemporary and 
eliciting great concern. 
This study has gathered a distinctive set of responses, each of which intends to slow 
deforestation by targeting international supply chains for the commodities of timber, palm oil, 
beef and soya (Chapter 1). Some individual responses to deforestation, such as timber 
sustainability schemes and NGO-industry Roundtables, have been subjected to scrutiny 
previously in an attempt to determine, inter alia, whether and how they might be effective. 
While nonetheless contributing to these overarching questions, this study largely reorients the 
focus away from responses' potential, a topic posing substantial attributional difficulties, and 
instead towards their limitations. An understanding of these limitations is a critical gap in 
current knowledge, because if responses can make only small contributions to slowing tropical 
deforestation it may be necessary and prudent to reinvigorate - or even redeploy - downstream 
actors' effort. 
To date responses have typically been considered individually, with rare exceptions for 
individual response-types such as Roundtables. A further effort by this study reorients the 
scrutiny of responses towards a collective basis, given their shared characteristics. This 
reorientation affords an original vantage point on downstream actors' efforts, allowing for both 
comparisons across responses and attention to interactions between them. The advantages of 
such a vantage point are apparent throughout the study, for example enabling the discernment 
of responses' shared framing of the problem of traded deforestation (Chapter 3], the 
implications of that framing (Chapter 4), as well as the consequences of response interactions 
(Chapters 5 and 7). 
Answering the study's primary question 
This study's primary research question (Chapter 2) asked, 'What will limit - or otherwise 
determine - the contribution of current responses from downstream actors to slowing tropical 
deforestation?'. In pursuing answers to this question, a separation was made between 
limitations deriving from the conceptual nature of responses, on the one hand, and their 
empirical behaviour, on the other. These channels of enquiry both yielded fruit: the study finds 
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that the limitations on current responses are significant, and derive both from responses' nature 
and their behaviour. It further finds that, while some limitations are inescapable, others have 
been exacerbated or - in effect - chosen by actors in the course of prioritising or protecting 
other objectives, such as the continued usage of implicated commodities, as well as increases in 
levels of consumption and the expansion of international trade. Overwhelmingly, then, 
responses reflect a particular framing of the problem of traded deforestation that does not 
jeopardise these economic ends, which are endorsed by almost all actors in both downstream 
and upstream societies (Chapter 6]. One potent question to emerge from this study, then, is 
whether and to what extent downstream actors can contribute to slowing tropical deforestation 
in the absence of regard to these often-unquestioned objectives. The prospects of a favourable 
answer are considerably lower given the danger of displacement, which can occur in multiple 
forms and be exceedingly difficult to detect, as well as potential rebound effects [Chapters 3 and 
4). Nonetheless, it is likely that some, if not many, current responses may yet prove a necessary 
component of broader, more systemic approaches to slowing tropical deforestation. 
To the extent that deeper, structural factors are essential for explaining the dynamics of 
contemporary deforestation, what current responses are instead likely to generate is the much 
narrower outcome of disconnecting a specific fraction of consumption from deforestation. Even 
if this fraction can be absolved of all direct connections, corresponding specifically to the 
portion of Western consumption covered by responses, deforestation may nevertheless 
continue unchecked and even accelerate, as at a global scale it currently shows signs of doing. 
How satisfactory such an outcome this would be for downstream actors remains as-yet 
unknown, yet it raises some interesting possibilities. Two discrete possibilities are considered 
here, both of which would lay bare the tension between the design of current responses, with 
their inherent blind-spots, and the objective to which they are intended to contribute, as well as 
testing the publicly-stated commitments of downstream actors. 
A first possibility is that in recognising the limitations of current responses in achieving the 
overall objective of slowing deforestation, downstream actors could be induced to continue 
experimenting, including by moving towards more holistic approaches that focus on upstream 
forest governance, such as FLEGT and (on paper) the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement. Equally, 
and just as importantly, downstream societies could attend more holistically to the blind-spots 
that limit current responses, revisiting the unquestioned assumptions of ever-increasing 
consumption and ever-expanding globalisation. The European Environment Agency's foray into 
the connections between consumption and the environment, for example, casts some light on 
the terrain involved in querying the former assumption. 
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A second, opposing possibility, however, is that the narrow disconnection of consumption from 
deforestation could create the temptation for downstream actors to claim that they had 'done all 
they could'. Downstream actors could therefore resign themselves to the further clearing of 
tropical forests that are beyond their direct influence, and sheet home the blame for that 
clearing entirely to actors, including governments, within tropical forest countries. This would 
be a disheartening position to reach, and not just for the resignation it would entail for 
continuing tropical deforestation. Equally as important are the adverse conclusions this position 
would suggest about this study's responses, both in failing to make a valuable contribution to 
slowing deforestation and - by implication - for their prospects for contributing to resolving 
other comparable problems. The plausibility of the outcome under consideration here is a 
reminder that the novelty of these responses - and downstream actors' willingness to 
experiment with them and form unlikely alliances in pursuing them - is no guarantee of their 
capacity to gain traction on a very real, tangible and complex international environmental 
problem. 
Determining the balance of responses' contribution to slowing deforestation 
As this study has shown, then, even if current responses could fully disassociate Western actors 
from deforestation, their effect on the underlying problem remains indeterminate. Broadly 
speaking, the ultimate balance of that contribution depends on whether responses 
under-achieve, with problematic commodities displaced towards other consumers (Chapter 4), 
or over-achieve, by positively influencing a disproportionate share of production (Chapter 7's 
pathways and theories of change}. Several instances of displacement - primarily geographical -
have already been linked to tropical deforestation, and evidence suggests that further instances 
may be imminent. Offsetting this danger is feasible, however, as demonstrated by several major 
companies that have sought greater and more prolonged engagements with suppliers in order 
to encourage and support changes in the latter's practices. Indeed, the further and pivotal 
significance of these particular cases is their suggestion that ensuring more sustainable sourcing 
may actually require a reversal - or re-evaluation - of the flexibility and disconnection 
entrenched within the current patterns and structures of international trade (Chapter 7). The 
fact that only few downstream actors have sought this engagement suggests that the vast 
majority either remain ignorant of that need, or are otherwise unwilling to consider changes to 
a presentiy favourable framing of the problem of tropical deforestation. 
The upper bound of responses' potential contribution is provided by the extent to which they 
might realise an influence beyond their coverage. Given this topic's importance in balancing out 
responses' limitations, the concluding empirical chapter of this study sought to identify the 
pathways through which such influence might be achieved. Multiple were found, many of which 
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seem viable and promising, even if difficult to attribute either prospectively or retrospectively. 
The wave of change that began sweeping through palm oil production in the year following 
Wilmar 's commitment to 'deforestation-free sourcing' is to date the most promising evidence 
that influence beyond coverage not only exists, but holds transformative potential. Again, 
however, several pathways - including 'influencing suppliers' and 'learning' - reflect a 
recognition by some downstream actors that deeper engagement with their supply chains is 
necessary in order to successfully retro-fit the aforementioned values of legality, sustainability 
and responsibility. These engagements support this study's exposition of current responses' 
'subject of governance' - international supply chains - which is found to be both one choice 
among many and a choice that blinds responses to alternative, deeper drivers of the problem of 
deforestation. 
There are several lines of enquiry relevant to this discussion of influence beyond coverage to 
which this study has contributed. The split reference points of sustainability and legality 
adopted by responses creates a danger that the latter will undermine pursuit of the former. Yet 
this is not inevitable and there remains scope for optimism, since many of the efforts needed to 
achieve legality in commodity sourcing - including engagement with suppliers - could also 
facilitate a further step towards sustainability. Indeed, in l ine with the tenets of regime complex 
theory, the simultaneous presence of multiple reference points may engender productive 
synergies between responses. Further, even notionally weaker baselines than legality, such as 
government-enforced mandates that companies report on their carbon emissions, can stimulate 
and shape the necessary engagement of the private sector with its supply chains. Concurrently, 
such efforts may also serve to reactivate the crucial roles of public authorities in advancing and 
protecting common interest concerns, of which mitigating environmental impacts at home and 
abroad is increasingly recognised as one. 
Of course, between these two bounds of 'under-achieving' and 'over-achieving', responses could 
simply generate an effect on deforestation proportionate to the extent of their coverage. This 
aligns with the 'narrow outcome' scenario explored earlier, whereby only a specific fraction of 
traded commodit ies is exonerated from its connection to deforestation. Were this to be the 
ult imate landing point for responses, their contribution to slowing deforestation could perhaps 
best be described as 'modest'. This is not, however, the same as insignificant; this outcome 
would mean effectively disconnecting from deforestation those supply chains covered by 
responses, and it remains plausible that current responses might yet have provided a necessary 
impetus to, and an essential component of, any broader approaches to deforestation that 
subsequently emerge. 
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One looming challenge here, for which few encouraging signs are evident in the rhetoric and 
behaviour of downstream actors, is that the drivers of deforestation could start shifting away 
from agricultural commodity production and towards more diffuse and elusive governance 
subjects, such as coal and oil exploration, wildfires and drought, and roads. Already in the 
Amazon, the effects of climate change are beginning to vie with commodity-driven deforestation 
in explaining some of the changes witnessed in those forests. Again, then, the ultimate limitation 
of all current downstream responses, with only rare and partial exceptions, is their framing of 
the problem of deforestation as driven by commodity production [Chapter 4). 
The theoretical grounding of responses and the benefits of collective analysis 
At a theoretical level, this study has identified responses as 'institutional teleconnections', with 
the key characteristic that the problem they respond to is incurred across international borders. 
Responses therefore need to operate over 'inter-jurisdictional distance' (Chapter 3). The 
particular consequences of this characteristic are in affecting the possibilities for downstream 
actors to respond to their connection to the problem, in ways this study has explored 
empirically with respect to the nexus between private sector and civil society [Chapter 5], as 
well as governments [Chapter 6], This study has also clarified the nature of the governance 
challenge that downstream actors face, construing it as a 'governance gap' that responses are 
intended to bridge. The gap itself refers to the situation where the emergence of connections to 
distant environmental problems has outpaced downstream actors' ability to prevent or mitigate 
those connections. Another significant theoretical contribution is the aforementioned 
identification of multiple 'subjects of governance' or framings of deforestation that responses 
could have been designed to respond to. 
As alluded to earlier, gathering current responses together enables an exceptional vantage point. 
One of this study's major findings is that interactions between responses are not always 
conducive towards furthering their shared objective of slowing deforestation. 'Tool' responses, 
especially, are often intended to compete with each other, distorting actors' behaviour and often 
generating counter-productive outcomes, with the ultimate result that responses come to be 
mutually inhibitive [Chapter 5). The emergence of additional responses looks set to continue, 
for example with producer countries developing national schemes for timber and palm oil. The 
implication of this finding is that downstream actors - especially NGOs and sustainability 
schemes, but also companies and governments - must become more attentive to the 
counter-productive effects that their behaviour and decisions can produce. Indeed, some actors 
have begun to express recognition of this point, although existing competitive and 
demonstrative behaviours - which are nonetheless narrowly rational - continue to hold sway 
over their behaviour. Efforts at harmonisation and collaboration, including those that result in 
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response to a regulatory impetus from government, hold some - though by no means unlimited 
- potential to short-circuit some of these counter-productive behaviours. 
The final empirical chapter provided an alternative interpretation of the interactions between 
responses, suggesting that their effects on each other may be less important than the signal they 
collectively convey to upstream actors, whether producer governments, traders or suppliers. 
This perspective, strongly voiced by multiple participants, holds that the differences between 
responses - their reference points of sustainability or legality, and their reliance on or neglect of 
specific sustainability schemes - are minor inconsistencies within the overall consensus that 
trade must be retro-fitted with values of legality, sustainability and responsibility (Chapter 7], It 
remains to be seen whether this view can reliably tr iumph over the competitive dynamics 
created by the fracturing of responses' reference points (Chapter 4} and actor behaviour 
(Chapter 5]. And certainly, even a consistent message from downstream actors would not in 
itself provide solutions for the complex and intractable governance challenges that characterise 
upstream production, especially of palm oil and timber, but merely - and at best - provide an 
impetus to find and create those solutions. The traction that corporate responses have recently 
gained within the palm oil industry is promising. Yet the mosaic of responses is dynamic and 
reactionary; upstream actors have subsequently sought to counter signals from downstream 
actors with a further set of responses, such as the national t imber frameworks within multiple 
countries (endorsed by the PEFC, but not yet by the EU's FLEGT] and palm oil frameworks in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Should these frameworks do nothing more than muddy the waters -
and the signal - at least some major upstream actors will be content. 
Broader implications of the study 
Although this study's findings derive from an examination of downstream actors' approaches to 
deforestation, they carry insights that are highly relevant for current and future approaches to 
other transnational problems, especially those in which international trade acts as a connecting 
mechanism. For wealthy, consuming societies in particular, implicit or explicit decisions not to 
attend to levels of consumption or the insistence and promotion of the further liberalisation of 
global economic activity has two consequences: it leaves them highly exposed to being ensnared 
in other unpalatable problems, whether environmental or social, that are teleconnected through 
expanding international trade; and more fundamentally it also leaves ungoverned the capacities 
of these structures to precipitate and exacerbate such environmental problems. 
Regardless of what changes take place with respect to deforestation, the growing capacity of 
international trade to implicate downstream actors creates a need for governance research and 
analysis aligned to relevant problems. Where a pattern emerges, for example implicating 
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international trade as a primary connecting mechanism between locations, a more systemic 
focus on governing international trade itself, including 'safeguards' in the form of provisions to 
monitor and protect strategic, significant, threatened or scarce resources, may ultimately be 
warranted. As a starting point, major actors - governments and international institutions - will 
need to acknowledge and honesdy consider a second, unpalatable side to the coins of both 
consumption growth and expanding trade. 
In delineating several major limitations on current responses to deforestation, then, this study 
raises further questions worthy of exploration. For example, what policy, institutional and 
regulatory responses might be necessary to target more systemic subjects of governance such 
as consumption and globalisation? And what is the state of awareness and willingness among 
downstream actors - especially governments - to identify and concertedly engage with such 
subjects? In essence, these questions ask how international trade would need to be governed -
how it would look - if it better guarded against exacerbating known and significant 
environmental problems. Despite the range of responses to tropical deforestation, the larger 
project of governing trade towards sustainable ends remains tenuous. Further, given that 
international trade comprises just one component of overall economic activity, which continues 
to precipitate alarming changes to human ecosystems around the planet, the project of 
governing this broader activity seems more daunting - yet more necessary - still. While this 
study has discovered a few encouraging signs in actors' awareness of one governance gap, 
narrowly conceived for traded deforestation, more research could better analyse societies' 
ability to conceive of and create these larger bridges, and ultimately to cross them. 
Responses to traded deforestation may remain a litmus test for, and insightful guide to, any 
evolving positions on these matters. Researchers returning in future to the specific responses 
canvassed by this study may find that the passage of just a few years has created vastly different 
dynamics to explore. Indeed, one participant in this study noted just how rapidly the dynamics 
of these responses and the actors behind them are shifting by commenting, in early 2014, "It's 
hard to believe that a year ago we were still living in RSPO-world". While this study has by its 
design excluded the actual implementation of responses within specific tropical forest contexts, 
this topic will only gain in importance as the 'rubber hits the road' for all responses considered 
here. There are also several identifiable trends warranting further attention, include a shift in 
trade patterns away from the Western countries from which current responses have 
overwhelmingly emerged and towards the economic powerhouses of China, Brazil, India and 
other previously 'developing' countries. A second shift involves the changing drivers of 
deforestation, away from the straightforwardness of the commodity-driven explanation and 
towards causes that are more difficult to control, such as smallholder cultivation, fires and 
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droughts. Further research could usefully explore the consequences of these shifts. And finally, 
this study's scrutiny of supply-chain focused responses leaves the dynamics of other 'groupings' 
of responses with shared characteristics - such as finance- and aid-related responses - open for 
further consideration, both as distinct subjects in themselves but equally in terms of their 
relationships to the supply-chain responses considered here. 
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